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Investment Awards vs Sovereign Immunity: Navigating the Enforcement Maze
By Cara North, Counsel, Ashurst
The intersection of foreign State immunity and the enforcement of international arbitral awards has been a hotly contested issues in recent years. First the question was whether a State has waived immunity from court processes concerning recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by ratifying the 1965 Convention of Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) – to which the answer has been yes in Australia and the England and Wales (among other jurisdictions). More recently, the question has been whether a State’s ratification of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) constitutes an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity, to which the High Court of Australia most recently held no.
In CCDM Holdings, LLC v The Republic of India [2026] HCA 9, the High Court of Australia unanimously held that ratification of the New York Convention does not, of itself, waive foreign State immunity under the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth). The decision aligns Australia with the current position in the United States, Canada, and England and Wales, reinforcing an emerging common law consensus in that regard.
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute arose from an investment by Mauritian companies in an Indian Government-owned corporation. In 2011, the Indian Government annulled the underlying agreement on public policy and national security grounds. The investors commenced arbitral proceedings against India under Article 8 of the India-Mauritius bilateral investment treaty (BIT), which contemplated ICSID arbitration. As India is not a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention, the arbitration proceeded under UNCITRAL Rules.
In 2020, the tribunal rendered an award of US$111 million. The award creditors sought enforcement in Australia under the New York Convention. India resisted, invoking immunity under section 9 of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth).
The Waiver Question in the Lower Courts
At first instance, Jackman J held that India had waived immunity by ratifying the New York Convention, finding a “clear” and “unmistakable” implication—particularly from Article III, read with Articles I(1) and II(1)—that ratification involved waiver and submission to the jurisdiction of other Contracting States.
On appeal, the Full Federal Court did not decide the waiver question definitively. It assumed ratification constituted a waiver, but held that India’s reservation—limiting the Convention to disputes “considered commercial under the Law of India”—circumscribed any such waiver. Finding the dispute was not commercial under Indian law, it held that India had not waived immunity in respect of the award.
The High Court’s Analysis
The High Court addressed the fundamental question directly: whether ratification of the New York Convention is capable of constituting a waiver of foreign State immunity.
The governing principle is that any waiver in an international agreement must be “clear and unmistakeable”, derived from the express words of the agreement, including necessary implications.
The High Court observed that the text of the New York Convention contains no express reference to foreign State immunity. The travaux préparatoires revealed an intention to preserve immunity in the courts of other States—a consideration militating against implied waiver.
Crucially, the Court examined Article III, which requires Contracting States to recognise awards as binding and enforce them “in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon”. The High Court held this phrase encompasses foreign State immunity rules, qualifying the enforcement obligation by reference to immunity rules in the relevant forum.
The Court also considered subsequent State practice under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It found that decisions from the United States, Canada, and England and Wales pointed in the opposite direction: ratification of the New York Convention is not, by itself, a sufficient act of waiver.
Distinguishing the ICSID Convention
The appellants sought to draw an analogy with Kingdom of Spain v Infrastructure Services Luxembourg Sàrl [2023] HCA 11, where Spain was held to have waived immunity by ratifying the ICSID Convention. The High Court rejected this analogy, identifying material distinctions:
- First, the ICSID Convention is expressly concerned with disputes to which a State is a party, and its travaux préparatoires addressed foreign State immunity in detail.
- Second, Article 55 of the ICSID Convention preserves immunity only from execution—implying waiver of immunity from recognition and enforcement. Article III of the New York Convention supports preservation of immunity from jurisdiction altogether.
- Third, the International Law Commission materials relied upon by the appellants did not equate the two Conventions in any dispositive way.
Implications for Enforcement Against States
CCDM Holdings provides an authoritative demarcation between the two principal conventions. For ICSID awards, Kingdom of Spain establishes that enforcement against a Contracting State in Australia will not be barred by claims of immunity from jurisdiction. For non-ICSID awards—including investment treaty awards under UNCITRAL or other rules—enforcement against an unwilling State under the New York Convention is foreclosed absent clear and unmistakeable waiver.
Investors must give careful consideration to the availability of ICSID arbitration when contracting with States. Where unavailable, parties should seek clear waivers of immunity if enforcement in Australia or similar jurisdictions is contemplated.
Conclusion
The High Court’s unanimous decision brings welcome clarity. Ratification of the New York Convention does not, of itself, waive foreign State immunity, aligning Australia with the United States, Canada, and (subject to the pending appeal) England and Wales.
For practitioners in cross-border dispute resolution, the message is clear: the choice of arbitral regime and the presence of an express waiver are matters of critical importance warranting attention from the earliest stages of investment planning.
Courtroom Attendance as a Forum Conveniens Factor in Hamilton v Barrow
This post is written by Timon Milan Solár, Doctoral researcher, Faculty of Law, Trnava University, Slovakia.
