Tag Archive for: China

Turning Point: China First Recognizes Japanese Bankruptcy Decision

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This post is written by Guodong Du and Meng Yu and published at China Justice Observer. It is reproduced here by kind permission of the authors. 

 

Key takeaways:

  • In September 2023, the Shanghai Third Intermediate People’s Court ruled to recognize the Tokyo District Court’s decision to commence civil rehabilitation proceedings and the order appointing the supervisor ((2021) Hu 03 Xie Wai Ren No.1).
  • This marks not only the first time that China has recognized a Japanese court’s decision in a bankruptcy procedure, but also the first time that China has recognized a Japanese judgment.
  • The case establishes a legal precedent for cross-border bankruptcy decisions, demonstrating that prior non-recognition patterns between China and Japan in civil and commercial judgments may not apply in such cross-border scenarios.
  • While not resolving the broader recognition challenges between the two nations, this acknowledgment sends a positive signal from the Chinese court, hinting at potential future breakthroughs and fostering hope for improved legal cooperation.

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Promulgation of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of International Treaties and International Practices in the Trial of Foreign-related Civil and Commercial Cases

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By Professor Du Tao* and Yang Zhenni**

On December 28, 2023, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) held a press conference on Judicial Interpretations and Typical Cases on the Application of International Treaties and International Practices in Foreign-related Civil and Commercial Cases, deliberating the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of International Treaties and International Practices in the Trial of Foreign-related Civil and Commercial Cases (Interpretation) and some related typical cases. The Interpretations was adopted by the Trial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court at its 1908th meeting on December 5, 2023, which will come into force on January 1, 2024. We translated the press announcement as follows:

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A milestone for the Apostille Convention: today it enters into force for Canada

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On 11 January 2024, the Apostille Convention entered into force for Canada. The accession of Canada to the Apostille Convention on 12 May 2023 was a milestone for the Apostille Convention and it is perhaps a development that has gone under the radar.

Considering that the Apostille Convention was adopted in 1961 (EIF: 24-I-1965), one may wonder why Canada took so long to join the Apostille Convention. This is primarily because there is no statutory requirement for the legalisation of incoming public documents in Canada. In its response to the 2021 Questionnaire, Canada indicated:

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The Convergence of Judicial Rules between Mainland China and Hong Kong has Reached a Higher Level

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By Du Tao* and Jingwei Qiu**

With the increasingly close personnel exchanges and deepening economic cooperation between Mainland China and Hong Kong, the number and types of legal disputes between the two regions have also increased. Against the backdrop of adhering to the “One Country, Two Systems” principle and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, the judicial and legal professions of the two regions have worked closely together and finally signed “the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hereinafter referred to as “REJ Arrangement”) in January 2019, which will come into effect in January 2024. REJ Arrangement aims to establish an institutional arrangement for the courts of the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to recognize and enforce judgments in civil and commercial cases, achieve the “circulation” of judgments in civil and commercial cases, reduce the burden of repeated litigation, and save judicial resources in the two regions.

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Amendment of Chinese Civil Procedure Law Concerning Foreign Affairs

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by Du Tao*/Xie Keshi

On September 1, 2023, the fifth session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress deliberated and adopted the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, which will come into force on January 1, 2024. This amendment to the Civil Litigation Law implements the Party Central Committee’s decision and deployment on coordinating domestic rule of law and foreign-related rule of law, strengthening foreign-related rule of law construction, and among the 26 amendments involved, the fourth part of the Special Provisions on Foreign-related civil Procedure is exclusive to 19, which is the first substantive amendment to the foreign-related civil procedure since 1991.

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How to Criticize U.S. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (Part II)

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Written by Bill Dodge, the John D. Ayer Chair in Business Law and Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law at UC Davis School of Law.

There are better and worse ways to criticize U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction. In Part I of this post, I discussed some shortcomings of a February 2023 report by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The U.S. Willful Practice of Long-arm Jurisdiction and its Perils.” I pointed out that the report’s use of the phrase “long-arm jurisdiction” confuses extraterritorial jurisdiction with personal jurisdiction. I noted that China applies its own laws extraterritorially on the same bases that it criticizes the United States for using. I argued that the report ignores significant constraints that U.S. courts impose on the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. And I suggested that China had chosen to emphasize weak examples of U.S. extraterritoriality, such as the bribery prosecution of Frédéric Pierucci, which was not even extraterritorial.

