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Unwired Planet v Huawei [2020] UKSC 37: The UK Supreme Court Declared Competence to Determine Global FRAND Licensing Rate

  1. Background

The UK Supreme Court delivered the landmark judgment on Unwired Planet v Huawei and Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, [2020] UKSC 37 on 26 Aug 2020. In 2014, the US company Unwired Planet sued Huawei and other smartphone manufacturers for infringing its UK patents obtained from Ericsson. Some of these patents are essential to the 2G, 3G and 4G wireless telecommunication standards set by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), an international standards setting organization (SSO). Since Ericsson and Nokia are subject to various ETSI policies including patent policies, these policies continue to apply after they are acquired by Unwired Planet. The ETSI patent policy requires that holder of patents that are indispensable for the implementation of ETSI standards, referred to as standard essential patents (SEP) , must grant licence to implementers (such as the smartphone manufacturers) on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory ” (FRABD) terms. In 2017, Canadian company Conversant filed similar lawsuits against Huawei and ZTE.

Unwired Planet and Conversant proposed to grant the worldwide licence, but Huawei proposed a UK only licence. Huawei believes that the UK litigation only concerns the UK licence and the licence fees paid to resolve disputes under the UK procedure should cover only British patents and not global patents. The UK Supreme Court upheld the High Court and Court of Appeal judgments, ruling that the FRAND licence will need to be global between large multinational companies. If Huawei refuses to pay the FRAND global licence rate determined by the court, the court will issue an injunction restraining Huawei’s sale of infringing products in the UK.

  1. Legal Issues

The Supreme Court answers five legal questions: 1. Does the English court have the power or jurisdiction without the parties’ agreement to require the parties to enter into a global licence under a multinational patent portfolio? 2. Is England the proper forum for such a claim? 3. What is the meaning and effect of the non-discrimination component of the FRAND undertaking? 4. Does the CJEU’s decision in Huawei v ZTE mean that a SEP owner is entitled to seek an injunction restraining infringement of those SEPs in circumstances such as those of the Unwired case? 5. Should Court grant damages in lieu of an injunction?

Given our focus on private international law, this note only focuses on the private international law related issue, namely the English court’s “long arm” jurisdiction to grant a global licence for dispute concerning the infringement of the UK patent and to issue an injunction if the global licence rate is not complied.

  1. Territoriality of Patents and Globalisation of Telecommunication

Telecommunication industry faces the conflict between territoriality of patents and globalisation of telecom products and equipment. Products made in different countries should be able to communicate and inter-operate and keep operational in different jurisdictions. It would be unrealistic to require patent holders to defend their patent country by country. It is also harmful to the industry if SEP holders demand unreasonable licence fees and prohibit the use of its invention within a national jurisdiction. It is unreasonable for consumers if they cannot use their mobiles smartphones or other telecom devices when travel abroad. To reconcile the conflict, the ETSI policy requires the SEP holders to irrevocably license their SEP portfolios on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. The policy reconciles conflict of interest between SEP holders and SEP implementers but does not, at least directly, resolve the conflict between territoriality and globalisation. In terms of the later, the industry practice shows that multinational SEP holders and implementers usually negotiate worldwide licences, bearing in mind that the SEP holders and implementers cannot test validity of each patent of the portfolio in each country. The licence rate is thus based on the understanding that some patents may be invalid in some countries.

The Supreme Court confirmed the territoriality principle. English court only has jurisdiction to determine validity and infringement of the UK patent. But the English court, based on the jurisdiction on the UK patent, has the competence to grant a global licence rate.

This judgment includes a few private international law matters. Firstly, the granting of global licence rate is a matter in relation to applicable law instead of jurisdiction from the private international law perspective. The case concerns the infringement and validity of the UK patents and the English court has no problem to take jurisdiction. After ruling the defendant indeed infringed the valid UK patents the English court moved to remedy. The remedy to the infringement of SEPs is the grant of FRAND rate pursuant to the ETSI policy and industry practice. This, however, does not mean the English court directly treats business custom or ETSI policy as the governing law, which, standing alone, may not be able to acquire the status as other non-state norms under the current legal framework. (Rome I Regulation) They are applied pursuant to the contract principle. The judgment heavily relies on the ETSI policy, including its language and purpose. The court concludes that the ETSI policy creates a contractual arrangement between SEP holders and implementers and it is the intention of the policy to grant global licences for SEP portfolios taking into account of industry practices and the purpose. English courts’ power to determine a global FRAND licence rate is inherently consistent with the ETSI policy, given there is no alternative international forum available. There is no much consideration of any choice of law rules, except the clarification that the ETSI policy was governed by French law. The court nevertheless does not consider the French law principle in interpreting contracts. Instead, the court naturally applies these non-state norms as part of the contract between the parties. Relying on contract to seise the power to determine the global rate helps the court to avoid the necessity to determine the validity of foreign patents of the same patent family.