In October 2025, the High Court of England and Wales (King’s Bench Division) handed down its judgment in Hamilton v Barrow [2025] EWHC 2593 (KB). The case concerned a failed unregulated investment scheme that collapsed in 2017, leaving investors without the possibility of recovering their investments, which ranged from £2,930 to £410,969. At first glance, the decision discusses important procedural questions, including abuse of process and champerty. However, on closer inspection, it also raises an interesting issue of English private international law that has gone overlooked. Can courtroom attendance be a factor in the forum conveniens test?
Facts of the Case
The defendants were all allegedly involved in a fraudulent investment scheme, under which investors from all over the world paid money to a ‘currency club’. Those funds were then supposed to be traded in foreign currency by one of the defendants who was based in Malaysia. Following the collapse of the scheme, the aggrieved investors alleged that the defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations to obtain investments and that the defendants were in breach of contract in their handling of the scheme. It was alleged that the currency club operated as a ‘Ponzi’ scheme and defrauded the investors.
This was a follow-on action arising from a successful test case by the claimant, a former English solicitor residing in Cyprus, against three of the present defendants. The claimant has now brought proceedings against a wider group of 12 defendants, acting under 101 separate assignments from other investors. The assignments provided that the assignors are entitled to 60% of the proceeds from the litigation.
Legal Issues
At this stage, the High Court was tasked with answering multiple preliminary legal issues, summarised by the judge (at para 15) as follows:
- Are the courts of England and Wales the appropriate forum for the trial (ie, is England and Wales the forum conveniens)?
- Are the assignments to the claimant void for being champertous agreements (‘meaning the claimant has no title to bring the claim’)?
- Are the proceedings an abuse of process?
- Should the claims against some of the defendants be summarily struck out?
- Should the claimant be allowed to amend his Particulars of Claim?
The Court ruled for the claimant, allowing the claim to proceed. A substantial part of the judgment related to the champerty and abuse of process issues. Looking at the case as a whole, the judge held that the assignments were not void as being champertous, nor did the proceedings constitute an oppressive abuse of process. On the contrary, voiding the assignments would deny the assignors an opportunity to be heard by a court, which the judge refused to allow given the prima facie evidence of fraud (at para 123).
Importantly, from a conflict of laws perspective, the interesting issue remains the Court’s application of the forum conveniens test.
Forum Conveniens
Setting out the relevant provisions of the forum conveniens test, the judge cited Lord Briggs’s judgment in Vedanta Resources Plc v Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, which in turn refers to Lord Goff’s speech in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (HL): ‘The task of the court is to identify the forum in which the case can be suitably tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice…’. This includes the crucial consideration of all factors that connect the claim with a particular jurisdiction.
The judge then moved to his consideration of the proper forum for this litigation. It was submitted by multiple defendants that Malaysia rather than England is the forum conveniens. Ultimately, the judge concluded that the appropriate forum is England, for seven listed reasons (at para 70):
- The claimant has already conducted a trial in England, is familiar with the forum, and has family in London who could provide him with accommodation during the trial; he would also lack the capacity to pursue this case in Malaysia;
- More than half of the key witnesses, the assignors, are located in the United Kingdom, whilst none in Malaysia;
- Only 2 of the 12 defendants are outside the United Kingdom and prefer Malaysia as the forum;
- The claimant’s three important witnesses all appear to be located in England and Wales and most of the claimant’s documentary evidence is available and in electronic form;
- Most of the participants in the trial will be English speakers, documents will be largely in English, and it does not appear that any participants speak Malay;
- Whilst there may be some difficulties in obtaining Malaysian banking material, this would not be impossible should the trial proceed in England, and the claimant has already shown that he was successful in obtaining Malaysian bank materials from HSBC Global; other banks can be approached in a similar way.
The final factor listed by the judge, however, introduces a rather unusual consideration of the forum conveniens test. At point (g), the judge noted:
‘although I do not give significant weight to this factor and the claimant did not rely on it, I note that a significant number of people attended the hearing and sat in the public gallery. This suggests that there is significant active interest in these proceedings from people resident in the United Kingdom.’
Discussion
Reliance on courtroom attendance in the judge’s forum conveniens analysis should strike every conflict of laws scholar or practitioner. It may appear benign; after all, the judge explicitly stated that he did not give that factor significant weight and it was not pleaded by the claimant. In hindsight, however, what the judge was essentially doing was considering a public, rather than a private, interest under the forum conveniens test. Indeed, this is an approach taken on the other side of the Atlantic, where the United States courts regularly take public interest factors into account. In this regard, the English High Court’s reasoning seems implicitly analogous to the Supreme Court of the United States’s decision in Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), where Justice Jackson opined that the test should also take into account public considerations such as holding the trial within the view and reach of the affected persons or having localised controversies decided at home. The High Court treated the interest of the members of the English public as somewhat justifying holding the trial in England rather than in Malaysia. It is unfortunate that the judge did not elaborate further on why noting the public attendance should matter.
