Many thanks to Karim Hammami for the tip-off
I. Introduction
Once in the 20th century, the so-called “Nevada Divorces” captured the attention of private international law scholars around the world, particularly regarding their recognition abroad. Today, a similar phenomenon is emerging with the so-called “Utah Zoom Wedding.” So, what exactly is this phenomenon? Read more
Last week (7 June 2025), I had this extraordinary opportunity to give a presentation at the 138th Annual Conference of the Japanese Association of Private International Law, which took place at Seinan Gakuin Daigaku, Fukuoka – Japan. The theme of my presentation was “Private International Law and Colonialism.” In this talk, I shared some preliminary thoughts on a topic that is both extraordinarily rich and complex. The following note offers some initial reflections based on that presentation (with a few adjustments) with the aim of contributing to ongoing discussion and encouraging deeper reflection.
The European Commission’s recent Omnibus proposes a significant change to the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). Article 29(7) of the original CSDDD requires Member States to implement its rules on civil liability rules so that these rules apply as overriding mandatory provisions, if the law applicable to the claim is not a law of a Member State. The Omnibus package proposes to delete art. 29(7) CSDDD. As a result, Member States will no longer be obliged to implement CSDDD’s rules on liability as overriding mandatory provisions. Read more
Written by George Jacob, Incoming Associate, Bombay Law Chambers
Globalisation has led to a rise in cross-border disputes, making international service of summons increasingly relevant. While domestic service in India is straightforward, sending summons to foreign defendants involves complex legal procedures. Proper service ensures that the defendant is duly notified and can respond, embodying the principle of audi alteram partem. Until recently, the procedure for international service in India was unclear. This ambiguity was addressed by the Kerala High Court in Charuvila Philippose v. P.V. Sivadasan.[1] This blog outlines the legal frameworks for international service, revisits the earlier Mollykutty[2] decision, and analyses the broader implications of Charuvila Philippose. Read more
I. Introduction:
In 2024, the Dubai Supreme Court rendered a significant decision on the issue of indirect jurisdiction under UAE law. Commenting on that decision (see here), I noted that it offered “a welcome, and a much-awaited clarification regarding what can be considered one of the most controversial requirements in the UAE enforcement system” (italic in the original).
The decision commented on here touches on the same issue. Yet rather than confirming the direction suggested in the above-mentioned decision, the Court regrettably reverted to its prior, more restrictive approach. This shift raises doubts about whether a consistent jurisprudence on indirect jurisdiction is taking shape, or whether the legal framework remains fragmented and unpredictable.
Written by Tarasha Gupta, BALLB (Hons), Jindal Global Law School, and Saloni Khanderia, Professor, Jindal Global Law School (India)
The Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”) has become a preferred hub for hearing litigation and arbitration of international commercial disputes. Accordingly, many decisions from the SICC require recognition and enforcement in India.
In this light, a recent judgment from the Delhi High Court (“HC”) is a significant development providing relief to those wishing to enforce the SICC’s judgments in India. In Discovery Drilling Pte Ltd v. Parmod Kumar & Anr,[1] the HC has held that the SICC is a superior court under Section 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”). As a result, its judgments can be directly executed in India. That said, the HC ultimately held the judgment in question to be unenforceable, as it failed to meet the tests in Section 13 of the CPC.
This article breaks down the arguments and legal context behind the HC’s judgment. It also highlights how the case demonstrates flaws in India’s regime, which create difficulties not just for creditors trying to enforce foreign judgments in India, but also in enforcing India’s judgments abroad. Read more
Written by Samhith Malladi, Dual-qualified lawyer (India and England & Wales), and Senior Associate, Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas [Bombay office]; and Niyati Gandhi, Partner, Dispute Resolution, Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas [Bombay office]
The Recalibration of Enforcement Doctrine
The global campaign to enforce arbitral awards against the Republic of India arising from its long-running dispute with Devas Multimedia has witnessed a significant doctrinal shift in the treatment of sovereign immunity within the enforcement of investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) awards.
