Views
There and Back Again? – The unexpected journey of EU-UK Judicial Cooperation finally leads to The Hague
by Achim Czubaiko, Research Fellow („Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter“) and PhD Candidate, supported by the German Scholarship Foundation, Institute for German and International Civil Procedural Law, University of Bonn.
Union Jack and European Union flag 2012 © Dave Kellam (CC BY-SA 2.0 Deed)
Today marks a significant step towards the reconstruction of EU-UK Judicial Cooperation. As neither House of Parliament has raised an objection by 17 May 2024,[1] the way seems to be paved for the Government’s ambitious plans to have the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention[2] implemented and ratified by the end of June 2024.[3] For the first time since the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (so-called Brexit) on 31 January 2020, a general multilateral instrument would thus once again be put in place to govern the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters across the English Channel.
We wish to take this opportunity to look back on the eventful journey that the European Union and the United Kingdom have embarked on in judicial cooperation since Brexit (I.) as well as to venture a look ahead on what may be expected from the prospective collaboration within and perhaps even alongside the HCCH system (II.).
I. From Brexit to The Hague (2016-2024)
When the former Prime Minister and current Foreign Secretary David Cameron set the date for the EU referendum on 23 June 2016, this was widely regarded as just a political move to ensure support for the outcome of his renegotiations of the terms of continued membership in the European Union.[4] However, as the referendum results showed 51.9% of voters were actually in favour of leaving,[5] it became apparent that Downing Street had significantly underestimated the level of voter mobilisation achieved by the Vote Leave campaign. Through the effective adoption of their alluring “take back control” slogan, the Eurosceptics succeeded in framing European integration as undermining Britain’s sovereignty – criticising inter alia a purportedly dominant role of the Court of Justice (CJEU) – while simultaneously conveying a positive sentiment for the United Kingdom’s future as an autonomous country[6] – albeit on the basis of sometimes more than questionable arguments.[7]
http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html
Whatever the economic or political advantages of such a repositioning might be (if any at all), it proved to be a severe setback in terms of judicial cooperation. Since most – if not all – of the important developments with respect to civil and commercial matters[8]in this area were achieved within the framework of EU Private International Law (PIL) (e.g. Brussels Ibis, Rome I-II etc.), hopes were high that some of these advantages would be preserved in the subsequent negotiations on the future relationship after Brexit.[9] A period of uncertainty in forum planning for cross-border transactions followed, as it required several rounds of negotiations between EU Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier and his changing UK counterparts (David Frost served for the final stage from 2019-2020) to discuss both the Withdrawal Agreement[10] as well as the consecutive Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA).[11] While the first extended the applicability of the relevant EU PIL Regulations for proceedings instituted, contracts concluded or events occurred during the transition period until 31 December 2020,[12] the latter contained from that point onwards effectively no provision for these matters, with the exception of the enforcement of intellectual property rights.[13] Thus, with regard to civil judicial cooperation, the process of leaving the EU led to – what is eloquently referred to elsewhere as – a “sectoral hard Brexit”.[14]
With no tailor-made agreement in place, the state of EU-UK judicial cooperation technically fell back to the level of 1973 before the UK’s accession to the European Communities. In fact, – in addition to the cases from the transition period – the choice of law rules of the Rome I and Rome II-Regulations previously incorporated into the domestic law, remained applicable as so-called retained EU law (REUL) due to their universal character (loi uniforme).[15] However, this approach was not appropriate for legal acts revolving around the principle of reciprocity, particularly in International Civil Procedure.[16] Hence, a legal stocktaking was required in order to assess how Brexit affected the status of those pre-existing multilateral conventions and bilateral agreements with EU Member States that had previously been superseded by EU law.
First, the UK Government has been exemplary in ensuring the “seamless continuity” of the HCCH 2005 Choice of Court Convention throughout the uncertainties of the whole withdrawal process, as evidenced by the UK’s declarations and Note Verbale to the depositary Kingdom of the Netherlands.[17] The same applies mutatis mutandis to the HCCH 1965 Service Convention, to which all EU Member States are parties, and the HCCH 1970 Evidence Convention, which has only been ratified so far by 23 EU Member States. Second, some doubts arose regarding an ipso iure revival of the original Brussels Convention of 1968,[18] the international treaty concluded on the occasion of EU membership and later replaced by the Brussels I Regulation when the EU acquired the respective competence under the Treaty of Amsterdam.[19] Notwithstanding the interesting jurisprudential debate, these speculations were effectively put to a halt in legal practice by a clarifying letter of the UK Mission to the European Union.[20] Third, there are a number of bilateral agreements with EU Member States that could be reapplied, although these can hardly substitute for the Brussels regime, which covers most of the continental jurisdictions.[21] This is, for example, the position of the German government and courts regarding the German-British Convention of 1928.[22]
It is evident that this legal patchwork is not desirable for a major economy that wants to provide for legal certainty in cross-border trade, which is why the UK Government at an early stage sought to enter into a more specific framework with the European Union. First and foremost, the Johnson Ministry was dedicated to re-access the Lugano Convention[23] which extended the Brussels regime to certain Member States of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)/European Economic Area (EEA) in its own right.[24] Given the strong resentments Brexiteers showed against the CJEU during their campaign this move is not without a certain irony, as its case law is also crucial to the uniform interpretation of the Lugano Convention.[25] Whereas Switzerland, Iceland and Norway gave their approval, the European Commission answered the UK’s application in the negative and referred to the HCCH Conventions as the “framework for cooperation with third countries”.[26] What some may view as a power play by EU bureaucrats could also fairly be described as a necessary rebalancing of trust and control due to the comparatively weaker economic and in particular judicial integration with the United Kingdom post-Brexit.[27] At the very least, the reference to the HCCH reflects the consistent European practice in other agreements with third countries.[28]
Be that as it may, if His Majesty’s Government implements its ratification plan as diligently as promised, the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention may well be the first new building block in the reconstruction what has been significantly shattered on both sides by the twists and turns of Brexit.