The Supreme Court also considered the forum non conveniens in Conversant case (forum non conveniens was not plead in Unwired Planet). The court refused to accept that China would be the more appropriate alternative forum. Although 64% of Huawei’s sales occur in China and only 1% in the UK and 60% of the ZTE’s operating revenue in the first six months of 2017 was from China and only 0.07% from the UK, the Supreme court held that Chinese courts might not assume jurisdiction to determine the global FRAND term. It seems possible that if China, or any other country, which maybe the most important global market for the disputed patents, follows the UK approach to grant global licence for SEP portfolios, the English court may apply forum non conveniens to decline jurisdiction. In fact, Chinese law does not prevent a Chinese court from issuing licence with broader territorial coverage, though there is not yet any case on this matter. The “Working Guidance for Trial of SEP disputes by the Guangdong Province Higher People’s Court (for Trial Implementation)” of 2018 provides in Art 16 that if the SEP holder or implementer unilaterally applies for the licence covering areas exceeding the court’s territory, and the other party does not expressly oppose or the opposition is unreasonable, the court could determine the applied licence rate with broader geographic coverage.

A more controversial point of the judgment is that the Supreme Court concludes that the ESTI policy would allow the court to issue injunction if the implementer refuses to pay the global licence rate. It is important to know that the ESTI policy does not expressly state such an effect. The UK court believes that an injunction would serve as a strong incentive for the patentee to accept a global licence. Damages, on the other hand, may encourage implementers to infringe patents until damages are applied and received in each jurisdiction. This conclusion is rather surprising as the injunction of SEPs in one jurisdiction may have the potential to disturb the whole telecommunication market for the given manufacturer. There is even argument that the purpose of ESTI is to prohibit injunction for SEPs (here; and here) The use of injunction may not “balance” the conflicting interests, but significantly favours the SEP holders to the disadvantage of the implementers

  1. Forum Shopping and Conflict of Jurisdiction

It is important to note that regardless of the current geopolitical tension between the US and China, the UK Supreme Court’s judgment should not be interpreted as one that has taken the political stance against China’s High-Tech companies. (here) It upholds the judgments of the lower courts dated back to 2017. It is also consistent with the principle of judicial efficiency, protection of innovation and business efficacy. Although the final result protects the patent holders more than the implementers, it is hard to argue anything wrong in terms of policy. Furthermore, since Huawei and Unwired Planet had already settled and the rate set by the court had been paid, this judgment will not result in additional payment obligations or an injunction. (here) Finally, although Huawei lost this case as the implementer, Huawei is also the biggest 5G SEP holder. Pursuant to this judgment, although Huawei has been banned from the UK’s 5G network, it can still require other 5G implementers for a global FRAND licence rate and apply for injunction upon a refusal.

If there is any political drive, it may be the intention to become an international litigation centre for patent disputes after Brexit. This judgment allows the English court jurisdiction to determine a global licence rate simply based on the infringement of a UK patent, no matter how small the UK market is. The one-stop solution available in the English court would be particularly welcome by patent holders, especially SEP holders, who would no longer need to prove validity in each jurisdiction. This judgment also enhances the negotiation power of the SEP holders versus implementers. It is likely that more FRAND litigation would be brought to the UK.

