Defending the Rule in Antony Gibbs

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By Neerav Srivastava

 

The Rule in Antony Gibbs[1] (‘the Rule’) provides that if the proper law of a contract is Australian, then a discharge of the debt by a foreign jurisdiction will not be a discharge in Australia unless the creditor submitted to the foreign jurisdiction.[2] The Rule is much maligned, especially in insolvency circles, and has been described as “Victorian”.[3] In ‘Heritage and Vitality: Whether Antony Gibbs is a Presumption’[4] I seek to defend the Rule.

Presumption

The article begins by arguing that, in the modern context, that the Rule should be recognised as a Presumption as to party intentions.

Briefly, Gibbs was decided in the 1890s. At the time, the prevailing view was that the proper law of a contract was either the law of the place of the contract or its performance.[5] This approach was based on apportioning regulatory authority between sovereign States rather than party intentions. To apply a foreign proper law in a territory was regarded as contrary to territorial sovereignty. Freedom of contract and party intentions were becoming relevant to proper law but only to a limited extent.[6]

As for Gibbs, Lord Esher’s language is consistent with the ‘Regulatory Approach’:

It is clear that these were English contracts according to two rules of law; first, because they were made in England; secondly, because they were to be performed in England. The general rule as to the law which governs a contract is that the law of the country, either where the contract is made, or where it is to be so performed that it must be considered to be a contract of that country, is the law which governs such contract …[7]

Notice that the passage makes no reference to party intentions.

By the early 20th century, the position had evolved in that it was generally accepted that party intentions determined the proper law.[8] Even so, it was not until the late 1930s that the Privy Council stated that the position was “well-settled”.[9] Party intentions has evolved into being the test for proper law universally.[10]

Under the modern approach, party intentions as to proper law are a question of fact and not territorial. Parties are free to choose a proper law of a jurisdiction with which they have no connection.[11] As a question of fact, party intentions are better understood as a ‘Presumption’. Further, the Presumption might be displaced. The same conclusion can be reached via an implied term analysis.

The parties can also agree that there is more than one proper law for a contract. That, too, is consistent with party autonomy. Under depeçage, one law can govern a contract’s implementation and another its discharge.[12] Likewise, the Second Restatement in the US[13] and the International Hague Principles allow a contract to have multiple proper laws.[14]

Cross-border Insolvency

The second part of the article addresses criticisms of Gibbs by cross-border insolvency practitioners. In insolvency, issues are no longer merely between the two contracting parties. The body of creditors are competing for a share of a company’s remaining assets. Under pari passu all creditors are to be treated equally. If a company is in a foreign liquidation, and its discharge of Australian debt is not recognised by an Australian court, Gibbs appears inconsistent with pari passu. Specifically, it appears that the creditor can sue in Australia and secure a disproportionate return.

That is an incomplete picture. While the foreign insolvency does not discharge the debt in Australia, when it comes to enforcement comity applies. Comity is agitated by a universal distribution process in a foreign insolvency. Having regard to comity, the Australian court will treat local and international creditors equally.[15] If creditors are recovering 50% in a foreign insolvency, an Australian court will not allow an Australian creditor to recover more than 50% at the enforcement stage. Criticisms of the Presumption do not give due weight to enforcement.

Gibbs has been described as irreconcilable with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 1997 (the 1997 Model Law),[16] which is generally[17] regarded as embodying ‘modified universalism’. That, it is submitted, reflects a misunderstanding.

Historically, in a cross-border insolvency “territorialism” applied.[18] Each country collected assets in its territory and distributed them to creditors claiming in those insolvency proceedings. In the past 200 years, universalism has been applied.[19] Under ‘pure universalism’, there is only one process for collecting assets globally and distributing to all creditors. Modified universalism:

accepts the central premise of [pure] universalism, that assets should be collected and distributed on a worldwide basis, but reserves to local courts discretion to evaluate the fairness of the home-country procedures and to protect the interests of local creditors …[20]

Modified universalism can be understood as a structured form of comity.[21] It asks that all creditors be treated equally but is a tent in that it allows States to choose how to protect the interest of creditors. A State may choose to couple recognition of the foreign insolvency – and the collection of assets in its jurisdiction – with the discharge of creditors’ debts. However, the 1997 Model Law does not require a State to follow this mechanism.[22] Under the Anglo-Australian mechanism (a) a debt may not be discharged pursuant to Gibbs (b), but creditors are treated equally at the enforcement stage. It is a legitimate approach under the tent that is modified universalism.

 

[1] Antony Gibbs & Sons v Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399.

[2] Albert Venn Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England With Reference To The Conflict of Laws (Stevens, 1896) rule 113.

[3] Varoon Sachdev, “Choice of Law in Insolvency Proceedings: How English Courts’ Continued Reliance on the Gibbs Principle Threatens Universalism” (2019) 93 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 343.

[4] (2021) 29 Insolvency Law Journal 61. Available at Westlaw Australia.

[5] Alex Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law (CUP, 2018) 53, citing Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co v Shand (1865) 16 ER 103.

[6] Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (CUP, 2009), 53.

[7] Antony Gibbs & Sons v Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399, 405 (Gibbs).

[8] Alex Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law (CUP, 2018) 56, Lord Collins et al, Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th ed, 2017), [32-004]–[32-005].

[9] Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277.

[10] Martin Davis et al, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (Lexis Nexis, 2019), [19.6]; Lord Collins et al, Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th ed, 2017), [32-004]–[32-005], [32-042]; and Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts promulgated by the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 2015.

[11] Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277, Martin Davis et al, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (Lexis Nexis, 2019), [19.15].

[12] Club Mediterranee New Zealand v Wendell [1989] 1 NZLR 216, Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Co Ltd [1998] 3 VR 380.

[13] Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188.

[14] Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts promulgated by the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 2015.

[15] Galbraith v Grimshaw [1910] AC 508, Chapman v Travelstead (1998) 86 FCR 460, Re HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (2005) 190 FLR 398.

[16] In Australia the 1997 Model Law was extended to Australia by the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth).

[17] Adrian Walters, “Modified Universalisms & the Role of Local Legal Culture in the Making of Cross-border Insolvency Law” (2019) 93 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 47, 64.

[18] Although Rares J has pointed out, “centuries earlier, maritime lawyers had developed a sophisticated and generally harmonious system of dealing with cross-border insolvencies”: Steven Rares, “Consistency and Conflict – Cross-Border Insolvency” (Paper presented at the 32nd Annual Conference of the Banking & Financial Services Law Association, Brisbane, 4 September 2015).