II. (Prospective) Terms of Judicial Cooperation
Even if the path of EU-UK Judicial Cooperation has eventually led to The Hague, there is still a considerable leeway in the implementation of international common rules.
Fortunately, the UK Government has already put forward a roadmap for the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention in its responses to the formal consultation carried out from 15 December 2022 to 9 February 2023[29] as well as the explanatory memorandum to the Draft Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments Regulations 2024.[30] Generally speaking, the UK Government wants to implement the HCCH Convention for all jurisdictions of the United Kingdom without raising any reservation limiting the scope of application. Being a devolved matter, this step requires the Central Government to obtain the approval of a Northern Ireland Department (Roinn i dTuaisceart Éireann) and the Scottish Ministers (Mhinistearan na h-Alba).[31] Furthermore, this approach also implies that there will be no comparable exclusion of insurance matters as under the HCCH 2005 Convention.[32] However, the Responses contemplated making use of the bilateralisation mechanism in relation to the Russian Federation upon its accession to the Convention.[33]
Technically, the Draft Statutory Instrument employs a registrations model that has already proven successful for most recognition and enforcement schemes applicable in the UK.[34] However, registration within one jurisdiction (e.g. England & Wales) will on this basis alone not allow for recognition and enforcement in another (e.g. Scotland, Northern Ireland), but is rather subject to re-examination by the competent court (e.g. Court of Session).[35] This already constitutes a significant difference compared to the system of automatic recognition under the Brussels regime. Moreover, the draft instrument properly circumvents the peculiar lack of an exemption from legalisation in the HCCH 2019 Convention by recognizing the seal of the court as sufficient authentication for the purposes of recognition and enforcement.[36] It remains to be seen if decisions of third states “domesticated” in the UK under the common law doctrine of obligation will be recognized as judgments within the European Union. If the CJEU extends the position taken in J. v. H Limited to the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention, the UK may become an even more attractive gateway to the EU Single Market than expected.[37] Either way, the case law of the CJEU will be mandatory for 26 Contracting States and thus once again play – albeit not binding – a dominant role in the application of the HCCH legal instrument.
As far as the other legal means of judicial cooperation are concerned, the House of Lords does not yet appear to have given up on accession to the Lugano Convention.[38] Nevertheless, it seems more promising to place one’s hopes on continued collaboration within the framework of the HCCH. This involves working towards the reconstruction of the remaining foundational elements previously present in EU-UK Judicial Cooperation by strengthening the HCCH Jurisdiction Project and further promoting the HCCH 1970 Evidence Convention in the EU.
III. Conclusion and Outlook
After all, the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union has dealt a serious blow to judicial cooperation across the English Channel. A look back at the history of Brexit and the subsequent negotiations has revealed that the separation process is associated with an enormous loss of trust. Neither could the parties agree on a specific set of rules under the TCA, nor was the European Union willing to welcome the United Kingdom back to the Lugano Convention.
Against this background, it is encouraging to see that both parties have finally agreed on the HCCH as a suitable and mutually acceptable forum to discuss the future direction of EU-UK Judicial Cooperation. If Brexit ultimately brought about a reinvigorated commitment of the United Kingdom to the HCCH Project, this might even serve as an inspiration for other States to further advance the Hague Conference’s ambitious goal of global judicial cooperation. Then the prophecies of the old songs would have turned out to be true, after a fashion. Thank goodness!
[1] HL Int. Agreements Committee, 11th Report of 8 May 2024 “Scrutiny of international agreements: 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters” (HL Paper 113), para. 1. According to sec. 20 (1) (a) and (2) of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (c. 25) is a treaty not ratified unless a Minister of the Crown has laid a copy before parliament for a period of 21 sitting days.