In this post, I suggest some better ways of criticizing U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction. Specifically, I discuss three cases in which the extraterritorial application of U.S. law appears to violate customary international law rules on jurisdiction to prescribe: (1) the indictment of Huawei executive Wanzhou Meng; (2) the application of U.S. sanctions based solely on clearing dollar transactions through U.S. banks; and (3) the application of U.S. export controls to foreign companies abroad based on “Foreign Direct Product” Rules. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs report complains a lot about U.S. sanctions, but not about the kind of sanctions that most clearly violates international law. The report says much less about export controls and nothing about Meng’s indictment, which is odd given the tensions that both have caused between China and the United States. Read more

How to Criticize U.S. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (Part I)

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Written by Bill Dodge, the John D. Ayer Chair in Business Law and Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law at UC Davis School of Law.

China has been critical of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction. In February, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a report entitled “The U.S. Willful Practice of Long-arm Jurisdiction and its Perils.” In the report, the Ministry complained about U.S. secondary sanctions, the discovery of evidence abroad, the Helms-Burton Act, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, and the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction in criminal cases. The report claimed that U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction has caused “severe harm … to the international political and economic order and the international rule of law.”

There are better and worse ways to criticize U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs report pursues some of the worse ways and neglects some better ones. In this post, I discuss a few of the report’s shortcoming. In a second post, I discuss stronger arguments that one could make against U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction. Read more

International Symposium on Legalisation of Foreign Relations in China

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Legalisation of Foreign Relations in China, 14 Oct 2023, Wuhan University

Wuhan University and Fudan University are co-organising an International Symposium “Legalisation of Foreign Relations in China” (in English) on 14 Oct 2023. This symposium will discuss the two most important developments in Chinese law relating to foreign relations, i.e. the Foreign Relations Law and the Foreign State Immunities Law. Some presented articles will be published in the special session of the Chinese Journal of Transnational Law. This symposium will be held in person and online. Everyone is welcome. For more information and the program, please follow the event page. This event can be attended in-person or online. No registration is required.

INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON LEGALISATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN CHINA
Time: 9:30 am (Beijing time), 14 Oct 2023

Join the Zoom meeting
https://zoom.us/j/87645264148?pwd=xlbP90sgAmV0R4kFT6nkmxbL5nVlHA.1

Meeting ID: 876 4526 4148
Password: 032908

China’s Draft Law on Foreign State Immunity—Part II

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Written by Bill Dodge, the John D. Ayer Chair in Business Law and Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law at UC Davis School of Law.

In December 2022, Chinese lawmakers published a draft law on foreign state immunity, an English translation of which is now available. In a prior post, I looked at the draft law’s provisions on immunity from suit. I explained that the law would adopt the restrictive theory of foreign state immunity, bringing China’s position into alignment with most other countries.

In this post, I examine other important provisions of the draft law, including immunity from attachment and execution, service of process, default judgments, and foreign official immunity. These provisions generally follow the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, which China signed in 2005 but has not yet ratified.

China’s draft provisions on immunity from attachment and execution, service of process, and default judgments make sense. Applying the draft law to foreign officials, however, may have the effect of limiting the immunity that such officials would otherwise enjoy under customary international law. This is probably not what China intends, and lawmakers may wish to revisit those provisions before the law is finally adopted. Read more

China’s Draft Law on Foreign State Immunity Would Adopt Restrictive Theory

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Written by Bill Dodge, the John D. Ayer Chair in Business Law and Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law at UC Davis School of Law.

On the question of foreign state immunity, the world was long divided between countries that adhere to an absolute theory and those that adopted a restrictive theory. Under the absolute theory, states are absolutely immune from suit in the courts of other states. Under the restrictive theory, states are immune from suits based on their governmental acts (acta jure imperii) but not from suits based on their non-governmental acts (acta jure gestionis).

During the twentieth century, many countries adopted the restrictive theory. (Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Erik Voeten have a useful list of the dates on which countries switched on the last page of this article.) Russia and China were the most prominent holdouts. Russia joined the restrictive immunity camp in 2016 when its law on the jurisdictional immunity of foreign states went into effect. That left China. In December 2022, Chinese lawmakers published a draft law on foreign state immunity, an English translation of which has recently become available. If adopted, this law would move China to into the restrictive immunity camp as well.

China’s draft law on foreign state immunity has important implications for other states, which would now be subject to suit in China on a range of claims from which they were previously immune. The law also contains a reciprocity clause in Article 20, under which Chinese courts may decline to recognize the immunity of a foreign state if the foreign state would not recognize China’s immunity in the same circumstances. Chinese courts could hear expropriation or terrorism claims against the United States, for example, because the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) has exceptions for expropriation and terrorism.

In this post, the first of two, I look at the draft law’s provisions on foreign state immunity from suit from a U.S. perspective. In the second post, I will examine the law’s provisions on the immunity of a foreign state’s property from attachment and execution, its provisions on service and default judgments, and its potential effect on the immunity of foreign officials. Read more