[19] Re HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, [30]; [2008] UKHL 21.

[20] Jay Lawrence Westbrook, “Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies” (1991) 17 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 499, 517.

[21] UNCITRAL, Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency (2014) [8].

[22] Akers v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 223 FCR 8; [2014] FCAFC 57. See too Re Bakhshiyeva v Sberbank of Russia [2019] Bus LR 1130 (CA); [2018] EWCA 2802.

The Hague Judgments Convention and Commonwealth Model Law: A Pragmatic Perspective

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The Hague Judgments Convention and Commonwealth Model Law

A foreign judgment that cannot be enforced is useless no matter how well it is/was written. The fact that a foreign judgment can be readily enforced aids the prompt settlement of disputes and makes international commercial transactions more effective.  The importance of the enforcement of foreign judgments cannot be over-emhpasised because international commercial parties are likely to lose confidence in a system that does not protect their interests in the form of recognising and enforcing a foreign judgment.

Today Hart published a new private international law monograph focused on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Its title is “The Hague Judgments Convention and Commonwealth Model Law: A Pragmatic Perspective.” The author of this monograph is Dr Abubakri Yekini of the Lagos State University. The monograph is based on his PhD thesis at the University of Aberdeen titled “A Critical Analysis of the Hague Judgments Convention and Commonwealth Model Law from a Pragmatic Perspective.”

The abstract of the book reads as follows:

“This book undertakes a systematic analysis of the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention, the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005, and the 2017 Commonwealth Model Law on recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments from a pragmatic perspective.

The book builds on the concept of pragmatism in private international law within the context of recognition and enforcement of judgments. It demonstrates the practical application of legal pragmatism by setting up a toolbox (pragmatic goals and methods) that will assist courts and policymakers in developing an effective and efficient judgments’ enforcement scheme at national, bilateral and multilateral levels.

Practitioners, national courts, policymakers, academics, students and litigants will benefit from the book’s comparative approach using case law from the United Kingdom and other leading Commonwealth States, the United States, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The book also provides interesting findings from the empirical research on the refusal of recognition and enforcement in the UK and the Commonwealth statutory registration schemes respectively.”

I have had the benefit of reading this piece once and can confidently recommend it to anyone interested in the important topic of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The pragmatic approach utilised in the book makes the work an interesting read. My prediction is that this book will endure for a long time, and will likely be utilised in adjudication.

Tort Choice of Law Rules in Cross-border Multi-party Litigation under European and Chinese Private International Law

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Tort Choice of Law Rules in Cross-border Multi-party Litigation under European and Chinese Private International Law Read more

Professor Burkhard Hess on “Reforming the Brussels Ibis Regulation: Perspectives and Prospects”

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A thought-provoking and much welcome contribution was posted by Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Burkhard Hess on SSRN, setting the stage for the discussion on the status quo in the application and the prospects of the Brussels IbisRegulation.

The article, titled “Reforming the Brussels Ibis Regulation: Perspectives and Prospects”, may be retrieved here.

The abstract reads as follows:

According to article 79 of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, the EU Commission shall present a report on the application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation by 11 January 2022. This paper intends to open the discussion about the present state of affairs and the necessary adjustments of the Regulation. Although there is no need to change its basic structure, the relationship of the Brussels Ibis Regulation with other EU instruments (as the General Data Protection Regulation) should be reviewed. There is also a need to address third-State relationships and cross-border collective redress. In addition, the paper addresses several inconsistencies within the present Regulation evidenced by the case law of the CJEU: such as the concept of contract (article 7 no 1), the place of damage (article 7 no 2), the protection of privacy and the concept of consumers (articles 17 – 19). Finally, some implementing procedural rules of the EU Member States should be harmonised, i.e. on the assessment of jurisdiction by national courts, on judicial communication and on procedural time limits. Overall, the upcoming review of the Brussels Ibis Regulation opens up an opportunity to improve further a central and widely accepted instrument of the European law of civil procedure.

Epic’s Fight to #freefortnite: Challenging Exclusive Foreign Choice of Court Agreements under Australian Law

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By Sarah McKibbin, University of Southern Queensland

Epic Games, the developer of the highly popular and lucrative online video game Fortnite, recently won an appeal against tech juggernaut, Apple, in Australia’s Federal Court.[1] Fortnite is played by over three million Apple iOS users in Australia.[2] In April 2021, Justice Perram awarded Apple a temporary three-month stay of proceedings on the basis of an exclusive foreign choice of court agreement in favour of the courts of the Northern District of California. Despite awarding this stay, Justice Perram was nevertheless ‘distinctly troubled in acceding to’ Apple’s application.[3] Epic appealed to the Full Court.

On 9 July, Justices Middleton, Jagot and Moshinsky found three errors of principle in Justice Perram’s consideration of the ‘strong reasons’ given by Epic for the proceedings to remain in the Federal Court — despite the exclusive foreign choice of court agreement.[4] Exercising its own discretion, the Full Court then found ‘strong reasons’ for the proceedings to remain in the Federal Court, particularly because enforcement of the choice of court agreement would ‘offend the public policy of the forum.’[5] They discerned this policy from various statutory provisions in Australia’s competition law as well as other public policy considerations.[6] The appeal highlights the tension that exists between holding parties to their promises to litigate abroad and countenancing breaches of contract where ‘serious issues of public policy’ are at play.[7]

1          Exclusive Choice of Foreign Court Agreements in Australia

Australians courts will enforce an exclusive choice of court agreement favouring a foreign court either by granting a stay of local proceedings or by awarding damages for breach of contract. The usual approach is for the Australian court to enforce the agreement and grant a stay of proceedings ‘unless strong reasons are shown why it should not.’[8] As Justice Allsop observed in Incitec v Alkimos Shipping Corp, ‘the question is one of the exercise of a discretion in all the circumstances, but recognising that the starting point is the fact that the parties have agreed to litigate elsewhere, and should, absent some strong countervailing circumstances, be held to their bargain.’[9] The burden of demonstrating strong reasons rests on the party resisting the stay.[10] Considerations of inconvenience and procedural differences between jurisdictions are unlikely to be sufficient as strong reasons.[11]