On the other hand, some implementers may decide to give up the UK market, especially those with small market share in the UK. Some companies may decide to accept the injunction instead of paying high global licence rate. This may also suggest that the UK consumers may find it slower and more expensive to access to some high-tech products.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s judgment does not depend on any unique domestic legislation but the ETSI contractual arrangement which applies to its members and the industry practice and custom. There is no barrier for other countries, including China, to follow the same reasoning.  It is possible many other countries may, fully or partly, follow this judgment. If the courts of multiple countries can set the global FRAND rate and they apply different standards to set this rate, forum shopping and conflict of jurisdictions may be inevitable. Anti-suit injunction and anti-enforcement injunction may be more frequently applied and issued. The China Supreme Court IP Tribunal recently restrained the Conversant from applying the German court to enforce the German judgment in a related case, which awards Conversant the FRAND rate 18.3 times of the rate awarded by the Chinese courts on the infringement of the Chinese patents of the same family. This is called act preservation in China with the similar function as the anti-enforcement injunction. ((2019) Supreme Court IP Tribunal Final One of No 732, 733 and 734) This case suggests Chinese courts would be ready to issue the similar act preservation order or injunction to prevent the other party from enforcing a global FRAND rate set by the foreign court against the Chinese implementers, whether or not Chinese court could issue the global FRAND licence. The long term impact of the Unwired Planet v Huawei may be the severer competition in jurisdiction between different courts which may require reconciliation either through judicial cooperation arrangement or through the establishment of a global tribunal by the relevant standard setting organisation.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Conflict of Laws

by Tobias Lutzi, University of Cologne

Since the sad news of her passing, lawyers all around the world have mourned the loss of one of the most iconic and influential members of the legal profession and a true champion of gender equality. Through her work as a scholar and a justice, just as much as through her personal struggles and achievements, Ruth Bader Ginsburg has inspired generations of lawyers.

On top of being a global icon of women’s rights and a highly influential voice on a wide range of issues, Ginsburg has also expressed her views on questions relating to the interaction between different legal systems, both within the US and internationally, on several occasions. In fact, two of her early law-review articles focus entirely on two perennial problems of private international law.

Accordingly, readers of this blog may enjoy to go through some of her writings in this area, both judicial and extra-judicial, in an attempt to pay tribute to her work.

Jurisdiction

In one of Ginsburg’s earliest publications, The Competent Court in Private International Law: Some Observations on Current Views in the United States (20 (1965) Rutgers Law Review 89), she retraces the approach to the adjudication of persons outside the forum state in US law by reference to both the common law and continental European approaches. She argues that

[t]he law in the United States has […] moved closer to the continental approach to the extent that a relationship between the defendant or the particular litigation and the forum, rather than personal service, may function as the basis of the court’s adjudicatory authority.

Ginsburg points out, though, that each approach includes ‘exorbitant’ bases of judicial competence, which ‘provide for adjudication resulting in a personal judgment in cases in which there may be no connection of substance between the litigation and the forum state.’

Bases of judicial competence found in the internal laws of certain continental states, but generally considered undesirable in the international sphere, include competence founded exclusively on the nationality of the plaintiff – for example, Article 14 of the French Civil Code – and competence (to render a personal judgment) based on the mere presence of an asset of the defendant when the claim has no connection with that asset-a basis found in the procedural codes of Germany, Austria, and the Scandinavian countries. Equally undesirable in the view of continental jurists is the traditional Anglo-American rule that personal service within the territory of the forum confers adjudicatory authority upon a court even in the case of a defendant having no contact with the forum other than transience

The ‘most promising currently feasible remedy’ for improper use of these ‘internationally undesirable’ bases of jurisdiction, she argues, is the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

At the least, a plaintiff who chooses such a forum should be required to show some reasonable justification for his institution of the action in the forum state rather than in a state with which the defendant or the res, act or event in suit is more significantly connected.

Applicable Law

As a Supreme Court justice, Ginsburg also had numerous opportunities to rule on conflicts between federal and state law.

In Honda Motor Co v Oberg (512 U.S. 415 (1994)), for instance, Ginsburg dissented from the Court’s decision that an amendment to the Oregon Constitution that prevented review of a punitive-damage award violated the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution, referring to other protections against excessive punitive-damage awards in Oregon law. In BMW of North America, Inc v Gore (517 US 559 (1996)), she dissented from another decision reviewing an allegedly excessive punitive-damages award and argued that the Court should ‘resist unnecessary intrusion into an area dominantly of state concern.’

