Views
The Nigerian Court of Appeal recognises the Immunity of the President of the Commission of ECOWAS from being impleaded in Nigerian courts
This is a case note on the very recent Nigerian Court of Appeal’s decision that recognised the immunity of the President of the Commission of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) from being impleaded in Nigerian courts.[1]
In Nigeria, the applicable law in respect of diplomatic immunities and privileges is the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act, which implements aspects of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 (the “Vienna Convention”). Under the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act, foreign envoys, consular officers, members of their families, and members of their official and domestic staff are generally entitled to immunity from suit and legal process.[2] Such immunities may also apply to organisations declared by the Minister of External Affairs to be organisations, the members of which are sovereign powers (whether foreign powers or Commonwealth countries or the Governments thereof).[3]
Where a dispute arises as to whether any organisation or any person is entitled to immunity from suit and legal process, a certificate issued by the Minister stating any fact relevant to that question shall be conclusive evidence of that fact.[4]
In a very recent case the claimant/respondent who was a staff of the Commission of ECOWAS sued the defendant/appellant in the National Industrial Court in Nigeria for orders declaring his suspension from office by the Commission unlawful and a violation of ECOWAS Regulations, and damages from the defendant/appellant for publishing what the claimant/respondent considered a “libelous” suspension letter. The defendant/appellant responded to the suit with a statement of defence and equally filed a motion of notice objecting to the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court on grounds of diplomatic immunity he enjoys from proceedings in municipal courts of Nigeria by virtue of the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of ECOWAS and the Headquarters Agreement between ECOWAS and the Government of the Republic of Nigeria. He also placed reliance on Principles of Staff Employment and ECOWAS staff Regulations. In addition he attached a certificate from Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs which acknowledged his diplomatic immunity.
The trial court (Haastrup J) held that it had jurisdiction and dismissed the preliminary objection of the defendant/appellant. It relied on Section 254C (2)[5] of the 1999 Constitution (as amended in 2011) and Order 14A Rule 1 (1)[6] of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria(Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 to hold that the National Industrial Court had jurisdiction to resolve all employment matters in Nigeria, including cases that have an international element.
The Nigerian Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal. Ugo JCA in his leading judgment held as follows:
“So this Certificate of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria attached to the affidavit of Chika Onyewuchi in support of appellant’s application/objection before the trial National Industrial Court for the striking out of the suit is sufficient and in fact conclusive evidence of the immunity claimed by appellant. That also includes the statement of the Minister in paragraph 2 of the same certificate that the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 was “ratified by the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 1st July, 1994,” thus, putting paid to the trial Judge’s contention that appellant needed to prove that the said treaty was ratified by Nigeria for him to properly claim immunity.
Even Section 254C(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which states that ‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, the National Industrial Court shall have the jurisdiction and power to deal with any matter connected with or pertaining to the application of any international convention, treaty or protocol of which Nigeria has ratified relating to labour, employment, workplace, industrial relations or matters connected therewith,’ does not by any means have the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court over diplomats. In fact Section 254C(2) of the 1999 Constitution, as was correctly argued by Mr. Obi, only confers on the National Industrial Court power to apply international conventions, protocols and treaties ratified by Nigeria relating to labour, employment, workplace, industrial relations and matters connected therewith while exercising its jurisdiction over persons subject to its jurisdiction. Diplomats who enjoy immunity from Court processes from municipal Courts in Nigeria like the Respondent are not such persons. Incidentally, the apex Court in African Reinsurance Corporation v. Abate Fantaye (1986) 3 NWLR (PT 32) 811 in very similar circumstances conclusively put to rest this issue of immunity from proceedings in municipal Courts enjoyed by persons like appellant. That case was cited to the trial Judge so it is surprising that she did not make even the slightest reference to it in expanding her jurisdiction to appellant who has always insisted, correctly, on his immunity. In truth, the lower Court did not simply expound its jurisdiction but attempted to expand it too. A Court is competent when, among others, the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction…
Appellant’s diplomatic status and his consequent immunity from proceedings in the Courts of this country was such a feature that prevented the National Industrial Court from exercising jurisdiction over him and Suit No. NICN/ABJ/230/2019 of respondent; it was therefore wrong in holding otherwise and dismissing his preliminary objection…”[7]
Adah JCA in his concurring judgment held as follows:
“The Appellant, being an international organization enjoys immunity from suit and legal process, both by virtue of Section 11 and 18 of the 1962 Act, and Certificate issued by the Minister of External Affairs. Where a sovereign or International Organization enjoys immunity from suit and legal process, waiver of such immunity is not to be presumed against it. Indeed, the presumption is that there is no waiver until the contrary is established. Thus, waiver of immunity by a Sovereign or International Organization must be expressly and positively done by that Sovereign or International Organization.