[2] Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters (HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention) of 2 July 2019, UNTS I-58036 and Tractatenblad 2024, 42 (Verdragsnr. 013672).
[3] Civil Procedure Rule Committee, Minutes of 1 December 2023, para. 28
[4] See inter alia, Mason, “How did UK end up voting to leave the European Union?”, The Guardian of 24 June 2016; Boffey, “Cameron did not think EU referendum would happen, says Tusk”, The Guardian of 21 January 2019; Duff, “David Cameron’s EU reform claims: If not ‘ever closer union’, what?”, Blogpost of 26 January 2016 on Verfassungsblog | On Matters Constitutional; von Lucke, “Brexit oder: Die verzockte Demokratie”, Blätter 8/2016, 5 et seq.
[5] UK Electoral Commission, “23 June 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union”, Report of September 2016, p 6.
[6] Compare Haughton, “Ruling Divisions: The Politics of Brexit”, Perspectives on Politics 19 (2021), 1258, 1260; Özlem Atikcan/Nadeau/Bélanger, “Framing Risky Choices: Brexit and the Dynamics of High-stakes Referendums”, p. 44.
[7] E.g. Rankin, “Is the leave campaign really telling six lies?”, The Guardian of 7 June 2016.
[8] This finding might look different for International Family Law, according to Beaumont, “Private International Law concerning Children in the UK after Brexit: Comparing Hague Treaty Law with EU Regulations”, Child & Fam. L. Q. 29 (2017), 213, 232: “In all these matters students, practitioners and judges will be grateful to have fewer operative legal regimes post-Brexit”.
[9] For example, on this blog Fitchen, “Brexit: No need to stop all the clocks”, Blogpost of 31 January 2020 or Lutzi, “Brexit: The Spectre of Reciprocity Evoked Before German Courts”, Blogpost of 13 December 2020.
[10] Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (Withdrawal Agreement) of 24 January 2020, OJ EU CI 384/1.
[11] Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part (TCA) of 30 December 2020, OJ EU L 149/10.
[12] Art. 126 of the Withdrawal Agreement.
[13] Compare Chapter 3: Art. 256-273 of the TCA.
[14] Bert, “Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters: Hard Brexit After All?”, Blogpost of 26 December 2020 on Dispute Re§olution Germany.
[15] Sec. 3 (1) European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, Chapter 16/2018, sec. 10, 11 The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and Non-Contractual Obligations (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/834; For the current status of the Retained EU Law, see House of Commons Library “The end of REUL? – Progress in reforming retained EU law”, Research Briefing No.°09957 of 2 February 2024 (author: Leigh Gibson).
[16] Implicitly Dickinson, “Realignment of the Planets – Brexit and European Private International Law”, IPRax 2021, 213, 217 et seq.
[17] See Notes Verbales of the United Kingdom to the Kingdom of the Netherlands in its capacity as depositary of the HCCH 2005 Judments Convention from 28 December 2018 to 28 September 2020 in the Treaty Database.
[18] Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matter (Brussels Convention) of 27 September 1968, OJ EU L 229/31; See e.g. Rühl, “Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters after Brexit: Which Way Forward?”, ICLQ 67 (2018), 99, 104 et seq.
[19] Art. 73m of the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts of 2 October 1997, OJ EU C 340/1.
[20] UK Mission to the European Union, Letter to the Council of the European Union of 29 January 2021, NO 17/2021.
[21] See, for example, the Agreement on the continued Application and Amendment of the Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Norway providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters singed at London on 12 June 1961, SI 2020 No. 1338.
[22] Convention on the Facilitation of Legal Proceedings in Civil and Commercial Matters between His Majesty and the President of the German Reich of 20 March 1928; RGBl. 1928 II Nr. 47; for the position of the German Government, please refer to German Federal Government “Response to the parliamentary enquiry on judicial cooperation in civil matters with the United Kingdom post-Brexit”, BT-Drucks. 19/27550 of 12 March 2021, p. 3, for a recent decision of the German Judiciary, see Higher Regional Court of Cologne, Decision of 2 March 2023, I-18 U 188/21, paras. 60 et seq.
[23] Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Lugano Convention) of 30 October 2007, OJ EU L 339/3.
[24] With the notable exception of Liechtenstein.
[25] Art. 64 Lugano Convention as well as the Protocol concerning the interpretation by the Court of Justice of 3 June 1971, OJ EU L No°204/28.
[26] For the consent of the other Contracting State (except Denmark), see Swiss FDFA, “Communications by the depositary with respect to the application of accession by the United Kingdom”, Notification of 28 April 2021, 612-04-04-01 – LUG3/21; for the rejection of the EU Commission, Note Verbale to the Swiss Federal Council of 22 June 2021 and, “Assessment on the application of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention”, COM(2021) 222 final of 4 May 2021, pp. 3 et seq. However, this decision was not without criticism, for example by the Chair-Rapporteur of the OHCHR Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises in a letter to the EU Commission of 14 March 2024.
