Views
A never-ending conflict: News from France on the legal parentage of children born trough surrogacy arrangements.
As reported previously, the ECtHR was asked by the French Cour de cassation for an advisory opinion on the legal parentage of children born through surrogacy arrangement. In its answer, the Court considered that the right to respect for private life (article 8 of ECHR) requires States parties to provide a possibility of recognition of the child’s legal relationship with the intended mother. However, according to the Court, a State is not required, in order to achieve such recognition, to register the child’s birth certificate in its civil status registers. It also declared that adoption can serve as a means of recognizing the parent-child relationship.
The ECtHR’s opinion thus confirms the position reached by French courts: the Cour de cassation accepted to transcribe the birth certificate only when the intended father was also the biological father. Meanwhile, the non-biological parent could adopt the child (See for a confirmation ECtHR, C and E v. France, 12/12/2019 Application n°1462/18 and n°17348/18).
The ECtHR advisory opinion was requested during the trial for a review of a final decision in the Mennesson case. Although it is not compulsory, the Cour de cassation has chosen to comply with its recommendations (Ass. plén. 4 oct. 2019, n°10-19053). Referring to the advisory opinion, the court acknowledged that it had an obligation to provide a possibility to recognize the legal parent-child relationship with respect to the intended mother. According to the Cour de cassation, the mere fact that the child was born of a surrogate mother abroad did not in itself justify the refusal to recognize the filiation with the intended mother mentioned in the child’s birth certificate.
When it comes to the mean by which this recognition has be accomplished, the Cour de cassation recalled that the ECtHR said that the choice fell within the State’s margin of appreciation. Referring to the different means provided under French law to establish filiation, the Court considered that preference should be given to the means that allow the judge to exercise some control over the validity of the legal situation established abroad and to pay attention to the particular situation of the child. In its opinion, adoption is the most suitable way.
However, considering the specific situation of the Mennesson twins who had been involved in legal proceedings for over fifteen years, the Court admitted that neither an adoption nor an apparent status procedure were appropriate as both involve a judicial procedure that would take time. This would prolong the twins’ legal uncertainty regarding their identity and, as a consequence, infringe their right to respect for private life protected by article 8 ECHR. In this particular case, this would not comply with the conditions set by the ECtHR in its advisory opinion: “the procedure laid down by the domestic law to ensure that those means could be implemented promptly and effectively, in accordance with the child’s best interest”.
As a result and given the specific circumstances of the Mennessons’ situation, the Cour de cassation decided that the best means to comply with its obligation to recognize the legal relationship between the child and the intended mother was to transcribe the foreign birth certificate for both parents.
The Cour de cassation’s decision of October 2019 is not only the final act of the Mennesson case, but it also sets a modus operandi for future proceedings regarding legal parentage of children born trough surrogate arrangements: when it comes to the relation between the child and the intended mother, adoption is the most suitable means provided under domestic French law to establish filiation. When such an adoption is neither possible nor appropriate to the situation, judges resort to transcribing the foreign birth certificate mentioning the intended mother. Thus, adoption appears as the principle and transcription as the exception.
Oddly enough, the Court then took the first chance it got to reverse its solution and choose not to follow its own modus operandi.
By two decisions rendered on December 18th 2019 (Cass. Civ. 1ère, 18 déc. 2019, n°18-11815 and 18-12327), the Cour de cassation decided that the intended non-biological father must have its legal relationship with the child recognized too. However, it did not resort to adoption as a suitable means of establishing the legal relationship with the intended parent. Instead, the court held that the foreign birth certificate had to be transcribed for both parents, while no references were made to special circumstances which would have justified resorting to a transcription instead of an adoption or another means of establishing filiation.
The Court used a similar motivation to the one used in 2015 for the transcription of the birth certificate when the intended father is also the biological father. It considered that neither the fact that the child was born from a surrogate mother nor that the birth certificate established abroad mentioned a man as the intended father were obstacles to the transcription of the birth certificate as long that they complied with the admissibility conditions of article 47 of the Civil Code.