Two categories of strong reasons predominate. The first category is where, as stated in Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd, enforcement ‘offends the public policy of the forum whether evinced by statute or declared by judicial decision’.[12] This includes the situation ‘where the party commencing proceedings in the face of an exclusive jurisdiction clause seeks to take advantage of what is or may be a mandatory law of the forum’.[13] The prohibition in Australian law against misleading and deceptive conduct is an example.[14] The second category justifying non-enforcement is where litigation in the forum concerns issues beyond the scope of the choice of court agreement or concerns third parties to the agreement.[15] Where third parties are concerned, it is thought that ‘the court should not start with the prima facie disposition in favour of a stay of proceedings’.[16]

2         Factual Background

The successful appeal represents the latest decision in an ongoing international legal battle between Apple and Epic precipitated by Fortnite’s removal from the Apple App Store in August last year. Epic released a software update for Apple iOS devices on 13 August 2020 making the Fortnite’s virtual currency (called V-Bucks) available for purchase through its own website, in addition to Apple’s App Store, at a 20 per cent discount. Any new game downloads from the App Store ‘came equipped with this new feature’.[17] While Fortnite is free to download, Epic’s revenue is generated by players purchasing in-app content, such as dance moves and outfits, through a digital storefront. After the digital storefront takes a commission (usually 30 per cent), Epic receives the net payment.

App developers only have one avenue if they wish to distribute their apps for use on Apple iOS devices: they must use the Apple App Store and Apple’s in-app payment system for in-app purchases from which Apple takes a 30 per cent revenue cut. Epic’s co-founder and CEO Tim Sweeney has singled out Apple and Google for monopolising the market and for their ‘terribly unfair and exploitative’ 30 per cent commission for paid app downloads, in-app purchases and subscriptions.[18] While a 70/30 revenue split has been industry standard for many years, the case for an 88/12 revenue model is building.[19] Sweeney argues that ‘the 30% store tax usually exceeds the entire profits of the developer who built the game that’s sold’.[20]

3         Apple’s App Developer Agreement

Epic’s relationship with Apple is regulated by the Apple Developer Program License Agreement (‘DPLA’) under which Apple is entitled to block the distribution of apps from the iOS App Store ‘if the developer has breached the App Store Review Guidelines’.[21] These Guidelines include the obligation to exclusively use Apple’s in-app payment processing system. Clause 14.10 contains Epic’s contractual agreement with Apple to litigate in the Northern District of California:

Any litigation or other dispute resolution between You and Apple arising out of or relating to this Agreement, the Apple Software, or Your relationship with Apple will take place in the Northern District of California, and You and Apple hereby consent to the personal jurisdiction of and exclusive venue in the state and federal courts within that District with respect any such litigation or dispute resolution.

By introducing a custom payment facility, the August update breached the App Store Review Guidelines. Apple swiftly removed Fortnite from its App Store. There were three consequences of this removal: first, Fortnite could not be downloaded to an Apple device; secondly, previously installed iOS versions of Fortnite could not be updated; and, thirdly, Apple device users could not play against players who had the latest version of Fortnite.[22]

4         The Proceedings

On the same day as Apple removed Fortnite from the App Store, Epic commenced antitrust proceedings in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging Apple’s ‘monopolisation of certain markets’ in breach of the United States’ Sherman Act and other California legislation. The judgment in the US trial is expected later this year. Epic also sued Apple in United Kingdom, the European Union and Australia on competition grounds. In February, the United Kingdom’s Competition Appeal Tribunal refused permission to serve Epic’s claim on Apple in California because the United Kingdom was not a suitable forum (forum non conveniens).[23] Together with these legal actions, Epic commenced a marketing campaign urging the game’s worldwide fanbase to ‘Join the fight against @AppStore and @Google on social media with #FreeFortnite’.[24] Epic also released a video parodying Apple’s famous 1984 commercial called ‘Nineteen Eighty-Fortnite’.[25]

The Australian proceedings were brought in the Federal Court in November 2020. Epic’s complaint against Apple is the same as in the US, the EU and the UK, but with the addition of a territorial connection, ie developers of apps for use on Australian iOS devices must only distribute their apps through Apple’s Australian App Store and only use Apple’s in-app payment processing system. As a consequence, Epic alleges that Apple has contravened three provisions of Part IV of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) concerning restrictive trade practices and the Australian Consumer Law for unconscionable conduct. In addition to injunctive relief restraining Apple from continuing to engage in restrictive trade practices and unconscionable conduct, Epic seeks ancillary and declaratory relief.

Apple applied for a permanent stay of the Federal Court proceedings, relying on the choice of court agreement in the DPLA and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Epic unsuccessfully argued that its claims under Australian law did not ‘relate to’ cl 14.10 of the DPLA.[26] More critically, Justice Perram did not think Epic had demonstrated strong reasons. He awarded Apple a temporary three-month stay of proceedings ‘to enable Epic to bring this case in a court in the Northern District of California in accordance with cl 14.10.’[27] Where relevant to the appeal, Justice Perram’s reasoning is discussed below.

5         The Appeal: Three Errors of Principle

The Full Court distilled Epic’s 17 grounds of appeal from Justice Perram’s decision into two main arguments. Only the second argument — turning on the existence of ‘strong grounds’[28] — was required to determine the appeal. Justices Middleton, Jagot and Moshinsky identified three errors of principle in Justice Perram’s evaluation of ‘strong reasons’, enabling them to re-evaluate whether strong reasons existed.

The first error was Justice Perram’s failure to cumulatively weigh up the reasons adduced by Epic that militated against the granting of the stay. Justice Perram had grudgingly granted Apple’s stay application without evaluating the five concerns he had expressed ‘about the nature of proceedings under Part IV which means they should generally be heard in this Court’,[29] as he was required to do. The five concerns were:[30]

  1. The public interest dimension to injunctive proceedings under the Competition and Consumer Act;
  2. The ‘far reaching’ effect of the litigation on Australian consumers and Australian app developers as well as the nation’s ‘interest in maintaining the integrity of its own markets’;
  3. The Federal Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over restrictive trade practices claims;
  4. ‘[D]icta suggesting that [restrictive trade practices] claims are not arbitrable’; and
  5. That if the claim in California ‘complex questions of [Australian] competition law will be litigated through the lens of expert evidence’.