[27] For these arguments see EU Commission, “Assessment on the application of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention”, COM(2021) 222 final of 4 May 2021, p. 3 and European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), “The United Kingdom’s possible re-joining of the 2007 Lugano Convention” Briefing PE 698.797 of November 2021 (author: Rafa? Ma?ko), pp. 3 et seq. For a theoretical foundation, see M. Weller, “ ‘Mutual Trust’: A Suitable Foundation for Private International Law in Regional Integration Communities and Beyond”, RdC 423 (2022), 37, 295 et seq.
[28] See e.g. Art. 24 of the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other par, OJ EU No°L 161/3: “The Parties agree to facilitate further EU-Ukraine judicial cooperation in civil matters on the basis of the applicable multilateral legal instruments, especially the Conventions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in the field of international Legal Cooperation and Litigation as well as the Protection of Children”. Until recently, the regulation of judicial cooperation specifically in and for extra-EU trade relations appeared to be aout of sight, see M. Weller, “Judicial cooperation of the EU in civil matters in its relations to non-EU States – a blind spot?”, in Alan Uzelac/Rhemco van Rhee (eds.), Public and Private Justice (PPJ) 2017: The Transformation of Civil Justice, Intersentia 2018, pp. 63 et seq.
[29] UK Ministry of Justice, The Hague 2019 – Response to Consultation of 23 November 2023 (“Responses”).
[30] Draft Statutory Instruments 2024 No. XXX Private International Law: The Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments (2019 Hague Convention etc.) Regulations 2024 (“Draft Guidelines”). The competence to make regulations in that respect is based on sec. 2 (1) of the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 (c. 24). According to sec. 2 (11) read in conjunction with sched. 6 paras. 4 (2) (a) and (d) draft regulations need to be laid before parliament for approval of each House by a resolution.
[31] Sec. 2 (12) Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 (c. 24); see also Letter from the Scottish Minister for Victims and Community Safety of 19 March 202 regarding the “UK SI Notification – The Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments (2019 Hague Convention etc) Regulations 2024”.
[32] See Response, para. 51; a similar discussion took place regarding “mixed litigation issues”, where only certain elements are within the scope of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention.
[33] Responses, para. 53.
[34] See inter alia the Administration of Justice Act 1920, Chapter 81/1920 (Regnal. 10 & 11 Geo 5) or the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, Chapter 13/1933 (Regnal. 23 & 24 Geo 5.
[35] Sec. 15 Draft Guidelines and Draft Explanatory Memorandum, para. 5.5.5.
[36] Sec. 12 Draft Guidelines; Garcimartin/Saumier, HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: Explanatory Report, para. 307.
[37] See CJEU, Judgment of 7 April 2022, J. v. H. Limited, C-568/20, para. 47. However, there is a certain chance that this case law will be corrected in the upcoming revision process of the Brussels Ibis-Regulation, see e.g. Hess/Althoff/Bens/Elsner/Järvekülg, “The Reform of the Brussels Ibis Regulation”, MPI Luxembourg Research Paper Series N.°2022 (6), proposal 15.
[38] HL Int. Agreements Committee, 11th Report of 8 May 2024 “Scrutiny of international agreements: 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters” (HL Paper 113), para. 17: “Many stakeholders have called for the Government to continue its efforts to join the Lugano Convention in addition to ratifying Hague 2019. We agree that the Government should do so.”
Way Out West? Understanding The CISG’s Application in Australia
Way out west, where the rain don’t fall
There’s a treaty for the sale of goods that’s good news for all
But you might not know it’s here
Unless you’re livin’ and a workin’ on the land …
In 2009, Associate Professor Lisa Spagnolo observed – based upon her census of Australia’s CISG case law at that time – that the Convention was effectively ‘in the Australian legal outback’. For those unfamiliar with Australia’s geography, most of its population is concentrated on the continent’s eastern coast. Australia’s outback extends, amongst other places, across much of Western Australia. With that geographic imagery in mind, one might not be surprised to hear that a recent decision of the County Court of Victoria – in Australia’s east – overlooked the Vienna Sales Convention’s application.
The circumstances in which this omission occurred are interesting, and provide a useful opportunity for Australian practitioners to learn more about the CISG’s application in Australia.
The case at issue is last year’s C P Aquaculture (India) Pvt Ltd v Aqua Star Pty Ltd [2023] VCC 2134. That case involved a sale of goods dispute (concerning prawn and shrimp) between Australian and Indian parties. Whilst the CISG has been part of Australian law since 1989, it is a well-known fact that India is not a CISG Contracting State. It is perhaps this well-known fact – taken at face value – that led the County Court of Victoria to overlook the CISG’s application.