According to Paul Schiff Berman (who provided a much more complete account of Ginsburg’s relevant writings than this post can offer in Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Interaction of Legal Systems (in Dodson (ed), The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg (CUP 2015) 151)), herwillingness to defer to state prerogatives in interpreting state law […] may surprise those who focus on Justice Ginsburg’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in gender-related cases.’

The same deference can also be found in some of her writings on the interplay between US law and other legal systems, though. In a speech to the International Academy of Comparative Law, she argued in favour of taking foreign and international experiences into account when interpreting US law and concluded:

Recognizing that forecasts are risky, I nonetheless believe the US Supreme Court will continue to accord “a decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind” as a matter of comity and in a spirit of humility. Comity, because projects vital to our well being […] require trust and cooperation of nations the world over. And humility because, in Justice O’Connor’s words: “Other legal systems continue to innovate, to experiment, and to find . . . solutions to the new legal problems that arise each day, [solutions] from which we can learn and benefit.”

Recognition of Judgments

Going back to another one of Ginsburg’s early publications, in Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments (82 (1969) Harvard Law Review 798), Ginsburg discussed the problem of the hierarchy between conflicting judgments from different states and made a case for ‘the unifying function of the full faith and credit clause’. As to whether anti-suit injunctions should also the clause, she expressed a more nuanced view, though, explaining that

[t]he current state of the law, permitting the injunction to issue but not compelling any deference outside the rendering state, may be the most reasonable compromise […].

The thesis of this article, that the national full faith and credit policy should override the local interest of the enjoining state, would leave to the injunction a limited office. It would operate simply to notify the state in which litigation has been instituted of the enjoining state’s appraisal of forum conveniens. That appraisal, if sound, might induce respect for the injunction as a matter of comity.

Ginsburg had an opportunity to revisit a similar question about thirty years later, when delivering the opinion of the Court in Baker v General Motor Corp (522 US 222 (1998)). Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause was not subject to a public-policy exception (as held by the District Court), an injunction stipulated in settlement of a case in front of a Michigan court could not prevent a Missouri court from hearing a witness in completely unrelated proceedings:

Michigan lacks authority to control courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions brought by strangers to the Michigan litigation, from determining for themselves what witnesses are competent to testify and what evidence is relevant and admissible in their search for the truth.

This conclusion creates no general exception to the full faith and credit command, and surely does not permit a State to refuse to honor a sister state judgment based on the forum’s choice of law or policy preferences. Rather, we simply recognize that, just as the mechanisms for enforcing a judgment do not travel with the judgment itself for purposes of Full Faith and Credit […] and just as one State’s judgment cannot automatically transfer title to land in another State […] similarly the Michigan decree cannot determine evidentiary issues in a lawsuit brought by parties who were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Michigan court.

According to Berman, this line of reasoning is testimony to Ginsburg’s judicial vision of ‘a system in which courts respect each other’s authority and judgments.’

The above selection has been created rather spontaneously and is evidently far from complete; please feel free to use the comment section to highlight other interesting parts of Justice Ginsburg’s work.

The Bee That’s Buzzing in Our Bonnets. Some Thoughts about Characterisation after the Advocate General’s Wikingerhof Opinion

Last week, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe rendered his Opinion on Case C-59/19 Wikingerhof, which we first reported in this post by Krzysztof Pacula. The following post has been written by Michiel Poesen, PhD Candidate at KU Leuven, who has been so kind as to share with us some further thoughts on the underlying problem of characterisation.

Characterisation is not just a bee that has been buzzing in conflicts scholars’ bonnets, as Forsyth observed in his 1998 LQR article. Given its central role in how we have been thinking about conflicts for over a century, it has pride of place in jurisprudence and literature. The Wikingerhof v Booking.com case (C-59/19) is the latest addition to a long string of European cases concerning the characterisation of actions as ‘matters relating to a contract’ under Article 7(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation n° 1215/2012.

Earlier this week, Krzysztof Pacula surveyed Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe’s opinion in the Wikingerhof case on this blog (Geert Van Calster also wrote about the opinion on his blog). Readers can rely on their excellent analyses of the facts and the AG’s legal analysis. This post has a different focus, though. The Wikingerhof case is indicative of a broader struggle with characterising claims that are in the grey area surrounding a contract. In this post, I would like to map briefly the meandering approaches to characterisation under the contract jurisdiction. Then I would like to sketch a conceptual framework that captures the key elements of characterisation.