The second error was Justice Perram’s ‘failure to recognise juridical disadvantages of proceeding in the US Court’.[31] The judge had accepted that litigating the case in California would be ‘more cumbersome’ since ‘expert evidence about the content of Australian law’ would be needed.[32] There was a risk that a California court ‘might decline to hear the suit on forum non conveniens grounds.’[33] Despite that, he concluded that ‘[a]ny inconvenience flows from the choice of forum clause to which Epic has agreed. It does not sit well in its mouth to complain about the consequences of its own bargain’.[34] However, the Full Court viewed the inapplicability of ‘special remedial provisions’ of the Australian Competition and Consumer Act in the California proceedings as the loss of a legitimate juridical advantage.[35]

The third error concerned a third party to the exclusive jurisdiction clause. In Australian Health & Nutrition Association Ltd v Hive Marketing Group Pty Ltd, Justice Bell observed that the default enforcement position was inapplicable in cases where ‘not all parties to the proceedings are party to an exclusive jurisdiction clause’.[36] Apple Pty Limited, an Australian subsidiary of Apple, was not a party to the DPLA. Yet it was responsible ‘for the distribution of iOS-compatible apps to iOS device users’ within the Australian sub-market in a manner consistent with Apple’s worldwide conduct.[37] Moreover, Epic’s proceedings included claims under the Competition and Consumer Act and the Australian Consumer Law against the Australian subsidiary ‘for conduct undertaken in Australia in connection with arrangements affecting Australian consumers in an Australian sub-market.’[38] In this light, the Full Court rejected Justice Perram’s description of the joinder of Apple Pty Limited as ‘ornamental and ‘parasitic on the claims Epic makes against Apple’.[39]

6          The Appeal: Strong Reasons Re-evaluated

The stay should have been refused. The Full Court found a number of public policy considerations that cumulatively constituted strong reasons not to grant a stay of Epic’s proceedings. The judges discerned ‘a legislative policy that claims pursuant to [the restrictive trade practices law] should be determined in Australia, preferably in the Federal Court’ — although it was not the only court that could hear those claims.[40] Essentially, the adjudication of restrictive trade practices claims in the Federal Court afforded legitimate forensic advantages to Epic — benefits which would be lost if Epic were forced to proceed in California. These benefits included the availability of ‘specialist judges with relevant expertise’ in the Federal Court, the potential for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to intervene, and the opportunity for private litigants (as in this case) to ‘develop and clarify the law’.[41] Indeed, the Federal Court has not yet interpreted the misuse of market power provision in the Competition and Consumer Act relied upon by Epic, which came into effect in 2017.[42] The litigation will also impact millions of Australians who play Fortnite and the state of competition in Australian markets.[43]

 

 

[1] Epic Games, Inc v Apple Inc [2021] FCAFC 122.

[2] Epic Games, Inc v Apple Inc (Stay Application) [2021] FCA 338, [7] (Perram J).

[3] Ibid, [64] (Perram J).

[4] Epic Games, Inc v Apple Inc (n 1) [48].

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid, [90].

[7] Ibid, [97]. See James O’Hara, ‘Strategies for Avoiding a Jurisdiction Clause in International Litigation’ (2020) 94(4) Australian Law Journal 267. Compare Mary Keyes, ‘Jurisdiction under the Hague Choice of Courts Convention: Its Likely Impact on Australian Practice’ (2009) 5(2) Journal of Private International Law 181; Richard Garnett, ‘Jurisdiction Clauses since Akai’ (2013) 87 Australian Law Journal 134; Brooke Adele Marshall and Mary Keyes, ‘Australia’s Accession to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’ (2017) 41 Melbourne University Law Review 246.

[8] A Nelson & Co Ltd v Martin & Pleasance Pty Ltd (Stay Application) [2021] FCA 754, [10] (Perram J) (emphasis added). See also Huddart Parker Ltd v Ship ‘Mill Hill’ (1950) 81 CLR 502, 508–9 (Dixon J); The Eleftheria [1970] P 94, 99 (Brandon J); Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418, 427–9 (Dawson and McHugh JJ), 445 (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ).

[9] Incitec Ltd v Alkimos Shipping Corp (2004) 138 FCR 496, 505 [43].

[10] There was some argument about onus in Epic Games (Stay Application) (n 2) [35]–[40] (Perram J).

[11] Incitec (n 9) [49]; Andrew S Bell, ‘Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in Transnational Contracts: Part I’ (1996) 10 Journal of Contract Law 53, 65. See generally O’Hara (n 7).

[12] (1996) 188 CLR 418, 445 (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). See also Marshall and Keyes (n 7) 257.

[13] Australian Health and Nutrition Association Ltd v Hive Marketing Group Pty Ltd (2019) 99 NSWLR 419, 438 [80] (Bell P).

[14] Australian Consumer Law s 18.

[15] Incitec (n 9) 506 [47], [49] (Allsop J); Marshall and Keyes (n 7) 258.

[16] Australian Health (n 13) 423 [1] (Bathurst CJ and Leeming JA), 442 [90] (Bell J).

[17] Epic Games (Stay Application) (n 2) [6] (Perram J).

[18] @TimSweeneyEpic (Twitter, 29 July 2020, 1:29 pm AEDT) <https://twitter.com/TimSweeneyEpic/status/1288315775607078912>.

[19] See, eg, Nick Statt, ‘The 70-30 Revenue Split is Causing a Reckoning in the Game Industry’, protocol (Web Page, 4 May 2021) <https://www.protocol.com/newsletters/gaming/game-industry-70-30-reckoning?rebelltitem=1#rebelltitem1>.

[20] @TimSweeneyEpic (Twitter, 26 June 2019, 10.13 am AEDT) <https://twitter.com/TimSweeneyEpic/status/1143673655794241537>.

[21] Epic Games (n 1) [5].

[22] Epic Games (Stay Application) (n 2) [7].

[23] Epic Games, Inc v Apple Inc [2021] CAT 4.

[24] ‘#FreeFortnite’, Epic Games (Web Page, 13 August 2020) <https://www.epicgames.com/fortnite/en-US/news/freefortnite>.

[25] Fortnite, ‘Nineteen Eighty-Fortnite – #FreeFortnite’ (YouTube, 13 August 2020) <https://youtu.be/euiSHuaw6Q4>.

[26] Epic Games (Stay Application) (n 2) [11]–[12].

[27] Ibid, [66].

[28] Epic Games (n 1) [41], [47].

[29] Ibid, [57].

[30] Epic Games (Stay Application) (n 2) [59]–[63].

[31] Epic Games (n 1) [58].

[32] Epic Games (Stay Application) (n 2) [53].

[33] Ibid, [44].

[34] Ibid, [58].