The C P Aquaculture judgment indicates that ‘[t]he parties are agreed that the proper law of the contracts between CP (India) and Aqua Star for the sale of shrimp or prawns is Victorian law’. As recorded in the judgment, this followed from the plaintiff’s view that ‘India has not adopted the convention on contracts for the international sale of goods’, and from the defendant’s view that there was a ‘failure on the part of either part[y] to allege and prove the terms of any other law as a proper law’.
On either view, however, there is actually a very good basis for applying the CISG, rather than non-harmonised Victorian law. This case therefore represents an excellent opportunity for Australian lawyers to better understand how and why the CISG applies in Australia.
Taking the plaintiff’s position first, the fact that India has not adopted the CISG is actually not fatal to the Convention’s application. In fact, the Convention specifically provides for its application in those exact circumstances. This follows from Art. 1(1) CISG, the treaty’s key application provision:
This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State.
Where – as in C P Aquaculture – it is not the case that both parties are from Contracting States, the CISG cannot apply by virtue of Art. 1(1)(a) CISG. But it can still apply pursuant to Art. 1(1)(b) CISG. The key here is whether ‘the rules of private international law’ call for the application of a Contracting State’s law.
In an informal discussion I once had with a leading Australian barrister, I was asked ‘what does “the rules of private international law” here actually mean?’ It may be that uncertainty over the meaning of this phrase contributes to the CISG’s application being overlooked in cases like C P Aquaculture. In short, private international law rules include choice of law rules (where a sales contract is governed by a CISG State’s law because of a choice of law clause) and conflict of laws rules (where, absent party choice of law, the forum’s rules indicate that a CISG State’s law is to apply). In a way, Art. 1(1)(b) CISG might have been more easily understood by non-specialists if it read ‘when a Contracting State’s law is the governing law’. Although it doesn’t read this way, that is essentially the provision’s effect, and understanding Art. 1(1)(b) CISG accordingly may better help Australian practitioners identify cases requiring the treaty’s application.
Taking the defendant’s position second, where the law of an Australian jurisdiction governs, it is actually not necessary to ‘allege and prove’ the CISG’s terms because the CISG – despite its abstract existence as a treaty – is not foreign law. Roder Zelt-Und Hallenkonstruktionen GmbH v Rosedown Park Pty Ltd – Australia’s first ever case applying the CISG – confirmed this by explaining that the CISG is ‘part of’ Australian law and is thus ‘not to be treated as a foreign law which requires proof as a fact’.
Indeed, the Goods Act 1958 (Vic) – a statute that the defendant itself sought to rely upon in C P Aquaculture – is the very vehicle giving effect to the CISG in Victoria, via its pt IV.
All this being said, C P Aquaculture provides Australian practitioners (and lawyers representing Australian traders’ counterparts) with some useful lessons in understanding how and why the CISG applies. If the CISG really is still in the Australian legal outback, then perhaps what Australian practitioners need is a good understanding of the lay of the land. And to that end, private international law can be their map.
Dr Benjamin Hayward
Associate Professor, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash Business School
X (Twitter): @LawGuyPI
International Trade and International Commercial Law research group: @MonashITICL
Abu Dhabi Supreme Court on the Applicability of Law on Civil Marriage to Foreign Muslims
I. Introduction
Recent developments in the field of family law in the UAE, in particular the adoption of the so-called “Civil Marriage Laws”, have aroused interest, admiration, curiosity, and even doubt and critics among scholars and practitioners of family law, comparative law and private international law around the world.[1] First introduced in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi,[2] and later implemented at the federal level,[3] these “non-religious” family laws, at least as originally enacted in Abu Dhabi, primarily intend to apply to foreign non-Muslims.[4] The main stated objective of these laws is to provide foreign expatriates with a modern and flexible family law based on “principles that are in line with the best international practices” and “close to them in terms of culture, customs and language”.[5] One of the peculiar feature of these laws is that their departure from the traditional family law regulations and practices in the region, particularly in terms of gender equality in pertinent matters such as testimony, succession, no-fault divorce and joint custody.[6]
Aside from the (critical) judgment that can be made about these laws, their application raises several questions. These include, inter alia, the question as to whether these laws would apply to “foreign Muslims”, and if yes, under which conditions. The decision of the Abu Dhabi Supreme Court (hereafter “ADSC”) reported here (Ruling No. 245/2024 of 29 April 2024) shed some light on this ambiguity.
II. The Facts:
The case concerns a unilateral divorce action initiated by the husband (a French-Lebanese dual national, hereafter “X”) against his wife (a Mexican-Egyptian dual national, hereafter “Y”). Both are Muslim.
According to the facts reported in the decision, X and Y got married in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi on 11 September 2023, apparently in accordance with the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law[7] although some aspects of the Islamic tradition regarding marriage appear to have been observed.[8] On 6 November 2023, X filed an action for no-fault divorce with the Abu Dhabi Civil Family Court (hereafter ADCFC) pursuant to the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law using the prescribed form.[9] Y contested the divorce petition by challenging the jurisdiction of the court. However, the ADCFC admitted the action and declared the dissolution of the marriage. The decision was confirmed on appeal.