In the instant case, the appellant from the record before the Court is an international organization. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Nigeria had given a certificate to indicate the immunity of the appellant. Exhibit CA issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16th January, 2020 in paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof state as follows:
“2. The ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to reaffirm the status of the ECOWAS Commission as an international organization and the immunity and privileges of the Commission and its staff members with exception of Nigerians and holders of Nigeria permanent residency from Criminal, Civil and Administrative proceedings by virtue of ECOWAS Revised Treaty by of 1993, which was ratified by the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 1st July, 1994.
3. The Headquarters Agreement between the ECOWAS Commission and the Federal Republic of Nigeria also confers immunity on officials and other employees of ECOWAS by virtue of Article VII (3) (C) of the Agreement.”
It is very clear therefore, that the appellant is covered by the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act and is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts. The fact that their base is in Nigeria or that Nigeria is the Host Country of the appellant does not make the appellant subserviate to the jurisdiction of Nigerian Courts. It is therefore, the law as stated lucidly in the leading judgment of my learned brother that the lower Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim against the appellant…”[8]
This is not the first time Nigerian courts have dealt with the issue of impleading a diplomat or foreign sovereign before the Nigerian court.[9] The decision of the trial judge was surprising in view of the weight of authorities from the Nigerian Supreme Court and Court of Appeal on the concept of diplomatic immunities in Nigeria. The claimant/respondent may have argued that matters of employment qualify as waiver of diplomatic immunity, but this position has never been explicitly endorsed by Nigerian courts. The Supreme Court of Nigeria has only accepted the concept of waiver in situations where the person claiming immunity entered into commercial transactions with the claimant.[10]
Looking at the bigger picture how does an employee who has been unfairly dismissed by a diplomatic organisation gain access to justice in Nigerian and African courts? Should the law be reformed in Nigeria and African countries to take into account the interest of employees as weaker parties?
[1] President of the Commission of ECOWAS v Ndiaye (2021) LPELR-53523(CA).
[2]Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act, Cap D9 LFN 2004 ss 1, 3-6.
[3]ibid, ss 11 and 12.
[4]ibid, s 18.
[5] ‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, the National Industrial Court shall have the jurisdiction and power to deal with any matter connected with or pertaining to the application of any international convention, treaty or protocol of which Nigeria has ratified relating to labour, employment, workplace, industrial relations or matters connected therewith.’
[6] It provides that:
1.—(1) Where an action involves a breach of or non-compliance with an international protocol, a convention or treaty on labour, employment and industrial relations, the Claimant shall in the complaint and witness statement on oath, include,
(a) the name, date and nomenclature of the protocol, convention or treaty ; and
(b) proof of ratification of such protocol, convention or treaty by Nigeria.
(2) In any claim relating to or connected with any matter, the party relying on the International Best Practice, shall plead and prove the existence of the same in line with the provisions relating to proof of custom in the extant Evidence Act.”
[7] President of the Commission of ECOWAS v Ndiaye (2021) LPELR-53523(CA) 19-20.
[8] Ibid 24-26.
[9] See generally CSA Okoli and RF Oppong, Private International Law in Nigeria (Hart, Oxford, 2020) (chapter 7).
[10]African Reinsurance Corporation v JDP Construction (Nig) Ltd (2007) 11 NWLR 224, 234-5 (Akintan JSC)..
The Time is Ripe? Proposed Regulation of Third Party Litigation Funding in the European Union
The Time is Ripe? Proposed Regulation of Third Party Litigation Funding in the European Union
Written by Adrian Cordina, PhD researcher at Erasmus School of Law, project member of the Vici project ‘Affordable Access to Justice’ which deals with costs and funding of civil litigation, financed by the Dutch Research Council (NWO).