But while in 2015 the Court referred to the fact that the certificate “did not contain facts that did not correspond to reality”, which was one of the requirements of article 47, in 2019 this condition is no longer required.
Thus, it seems that the Cour de cassation is no longer reluctant to allow the full transcription of the foreign birth certificate of children born of surrogate arrangements. After years of constant refusal to transcribe the birth certificate for the non-biological parent, and just a few months after the ECtHR advisory opinion accepting adoption as a suitable means to legally recognize the parent-child relationship, this change of view was unexpected.
However, by applying the same treatment to both intended parents, biological and non-biological, this reversal of solution put into the spotlight the publicity function of the transcription into the French civil status register. As the Cour de cassation emphasized, a claim for the transcription of a birth certificate is different from a claim for the recognition or establishment of filiation. The transcription does not prevent later proceedings directed against the child-parent relationship.
But the end is still not near! On January 24th, during the examination of the highly sensitive Law of Bioethics, the Sénat (the French Parliament’s upper house) adopted an article prohibiting the full transcription of the foreign birth certificates of children born trough surrogate arrangements. This provision is directly meant to “break” the Cour de cassation’s solution of December 18th 2019. The article will be discussed in front of the Assemblée nationale, the lower house, and the outcome of the final vote is uncertain.
The conflict over the legal parentage of children born trough surrogate arrangements is not over yet. To be continued…
C-493/18, UB v. VA and others – Exclusive jurisdiction under the European Insolvency Regulation
By Dr Lukas Schmidt (PhD EBS Law School), law clerk (Rechtsreferendar) at the Regional Court of Wiesbaden, Germany
In cross-border insolvencies questions of international jurisdiction might arise either in relation to the opening of an insolvency proceeding as such, or – further down the road – in relation to proceedings deriving from already opened insolvency proceedings. In both cases the European Insolvency Regulation Recast (Regulation 2015/848) provides for answers: According to Article 3 of the Regulation the courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor’s main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings. Article 6 of the Regulation provides that the courts in such Member States shall have jurisdiction as well for actions deriving directly from insolvency proceedings and closely linked with them. Both kind of decisions are to be automatically recognized in all other member states, either through Art. 19 (judgments opening insolvency proceedings) or through Art. 32 (other judgments).
Whereas Article 3 is also to be found in the old EIR (Regulation 1346/2000) as is Article 19 (Article 16) and Article 32 (Article 25), Article 6 is a new provision, however based without any doubt on the ECJ´s settled case law (Seagon, C-339/07 and Schmid, C-382/12) on the old EIR. Still on the old regulation, but with effect also for Art. 6 and 32 EIR, the ECJ has now specified in the case UB v. VA and others (C-493-18) the scope and the exclusive nature of the vis attractiva concursus as (now) laid down in Art. 6 of the EIR.
Some facts are necessary to understand the case:
The insolvent debtor UB, a Dutch citizen, owned an apartment and a property complex in France. Although his assets had been frozen by an English court he and his sister VA signed an acknowledgement of debt by which UB acknowledged owing VA the sum of EUR 500 000 in respect of various loans. UB undertook to repay that sum by 22 August 2017 and subsequently mortgaged, in favour of VA, the apartment and the property complex which he owned in France. In March 2010 he had sold the apartment to Tiger, a company founded by VA. On 10 May 2011 insolvency proceedings were opened against UB in the United Kingdom by the Croydon County Court. The Croydon County Court authorised the insolvency administrator, to bring an action before the courts in France in order to obtain a ruling that the sale of the properties and the mortgages granted over those properties were avoidable under the relevant United Kingdom bankruptcy law provisions. The insolvency administrator made use of this authorisation and succeeded before the French Regional Court and the Court of Appeal. However, the Court of Cassation referred the question of international jurisdiction of the French courts (and its recognition) to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
By answering the first two referred questions the ECJ has made clear – rather not surprising – that an action brought by the trustee in bankruptcy appointed by a court of the Member State within the territory of which the insolvency proceedings were opened seeking a declaration that the sale of immovable property situated in another Member State and the mortgage granted over it are ineffective as against the general body of creditors falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the first Member State.
