Views
Abu Dhabi Supreme Court on the Applicability of Law on Civil Marriage to Foreign Muslims
I. Introduction
Recent developments in the field of family law in the UAE, in particular the adoption of the so-called “Civil Marriage Laws”, have aroused interest, admiration, curiosity, and even doubt and critics among scholars and practitioners of family law, comparative law and private international law around the world.[1] First introduced in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi,[2] and later implemented at the federal level,[3] these “non-religious” family laws, at least as originally enacted in Abu Dhabi, primarily intend to apply to foreign non-Muslims.[4] The main stated objective of these laws is to provide foreign expatriates with a modern and flexible family law based on “principles that are in line with the best international practices” and “close to them in terms of culture, customs and language”.[5] One of the peculiar feature of these laws is that their departure from the traditional family law regulations and practices in the region, particularly in terms of gender equality in pertinent matters such as testimony, succession, no-fault divorce and joint custody.[6]
Aside from the (critical) judgment that can be made about these laws, their application raises several questions. These include, inter alia, the question as to whether these laws would apply to “foreign Muslims”, and if yes, under which conditions. The decision of the Abu Dhabi Supreme Court (hereafter “ADSC”) reported here (Ruling No. 245/2024 of 29 April 2024) shed some light on this ambiguity.
II. The Facts:
The case concerns a unilateral divorce action initiated by the husband (a French-Lebanese dual national, hereafter “X”) against his wife (a Mexican-Egyptian dual national, hereafter “Y”). Both are Muslim.
According to the facts reported in the decision, X and Y got married in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi on 11 September 2023, apparently in accordance with the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law[7] although some aspects of the Islamic tradition regarding marriage appear to have been observed.[8] On 6 November 2023, X filed an action for no-fault divorce with the Abu Dhabi Civil Family Court (hereafter ADCFC) pursuant to the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law using the prescribed form.[9] Y contested the divorce petition by challenging the jurisdiction of the court. However, the ADCFC admitted the action and declared the dissolution of the marriage. The decision was confirmed on appeal.
Y then appealed to the ADSC primarily arguing that the Court of Appeal had erred in applying the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law to declare the dissolution of the marriage because both parties were Muslim. Y’s main arguments as summarized by the ADSC are as follows:
- The Abu Dhabi courts lacked international jurisdiction because she was foreigner and did not have a place of residence in Abu Dhabi and that her domicile was in Egypt,
- The Court of Appeal rejected her argument on the ground that X had a known domicile in Abu Dhabi,
- Both parties were foreign Muslims and not concerned with the application of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law knowing that the marriage fulfilled all the necessary requirement for Islamic marriage and was concluded with the presence and the consent of Y’s matrimonial guardian (her brother in casu).
III. The Ruling
The ADSC accepted the appeal and ruled that the ADCFC was not competent to hear the dispute, stating as follows:
“Pursuant to Article 87 of the [2022 Federal Act on Civil Procedure, hereafter “FACP”], challenges to the court’s judicial jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the courts sua sponte and may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings. On appeal, Y argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because she was Muslim […] and a dual national of Mexico and Egypt, while X was also a Muslim […] and holder of French and Lebanese nationalities.
[However,] the Court of Appeal rejected Y’s arguments and confirmed its jurisdiction based on Articles 3 and 4 of [the Procedural Regulation]; [although] the opening of Article 3 relied on [by the court] states that “the court is competent to hear civil family matters for non-Muslim foreigners regarding civil marriage, divorce and their effects”. In addition, Article 1(1) of Federal Legislative Decree No. 41/2022 states that “The provisions of the present Legislative Decree shall apply to non-Muslim citizens of the UAE and to foreign non-Muslims residing in the UAE, unless they invoke the application of their own law in matters of marriage, divorce, succession, wills and establishment of filiation.”
[Given that] it was judicially established by the parties’ acknowledgement that they were Muslim, the Court of Appeal violated the Law No. 14/2021, as amended by Law No. 15/2021, and its Procedural Regulation [No. 8/2022], as well as Federal Legislative Decree No. 41/2022 by upholding the appealed decision without ascertaining the religion of the parties and ruling as it did, [therefore its decision] must be reversed”.
IV. Comments
The main legal question referred to the ADSC concerned the applicability of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation to foreign Muslims. The ADSC answered the question in the negative, stating that the ADCFC was not competent to declare the dissolution a marriage between foreign Muslims. Although the case raises some interesting issues regarding the international jurisdiction of the ADCFC, for the sake of brevity, only the question of the applicability of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law will be addressed here.
1. Unlike the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status, which explicitly states that its provisions “apply to non-Muslim UAE citizens, and to non-Muslim foreigners residing in the UAE” (article 1, emphasis added), the law in Abu Dhabi is rather ambiguous on this issue.
i. It should be indicated in this respect that, the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law, which was originally enacted as “The Personal Status for Non-Muslim Foreigners in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi” (Law No. 14/2021 of 7 November 2021, emphasis added) clearly limited its scope of application to foreign non-Muslims. This is also evident from the definition of the term “foreigner” contained in the former article 1 of the Law, according to which, the term (foreigner) was defined as “[a]ny male or female non-Muslim foreigner, having a domicile, residence or place of work in the Emirate.” Former article 3 of the Law also defined the scope of application of the Law and limited only to “foreigners” in the meaning of article 1 (i.e. non-Muslim foreigners). Therefore, it was clear that the Law, in its original form, did not apply to “foreign Muslims” in general.[10]
ii. However, only one month after its enactment (and even before its entry into force), the Law was amended and renamed “The Law on Civil Marriage and its Effects in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi” by the Law No. 15/2021 of 8 December 2021. The amendments concerned, inter alia the scope of application rationae personae of the Law. Indeed, the Law No. 15/2021 deleted the all references to “foreigners” in the Law No. 14/2021 and replaced the term with a more neutral one: “persons covered by the provisions of this Law [al-mukhatabun bi hadha al-qanun]”. This notion is broadly defined to include both “foreigners” (without any particular reference to their religious affiliation) and “non-Muslim citizens of the UAE” (New Article 1).
