Over the past several months, three state appellate courts in the United States have examined whether a “talaq” divorce obtained in another country is entitled to recognition as a matter of comity. In this post, I first survey the rules relating to the recognition of foreign divorce judgments in the United States. I then explain the concept of a talaq divorce. Finally, I discuss the cases.
Choice of forum clauses are an important means of managing litigation risk in international commercial contracts. Their effectiveness, however, depends on how courts understand and enforce the parties’ agreement. This well-researched book offers a substantial comparative examination of that problem across seven Asian jurisdictions: Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, China, Indonesia and Japan. Presented as the first work devoted to this particular comparative inquiry, it makes a valuable contribution to Asian private international law and offers insights that will interest readers working on choice of forum agreements elsewhere.
Private international law in Egypt has often been described as being in a state of stagnation. After enormous efforts by the government since the end of the 19th century, and particularly during the beginning of the 20th century, Egypt succeeded in developing a relatively comprehensive PIL framework, covering choice of law (Arts 10–28 of the 1948 Civil Code), international jurisdiction (Arts 28–35 of the 1968 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure), and the enforcement of foreign judgments (Arts 296–301 the 1968 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure), alongside other rules scattered across various pieces of legislation. While these rules could be considered relatively modern and well developed, and broadly in line with the general tendencies of comparative law at the time, they have since become quite outdated and, in many respects, old-fashioned. This, however, has not prevented Egyptian law from exerting considerable influence throughout the region, with more recent codifications often reproducing or adapting Egyptian solutions.
Written by Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar LLM, PhD (KIMEP University)
Facts of the case
An unreported judgment of the Family, Childhood and Capacity Section of the Tribunal de Instancia de Alicante (No. 3), dated 29 April 2026, has attracted attention for ordering a Mexican gestational surrogate to pay child maintenance to the Spanish father for whom she carried a child, despite having no custody, no exercise of parental authority, and no contact rights (here and here).
South Africa occupies a strategic position in African and Global South trade networks, yet its economy continues to lag behind its BRICS partners and many of its African peers. A recurring, if underexamined, contributor to this underperformance is the state of its private international law governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (REFJ). The article, published in the Journal of African Law (2026), investigates why and how the principle of comity might help resolve this issue.
The empirical picture is striking. Of the reported South African REFJ cases collated for this study, roughly 44 per cent of foreign judgments brought for enforcement are refused. Contrary to what one might expect, the leading cause is rarely fraud or public policy. Instead, over half of all refusals (53 per cent) turn on a single, narrow ground: the rendering court’s lack of “international competence” under South African law. Under the framework laid down in Jones v Krok (1995), a foreign court is internationally competent only where the debtor was resident in, or voluntarily submitted to, that court’s jurisdiction. Every other basis for jurisdiction recognised elsewhere – the place of contractual performance, the place where harm occurred, or a valid choice-of-court agreement standing alone- is, on the weight of authority, insufficient.
A. The Impetus for Presenting the Issue
In light of the publication of three judgments of the Thessaloniki First Instance Court concerning the service of documents in Contracting States to the 1965 Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters [hereinafter: HSC], the issue examined was whether proceedings may continue despite the absence of a certificate of service from the State addressed. In this context, a decisive role for the judge is played by the answer to the question whether “persistent efforts” within the meaning of the Greek version of Article 15(2)(c) HSC, or “reasonable efforts” (in the English-language formulation), were undertaken by the competent authorities of the State addressed in order to obtain a certificate. The same issue arises under the relevant EU Regulation (Article 22 Regulation 2020/1784), concerning cross-border service within the EU. Finally, the very recent amendment of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, introducing new Article 134A GCCP, is also of particular interest.
The discussion will begin with the case law referred to above, examined in the light of the HSC (B). This will be followed by a reference to the corresponding provision of the EU Regulations (C). Next, a preliminary account will be given of the recent provision of Article 134A GCCP and its innovative features (D). This will be followed by an analysis of the terms “persistent effort” and “reasonable effort” (E-F). The study concludes with a detailed presentation of German legal scholarship (G), followed by a brief conclusion (H).
by Marta Liduma, LLB candidate in International and European Law, University of Groningen
A Dutch actor dies in March. By April, his likeness starts to appear widely. Generated videos show him promoting a supplement, and one clip ends with a link to a shop selling shirts printed with his face. A single man in Germany creates all of this, in large quantities, using a dozen deceased performers.