The question of how to fund litigation is an essential precondition for civil justice systems. While in some countries like Australia third party litigation funding (TPLF) has been developing for decades, in Europe too TPLF is now on the rise, particularly in international arbitration and collective actions. This has also caught the attention of the European legislator.
On the 17th of June 2021 the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs published a Draft Report with recommendations to the Commission on Responsible Private Funding of Litigation (TPLF). This follows the February 2021 European Parliament Research Service Study on the same matter. TPLF is the funding of litigation by an external third party in return for a share of the proceeds in case of success and is a growing commercial practice. The Draft highlights that TPLF in the EU is however currently operating in a ‘regulatory vacuum’, as it is not only present in consumer collective redress cases, in which case specific funding rules have already been enacted through the Directive (EU) 2020/1929 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers [Representative Actions Directive (RAD)].
While recognising the role TPLF plays in facilitating access to justice where otherwise not available due to the costs and risks of litigation, the Draft attempts to provide proposals on how to tackle the risks and concerns TPLF gives rise to. It focuses especially on the conflicts of interest between the litigation funders and the claimants, more specifically on the economic interest of the funder, which could drive the funder to demand excessive shares of the proceeds and to control the litigation process.
Similarly to the RAD, the Draft contains recommendations that it should be ensured that decisions in the relevant legal proceedings, including decisions on settlement, are not influenced in any way by the litigation funders and that courts or administrative authorities be empowered to require disclosure of information on third-party litigation funding.
Amongst the main recommendations which go beyond the funding rules in the RAD is that of establishing a system of supervisory authorities in each Member State which permits TPLF. These would grant authorisations and require that litigation funders comply with minimum criteria of governance, transparency, capital adequacy and observance of a fiduciary duty to claimants. Article 5 also proposes that third-party funding agreements need to comply with the laws of the Member State of the litigation proceedings or of the claimant, which could create problems if claimants and/or intended beneficiaries are from different Member States, from outside the EU or if one Member State prohibits TPLF in cross-border litigation.
It also contains recommendations on funding agreements being worded transparently, clearly and in simple language, on capping the return rate to the litigation funder at 40%, and on, subject to exceptions, preventing litigation funders from withdrawing funding midway through proceedings.
The debate on TPLF in Europe has only in recent years started to take the limelight in civil justice academia (see e.g. Kramer & Tillema 2020; Tzankova & Kramer 2021). That this topic is garnering attention is also evidenced by the September 2021 survey commissioned by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform on Consumer Attitudes on TPLF and its regulation in the EU. While the complex matter of TPLF is in need of further research and reflection, considering developments in legal practice perhaps now indeed the time is also ripe for regulatory discussions.
Can a Foreign Company that is not registered in Nigeria maintain an action in Nigerian Courts (Part 2)?
This is an update on my previous blog post here
Capacity to sue and be sued is an important aspect of conflict of laws. It connects very well with the issue of access to justice. For example if a foreign company that does business with a Nigerian company cannot sue in Nigeria it can result in injustice, and lead to loss of confidence in doing transactions with parties located in the Nigerian legal system.
Why is the above topic important? Having undertaken further research, it can be said that Nigerian court decisions are not consistent on the issue of capacity of a foreign company to sue and be sued in Nigeria. The latest reported authoritative source from the Nigerian Supreme Court is that by virtue of Section 54 and 55 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 Cap C20 (now Section 78 and 79 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020), a foreign company that carries on business in Nigeria without being registered as a Nigerian company carries out an illegal and void transaction, and thus such a contract cannot be enforced in Nigerian courts.[1] In effect, the provision of Section 60(b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 Cap C20 (now Section 84(b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020) cannot avail the foreign company in granting it the capacity to sue in Nigeria to enforce a contract where it carries on business in Nigeria without registering as a foreign company.[2] It is only where the foreign company that is not registered in Nigeria enters into a contract with a Nigerian company, while not doing business in Nigeria, will such a contract be enforceable in Nigeria.[3] The key word is thus doing business in Nigeria in determining whether a foreign company that is not registered in Nigeria can sue or be sued in Nigeria. This decision has now been confirmed by a very recent Court of Appeal decision, though in the instant case it was held that the foreign company was not carrying out business in Nigeria (it was a single transaction), so the contract was enforceable in Nigeria.[4]
Yet this current position of Nigerian law is strange and appears to contrast with the law in other common law countries including common law African countries. The recent position of the Nigerian Supreme Court also appears to contrast with previous decisions of Nigerian appellate courts that held that foreign companies could sue and be sued in Nigeria irrespective of whether they are carrying on business in Nigeria.[5]
This aspect of law requires further reflection as it is now an important and controversial aspect of Nigerian law. Dr Abubakri Yekini and I plan to write a full blown article on this interesting subject. Please stay tuned!
