GD Goenka University, Gurugram is part of the GD Goenka Group. GD Goenka University was established in 2013 under the Haryana Private Universities (Amendment) Act, 2013. The GD Goenka University School of Law offers Law Degree Programs at Undergraduate, Post Graduate and Doctoral levels and strives to open new vistas in the arena of law through clinical legal studies and research. With an objective to raise the standards of clinical legal education in India, the GD Goenka University, School of Law regularly hosts Moot Court Competitions and encourages law students from various Law Schools and Universities from across India and world to learn the art and skills of advocacy.

In November 2020, School of law, GD Goenka University successfully organized an arbitration moot court competition “GD Goenka – CIArb (India) International Virtual Commercial Arbitration Competition 2020” in association with CIArb (India) Chapter. The University is now organising the Fifth edition of  “GD Goenka – CIArb (India) International Virtual Commercial Arbitration Competition 2021″ in association with CIArb (India) Chapter on 20th-21st November. The event is expected to have participation from various Law Schools and Universities from across India & abroad.

The Registration for the Competition is open. The registration fee is USD 11 /- only.

You would also be pleased to know the Prizes for winners in various categories-

Winners- Rs 70,000/- (USD 935/-)

Runners Up- Rs 40,000/- (USD 534/-)

Best Speaker Male & Female- Rs 10,000/- each. (USD 133/- each)

Best Memorial- Rs 10,000/- (USD 133/-)

The link to the registration form, posters and brochure is found below.

Registration Form- https://forms.gle/ZwJpZKmsPNDJiwMN6

With Warm Regards,

Prof. (Dr.) Tabrez Ahmad,

Vice Chancellor GD Goenka University &

Dean School of Law

Tulane University School of Law and The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel’s Legal Education Committee are organizing the 9th academic symposium financially supported by The ACTEC Foundation. The symposium, Conflict of Laws in Trusts and Estates will be held at the Tulane University School of Law on Friday, October 21, 2022. The keynote address will be given by Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum of Vanderbilt University Law School.

Among the objectives of this symposium are the following:

• To bring together prominent and up-and-coming scholars for the discussion of important issues in conflict of laws;
• To spur leading-edge research on conflict of laws in trusts and estates;
• To encourage professors of trusts and estates to incorporate and consider issues of conflict of laws in their scholarship and teaching;
• To promote collaborations and exchanges between conflict-of-laws scholars and scholars of trusts and estates.

Papers presented at the symposium will consist of papers selected from this Call for Papers and papers from invited speakers. The papers will be published in the Tulane Law Review.

If you would like to be considered to present a paper, please submit an abstract of your paper to Ron Scalise by email (rscalise@tulane.edu) by November 1, 2021. Those chosen to participate  in the symposium will be notified no later than December 1, 2021. Symposium speakers will be required to submit a draft of their papers by August 15, 2022, so that the panel commentators will have sufficient time to prepare their commentary.

Symposium speakers will be reimbursed for their travel expenses (economy airfare, the cost of ground transportation, and up to two nights’ hotel stay). Speakers will be invited to dinner on the evenings of Thursday, October 20, 2022, and (for speakers staying Friday evening) Friday, October 21, 2022.

Breakfast and lunch will be provided to speakers and attendees on Friday, October 21, 2022, courtesy of The ACTEC Foundation.

Questions about the symposium or this call for papers should be directed to Ron Scalise at the email address above.

This symposium was made possible through the financial support of The ACTEC Foundation, https://actecfoundation.org.

 

 

This post is by Emilia Beuger (LL.M. Utrecht), JD Candidate at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.

As noted in an earlier post on this site, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation on September 30, 2021. Below is a more detailed discussion of the issues at play in this case.

This case originated in the state of California and was then appealed to the Ninth Circuit before filing a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. The central legal issue concerns the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), whose application and interpretation has been split across Circuit Courts.

The issue before the Supreme Court is whether a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the FSIA must apply the forum state’s choice-of-law rules to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue, or whether it may apply federal common law. The state law is California’s choice-of-law test and the federal common law’s choice-of-law test is set forth in the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws. The FSIA does not have an express choice of law provision.

Background

The Cassirer family has sought to recover a painting that was stolen from Lilly Cassirer by the Nazis in 1939, and it was subsequently smuggled into the United States and traded privately. This was unbeknownst to Lilly, who brought proceedings in the United States Court of Restitution Appeals under the assumption that the painting had been lost or destroyed. The Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (TBC) purchased the painting in 1993. TBC is a public foundation, and it is considered an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom of Spain. In 2000, Lilly’s grandson Claude Cassirer learned that TBC had possession of the painting and requested both Spain and TBC for the painting’s return. Spain refused. Claude filed suit against Spain and TBC in 2005. Spain was voluntarily dismissed as a party in 2011.

Claude passed away in 2010, and his children David and Ava, as well as the United Jewish Federation of San Diego County, were substituted as plaintiffs. Ava’s estate was substituted as a plaintiff after she passed away in 2018.