The ECJ has pointed out that for determining whether actions derive directly from insolvency proceedings not the procedural context of the action is decisive, but its legal basis (the trustee asked the French courts to rule on a declaration of ineffectiveness rather than on an action to set the transactions aside).
Equally insignificant for international jurisdiction to hear an action for the restitution of immovable property to the bankruptcy estate is where those assets are located. The court underlines that the objective of improving the efficiency and speed of cross-border insolvency proceedings is only consistent with concentrating all the actions directly related to the insolvency proceedings before the courts of the Member State within the territory of which those proceedings were opened.
More intriguing and not yet subject to the ECJ’s case law is the question whether a court can confer its international jurisdiction according to Art. 6 EIR. Eventually, this is what the Croydon Country Court did by authorizing the administrator to bring an action before the French courts in order to obtain a ruling that UB´s deals regarding the French properties were avoidable transactions under the relevant United Kingdom bankruptcy law provisions. The referring Court of Cassation therefore asked in his third question if the UK court’s decision authorizing the insolvency administrator to bring an action before the French courts could be classified as a judgment concerning the course of insolvency proceedings within the meaning of Article 25 (now Article 32), which may, on that basis, be recognised with no further formalities, pursuant to that article.
The court’s answer to this question is in line with its decision in Wiemer & Trachte v. Tadzher (C-296/17) in which it already confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings have been opened for set aside actions. Hence, the ECJ refused the UK court’s approach quite quickly stating that Article 25 (now 32) EIR cannot be interpreted in such a way as to call into question the said exclusive nature of the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State within the territory of which the insolvency proceedings were opened to hear actions which derive directly from those proceedings and which are closely connected with them. According to the ECJ Article 25 EIR merely allows for the possibility that the courts of a Member State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings have been opened may also hear and determine an action which derives directly from those proceedings and is closely connected with them, whether that be the court which opened the insolvency proceedings under Article 3(1), or another court of that same Member State having territorial and substantive jurisdiction.
White Paper on Smart Derivatives Contract
by Matthias Lehmann
Smart contracts and the conflict of laws is a widely discussed topic today (see for instance the post by Giesela Rühl). A new contribution to this debate comes from ISDA, the International Swaps and Derivatives, in collaboration with the Singapore Academy of Law and leading law firms. Also involved is the provider of an existing smart contract platform (Corda), which guarantees the paper’s practical relevance. The analysis focuses on a potential smart derivative contract to be implemented on Corda.
The authors of the paper take the view that a court in Singapore and the UK would have little difficulties in determining the law governing such a contract – it would simply be the one chosen in the derivatives master agreement. The same goes for the choice of the competent court. In this context, it is important to note that only B2B transactions are considered, with no consumer contracts being involved. The authors also see little risk for the intervention of public policy rules.
Collateralised derivative transactions, which are of utmost practical importance, are more problematic to the extent that the collateral is governed by the lex rei sitae. But the paper also sees a way out here: The collateral could be represented by a token (through so-called tokenisation). Given that tokens have no real geographic location, the law applicable to the token could be determined again by a choice of the parties.
The paper even suggests an innovative way to avoid the need for enforcement: The parties could agree that the “notary” of the platform must implement any judgment rendered by the chosen court. In this way, the need to apply for cross-border recognition and enforcement in the country in which the platform is established would fall away.
Whether this proposal works in practice remains to be seen. One may reasonably fret that the platform will not enjoy complete immunity from the country in which it is established. As long as the courts of this country are liberal, there is however little reason for fear. The Singapore High Court has already shown its readiness to extending property protection to the holders of cryptocurrencies. The country could thus provide a safe haven for the operation of a smart derivatives platform, but that does not exclude the continuing power of its courts to intervene and the possible application of national law, e.g. in case of an insolvency of the platform provider.