1. Not All ‘Matters Relating to a Contract’ Are Created Equal

There are around 30 CJEU decisions concerning the phrase ‘matters relating to a contract’. Three tests for characterisation are discernible in those decisions. In the first approach, characterisation depends on the nature of the legal basis relied on by the claimant. If a claim is based on an obligation freely assumed, then the claim is a matter relating to a contract to which the contract jurisdiction applies. Statutory, fiduciary, or tortious obligations arising due to the conclusion of a contract are also contractual obligations for private international law purposes. I will call this approach the ‘cause of action test’, because it centres on the nature of the cause of action pleaded by the claimant. In recent decisions, for example, the cause of action test has been used to characterise claims between third parties as contractual matters (C-337/17 Feniks, blogged here; C-772/17 Reitbauer, blogged here; joined cases C-274/16, C-447/16 and C-448/16 flightright).

The second approach to characterisation is to focus on the relationship between the litigants. From this standpoint, only claims between litigants who are bound by a contract can be characterised as ‘matters relating to a contract’. This approach has for example been used in the Handte and Réunion européenne decisions. We will call it the ‘privity test’. Sometimes scholars relied on this test to argue that all claims between contracting parties are to be characterised as matters relating to a contract.

The third and final approach emphasises the nature of the facts underlying the claim brought by the claimant. This approach was first developed in the Brogsitter decision (C-548/12). However, it is predated by AG Jacob’s opinions in the Kalfelis (C-189/87) and Shearson Lehmann Hutton (C-89/91) cases (which since have been eagerly picked up by the Bundesgerichtshof of Germany). The Brogsitter decision provided that a claim is a contractual matter if the defendant’s allegedly wrongful behaviour can reasonably be regarded to be a breach of contract, which will be the case if the interpretation of the contract is indispensable to judge. I will dub this approach the ‘factual breach test’, since it directs attention to factual elements such as the defendant’s behaviour and the indispensability to interpret the contract. It is plain to see that this is by far the most complicated of the three approaches to characterisation we discussed here (among other things because of the unclear relation between the different layers of which the test is composed, an issue that AG Saugmandsgaard Øe entertained in Wikingerhof, [69]–[70], and C-603/17 Bosworth v Arcadia).

The use in practice and literature of the three approaches laid out above demonstrates a tale of casuistry. Similar claims have been subjected to different approaches, and approaches developed in a specific setting have been applied to entirely different contexts. For example, a few CJEU decisions characterised claims between litigants who are not privy to consensual obligations as non-contractual in nature under the privity test. Other decisions characterised such claims as contractual in nature, applying the cause of action test. A similar dichotomy underlies the characterisation of claims between contracting parties. Initially, the CJEU jurisprudence applied the cause of action test, focussing on the nature of the legal basis relied on (see C-9/87 Arcado v Haviland). Later, the Brogsitter decision adopted the factual breach test, which shifted the focus to the nature of the facts underlying the claim.

It is difficult to understand why these divergences have occurred. How can they be explained?

2. The Theories Underlying Characterisation

A good way to start is to conceptualise characterisation further along the lines of this scheme:

Seen from the perspective of this scheme, the previous section described three ‘tests for characterisation’. A ‘test for characterisation’ refers to the interpretational exercise that lays down the conditions under which a claim can be characterised as a matter relating to a contract. Each test elevates different elements of a ‘claim’ as relevant for the purpose of characterisation and disregards others. Those elements are the identity of the litigants, the claim’s legal basis, or the dispute underlying the claim. As such, it concretises an idea about the broader purpose the contract jurisdiction should serve, which is called a ‘theory’. The divergences among the tests for characterisation outlined above is explained by the reliance on different theories.