[35] Epic Games (n 1) [62].

[36] Australian Health (n 13) 442 [90] (Bell P).

[37] Epic Games (n 1) [74].

[38] Ibid, [78].

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid, [99]. The Full Court clarified that ‘other Australian courts may determine Pt IV claims, but within a limited compass and for specific reasons’: [116].

[41] Ibid, [104], [107], [122].

[42] Ibid, [107].

[43] Ibid, [97].

HCCH First Secretary Ribeiro-Bidaoui’s response re the debate surrounding the 2005 HCCH Choice of Court Convention

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Dr. João Ribeiro-Bidaoui (First Secretary at the Hague Conference on Private International Law) has posted a compelling answer on the Kluwer Arbitration Blog to the debate sparked by Prof. Gary Born’s criticism in a series of posts published on the same Blog (see Part I, Part II, and Part III). First Secretary Ribeiro-Bidaoui’s response is masterfully crafted in drawing the boundaries between equally valuable and essential instruments, and certainly constitutes a most welcome contribution.

For further commentary on these exchanges, see also on the EAPIL Blog, here.

Red-chip enterprises’ overseas listing: Securities regulation and conflict of laws

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Written by Jingru Wang, Wuhan University Institute of International Law

 

1.Background

Three days after its low-key listing in the US on 30 June 2021, Didi Chuxing (hereinafter “Didi”) was investigated by the Cyberspace Administration of China (hereinafter “CAC”) based on the Chinese National Security Law and Measures for Cybersecurity Review.[1] Didi Chuxing as well as 25 Didi-related APPs were then banned for seriously violating laws around collecting and using personal information,[2] leading to the plummet of Didi’s share. On 16 July 2021, the CAC, along with other six government authorities, began an on-site cybersecurity inspection of Didi.[3] The CAC swiftly issued the draft rules of Measures for Cybersecurity Review and opened for public consultation.[4] It proposed that any company with data of more than one million users must seek the Office of Cybersecurity Review’s approval before listing its shares overseas. It also proposed companies must submit IPO materials to the Office of Cybersecurity Review for review ahead of listing.

It is a touchy subject. Didi Chuxing is a Beijing-based vehicle for hire company. Its core business bases on the accumulation of mass data which include personal and traffic information. The accumulated data not only forms Didi’s unique advantage but also is the focus of supervision. The real concern lays in the possible disclosure of relevant operational and financial information at the request of US securities laws and regulations, which may cause data leakage and threaten national security. Therefore, China is much alert to information-based companies trying to list overseas.

The overseas listing of China-related companies has triggered regulatory conflicts long ago. The Didi event only shows the tip of an iceberg. This note will focus on two issues: (1) China’s supervision of red-chip companies’ overseas listing; (2) the conflicts between the US’s demand for disclosure and China’s refusal against the US’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.

 

2. Chinese supervision on red-chip companies’ overseas listing

A red-chip company does most of its business in China, while it is incorporated outside mainland China and listed on the foreign stock exchange (such as New York Stock Exchange). Therefore, it is expected to maintain the filing and reporting requirements of the foreign exchange. This makes them an important outlet for foreign investors who wish to participate in the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. When asking Chinese supervision on red-chip companies listed overseas, such as Didi, the foremost question is whether the Chinese regulatory authority’s approval is required for them to launch their shares overseas. It is uneasy to conclude.

One reference is the Chinese Securities Law. Article 238 of the original version of the Chinese Securities Law provides that “domestic enterprises issuing securities overseas directly or indirectly or listing their securities overseas shall obtain approval from the securities regulatory authority of the State Council following the relevant provisions of the State Council.” This provision was amended in 2019. The current version (Art. 224 of the Chinese Securities Law) only requires the domestic enterprises to comply with the relevant provisions of the State Council. The amendment indicated that China has adopted a more flexible approach to addressing overseas listing. Literally, the securities regulatory authority’s approval is no longer a prerequisite for domestic enterprises to issue securities overseas.

When it comes to Didi’s listing in the US, a preliminary question is the applicability of such provision. Art. 224 is applied to “domestic enterprise” only. China adopts the doctrine of incorporation to ascertain company’s nationality.[5] According to Article 191 of the Chinese Company Law, companies established outside China under the provisions of foreign law are regarded as foreign companies. Didi Global Inc. is incorporated in the state of Cayman Islands, and a foreign company under the Chinese law. In analogy, Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., another representative red-chip enterprise, had not obtained and not been required to apply for approval of the Chinese competent authority before its overseas listing in 2014. A Report published by the Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange specifically pointed out that “domestic enterprises” were limited to legal persons registered in mainland China, which excluded Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., a Cayman Islands-based company with a Chinese background.[6]

In summary, it is fair to say that preliminary control over red-chip enterprise’s overseas listing leaves a loophole, which is partly due to China’s changing policy. That’s the reason why Didi has not been accused of violating the Chinese Securities Law but was banned for illegal accumulation of personal information, a circumvent strategy to avoid the possible information leakage brought by Didi’s public listing. Theoretically, depends on the interpretation of the aforementioned rules, the Chinese regulatory authority may have the jurisdiction to demand preliminary approval. Based on the current situation, China intends to fill the gap and is more likely to strengthen the control especially in the field concerning data security.

 

3. The conflict between the US’s demand for audit and China’s refusal against the US’s extraterritorial jurisdiction

Another problem is the conflict of supervision. In 2002, the US promulgated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, under which the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereinafter “PCAOB”) was established to oversee the audit of public companies. Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, wherever its place of registration is, a public accounting firm preparing or issuing, or participating in the preparation or issuance of, any audit report concerning any issuer, shall register in the PCAOB and accept the periodic inspection.[7] The PCAOB is empowered to investigate, penalize and sanction the accounting firm and individual that violate the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the rules of the PCAOB, the provisions of the securities laws relating to the preparation and issuance of audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of accountants. Opposed to this provision (although not intentionally), Article 177 of the Chinese Securities Law forbids foreign securities regulatory authorities directly taking evidence in China. It further stipulates that no organization or individual may arbitrarily provide documents and materials relating to securities business activities to overseas parties without the consent of the securities regulatory authority of the State Council and the relevant State Council departments. Therefore, the conflict appears as the US requests an audit while China refused the jurisdiction of PCAOB over Chinese accountant companies.