Y then appealed to the ADSC primarily arguing that the Court of Appeal had erred in applying the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law to declare the dissolution of the marriage because both parties were Muslim. Y’s main arguments as summarized by the ADSC are as follows:
- The Abu Dhabi courts lacked international jurisdiction because she was foreigner and did not have a place of residence in Abu Dhabi and that her domicile was in Egypt,
- The Court of Appeal rejected her argument on the ground that X had a known domicile in Abu Dhabi,
- Both parties were foreign Muslims and not concerned with the application of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law knowing that the marriage fulfilled all the necessary requirement for Islamic marriage and was concluded with the presence and the consent of Y’s matrimonial guardian (her brother in casu).
III. The Ruling
The ADSC accepted the appeal and ruled that the ADCFC was not competent to hear the dispute, stating as follows:
“Pursuant to Article 87 of the [2022 Federal Act on Civil Procedure, hereafter “FACP”], challenges to the court’s judicial jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the courts sua sponte and may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings. On appeal, Y argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because she was Muslim […] and a dual national of Mexico and Egypt, while X was also a Muslim […] and holder of French and Lebanese nationalities.
[However,] the Court of Appeal rejected Y’s arguments and confirmed its jurisdiction based on Articles 3 and 4 of [the Procedural Regulation]; [although] the opening of Article 3 relied on [by the court] states that “the court is competent to hear civil family matters for non-Muslim foreigners regarding civil marriage, divorce and their effects”. In addition, Article 1(1) of Federal Legislative Decree No. 41/2022 states that “The provisions of the present Legislative Decree shall apply to non-Muslim citizens of the UAE and to foreign non-Muslims residing in the UAE, unless they invoke the application of their own law in matters of marriage, divorce, succession, wills and establishment of filiation.”
[Given that] it was judicially established by the parties’ acknowledgement that they were Muslim, the Court of Appeal violated the Law No. 14/2021, as amended by Law No. 15/2021, and its Procedural Regulation [No. 8/2022], as well as Federal Legislative Decree No. 41/2022 by upholding the appealed decision without ascertaining the religion of the parties and ruling as it did, [therefore its decision] must be reversed”.
IV. Comments
The main legal question referred to the ADSC concerned the applicability of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation to foreign Muslims. The ADSC answered the question in the negative, stating that the ADCFC was not competent to declare the dissolution a marriage between foreign Muslims. Although the case raises some interesting issues regarding the international jurisdiction of the ADCFC, for the sake of brevity, only the question of the applicability of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law will be addressed here.
1. Unlike the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status, which explicitly states that its provisions “apply to non-Muslim UAE citizens, and to non-Muslim foreigners residing in the UAE” (article 1, emphasis added), the law in Abu Dhabi is rather ambiguous on this issue.
i. It should be indicated in this respect that, the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law, which was originally enacted as “The Personal Status for Non-Muslim Foreigners in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi” (Law No. 14/2021 of 7 November 2021, emphasis added) clearly limited its scope of application to foreign non-Muslims. This is also evident from the definition of the term “foreigner” contained in the former article 1 of the Law, according to which, the term (foreigner) was defined as “[a]ny male or female non-Muslim foreigner, having a domicile, residence or place of work in the Emirate.” Former article 3 of the Law also defined the scope of application of the Law and limited only to “foreigners” in the meaning of article 1 (i.e. non-Muslim foreigners). Therefore, it was clear that the Law, in its original form, did not apply to “foreign Muslims” in general.[10]
ii. However, only one month after its enactment (and even before its entry into force), the Law was amended and renamed “The Law on Civil Marriage and its Effects in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi” by the Law No. 15/2021 of 8 December 2021. The amendments concerned, inter alia the scope of application rationae personae of the Law. Indeed, the Law No. 15/2021 deleted the all references to “foreigners” in the Law No. 14/2021 and replaced the term with a more neutral one: “persons covered by the provisions of this Law [al-mukhatabun bi hadha al-qanun]”. This notion is broadly defined to include both “foreigners” (without any particular reference to their religious affiliation) and “non-Muslim citizens of the UAE” (New Article 1).
Article 5 of the Procedural Regulation provides further details. It defines the terms “persons covered by the provisions of this Law” as follows:
- Non-Muslim [UAE] citizens.
- A foreigner who holds the nationality of a country that does not primarily apply the rules of Islamic Sharia in matters of personal status as determined by the Instruction Guide issued by the Chairman of the [Judicial] Department […] (emphasis added).
The wording of article 5(2) is somewhat confusing, as it can be interpreted in two manners:
(i) if read a contrario, the provision would mean that foreigners, irrespective to their religion (including non-Muslims), would not be subject to the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation if they hold the nationality of a country that does “primarily apply the rules of Islamic Sharia in matters of personal status”. As a result, family relationships of Christian Algerian or Moroccan, for example, would not be governed by the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation. However, this interpretation seems to be in opposition with the very purpose of adopting the Law, which, in its own terms, applies to non-Muslim UAE citizens.