[1] Citec Intl Estates Ltd. v. E. Intl Inc. and Associates (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 332, 357 – 364 (Eko JSC)
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Mocoh SA & Anor v. Shield Energy Ltd & Anor (2021) LPELR-54559(CA).
[5]INFAZ v COBEC (Nig) Ltd (2018) 12 NWLR Pt. 1632) 127; Bank of Baroda v Iyalabani Company Ltd (2002) 13 NWLR 551. See also Watanmal (Singapore) Pte Ltd v. Liz Olofin and Company Plc (1997) LPELR-6224(CA) 13 (Musdapher JCA as he then was); NU Metro Retail (Nig) Ltd v. Tradex S.R.L & Another (2017) LPELR-42329(CA) 41-2 (Garba JCA as he then was).
News
“Who’s Afraid of Punitive Damages?” – Now in Hybrid Format
Due to massive strikes in Germany’s public transport sector, we have made the decision to move the conference on “Who’s Afraid of Punitive Damages?”, to take place in Augsburg on 8/9 March (originally announced here), to a hybrid format.
Accordingly, everyone interested in the topic is welcome to join some (or all) presentations via this Zoom link (ID: 624 2497 5622; password: &ZB&%1).
The latest version of the conference programme can be found here.
Connection in a divided world: Rethinking ‘community’ in international law – 9th Annual T.M.C. Asser Lecture, 25 April 2024
On 25 April, Fleur Johns (University of New South Wales) will deliver the 9th Annual T.M.C. Asser Lecture at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands. The organizers have kindly shared the following abstract (and this invitation) with us.
The concept of ‘community’ (as in the ‘international community’ or the ‘community of nations’) has been a cornerstone of international law, sometimes aiding the articulation and promotion of public interests. For example, recent attempts to forge international agreement on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response have been spurred by governments acknowledging ‘the catastrophic failure of the international community’ to ensure solidarity and equity in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
And lately, international legal litigants have invoked ‘community interest’ in seeking to hold states accountable for alleged violations of international law. Such claims have been central to recent proceedings brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging genocide or torture: by The Gambia against Myanmar; by Canada and the Netherlands against the Syrian Republic; and by South Africa against Israel.
Nonetheless, international legal notions of ‘community’ have also served racist, exclusionary purposes. The 19th century international lawyer James Lorimer famously argued that some religious and racialised peoples could never be full members of a community of nations under international law. Current international legal vocabularies, such as the ICJ Statute’s reference to the ‘law recognized by civilized nations’ for example, remain redolent of this racist idea of community-as-privilege.
In view of their ambivalence, claims about ‘international community’ should be made with caution. They often imply commonality of experience and shared value on a global scale when the experiences and values at issue may, in fact, be partial or contested, perhaps increasingly so. Digital technologies have changed how nations and peoples are brought together or connect, creating new disparities between those made more vulnerable to violence and injustice by digital connectivity, and those who benefit from the uneven global spread of computation.
This lecture will examine the concept of ‘community’ in today’s international law, especially in the context of humanitarianism and the growing use of technology. We will revisit key texts such as Georges Abi-Saab’s 1998 article, ‘Whither the International Community?‘. Ideas of ‘community’ have long played a role in making insiders and outsiders in international law, and continue to do so. Yet techniques of community-making in international law may nevertheless present egalitarian possibilities—or so this lecture will show.
Seats can be booked via this link.
Workshop on International Investment Contracts in Lillehammer, December 2024
On 6 December 2024, Yuliya Chernykh (Norway University of Applied Sciences) is going to host a workshop on international investment contracts in Lillehammer, Norway. She has kindly shared the Call for Abstracts with us.