It is suspected that despite the PCAOB’s inofficial characteristic, information (including the sensitive one) gathered by the PCAOB may be made available to government agencies, which may threaten the national security of China.[8] Consequently, China prevents the PCAOB’s inspection and some of Chinese public accounting firm’s application for registration in the PCAOB has been suspended.[9] In 2013, the PCAOB signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Chinese securities regulators that would enable the PCAOB under certain circumstances to obtain audit work papers of China-based audit firms. However, the Memorandum seems to be insufficient to satisfy the PCAOB’s requirement for supervision. The PCAOB complained that “we remain concerned about our lack of access in China and will continue to pursue available options to support the interests of investors and the public interest through the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports.”[10] After the exposure of Luckin Coffee’s accounting fraud scandal, the US promulgated the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act in 2020. This act requires certain issuers of securities to establish that they are not owned or controlled by a foreign government. Specifically, an issuer must make this certification if the PCAOB is unable to audit specified reports because the issuer has retained a foreign public accounting firm not subject to inspection by the PCAOB. If the PCAOB is unable to inspect the issuer’s public accounting firm for three consecutive years, the issuer’s securities are banned from trade on a national exchange or through other methods.

China has made “national security” its core interest and is very prudent in opening audit for foreign supervisors. From the perspective of the US, however, it is necessary to strengthen financial supervision over the public listing. As a result, Chinese enterprises have to make a choice between disappointing the PCAOB and undertaking domestic penalties. Under dual pressure of China and the US, sometimes Chinese companies involuntarily resort to delisting. This may not be a result China or the US long to see. In this situation, cooperation is a better way out.

 

4. Conclusion

China’s upgrading of its cybersecurity review regulation is not aimed at burning down the whole house. Overseas listing serves China’s interest by opening up channels for Chinese companies to raise funds from the international capital market, and thus contribute to the Chinese economy. The current event may be read as a sign that China is making provisions to strengthen supervision on red-chip companies’ overseas listing. It was suggested that the regulatory authority may establish a classified negative list. Enterprises concerning restricted matters must obtain the consent of the competent authority and securities regulatory authority before listing.[11] It is not bad news for foreign investors because the listed companies will undertake more stringent screening, which helps to build up an orderly securities market.

 

 

 

[1] http://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-07/02/c_1626811521011934.htm

[2] http://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-07/04/c_1627016782176163.htm; http://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-07/09/c_1627415870012872.htm.

[3] http://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-07/16/c_1628023601191804.htm.

[4] Notice of Cyberspace Administration of China on Seeking Public Comments on the Cybersecurity Review Measures (Draft Revision for Comment), available at: http://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-07/10/c_1627503724456684.htm

[5] The real seat theory is recommended by commentators, but not accepted by law. Lengjing, Going beyond audit disputes: What is the solution to the crisis of China Concept Stocks?, Strategies, Volume 1, 2021, p. 193.

[6] 2014 Cross-border capital flow monitoring report of the People’s Republic of China, available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/site1/20150216/43231424054959763.pdf

[7] Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §102(a), §104 (a) & (b).

[8] Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §105 (b)(5)(B).

[9] https://pcaobus.org/Registration/Firms/Documents/Applicants.pdf

[10] China-Related Access Challenges, available at: https://pcaobus.org/oversight/international/china-related-access-challenges.

[11] https://opinion.caixin.com/2021-07-09/101737896.html.

The Latest Development on Anti-suit Injunction Wielded by Chinese Courts to Restrain Foreign Parallel Proceedings

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(This post is provided by Zeyu Huang, who is an associate attorney of Hui Zhong Law Firm based in Shenzhen. Mr. Huang obtained his LLB degree from the Remin University of China Law School. He is also a PhD candidate & LLM at the Faculty of Law in University of Macau. The author may be contacted at the e-mail address: huangzeyu@huizhonglaw.com)

