Views
Fifty Shades of (Facebook) Blue – ECJ Renders Decision on Consumer Jurisdiction and Assigned Claims in Case C-498/16 Schrems v Facebook
Written by Tobias Lutzi, DPhil Candidate and Stipendiary Lecturer at the University of Oxford.
Yesterday, the ECJ has rendered its decision in Case C-498/16 Maximilian Schrems v Facebook Ireland Limited. The case will be of interest to many readers of this blog as its facts are not only closely linked to the ECJ’s well-known decision in Case C-362/14 Schrems but also could have come straight out of a conflict-of-laws textbook.
Maximilian Schrems has been litigating against Facebook and the way in which the company uses the personal data of its users since 2011, when he first submitted a range of complaints to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner. In 2013, he submitted another complaint, which ultimately lead to the annulment of the ‘Safe Harbour’ framework between the EU and the US in the aforementioned decision; the proceedings continued with a reformulated version of this complaint and have recently been referred to the ECJ for a second time. Over the course of this litigation, Schrems built a reputation as a privacy activist, publishing two books, giving talks and lectures, and founding a non-profit organisation that uses ‘targeted and strategic litigation’ to enforce privacy and data protection laws across Europe.
The proceedings that gave raise to yesterday’s decision by the ECJ are formally unrelated to the aforementioned litigation. In 2014, Schrems set out to bring a ‘class action’ against Facebook for numerous violations of privacy and data protection laws. For this purpose, 25,000 Facebook users assigned their claims to him. Only eight of these claims, regarding Schrems’ own Facebook account and Facebook ‘page’ as well as the accounts of seven other users from Austria, Germany, and India, formed the object of the present proceedings. The claims were brought at Schrems’ domicile in Vienna, Austria, based on the special head of jurisdiction for consumer contracts in Art 16(1) Brussels I (= Art 18(1) of the recast Regulation).
The proceedings raised two separate questions, which the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof ultimately referred to the ECJ:
- Can Schrems still be considered a consumer in the sense of Art 15(1) Brussels I, despite his continued activism and professional interest in the claims?
- If so, can he also rely on the privilege of Art 16(1) Brussels I regarding claims that have been assigned to him by other consumers who are domiciled in (a) the same EU Member State; (b) another Member State; (c) a non-member State?
Following the Advocate General’s opinion (reported here), the Court answered the first question in the positive (I.) and the second one in the negative (II.). Both answers are testimony to a nuanced interpretation of the special rules of jurisdiction for consumer contracts (III.)
I. The Consumer Exception
According to the ECJ’s well-known decisions in Case C-269/95 Benincasa and Case C-464/01 Gruber, the assessment of whether a party is a ‘consumer’ in the sense of Art 15(1) Brussels I does not depend on their subjective qualities but on the ‘the position of the person concerned in a particular contract’ (Benincasa, [16]), which must have been ‘concluded for the purpose of satisfying an individual’s own needs in terms of private consumption’ (ibid, [17]); where a contract has been concluded for a purpose that is partly private and partly professional, the professional aspect of it must be ‘so slight as to be marginal’ for the contract to still fall under the provision (Gruber, [39]).
In the present case, this definition raised two questions. The Court first had to decide whether the assessment was to be made only at the moment when the contract was originally concluded or whether subsequent changes of circumstances must also be taken into account. It held that
[38] … a user of [a digital social network] may, in bringing an action, rely on his status as a consumer only if the predominately non-professional use of those services, for which the applicant initially concluded a contract, has not subsequently become predominately professional.
Second, the Court had to decide whether this was the case for Schrems, who had originally entered into a contract with Facebook for private purposes but subsequently developed a professional activity involving litigation against Facebook. According to the Court,
[39] … neither the expertise which [a] person may acquire in the field covered by those services nor his assurances given for the purposes of representing the rights and interests of the users of those services can deprive him of the status of a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of Article 15 [Brussels I].
[40] Indeed, an interpretation of the notion of ‘consumer’ which excluded such activities would have the effect of preventing an effective defence of the rights that consumers enjoy in relation to their contractual partners who are traders or professionals, including those rights which relate to the protection of their personal data. …
Interestingly, the Court put little emphasis on the possible distinction between Schrems’ private Facebook ‘profile’ and his arguably professional Facebook ‘page’ (see [34]–[36]). Instead, it seemed to generally exclude ‘representing the rights and interests of the users’ of a particular service from the range of professional activities that might prevent the contract for this service from being considered a consumer contract. The Court explicitly linked this interpretation to the objective of ensuring a high level of consumer protection in Art 169 TFEU. Thus, its decision might not even have been different had Schrems joined Facebook with the sole aim of enforcing his (and other users’) rights. This way, the Court effectively sidestepped the problems created by the increasingly wide range of uses to which social media and other online platform accounts can be put, which the Advocate General had so colourfully described as ‘fifty shades of (Facebook) blue’ (Opinion, [46]) – and which, for the time being, remain unaddressed.