The AG’s considerations about Brogsitter in the Wikingerhof opinion illustrate the scheme. The AG observed that the factual breach test is informed by what I will dub the ‘natural forum theory’. According to that theory, the contract jurisdiction offers the most appropriate and hence natural forum for all claims that are remotely linked to a contract (for the sake of proximity and avoiding multiple jurisdictional openings over claims relating to the same contract). This theory explains why the factual breach test provides such a broad, hypothetical test for characterisation that captures all claims that could have been pleaded as a breach of contract. Opining against the use of the factual breach test and underlying natural forum theory, the AG suggested that the cause of action test be applied. He then integrated the indispensability to interpret the contract (originally a part of the factual breach test) into the cause of action test as a tool for determining whether a claim is based on contract ([90] et seq). Essentially, his approach was informed by what I will call the ‘ring-fencing theory’. In contrast to the natural forum theory, this theory presumes that the contract jurisdiction should be delineated strictly for two reasons. First, the contract jurisdiction is a special jurisdiction regime that cannot fulfil a broad role as a natural forum contractus ([84]–[85]). Second, a strict delineation promotes legal certainty and efficiency, since it does not require judges to engage in a broad, hypothetical analysis to determine whether a claim is contractual or not ([76]–[77]). The scheme was applied succinctly here, but the analysis could be fleshed out for example by integrating the role of the parallelism between the Brussels Ia and Rome I/II Regulations.

The scheme can be used to understand and evaluate the CJEU’s eventual judgment in Wikingerhof. I hope that the decision will be a treasure trove that furthers our understanding of the mechanics of characterisation in EU private international law.

News

Conference: The Law of Treaties as Applied to Private International Law, Milan, 5-6 May 2023

A conference on “The Law of Treaties as Applied to Private International Law” will take place at the Catholic University of Milan on 5 and 6 May 2023, under the auspices of the Italian Society of International Law and EU Law (SIDI) and the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL).

The event aims to discuss the impact of the rules of treaty law on the formation, interpretation and implementation of international conventions laying down rules of private international law, and to assess whether, and in which way, the specific object and features of private international law have a bearing on the operation of the law of treaties in this area.

Speakers and chairs include Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling), Catherine Brölmann (University of Amsterdam), Sergio Carbone (University of Genova, Emeritus), Luigi Crema (University of Milan), Zeno Crespi Reghizzi (University of Milan), Pedro De Miguel Asensio (Complutense University of Madrid), Malgosia Fitzmaurice (Queen Mary University of London), Burkhard Hess (Director of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law), Patrick Kinsch (University of Luxembourg), Catherine Kessedjian (University Paris II Panthéon-Assas, Emerita), Jan Klabbers (University of Helsinki, TBC), Antonio Leandro (University of Bari), Alex Mills (University College London), Etienne Pataut (University Paris I – Panthéon-Sorbonne), Andrea Schulz (German Federal Ministry of Justice), Jean-Marc Thouvenin (University of Paris Nanterre; Secretary-General of The Hague Academy of International Law), Chiara Tuo (University of Genova), Hans van Loon (former Secretary-General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law), and Jan Wouters (KU Leuven).

A roundtable on “The role of IGOs in the elaboration, implementation and coordination of private international law treaties”, chaired by Fausto Pocar (University of Milan, Emeritus), will feature interventions by Luca Castellani (Secretary of Working Group IV (Electronic Commerce) – Uncitral), Nicolas Nord (Secretary-General of the International Commission on Civil Status), Andreas Stein (Head of Unit (Civil Justice) at the European Commission Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers – Civil and commercial justice) and Ignacio Tirado (Secretary-General of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (Unidroit), among others.

A key-note speech will be delivered by Maciej Szpunar (Judge at the Court of Justice of the European Union, TBC). Closing remarks will be provided by Stefania Bariatti (University of Milan).

The conference, in English, will be on-site only.

See the full programme and the registration form. Early bird rates are offered to those registering before 6 March 2023.

For further information: pietro.franzina@unicatt.it.

New law on International Commercial Arbitration in Greece

A new law on international commercial arbitration was published on the 4th of February in Greece. It is the fruit of the efforts by a committee established by the Ministry of Justice. The previous law nr. 2735/1999 is abolished.