When confronted with international parallel proceedings due to the existence of a competent foreign court having adjudicative jurisdiction, the seized foreign court located in common law jurisdictions seems to see it as no offence to Chinese courts by granting anti-suit injunctions to restrain Chinese proceedings. This is because the common law court believes that “An order of this kind [anti-suit injunction] is made in personam against a party subject to the court’s jurisdiction by way of requiring compliance with agreed terms. It does not purport to have direct effect on the proceedings in the PRC. This court respects such proceedings as a matter of judicial comity”. [1] However, the fact that the anti-suit injunction is not directly targeted at people’s courts in the PRC does not prevent Chinese judges from believing that it is inappropriate for foreign courts to issue an anti-suit injunction restraining Chinese proceedings. Instead, they would likely view such interim order as something that purports to indirectly deprive the party of the right of having access to Chinese court and would unavoidably impact Chinese proceedings.
The attitude of Chinese courts towards the anti-suit injunction – a fine-tuning tool to curb parallel proceedings – has changed in recent years. In fact, they have progressively become open-minded to resorting to anti-suit injunctions or other similar orders that are issued to prevent parties from continuing foreign proceedings in parallel. Following that, the real question is whether and how anti-suit injunction is compatible with Chinese law. Some argued that Article 100 of the PRC CPL provides a legal basis for granting injunctions having similar effects with anti-suit injunction at common law. [2] It provides that:
“The people’s court may upon the request of one party to issue a ruling to preserve the other party’s assets or compel the other party to perform certain act or refrain from doing certain act, in cases where the execution of the judgment would face difficulties, or the party would suffer other damages due to the acts of the other party or for other reasons. If necessary, the people’s court also could make a ruling of such preservative measures without one party’s application.” [3]
Accordingly, Chinese people’s court may make a ruling to limit one party from pursuing parallel foreign proceedings if such action may render the enforcement of Chinese judgment difficult or cause other possible damages to the other party.
In maritime disputes, Chinese maritime courts are also empowered by special legislation to issue maritime injunctions having anti-suit or anti-anti-suit effects. Article 51 of the PRC Maritime Special Procedure Law provides that the maritime court may upon the application of a maritime claimant issue a maritime injunction to compel the respondent to do or not to do certain acts in order to protect the claimant’s lawful rights and interests from being infringed. [4] The maritime injunction is not constrained by the jurisdiction agreement or arbitration agreement as agreed upon between the parties in relation to the maritime claim. [5] In order to obtain a maritime injunction, three requirements shall be satisfied – firstly, the applicant has a specific maritime claim; secondly, there is a need to rectify the respondent’s act which violates the law or breaches the contract; thirdly, a situation of emergency exists in which the damages would be caused or increased if the maritime injunction is not issued immediately. [6] Like the provision of the PRC CPL, the maritime injunction issued by the Chinese maritime court is mainly directed to mitigate the damages caused by the party’s behaviour to the other parties’ relevant rights and interests.
In Huatai P&C Insurance Corp Ltd Shenzhen Branch v Clipper Chartering SA, the Maritime Court of Wuhan City granted the maritime injunction upon the claimant’s application to oblige the respondent to immediately withdraw the anti-suit injunction granted by the High Court of the Hong Kong SAR to restrain the Mainland proceedings. [7] The Hong Kong anti-suit injunction was successfully sought by the respondent on the grounds of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. [8] However, the respondent did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Mainland maritime court over the dispute arising from the contract of carriage of goods by sea. Therefore, the Maritime Court of Wuhan City held that the respondent had submitted to its jurisdiction. As a result, the application launched by the respondent to the High Court of the Hong Kong SAR for the anti-suit injunction to restrain the Mainland Chinese proceedings had infringed the legitimate rights and interests of the claimant. In accordance with Article 51 of the PRC Maritime Special Procedure Law, a Chinese maritime injunction was granted to order the respondent domiciled in Greece to withdraw the Hong Kong anti-suit injunction (HCCT28/2017). [9] As the maritime injunction in the Huatai Property case was a Mainland Chinese ruling issued directly against the anti-suit injunction granted by a Hong Kong court, it is fair to say that if necessary Chinese people’s court does not hesitate to issue a compulsory injunction “which orders a party not to seek injunction relief in another forum in relation to proceedings in the issuing forum”. [10] This kind of compulsory injunction is also called ‘anti-anti-suit injunction’ or ‘defensive anti-suit injunction’. [11]
When it comes to civil and commercial matters, including preserving intellectual property rights, the people’s court in Mainland China is also prepared to issue procedural orders or rulings to prevent the parties from pursuing foreign proceedings, similar to anti-suit injunctions or anti-anti-suit injunction in common law world. In Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecommunications Corp Ltd and its Shenzhen Branch v Sharp Corporation and ScienBiziP Japan Corporation, the plaintiff OPPO made an application to the seized Chinese court for a ruling to preserve actions or inactions.[12] Before and after the application, the defendant Sharp had brought tort claims arising from SEP (standard essential patent) licensing against OPPO by commencing several parallel proceedings before German courts, a Japanese court and a Taiwanese court. [13] In the face of foreign parallel proceedings, the Intermediate People’s Court of Shenzhen City of Guangdong Province rendered a ruling to restrain the defendant Sharp from pursing any new action or applying for any judicial injunction before a Chinese final judgment was made for the patent dispute. [14] The breach of the ruling would entail a fine of RMB 1 million per day. [15] Almost 7 hours after the Chinese ‘anti-suit injunction’ was issued, a German ‘anti-anti-suit injunction’ was issued against the OPPO. [16] Then, the Shenzhen court conducted a court investigation to the Sharp’s breach of its ruling and clarified the severe legal consequences of the breach. [17] Eventually, Sharp choose to defer to the Chinese ‘anti-suit injunction’ through voluntarily and unconditionally withdrawing the anti-anti-suit injunction granted by the German court. [18] Interestingly enough, Germany, a typical civil law country, and other EU countries have also seemingly taken a U-turn by starting to issue anti-anti-suit injunctions in international litigation in response to anti-suit injunctions made by other foreign courts, especially the US court. [19]
In some other IP cases involving Chinese tech giants, Chinese courts appear to feel more and more comfortable with granting compulsory rulings having the same legal effects of anti-suit injunction and anti-anti-suit injunction. For example, in another seminal case publicized by the SPC in 2020, Huawei Technologies Corp Ltd (“Huawei”) applied to the Court for a ruling to prevent the respondent Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (“Conversant”) from further seeking enforcement of the judgment rendered by the Dusseldorf Regional Court in Germany. [20] Before the application, a pair of parallel proceedings existed, concurrently pending before the SPC as the second-instance court and the Dusseldorf Regional Court. On the same date of application, the German regional court delivered a judgement in favour of Conversant. Within 48 hours after receiving the Huawei’s application for an anti-suit injunction, the SPC granted the injunction to prohibit Conversant from applying for enforcement of the German judgment; if Conversant failed to comply with the injunction, a fine (RMB 1 million per day) would be imposed, accumulating day by day since the date of breach. [21] Conversant applied for a reconsideration of the anti-suit injunction, and it was however rejected by the SPC eventually. [22] The SPC’s anti-suit injunction against the German regional court’s decision compelled both parties to go back to the negotiating table, and the dispute between the two parties striving for global parallel proceedings was finally resolved by reaching a settlement agreement. [23]
The SPC’s injunction in Huawei v. Conversant is commended as the very first action preservation ruling having the “anti-suit injunction” nature in the field of intellectual property rights litigation in China, which has prematurely established the Chinese approach to anti-suit injunction in judicial practice. [24] It is believed by the Court to be an effective tool to curb parallel proceedings concurrent in various jurisdictions across the globe. [25] We still wait to see Chinese court’s future approach in other civil and commercial matters to anti-suit injunction or anti-anti-suit injunction issued by itself as well as those granted by foreign courts.

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1. See Impala Warehousing and Logistics (Shanghai) Co Ltd v Wanxiang Resources (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2015] EWHC 811, para.144.
2. See Liang Zhao, ‘Party Autonomy in Choice of Court and Jurisdiction Over Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Disputes in China’ (2019) 15 Journal of Private International Law 541, at 565.
3. See Article 100, para.1 of the PRC CPL (2017).
4. See Article 51 of the PRC Special Maritime Procedure Law (1999).
5. See Article 53 of the PRC Special Maritime Procedure Law (1999).
6. See Article 56 of the PRC Special Maritime Procedure Law (1999).
7. See Huatai Property & Casualty Insurance Co Ltd Shenzhen Branch v Clipper Chartering SA (2017) E 72 Xing Bao No.3 of the Maritime Court of Wuhan City.
8. See HCCT 28/2017 of the High Court of the Hong Kong SAR.
9. See (2017) E 72 Xing Bao No.3.
10. See Andrew S. Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (Oxford University Press 2003), at 196.
11. See ibid.
12. See (2020) Yue 03 Min Chu No.689-1.
13. See ibid.
14. See ibid.
15. See ibid.
16. See ibid.
17. See ibid.
18. See ibid.
19. See Greta Niehaus, ‘First Anti-Anti-Suit Injunction in Germany: The Costs for International Arbitration’ Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 28 February 2021.
20. See Huawei Technologies Corp Ltd and Others v Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (2019) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No.732, No.733, No.734-I.
21. See ibid.
22. See Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v Huawei Technologies Corp Ltd and Others, (2019) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No.732, No.733, No.734-II.
23. See Case No.2 of the “10 Seminal Intellectual Property Right Cases before Chinese Courts”, Fa Ban [2021] No.146, the General Office of the Supreme People’s Court.
24. See ibid.
25. See ibid.