II. Jurisdiction for Assigned Claims
With regard to using the second alternative of Art 16(1) Brussels I to bring claims that have been assigned to the claimant by other consumers at the claimant’s domicile, the Court held:
[45] The rules on jurisdiction laid down, as regards consumer contracts, in Article 16(1) of the regulation apply, in accordance with the wording of that provision, only to an action brought by a consumer against the other party to the contract, which necessarily implies that a contract has been concluded by the consumer with the trader or professional concerned ….
…
[48] … [T]he assignment of claims cannot, in itself, have an impact on the determination of the court having jurisdiction …. It follows that the jurisdiction of courts other than those expressly referred to by Regulation No 44/2001 cannot be established through the concentration of several claims in the person of a single applicant. … [A]n assignment of claims such as that at issue in the main proceedings cannot provide the basis for a new specific forum for a consumer to whom those claims have been assigned.
This interpretation seems to align well with earlier decisions by the Court, according to which the special head of jurisdiction in Art 16(1) Brussels I is only available personally to the consumer who is party to the consumer contract in question (Case C-89/91 Shearson Lehman Hutton, [23]; Case C-167/00 Henkel), [33]), and according to which the assignment of a claim does not affect international jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation (Case C-352/13 CDC Hydrogene Peroxide, [35]–[36]).
An interesting, and arguably unfortunate, side effect of this restrictive interpretation is that it may even exclude the consolidation of the claims of other Austrian consumers in the same forum, considering that the second alternative of Art 16(1) does not only contain a rule of international jurisdiction but also determines local (internal) jurisdiction. In this regard, the Advocate General argued that an additional forum in which such consumer claims could be brought could be created under national law (Opinion, [117]), a proposition that does not appear easily reconcilable with the clear wording of Art 16(1).
Contrary to the claimant’s press release, though, the fact that a consumer is not allowed to avail him- or herself of the privilege in Art 16(1) Brussels I in order to bring the claims 25,000 other consumers that have been assigned to him at his or her domicile does not mean that company’s can ‘divide and conquer’ and ‘block enforcement of consumer rights’. A claimant is free to rely on the first alternative of Art 16(1) Brussels I (which mirrors Art 2(1)) and bring all claims in the defendant’s Member State of domicile, the procedural law of which will then decide on whether the claims may be consolidated.
III. A Nuanced Approach to the Consumer Exception
What seems to emerge from the decision is a nuanced approach to the special provisions for consumer contracts. The Court applies a rather flexible interpretation to Art 15(1) Brussels I, allowing for changes of circumstances to be taken into account but also distinguishing the enforcement of (consumer) rights from other types of professional activities. At the same time, it interprets the special head of jurisdiction in Art 16(1) restrictively, limiting the privilege to each individual consumer and excluding the possibility of other consumers assigning their claims to one who is domiciled in what may appear as a more favourable forum.
Of course, there may well be strong arguments for the existence of such a possibility, especially in cases where each individual claim is too small to justify litigation but the sum of them is not. But it seems questionable whether Art 16(1) Brussels I would be the right instrument to create such a mechanism of collective redress – and, indeed, whether it should be the Court’s role to implement it.
Sharia law in Greece: Blending European values with Islamic tradition
The Hellenic Republic is the sole EU Member State which provides for the application of Sharia law in its territory for more than a century. A recent amendment is granting Greek Moslems the right to opt-out, and resort to domestic civil law. At the same time, the new law respects the right to opt-in for the application of Sharia law, upon the condition of mutual agreement between the parties.
Law 4511/2018 was enacted on January 15. It contains only one article (the second simply declares that the law will be in force upon publication in the State Gazette), which amends the previous status of Sharia courts in Greece. A new Paragraph (4) is added to Art. 5 Law 1920/1991. By virtue of the new provision, the jurisdiction of the Mufti becomes the exception, whereas (until today) it was the rule for Greek Moslems living in the region of (Western) Thrace. The Mufti has jurisdiction for a vast number of family and succession matters, which are listed under Article 5.2 Law 1920/1991. A prerequisite is that the parties have submitted the above matters to Sharia law.
The new law grants the right to each party to seek Justice before domestic courts, and in accordance with Greek substantive and procedural law. The Mufti may exercise jurisdiction only if both parties file an application for this cause. Once the case is submitted to the Mufti, the jurisdiction of national courts is irrevocably excluded.