Issues and Arguments

A series of different proceedings have occurred since the original filing in 2005. The Ninth Circuit found that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies to the dispute because the painting was stolen by Germany in violation of international law.

The most recent case in the district court in 2015 was a result of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on the choice-of-law and its application. The district court found for TBC. Even though the buyer prior to TBC had not purchased the painting in good faith and did not pass good title to TBC, TBC lacked actual knowledge under Spanish law. Because TBC lacked actual knowledge under Spanish law, TBC was allowed to keep the stolen painting.

Cassirer’s theory on appeal was that the district court should have applied California law, not Spanish law. Under California law, a thief cannot pass title to anyone, even if there was a good faith purchaser (i.e. who TBC claims to be in this case). Therefore, if California law had been applied in this case, the outcome would have been different.

Key to both sides arguments is that the FSIA provides: “foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 1606.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, affirming the application of federal common law to the choice-of-law analysis under the FSIA, but remanded because the Ninth Circuit felt that the district court did not properly apply the Spanish law. Cassirer argues that this contrasts with other Circuit Courts, such as the Second, Fifth, Sixth and D.C. Circuits, who have applied the law of the forum state to the choice-of-law analysis for claims under the FSIA.

In Cassirer’s petition, he cites cases across the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits that say the law of the forum state should be applied, not federal common law. The decision to apply federal common law by the Ninth Circuit turned on the wording of past precedents that show that the court may “prefer” to apply it. In contrast, the Second Circuit has interpreted that the FSIA is a “pass-through” for the application of state law to be controlling when there is an issue of choice-of-law. If the goal of the FSIA is to apply the same laws to foreign states and private individuals, then the application must be done with the law that the court would use if the court was dealing with two private parties. Cassirer argues that the application of California’s choice-of-law test would have led to the application of California law because the state law interest of California would be more impaired than if the Spanish law was chosen to be applied in this case.

The Ninth Circuit’s approach, Cassirer argues, would lead to an inconsistency within the liability standards for foreign states and private individuals because the law applied in the state court would be different than the law applied if the suit was brought in federal court. Additionally, Cassirer puts forth public policy arguments. Because there is a split in the Circuit Courts, Cassirer argues that the Supreme Court should hear this case.

While Cassier argues that both tests would have warranted application of California law, TBC argues that both tests would have warranted application of Spanish law.

TBC filed a response to Cassirer’s Petition, arguing that while there may be a split amongst the Circuits, the split is a shallow one. TBC also argues that the outcome(s) will almost always be the same, no matter what choice-of-law test is applied. Public policy arguments are also advanced by TBC that the FSIA’s goal of holding foreign sovereigns accountable and that foreign sovereigns are to be dealt with differently than individuals, specifically at the federal level. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit rests on a federal question, not a diversity matter, so the Ninth Circuit should apply the federal common law test.

Briefs will be filed later this year and early next year.

The Supreme Court is slated to hear arguments during its 2021 Term.

The relationship between comparative law and public international law is paradoxical. These fields are in principle close to each other but remote in practice. The emergence of comparative international law has changed the situation as it invites comparative law scholars to enter into discussion on international law. This article provides a critical analysis on the possibilities for comparative law in the field of international law. It discusses and explains why a non-normative understanding of comparative international law works well together with the pluralist conception of comparative law, and why a normative understanding of comparative international law is incompatible with it. This article explains why comparative law scholars do not welcome the use of comparative law for international law purposes with open arms.

More than a Problem of Characterization: The Relationship Between Consumer Contract Law and the Law of Capacity. – The EU regulations in the area of private international law largely exclude legal capacity. The law applicable to questions of capacity is determined by the applicable national conflict-of-law rules. This raises the question of the scope of the law of capacity and how it is to be distinguished from neighbouring fields of law. In particular, drawing this distinction vis-à-vis contract law presents difficulties in cases involving consumers. Both consumer law and the law of capacity place the protection of the weaker party in the foreground. Distinguishing the law of capacity from neighbouring fields of law is therefore more than a mere problem of characterization: it is a matter of not undermining the level of protection sought by the different fields of law in cross-border cases. In this paper, a proposal is made as to how the boundaries of the law of capacity can be determined in relation to contract law, taking into account this intended protection of the weaker party.

The Uruguayan General Law of Private International Law. – Uruguay has always been a center for private international law. The Montevideo Congress, held in 1888 and 1889 at Uruguay’s invitation – before the Hague Conference on Private  International Law – was of instrumental significance for the development of private international law in Latin America. Uruguay has consistently played an active role in preparing the inter-American specialized conferences on private international law and in propagating bilateral PIL treaties. The new private international law legislation underway since the end of the last century does not break with tradition completely, but seeks to develop it further adapting it to present-day demands. Some major features of the reform bear emphasis: a comprehensive regulation of the general rules of private international law, refinements to the contours of international family law, a recasting of international contracts law based on party autonomy,  and detailed rules on the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts in international disputes.

For a German translation of the Uruguayan General Law of Private International Law of 27 November 2020 by Samtleben, see: Volume 85 (2021) / Issue 4, pp. 907-925 (19), https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2021-0052