The new law nr. 5016/2023 consists of 59 articles, whereas the predecessor had only 37 articles. Both laws are based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The main novelties of the recent law are the following:

  • Article 11 covers the issue of the validity of the arbitration agreement.
  • Article 16 introduces a provision for multiparty arbitration.
  • Article 22 regulates the issue of the arbitrator’s liability.
  • Article 24 introduces a provision for the unification of multiple arbitrations.
  • Article 35 contains a special rule for the production of documents and the submission of evidence.
  • Last but not least, Article 46 sets the stage for the foundation of Arbitration Centers by private companies or public law corporations, such as Bar Associations. Some of them have already established Arbitration Centers (mostly if not exclusively for purely domestic disputes) in the major cities of the country, such as Athens and Thessaloniki. The new law grants them access to international commercial disputes.

Chinese judgment on the third-party funding in arbitration

Wang Jingru, Wuhan University Institute of International Law

Background

In November 2022, Beijing Fourth Intermediate People’s Court delivered the landmark decision in Ruili Airlines Co. Ltd. and Others v. CLC Aircraft Leasing (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. For the first instance, the Chinese court confirmed the legitimacy of third-party funding in arbitration and clarified the standard of review regarding the challenge towards it.

In 2021, the CIETAC rendered an arbitral award addressing the dispute arising from an aircraft leasing agreement. In this case, the claimant, CLC Aircraft Leasing (Tianjin) Co., Ltd., was funded by a third-party funder, IMF Bentham Limited. The respondents, Ruili Airlines Co. Ltd. (Ruili Airlines), Yunnan Jingcheng Group Co., Ltd. and Dong Lecheng, opposed enforcement of the award before Wuxi Intermediate People’s Court .[i] After being dismissed by the Wuxi Court, the respondents challenged the arbitral award before Beijing Fourth Intermediate People’s Court and were again dismissed.[ii]

Legal Issues

The respondents challenged the arbitral awards based on four grounds: first, the composition of the tribunal was not in accordance with the arbitration rules; second, the claimant and the tribunal breached the principle of confidentiality for disclosing information to the third-party funder; third, the tribunal failed to bear the parties fair opportunity to present the case; fourth, the arbitral award infringed the social public interest.[iii] The court reviewed the challenge under Article 281 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law, which dealt with the challenge to foreign-related arbitral awards. Given our focus on third-party funding, this note only discussed the first two grounds.

Composition of the Tribunal

The respondents submitted that Rollin Chan, the arbitrator appointed by the claimant, was affiliated with the Nixon Peabody CWL, a Hong Kong law firm which had a significant relationship with the funder, IMF Bentham Limited. The Nixon Peabody CWL Law Firm had provided legal services to HSBC Group and JP Morgan Group, which were actual controllers of IMF Bentham Limited’s two main shareholders, HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited and JP Morgan Nominees Australia Limited. The respondents argued that this relationship fell within the arbitrator’s obligation to disclose. However, neither did Rollin Chan disclose the relationship nor did he resign, which raised justifiable doubts about his independence and impartiality.

The court first pointed out that the current law did not prohibit third-party funding arbitration. The third-party funding and the funder’s relationship with the arbitrator are related to the credibility of arbitration and the integrity of the award. Therefore, the court’s analysis focused on the challenge to the arbitrator and the disclosure of the third-party funder.

As explained by the court, the mechanism of challenge to arbitrators intended to eliminate the arbitrators with conflicts of interest which might undermine the fair trial and decision. The disclosure obligation requires the arbitrators to disclose any fact within their knowledge regarding their relationship with the case, the parties, members of the tribunal or other situations which may raise justifiable doubts about their independence and impartiality to the parties and the arbitration institution. Meanwhile, the court stressed that the arbitrators’ obligation to disclose should be based on their knowledge of potential conflicts of interest which may give rise to justifiable doubts about their independence and impartiality. Arbitrators could be challenged based on grounds specified by law or arbitration rules. If the relations were not known to the arbitrators and were insufficient to undermine the independence and impartiality of the arbitration, the arbitrator would not breach the duty for not disclosing the relationship. Likewise, there would be no violation against the provision of challenge to arbitrators.