In addition, the new law paves the path for a more structured procedure before the Mufti: A drafting Committee will be authorized to prepare a decree, which will shape (for the first time) the Rules and Regulations of the Mufti ‘courts’. Signs of a formalized process are already clearly visible in the new law (Article 4.b).
Inheritance matters are also regulated by the new legislation: In principle they are subjected to Greek law, unless the testator solemnly states before a notary public his wish to submit succession matters to Sharia law. A parallel application of Greek and Sharia law is not permitted. However, revocation of the testator’s declaration is allowed, pursuant to Greek succession law provisions embedded in the Civil Code.
The new law has certainly conflict of laws ramifications too, most notably in light of the recent Sahyouni case of the CJEU. In this respect it is important to underline that all decisions rendered by the Mufti are passing through a hybrid process of domestic exequatur, which is rudimentarily regulated under Article 5.3 Law 1920/1991. Failure to submit the Mufti decisions to domestic courts’ scrutiny, deprives them of res iudicata and enforceability. Hence, EU Member States courts, whenever confronted with a request to recognize or enforce Mufti decisions within their jurisdiction, will always have to examine whether a Greek court has granted full faith and credit to the Mufti’s ruling.
Japanese Supreme Court Renders Decision on Hague Abduction Convention
On December 21, 2017, the Japanese Supreme Court rendered a decision on the Hague Abduction Convention. The Court upheld a lower court decision in favor of the Japanese mother, even though she had turned back on her promise to return the kids from a visit to Japan, and even though that same court had earlier issued a return order in favor of the American father. The matter had received international press attention, and even a Congressional subcommittee hearing.
Japan had long refused to join the Hague Convention, and when it did, in 2014, critical observers already expected that courts would find ways to undermine it. Those observers see themselves vindicated.
Colin Jones reports critically on the decision; he has previously written on Japan’s joining the Convention and on reluctance to enforce it. Useful background from the Law Library of Congress is here.
Japanese accession to the Convention has been a frequent scholarly topic, both in Japan and elsewhere. Yuko Nishitani, who had already written about “International Child Abduction in Japan” in (2006) 8 Yearbook of Private International Law 125-143, and who wrote a long report (in Japanese) for the Japanese Ministry in 2010, provided a brief analysis in 2011. Dai Yokomizo discussed the accession in (2012) Revue critique 799; Jun Yokohama did so in the Mélanges van Loon (2013, pp 661-72). Vol. 57 (2014) of the Japanese Yearbook of International Law contains articles by Tatsuki Nishioka and Takako Tsujisaka, Masayuki Tanamura, Masako Murakami, Martina Erb-Klünemann, and Nigel Vaughan Lowe. Takeshi Hamano helpfully explains the Japanese reluctance with regard to the Japanese ideology of the family. Outside of Japanese authors, Barbara Stark and Paul Hanley wrote most recently in the United States; the topic is also addressed in several student notes. The accession was also discussed by Bengt Schwemann (in German) and Francisco Barberán Pelegrín (in Spanish).
News
A new article on private international law was published open-access earlier this week in The Cambridge Law Journal
on: ‘JUSTIFYING CONCURRENT CLAIMS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW‘.
Written by Sagi Peari and Marcus Teo, the article analyses whether claimants can choose between contract and tort claims arising on the same facts with different jurisdictional and/or choice-of-law consequences. While domestic legal systems generally recognise a concurrent liability, commentators object that its extension to private international law would be unprincipled and would threaten the field’s values. This, however, contrasts with the position in common law and under EU Regulations, where concurrent claims are generally recognised with only narrow limits. This article justifies concurrent claims in private international law, arguing that the same premises supporting concurrent liability in domestic law exist in private international law and that no field-unique concerns foreclose it.
AMEDIP’s upcoming webinar: child support cases between Mexico and the United States of America – 23 February 2023 (at 14:30 Mexico City time)
The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on Thursday 23 February 2023 at 14:30 (Mexico City time – CST), 21:30 (CET time). The topic of the webinar is the Right to Child Support within the international framework – Mexico and the United States of America and will be presented by Claudia Sierra Martínez of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) (in Spanish).
By way of context, please note that Mexico is not yet a party to the 2007 HCCH Child Support Convention but the United States is. On the other hand, Mexico is a party to the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations and the United Nations Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance but the United States is not. Faced with this conundrum and given the great number of Child Support cases between these two countries, other solutions have been made available (think for example of US domestic law / bilateral practices).
The details of the webinar are:
Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87996362538?pwd=QjNuZThqNUpTVHQ3cFZaZ1BXZ0YzQT09
Meeting ID: 879 9636 2538
Password: AMEDIP
Participation is free of charge.