A Conflict of Laws Companion – Adrian Briggs Retires from Oxford

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By Tobias Lutzi, University of Cologne

There should be few readers of this blog, and few conflict-of-laws experts in general, to whom Adrian Briggs will not be a household name. In fact, it might be impossible to find anyone working in the field who has not either read some of his academic writings (or Lord Goff’s seminal speech in The Spiliada [1986] UKHL 10, which directly credits them) or had the privilege of attending one of his classes in Oxford or one of the other places he has visited over the years.

Adrian Briggs has taught Conflict of Laws in Oxford for more than 40 years, continuing the University’s great tradition in the field that started with Albert Venn Dicey at the end of the 19th century and had been upheld by Geoffrey Cheshire, John Morris, and Francis Reynolds* among others. His writings include four editions of The Conflict of Laws (one of the most read, and most readable, textbooks in the field), six editions of Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments and his magnus opus Private International Law in English Courts, a perfect snapshot of the law as it stood in 2014, shortly before the UK decided to turn back the clock. His scholarship has been cited by courts across the world. Still, Adrian Briggs has managed to maintain a busy barrister practice in London (including well-known cases such as Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill, Rubin v Eurofinance [2012] UKSC 46, and The Alexandros T [2013] UKSC 70) while also remaining an active member of the academic community regularly contributing not only to parliamentary committees but also, on occasion, to the academic discussion on this blog.

To honour his impact on the field of Conflict of Laws, two of Adrian’s Oxford colleagues, Andrew Dickinson and Edwin Peel, have put together a book, aptly titled ‘A Conflict of Laws Companion’. It contains contributions from 19 scholars, including four members of the highest courts of their respective countries, virtually all of whom have been taught by (or together with) the honorand at Oxford. The book starts with a foreword by Lord Mance, followed by three short notes on Adrian Briggs as a Lecturer at Leeds University (where he only taught for about a year), as a scholar at Oxford, and as a fellow at St Edmund Hall. Afterwards, the authors of the longer academic contributions offer a number of particularly delightful ‘recollections’, describing Adrian Briggs, inter alia, as “the one time wunderkind and occasional enfant terrible of private international law” (Andrew Bell), “the perfect supervisor: unfailingly generous with his time and constructive with his criticism” (Andrew Scott), and “a tutor, colleague and friend” (Andrew Dickinson).

The academic essays that follow are conventionally organised into four categories: ‘Jurisdiction’, ‘Choice of Law’, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’, and ‘Conflict of Laws within the Legal System’. They rise to the occasion on at least two accounts. First, they all use an aspect of Adrian Briggs’ academic oeuvre as their starting point. Second, they are of a quality and depths worthy of the honorand (possibly having profited from the prospect of needing to pass his critical eye). While they all are as insightful as inspiring, Ed Peel’s contribution on ‘How Private is Private International Law?’ can be recommended with particular enthusiasm as it picks up Adrian Briggs’ observation (made in several of his writings) that, so far as English law is concerned, “a very large amount of the law on jurisdiction, but also on choice of law, is dependent on the very private law notions of consent and obligation” and critically discusses it from the perspective of contract-law expert. Still, there is not one page of this book that does not make for a stimulating read. It is a great testament to one of the greatest minds in private international law, and a true Conflict of Laws companion to countless students, scholars, colleagues, and friends.

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* corrected from an earlier version

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments about Forum Land

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By Stephen G.A. Pitel, Western University

In common law Canada, it has long been established that a court will not recognize and enforce a foreign judgment concerning title to land in the forum.  The key case in support is Duke v Andler, [1932] SCR 734.

The ongoing application of that decision has now been called into question by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Lanfer v Eilers, 2021 BCCA 241 (available here).  In the court below the judge relied on Duke and refused recognition and enforcement of a German decision that determined the ownership of land in British Columbia.  The Court of Appeal reversed and gave effect to the German decision.  This represents a significant change to Canadian law in this area.

The Court of Appeal, of course, cannot overturn a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.  It reached its result by deciding that a more recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, that in Pro Swing Inc v Elta Golf Inc, 2006 SCC 52, had overtaken the reasoning and result in Duke and left the Court of Appeal free to recognize and enforce the German decision (see paras 44-45 and 74).  This is controversial.  It has been questioned whether Pro Swing had the effect of superseding Duke but there are arguments on both sides.  In part this is because Pro Swing was a decision about whether to recognize and enforce foreign non-monetary orders, but the orders in that case had nothing to do with specific performance mandating a transfer or title to land in the forum.

I find it hard to accept the decision as a matter of precedent.  The title to land aspect of the foreign decision seems a significantly different element than what is at issue in most non-monetary judgment decisions, such that it is hard to simply subsume this within Pro Swing.  What is really necessary is detailed analysis of whether the historic rule should or should not be changed at a normative level.  How open should courts be to recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments concerning title to land in the forum?  This raises related issues, most fundamentally whether the Mocambique rule itself should change.  If other courts now know that British Columbia is prepared to enforce foreign orders about land in that province, why should foreign courts restrain their jurisdiction in cases concerning such land?

In this litigation, the defendant is a German resident and by all accounts is clearly in violation of the German court’s order requiring a transfer of the land in British Columbia (see para 1).  Why the plaintiff could not or did not have the German courts directly enforce their own order against the defendant’s person or property is not clear in the decision.  Indeed, it may be that the German courts only were prepared to make the order about foreign land precisely because they had the power to enforce the order in personam and that it thus did not require enforcement in British Columbia (analogous to the Penn v Baltimore exception to Mocambique).

Given the conflict with Duke, there is a reasonable likelihood that the Supreme Court of Canada would grant leave to appeal if it is sought.  And if not, a denial of leave would be a relatively strong signal of support for the Court of Appeal’s decision.  But the issue will be less clear if no appeal is sought, leaving debate about the extent to which the law has changed.