Who can sue, and in which court?
Dutch law answers the first question readily. Article 21 of the Auteurswet allows publication to be resisted when a reasonable interest of the portrayed person, or after his death of one of his surviving relatives, opposes it. Article 25a, in the same paragraph of the Act, identifies those relatives as the parents, the spouse or registered partner and the children, each of whom may act independently of the others. Article 21 addresses whoever holds the copyright for the portrait, which poses a problem for a generated video that may have no author at all. However, Article 35 makes the publication of a portrait without entitlement an offence for anybody, and Dutch practice has long read the two provisions together. German law follows a similar design. Section 22 of the Kunsturhebergesetz (KUG) requires the consent of the family of the deceased (Angehörige) for ten years after death, and defines them as the surviving spouse or registered partner and the children, failing whom the parents.
The second question leads to the Court of Justice and its judgment on 18 June 2026 in Idziski (C-232/25). The concentrating head of Article 7(2) Brussels Ia puts two questions to a single individual. Does the content identify you, and where are your interests centred? Death creates separation between these questions, and current case law keeps them apart.
This review concentrates principally on the private international law dimensions of Andrew Dickinson and Alexander Thompson’s The State Immunity Act 1978. Although state immunity is fundamentally a subject of public international law, the legislation operates at the point where public and private international law intersect. It determines whether the English courts may adjudicate disputes involving foreign states, how proceedings may be served, and whether judgments or arbitral awards may be recognised and enforced against state property. These questions are of direct importance to private international lawyers, particularly in transnational commercial, employment, property and arbitration disputes.
The authors bring considerable practical expertise to the subject. As the preface indicates, their analysis is informed not only by academic study but also by professional experience of state-immunity litigation. The result is a specialist and authoritative treatment of a technically demanding statute. The chapters generally combine legislative history, an overview of the relevant statutory provisions, and a detailed examination of their judicial application.
Iran’s use of property measures against critics abroad is no longer hypothetical. In March 2026, Iran’s Prosecutor-General’s Office warned Iranians living abroad that support for, or cooperation with, states regarded by Iran as hostile could result in confiscation of their property. Reuters reported the warning on the basis of statements carried by Iranian state media.
The policy has since acquired a more concrete form. In May 2026, Amnesty International reported judicial orders to identify, freeze and seize bank accounts, properties and other assets belonging to persons accused of cooperating with “enemy states” or “hostile media”. Iranian authorities had reportedly announced measures affecting more than 750 persons inside and outside Iran, including journalists living abroad.
Administrative measures adopted in 2026 have also brought security screening into the use of consular powers of attorney. A circular concerning power of attorney issued abroad required inquiries where such instruments were presented in Iran and contemplated prosecutorial action where the grantor was identified as an opponent of the Islamic Republic abroad.
For present purposes, this situation can be described as political immobilization. Ownership may formally remain intact, while access to the legal mechanisms required to sell, mortgage, partition or administer the property is conditioned by political or security considerations.
The immediate concern is one of human rights. A separate question arises in private international law once the consequences of such measures are relied upon before courts outside Iran.
by Sibusiso Mabaso, Lecturer in Private International Law, University of South Africa
For many years, South African private international law relied on the lex domicilii matrimonii as connecting factor to determine the legal system applicable to the proprietary consequences of a marriage. The lex domicilii matrimonii is interpreted as the husband’s domicile at the time of entering into the marriage. This rule was firmly entrenched in South African law since it was formally adopted in Frankel’s Estate v The Master & Another 1950(1) SA 220 (A) and reinforced in subsequent decisions, the latest being LE v LA 2024 (5) SA 539 (GJ). Despite the courts’ reliance on this rule, it became increasingly evident that it is not compatible with South Africa’s Constitutional commitment to equality, dignity and non-discrimination (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). The Westen Cape High Court has finally addressed this discriminatory connecting factor in a judgment delivered on 24 June 2026 in Pringle v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (2468 / 2024) [2026] ZAWCHC 343.