This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX
Lex & Forum, Volume 4/2022 – A special on cross border family law
Family disputes constitute the majority of cases of cross-border nature. The free movement of people within the European judicial space and the integration of third-country nationals has created a considerable number of multinational family structures, that give rise to a significant number of legal disputes, leading to complex conflict of law issues. It is no coincidence that in the area of family disputes one could identify the most extended number of EU legislative initiatives, from Regulation 1347/2000 (Brussels II Regulation) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children of both spouses, followed by the “successors”, i.e., Regulation No 2201/2003 (Brussels IIa Regulation) and Regulation 2019/1111 (Brussels IIb Regulation), Regulation 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, Regulation 1259/2010 (Rome III Regulation) on the applicable law to divorce and legal separation, as well as and Regulations 2016/1103 and 2016/1104 on international jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes and, registered partners, respectively, covering the maximum scope of personal or property family disputes. It is also notable that, as concluded after examining the data kindly brought to our attention by the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance Department of Publications, out of one hundred court judgments related to international law issued in the year 2022 by the above mentioned Court, approximately 70% of them concerned family disputes in a broader sense, either within the EU, or related to third countries, demonstrating the importance of the matter in practice.
Cross-border family disputes are the Focus of the current issue and were examined in an online conference of Lex and Forum (8.12.2022), under the Presidency of the Supreme Court Judge, Ms. Evdoxia Kiouptsidou-Stratoudaki. The topics of the conference concern the international jurisdiction on matrimonial and child custody disputes according to Regulation No 2019/1111, by Ioannis Delikostopoulos, Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Athens; the practical problems of the application of the Regulations for family disputes and parental custody disputes, by Ms. Aikaterini Karaindrou, Judge at the First Instance Court; the agreements on the exercise of parental care according to Regulation No 2019/1111 and their relationship with Greek law, by Aikaterini Fundedaki, Professor at the Law Faculty of the University of Thessaloniki; Law No 4800/2021 and the harmonization of the Greek legal provisions with international law, by Ioannis Valmantonis, Judge at the Court of Appeal, and the new Hague Convention for the protection of adults, by Dr. Vasileios Sarigiannidis, Head of the Private International Law Department at the Hellenic Ministry of Justice.
The present issue also contains case comments on the CJEU judgment, 15.11.2022, Senatsverwaltung/TB, on the recognition of dissolution of marriage from another member state, by Dr. Apostolos Anthimos; the CJEU judgments, 15.11 .2021, ??/FA and 10.2.2022, OE/VY, on the concept of habitual residence and, respectively, the importance of the length of residence of the claimant in a member state for the establishment of international jurisdiction under the Brussels IIa/b Regulation, by Paris Arvanitakis, Professor at the University of Thessaloniki, and . Stefania Kapaktsi, Judge at the Court of First Instance; the Greek Supreme Court judgment No 30/2021 on the declaration of enforceability of a foreign decision on the distribution of the spouses’ common property, by Dr. Apostolos Anthimos; the Greek Supreme Court cases No 48/2021 and 54/2021 on international child abduction, by Ioannis Valmantonis, Judge at the Court of Appeal; the judgment of the Thessaloniki First Instance Court No 1285/2022, on the temporary regulation of contact rights according to the Brussels IIb Regulation and the 1996 HAGUE Convention, by Professor Delikostopoulos, and the German Supreme Court judgment dated from 29.9. 2021, on the non-opposition to public order of a marriage performed by a proxy, with a note by Dr. Anthimos. The jurisprudence section also contains the CJEU decisions, 22.4.2022, Volvo/RM, regarding the temporal scope of the Directive No 2014/104 and their incorporation into substantive or procedural EU law, accompanied by the Opinion of the Advocate General, Mr. Athanassios Rantos, with a case comment by Dr. Stefanos Karameros, PhD, and the Court of First Instance case No 13535/2019, on the possibility of implicit prorogation of jurisdiction in case of provisional measures in the Brussels Ia Regulation, despite a contrary agreement, with a case comment by Ioanna Pissina, PhD Candidate.
The issue is completed with the Praefatio by Vassilios Christianos, Emeritus Professor at University of Athens, and former Director of the Center of International and European Economic Law, regarding the contribution of the comparative method to EU procedural law; the expert opinion by Dimitrios Tsikrikas, Professor at the Athens Faculty of Law, on the scope of application of choice-of-court agreements in bond loans and interest rate contracts; and finally, the analysis of practical issues on the recognition of foreign divorce decrees, focusing on the difficulties of the applicants to prove the finality of the foreign decision (L&F Praxis), by Dr. Anthimos.
[editorial prepared by Professor Paris Arvanitakis, scientific director of Lex & Forum]