To recall, the dispute arises from a contract entered in 2005 between Devas Multimedia Private Limited (Devas) and the Indian state-owned Antrix Corporation (Antrix), which was the commercial arm of the Indian Space Research Organisation. Antrix had agreed to lease S-band spectrum to Devas to broadcast its multimedia services in India. Antrix terminated this contract in 2011 citing national security concerns. In a nutshell, the dispute spawned three concluded arbitrations – a commercial ICC arbitration between Devas and Antrix and two investor-state arbitrations between Devas’ shareholders and India under the India-Mauritius Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 1998 and the India-Germany BIT 1995. In 2022, Devas’ Mauritian shareholders commenced another investor-state arbitration against India under the India-Mauritius BIT in relation to India’s efforts to thwart the award against Antrix in the ICC arbitration, which currently remains pending before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. An overview of the various proceedings arising from this dispute has been previously discussed on this blog here. Read more
Guest post by Bebizuh Mulugeta Menkir, former Lecturer of Laws in University of Gondar, currently working as a Lawyer and Senior National Consultant for a legal reform project. E-mail: babimulugeta@gmail.com
The Ethiopian legal system is characterized by the absence of codified rules on conflict of laws. Though it cannot be considered as the exact period in which conflict of laws have emerged in Ethiopia, some elements of such rules can be found even in the early 1900s, which is long before the modern codes were developed in 1950s and 1960s.
A book written by Mersehazen Woledekirkos titled “Ye Hayagenawe Keflezemen Mebacha:Ye Zemen Tarik Tezetaye Kayehute ena Kesemahute 1896–1922”[1] is a record of historical events that happened in 20th century Ethiopia. One of the records is the “Trade Agreement (1908)” that was signed between Ethiopia and France. This agreement, among others, regulates the adjudication of disputes between Ethiopian and French nationals/dependents. This short piece aims to briefly discuss the salient conflict of laws rules that are incorporated in this trade agreement. Read more
Written by Mayela Celis, Maastricht University
The hearing in the case of Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. et al. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico) No. 23-1141 took place in March 2025 before the US Supreme Court. We have previously reported on this case here and here. The transcript and the audio files can be found here.
As previously indicated, this is a much-politicized case brought by Mexico against US gun manufacturers. Mexico alleges inter alia that defendants actively assist and facilitate trafficking of their guns to drug cartels in Mexico. Among the claims for relief are: Negligence, public nuisance, defective condition – unreasonably dangerous, negligence per se, gross negligence, unjust enrichment and restitution, violation of CUTPA [Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act], Violation of Mass. G.L. c. 93A [Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act] and punitive damages.
By Guillaume Croisant (Linklaters LLP)
The United Kingdom deposited an instrument of accession to the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (the “Convention”) on 28 September 2020. This instrument of accession became effective after the Brexit’s transition period, on 1 January 2021, and gained binding force within the UK legal order following the adoption of the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020.
As many readers will be aware, a controversy exists regarding the temporal scope of the Convention. It applies to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded after its entry into force for the State of the chosen court and to disputes initiated after its entry into force for the State of the seized court. EU Member States have been bound by the Hague Convention since its approval by the European Union on 1 October 2015, but what about the UK after its withdrawal from the EU?
According to a first viewpoint, reflected in the UK’s instrument of accession, ” In accordance with Article 30 of the 2005 Hague Convention, the United Kingdom became bound by the Convention on 1 October 2015 by virtue of its membership of the European Union, which approved the Convention on that date.”
Conversely, under a second viewpoint (apparently shared by the European Commission in its ‘Notice to stakeholders – Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU rules in the field of civil justice and private international law’ dated 27 August 2020, p. 9), the Convention could only apply after the United Kingdom’s ‘independent’ ratification, which occurred on 1 January 2021. If this second perspective were accepted, jurisdiction agreements concluded before this date would not benefit from the mutual recognition system established by the Convention.
In a judgment (in French) dated 27 March 2025 (C.24.0012.F), the Belgian Supreme Court (Court de Cassation/Hof van Cassatie) ruled in favour of the first viewpoint, holding that “The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 has been applicable to the United Kingdom as a bound State, owing to the European Union’s approval of the Convention, from 1 October 2015 until 31 December 2020, and as a contracting party from 1 January 2021. The argument, in this regard, that the United Kingdom ceased to be bound by the Convention following its withdrawal from the European Union on 1 February 2020, is without legal basis.”