(ii) Alternatively, the word “foreigner” here could be understood to mean “Muslim foreigners”, but only those who hold the “the nationality of a country that does not primarily apply the rules of Islamic Sharia in matters of personal status”. As a result, the family relationships of Muslim Canadian, French, German or Turkish (whether Tunisian would be included here is unclear) would be governed by the Law.
The latter interpretation seems to be prevalent.[11] In addition, the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department (ADJD)’s official website (under section “Marriage”) presents even a broader scope since it explains that “civil marriage” is open to “anyone, regardless of their religion” including “Muslims” “as long as they are not UAE citizens”.
iii. The situation becomes more complicated when the parties have multiple nationalities especially when, as in the reported decision, one is from of a predominantly Muslim country and the other from a non-Muslim country. Here, article 5 of the Procedural Regulation provides useful clarifications. According to paragraph 2 in fine, the nationality to be taken into account in such situation is the one used by the parties according to their [status] of residence in the UAE. If interpreted literally, family law relationships of foreign Muslims who, in addition to their nationality of a non-Muslim country, also hold a nationality of a country whose family law is primarily based on Islamic Sharia (as in the reported decision) would be governed by the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation if, according to their status of residence, they use the nationality of their non-Muslim country nationality.
iv. In the case commented here, the parties have dual nationality (French/Lebanese, Mexican/Egyptian). Although the parties are identified as “Muslim”, they appear to have used the nationality of their non-Muslim countries.[12] Accordingly, contrary to the ADSC’s decision, it can be said that the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation were applicable in this case.
2. In addition to the religion of the parties, the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation determine other situations in which the Law applies.
i. These include, with respect to the effect of the marriage and its dissolution, the case where “the marriage is concluded in accordance with” the Law and its provisions (Article 3 of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law;[13] Article 5(4) of the Procedural Regulation).[14] The application of this rule does not seem to be dependent on the religion of the parties concerned. Consequently, since the marriage in casu was concluded pursuant to the provisions of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law,[15] its dissolution should logically be governed by the provisions of the same Law.
ii. However, it must be acknowledged that such a conclusion is not entirely self-evident. The confusion stems from the ADJD’s official website (under section “Divorce”) which states as a matter of principle that, normally, “anyone who obtained a Civil Marriage through the ADCFC” is entitled to apply for divorce in application of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law. However, the same website indicates that “[f]or applicants holding citizenship of a country member of the Arab League countries [sic], an official document proving the religion of the party may be required” when they apply for divorce” (emphasis added).[16] Although the ADSC made no reference to the Arab citizenship of the parties in its decision, it appears that it adheres to the idea of dissociation between the conclusion and the dissolution of marriage in dispute involving Muslims. In any case, one can regret that the ASDC missed the opportunity to examine the rule on dual nationality under article 5(2).
Concluding Remarks
1. To deny the jurisdiction of the ADCFC, the ASDC relied on article 3 of the Procedural Regulation, which the Court quoted as follows: “The [ADCFC] is competent to hear civil family matters for foreign non-Muslims in relation to civil marriage, divorce and its effects (emphasis added).” The problem, however, is that the ADSC conveniently omitted key words that significantly altered the meaning of the provision.
The provision, properly quoted, reads as follows: “The [ADCFC] is competent to hear civil family matters for foreigners or non-Muslim citizens in relation to civil marriage, divorce and its effects (emphasis added).” In other words, article 3 does not limit the scope of application of the Law and its Regulation exclusively to “foreign non-Muslims” as outlined above.
2. Moreover, it is quite surprising that the ADSC also referred to Article 1 of the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status in support of its conclusions, i.e. that the taking of jurisdiction by the ADFCF “violated the law”. This is because it is accepted that the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status does not apply to Abu Dhabi.[17] In addition, some important differences exist between the two laws such as age of marriage which fixed at 18 in the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law (article 4(1)), but raised to 21 in the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status (article 5(1)).[18] The combined (mis)application of 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status appears opportunistic and reveals the ADSC’s intention to exclude contra legem foreign Muslims (or at least those who are binational of both a Muslim and Non-Muslim countries) from the scope of application of 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation.
[1] see on this blog, Lena-Maria Möller, “Abu Dhabi Introduces Personal Status for non-Muslim Foreigners, Shakes up Domestic and International Family Law”. See Also, idem, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates: A Preliminary Assessment”, 37 Arab Law Quarterly (2023) 1 ff. For a particularly critical view, see Sami Bostanji, “Le droit de statut personnel au service de l’économie de marché! Reflexoins autour de la Loi n°14 en date de 7 novembre 2021 relative au statut personnel des étrangers non-musulmans dans l’Emirat d’Abou Dhabi” in Mélanges offerts en l’honneur du Professeur Mohamed Kamel Charfeddine (CPU, 2023) 905 ff.