Crucially, considering public interest factors under the Spiliada test was decidedly rejected in England by the highest judicial authority in Lubbe v Cape Plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545 (HL). As Lord Hope held (at para 53):
‘…if the interests of all parties and the ends of justice require that the action in this country should be stayed, a stay ought to be granted however desirable it may be on grounds of public interest or public policy that the action should be tried here.’
Considering the interest of the people residing in the United Kingdom in the litigation seems to be in clear contradiction with this ruling.
Not only does such an approach represent a doctrinal problem, its relevance for determining an appropriate forum seems questionable notwithstanding the well-established precedent. The investment club operated worldwide, and evidence suggested that there were thousands of investors from various countries. The proposition that the United Kingdom audience possesses any uniquely stronger active interest in the proceedings than an audience elsewhere is highly questionable. While this factor may have appeared to point clearly to England when contrasted solely against Malaysia (to which even the traditional connecting factors were missing), applying this logic to less clear-cut cases could easily lead to arbitrary results.
Conclusion
The judgment in Hamilton v Barrow should not be understood as an authority bringing public interest factors into the Spiliada test. Indeed, the judge tried to downplay its significance for the forum conveniens calculus. The other connecting factors the judge relied on, particularly the location of litigants and witnesses, are non-controversial and were sufficient on their own to justify holding the trial in England in the absence of other factors pointing towards Malaysia. Nevertheless, the mere mention of the public interest in the trial is problematic. Forum conveniens being a discretionary doctrine, it is not necessarily clear how the overall balance of connecting factors plays out when the judge looks at the case ‘holistically’. Any creeping in of public interest factors should therefore be viewed with scepticism. The law is clear on rejecting public interest factors from the Spiliada analysis. Such a structural change would need to come from the highest authority, an intervention which appears unlikely.
Greenpeace Anti-SLAPP Suit Blocked by International Antisuit Injunction
This post was written by Hannah Buxbaum, Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. The post is cross-posted from the Transnational Litigation Blog with kind permission.
In 2019, Energy Transfer, the developer of the Dakota Access Pipeline, sued Greenpeace International, a Dutch foundation, in North Dakota state court. Last year, Greenpeace responded with an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) lawsuit against Energy Transfer in Dutch court. In the latest twist in this lengthy dispute, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued an antisuit injunction last week blocking (partially) that anti-SLAPP suit.
The injunction is unusual in two respects. First, it does not actually bar Greenpeace from pursuing the Dutch action; rather, it purports to limit the issues that Greenpeace can raise in that litigation. Second, it was entered after judgment had already been reached in the North Dakota lawsuit. Read more
News
AAPrIL June Seminar (Online): “A Long-Awaited Reform: Papua New Guinea’s New Arbitration Law A conversation with Michael Henao”
News from the Australasian Associate of Private International Law:
We are pleased to share the updated flyer for our forthcoming event, A Long-Awaited Reform: Papua New Guinea’s New Arbitration Law — A Conversation with Michael Henao, taking place on 9 June. We are delighted to confirm that Cara North will be joining Michael Henao for what promises to be a timely and engaging discussion on this significant development in the region’s arbitration landscape.
This is an excellent opportunity to hear first-hand insights into Papua New Guinea’s new arbitration framework from a highly respected practitioner. We very much look forward to welcoming you on the day and encourage you to circulate the attached flyer among interested colleagues. Further details can be found in the flyer enclosed:
Workshop on Private International Law, Sustainability and Fashion
As part of the DFG- and AHRC-funded Fashion’s PLACE project, there will be a workshop on Private International Law, Sustainability and Fashion at the Geneva Graduate Institute on 18 June 2026 (11:00–13:00 CEST), just prior to the EAPIL conference. The event will bring together perspectives from law, sustainability and the fashion industry, with short presentations and space for discussion. If you are in Geneva and interested in the intersection of private international law, circular economy and fashion, consider coming. No sign-up necessary.
Conference: European Principles of Transnational Litigation and Their Reception Abroad (Hamburg, 8–10 Oct 2026)
On 8–10 October 2026, Julian Rapp and Wolfgang Wurmnest will be hosting a conference on European Principles of Transnational Litigation and Their Reception Abroad at the University of Hamburg.
The aim of the conference is described as follows:
As cross-border disputes grow increasingly common in today’s globalized world, reflection on key European procedural principles – and their influence beyond Europe – deserves closer examination. This conference examines how European procedural rules, particularly those shaped by the Court of Justice of the European Union, have evolved into general principles of transnational litigation. It will discuss classic jurisdictional rules (contract and tort jurisdiction, jurisdiction agreements, and lis pendens), the protection of weaker parties, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments – all reflecting the practical challenges that litigants and courts face in cross-border litigation.