News
CfP: Enforcement of Rights in the Digital Space (7/8 Nov 24, Osnabrück)
On 7 and 8 November, the European Legal Studies Institute (ELSI) at the University of Osnabrück, Germany, is hosting a conference on “Enforcement of Rights in the Digital Space”.
The organizers have kindly shared the following Call for Papers with us:
The European Legal Studies Institute (ELSI) is pleased to announce a Call for Papers for a conference at Osnabrück University on November 7th and 8th, 2024.
We invite submissions on the topic of »Enforcement of Rights in the Digital Space« and in particular on the interplay between the current EU acts on the digital space and national law. The deadline for submissions is May 15th, 2024.
Legal Acts regulating the digital space in the European Union, such as the GDPR, the Data Act and the Digital Services Act, establish manifold new rights and obligations, such as a duty to inform about data use and storage, rights of access to data or requests for interoperability. Yet, with regard to many of these rights and obligations it remains unclear whether and how private actors can enforce them. Often, it is debatable whether their enforcement is left to the member states and whether administrative means of enforcement are intended to complement or exclude private law remedies. The substantial overlap in the scope of these legal acts, which often apply simultaneously in one and the same situation, aggravates the problem that the different legal acts lack a coherent and comprehensive system for their enforcement.
The conference seeks to address the commonalities, gaps and inconsistencies within the present system of enforcement of rights in the digital space, and to explore the different approaches academics throughout Europe take on these issues.
Speakers are invited to either give a short presentation on their current work (15 minutes) or present a paper (30 minutes). Each will be followed by a discussion. In case the speakers choose to publish the paper subsequently, we would kindly ask them to indicate that the paper has been presented at the conference. We welcome submissions both from established scholars and from PhD students, postdocs and junior faculty.
All speakers are invited to a conference dinner which will take place on November 7th, 2024. Further, the European Legal Studies Institute will cover reasonable travel expenses.
Electronic submissions with an abstract in English of no more than 300 words can be submitted to [elsi@uos.de]. Please remove all references to the author(s) in the paper and include in the text of the email a cover note listing your name and the title of your paper. Any questions about the submission procedure should be directed to Mary-Rose McGuire [mmcguire@uos.de]. We will notify applicants as soon as practical after the deadline whether their papers have been selected.
Reminder: Conference on Informed Consent to Dispute Resolution Agreements, Bremen, 20–21 June 2024
We have kindly been informed that a limited number of places remains available at the conference on Informed Consent to Dispute Resolution Agreements on 20 and 21 June in Bremen, which we advertised a couple of weeks ago.
The full schedule can be found on this flyer, which has meanwhile been released.
First View Article on ICLQ
A first view article was published online on 12 April 2024 in International and Comparative Law Quarterly.
Raphael Ren, “The Dichotomy between Jurisdiction and Admissibility in International Arbitration”
The dichotomy between jurisdiction and admissibility developed in public international law has drawn much attention from arbitrators and judges in recent years. Inspired by Paulsson’s ‘tribunal versus claim’ lodestar, attempts have been made to transpose the distinction from public international law to investment treaty arbitration, yielding a mixed reception from tribunals. Remarkably, a second leap of transposition has found firmer footing in commercial arbitration, culminating in the prevailing view of the common law courts in England, Singapore and Hong Kong that arbitral decisions on admissibility are non-reviewable. However, this double transposition from international law to commercial arbitration is misguided. First, admissibility is a concept peculiar to international law and not embodied in domestic arbitral statutes. Second, its importation into commercial arbitration risks undermining the fundamental notion of jurisdiction grounded upon the consent of parties. Third, the duality of ‘night and day’ postulated by Paulsson to distinguish between reviewable and non-reviewable arbitral rulings is best reserved to represent the basic dichotomy between jurisdiction and merits.