[2] Law No. 14/2021 of 7 November 2021 on the “Personal Status for Non-Muslims” as modified by the Law No. 15/2021 of 8 December 2021 which changed the Law’s title to “Law on Civil Marriage and its Effects” (hereafter “2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law”) and its Procedural Regulation issued by the Resolution of the Chairman of the Judicial Department No. 8/2022 of 1 February 2022, hereafter the “2022 Procedural Regulation”
[3] Federal Legislative Decree No. 41/2022 of 3 October 2022 on “Civil Personal Status” (hereafter “2022 Federal Civil Personal Status”) and its Implementing Regulation issued by the Order of the Council of Ministers No. 1222 of 27 November 2023.
[4] See below IV(1)(i). On the difference between the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status on this particular point, see below IV(1).
[5] Article 2 of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law.
[6] Article 16 of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law; article 4 of the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status.
[7] The text of the decision is not clear on this point. Some comments online explain that the marriage was concluded pursuant to 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law.
[8] The text of the decision particularly mentions the presence and consent of Y’s matrimonial guardian (wali), which is a necessary requirement for the validity of marriage between Muslims, but not a requirement under the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law.
[9] The ADCFC, which was established specifically to deal with family law matters falling under the purview of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law, holds subject-matter jurisdiction in this regard.
[10] cf. Möller, “Abu Dhabi Introduces Personal Status for non-Muslim Foreigners” op. cit.
[11] For an affirmative view, see Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 7.
[12] Some comments online explain that the marriage was concluded using foreign passports with no-Arabic names and no indication of the parties’ religion.
[13] On the problems of interpretation of this provision, see Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 7.
[14] The Procedural Regulation further expands the scope of application of the Civil Marriage Law to cover cases where “the marriage was concluded abroad in a country whose family law is not primarily based on Islamic Sharia as determined by Abu Dhabi authorities” (Article 5(3)) and in any other case determined by the Chairman of the Judicial Department and about which an order is issued (Article 5(5)).
[15] See supra n (7).
[16] However, this rule appears to be devoid of any legal basis.
[17] Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 2.
[18] For a comparision, see Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 13-15.
News
ILA Committee on Conflict-of-Laws Issues in International Arbitration: First Webinar on 18 February 2025
This post was written by Lukas Petschning, University of Vienna.
Conflict of laws is one of the most complex and disputed subject areas in international arbitration. An abundance of academic works has examined the issue and proposed widely diverging solutions. Yet, these studies frequently focus on isolated issues and lack overall consistency. Equally, they are often overly theoretical, lacking practical guidance useful to the average arbitrator or judge.
Forging a path toward more legal certainty, the International Law Association has established a new Committee on Conflict-of-Laws Issues in International Arbitration. It is chaired by Dr Nikolaus Pitkowitz and Ms Wendy Lin, with Professor Matthias Lehmann and Dr Mariel Dimsey acting as co-rapporteurs.
Out Now: Kim, Overriding Mandatory Rules in International Commercial Disputes [Open Access]
As part of Hart’s Studies in Private International Law – Asia, Min Kyung Kim, Judge at the Incheon District Court in Korea, just published her new book on Overriding Mandatory Rules in International Commercial Disputes: Korean and Comparative Law.
The impressive monograph, just shy of 200 pages, takes a comprehensive look at the role of overriding mandatory rules in international commercial litigation and arbitration, using Korea as a vantage point. It takes a close look at a large variety of (mainly European) sources in order to interpret and critically discuss the Korean Act on Private International Law, with a particular focus on the treatment of third-country mandatory rules. The book also identifies a range of potentially overriding mandatory provisions in Korean law.
The book is available open access at the publisher’s website.
Dutch Journal of PIL (NIPR) – issue 2024/4
The latest issue of the Dutch Journal on Private International Law (NIPR) has been published.
EDITORIAL
M.H. ten Wolde / p. 626-628
ARTICLES
A. Mens, De kwalificatie en de rechtsgevolgen van de erkenning van een kafala op grond van het Nederlandse internationaal privaatrecht/ p. 628-649
Abstract
This article focuses on the qualification and legal consequences of recognising a kafala under Dutch private international law. A kafala is a child protection measure under Islamic law, which entails an obligation to care for, protect, raise, and support a child, but without any implications for lineage or inheritance rights. The main conclusion is that a kafala generally constitutes both a guardianship and a maintenance decision. Consequently, the recognition of a foreign kafala in the Netherlands essentially entails the recognition of both the guardian’s (kafil) authority over the child (makful) and the recognition of the guardian’s maintenance obligation towards the child.
B. van Houtert, The Anti-SLAPP Directive in the context of EU and Dutch private international law: improvements and (remaining) challenges to protect SLAPP targets / p. 651-673
Abstract
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