In this case, the court found that Rollin Chan was a consultant of Nixon Peabody CWL instead of an associate or a partner who got dividends. He was based in Shanghai instead of Hong Kong. He did not engage in office matters and did not know about the dealings between Nixon Peabody CWL and IMF’s shareholders, as well as their actual controllers. Also, it was confirmed that none of them had been Nixon Peabody CWL’s clients. While they could connect with Nixon Peabody law firms in other regions, those law firms were independent of Nixon Peabody CWL. Nixon Peabody was an international lawyer network. Law firms within the network were separate entities subject to respective supervision of different jurisdictions. These law firms did not share client information or financial income. The respondents presented evidence to expose the business relationship between Nixon Peabody LLP (US) and HSBC (US), JP Morgan (US). However, the evidence mistook Nixon Peabody LLP (US) for Nixon Peabody CWL (HK). Also, HSBC (US) and JP Morgan (US) were different from the funder’s shareholders, HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited and JP Morgan Nominees Australia Limited. Therefore, the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove the conflicts of interest or create a ground for challenge.

The court confirmed that the civil party had the legitimate right to accept third-party funding. Such a choice shall be respected as long as the arrangement does not breach the law or undermine the integrity of the award. In the absence of guidance on the disclosure of third-party funding, it is encourageable for the party to disclose the existence of third-party funding, which assists the parties in exercising their right based on the information.

Confidentiality

The respondents submitted that the third-party funder got information on the procedure and merits of the case. Considering that the funder was a listed company, the outcome of the case could be disclosed to the public. Therefore, the claimant and the tribunal breach the principle of confidentiality.

As acknowledged by the claimant, information including the procedural arrangement and the arbitral award was shared with the funder. For this issue, the court clarified that the key to confidentiality was withholding the information from the public so as to protect the parties’ commercial secrets and social image. While the arbitration rules prohibit disclosure to the “outsider”, information can be shared with the people concerned. In practice, the people concerned, such as the secretary of the tribunal and the parties’ shareholders who had significant interest in the case, could gain information about the arbitration, even though such disclosure was not explicitly allowed by the arbitration rules. Since the current rules did not preclude third-party funders from sponsoring the parties to engage in arbitration, the establishment of a funding relationship did not violate the principle of confidentiality.

Comments

Supporters of third-party funding argue that this mechanism could promote access to justice for impecunious parties and help the parties to overcome liquidity issues,[iv] which makes it an essential complement to the arbitration market. However, despite the fact that the third-party funding in arbitration has somewhat become a common phenomenon, worries about its adverse influence on arbitration are not unfounded. Third-party funders are stimulated by the economic interest directly connected to the outcome of the arbitration. To secure the recovery and maximize the profit, third-party funders may recommend counsel or arbitrators with whom they are familiar to the parties. They may also precipitate the “claim inflation” which exceeds the real loss of the funded party.[v] The third-party funding raises debate on its legitimacy and brings novel questions to be answered.

In this case, the Chinese court directly clarified the legitimacy of third-party funding and the standard of review. With the ambition to build up an attractive arbitral seat, China takes a rather friendly position to embrace this fast-growing mechanism. The court confirmed that third-party funding was not forbidden by the current law. Accordingly, it is natural to disclose relevant information to the third-party funder which is not viewed as a breach of confidentiality. The challenge to third-party funding will be assessed case by case. The arbitral award can only be set aside if third-party funding hinders the arbitration proceedings or undermine the integrity of the arbitral awards. The decision also shed some light on procedural control over third-party funding arbitration. The court held that the relationship between the arbitrator and third-party funder could also give rise to justifiable doubts about the arbitrator’s independence and impartiality. Besides, without explicit guidance of law, the court encouraged the funded party to disclose the existence of third-party funding, which was consistent with the common anticipation of arbitration practitioners.[vi] Whilst a single decision is not required to address everything, the way forward remains to be seen.

[i] See Ruili Airlines Co. Ltd. and Others v. CLC Aircraft Leasing (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. (2022) Su 02 Zhi Yi No. 14.

[ii] See Ruili Airlines Co. Ltd. and Others v. CLC Aircraft Leasing (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. (2022) Jing 04 Min Te No. 368.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] See Marie Stoyanov and Olga Owczarek, ‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: Is it Time for Some Soft Rules?’ (2015) 2(1) BCDR International Arbitration Review 171, 172.

[v] See John Beechey, ‘The Pandora’s Box of Third-Party Funding: Some Practical Suggestions for Arbitrators in Light of Recent Developments’ (2019) 20 ICCA Congress Series 558, 573.

[vi] See School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary University of London, 2015 Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration, available at: https://arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/2015/index.html.