Article 5 of the Procedural Regulation provides further details. It defines the terms “persons covered by the provisions of this Law” as follows:
- Non-Muslim [UAE] citizens.
- A foreigner who holds the nationality of a country that does not primarily apply the rules of Islamic Sharia in matters of personal status as determined by the Instruction Guide issued by the Chairman of the [Judicial] Department […] (emphasis added).
The wording of article 5(2) is somewhat confusing, as it can be interpreted in two manners:
(i) if read a contrario, the provision would mean that foreigners, irrespective to their religion (including non-Muslims), would not be subject to the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation if they hold the nationality of a country that does “primarily apply the rules of Islamic Sharia in matters of personal status”. As a result, family relationships of Christian Algerian or Moroccan, for example, would not be governed by the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation. However, this interpretation seems to be in opposition with the very purpose of adopting the Law, which, in its own terms, applies to non-Muslim UAE citizens.
(ii) Alternatively, the word “foreigner” here could be understood to mean “Muslim foreigners”, but only those who hold the “the nationality of a country that does not primarily apply the rules of Islamic Sharia in matters of personal status”. As a result, the family relationships of Muslim Canadian, French, German or Turkish (whether Tunisian would be included here is unclear) would be governed by the Law.
The latter interpretation seems to be prevalent.[11] In addition, the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department (ADJD)’s official website (under section “Marriage”) presents even a broader scope since it explains that “civil marriage” is open to “anyone, regardless of their religion” including “Muslims” “as long as they are not UAE citizens”.
iii. The situation becomes more complicated when the parties have multiple nationalities especially when, as in the reported decision, one is from of a predominantly Muslim country and the other from a non-Muslim country. Here, article 5 of the Procedural Regulation provides useful clarifications. According to paragraph 2 in fine, the nationality to be taken into account in such situation is the one used by the parties according to their [status] of residence in the UAE. If interpreted literally, family law relationships of foreign Muslims who, in addition to their nationality of a non-Muslim country, also hold a nationality of a country whose family law is primarily based on Islamic Sharia (as in the reported decision) would be governed by the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation if, according to their status of residence, they use the nationality of their non-Muslim country nationality.
iv. In the case commented here, the parties have dual nationality (French/Lebanese, Mexican/Egyptian). Although the parties are identified as “Muslim”, they appear to have used the nationality of their non-Muslim countries.[12] Accordingly, contrary to the ADSC’s decision, it can be said that the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation were applicable in this case.
2. In addition to the religion of the parties, the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation determine other situations in which the Law applies.
i. These include, with respect to the effect of the marriage and its dissolution, the case where “the marriage is concluded in accordance with” the Law and its provisions (Article 3 of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law;[13] Article 5(4) of the Procedural Regulation).[14] The application of this rule does not seem to be dependent on the religion of the parties concerned. Consequently, since the marriage in casu was concluded pursuant to the provisions of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law,[15] its dissolution should logically be governed by the provisions of the same Law.
ii. However, it must be acknowledged that such a conclusion is not entirely self-evident. The confusion stems from the ADJD’s official website (under section “Divorce”) which states as a matter of principle that, normally, “anyone who obtained a Civil Marriage through the ADCFC” is entitled to apply for divorce in application of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law. However, the same website indicates that “[f]or applicants holding citizenship of a country member of the Arab League countries [sic], an official document proving the religion of the party may be required” when they apply for divorce” (emphasis added).[16] Although the ADSC made no reference to the Arab citizenship of the parties in its decision, it appears that it adheres to the idea of dissociation between the conclusion and the dissolution of marriage in dispute involving Muslims. In any case, one can regret that the ASDC missed the opportunity to examine the rule on dual nationality under article 5(2).
Concluding Remarks
1. To deny the jurisdiction of the ADCFC, the ASDC relied on article 3 of the Procedural Regulation, which the Court quoted as follows: “The [ADCFC] is competent to hear civil family matters for foreign non-Muslims in relation to civil marriage, divorce and its effects (emphasis added).” The problem, however, is that the ADSC conveniently omitted key words that significantly altered the meaning of the provision.
The provision, properly quoted, reads as follows: “The [ADCFC] is competent to hear civil family matters for foreigners or non-Muslim citizens in relation to civil marriage, divorce and its effects (emphasis added).” In other words, article 3 does not limit the scope of application of the Law and its Regulation exclusively to “foreign non-Muslims” as outlined above.
2. Moreover, it is quite surprising that the ADSC also referred to Article 1 of the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status in support of its conclusions, i.e. that the taking of jurisdiction by the ADFCF “violated the law”. This is because it is accepted that the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status does not apply to Abu Dhabi.[17] In addition, some important differences exist between the two laws such as age of marriage which fixed at 18 in the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law (article 4(1)), but raised to 21 in the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status (article 5(1)).[18] The combined (mis)application of 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status appears opportunistic and reveals the ADSC’s intention to exclude contra legem foreign Muslims (or at least those who are binational of both a Muslim and Non-Muslim countries) from the scope of application of 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation.
[1] see on this blog, Lena-Maria Möller, “Abu Dhabi Introduces Personal Status for non-Muslim Foreigners, Shakes up Domestic and International Family Law”. See Also, idem, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates: A Preliminary Assessment”, 37 Arab Law Quarterly (2023) 1 ff. For a particularly critical view, see Sami Bostanji, “Le droit de statut personnel au service de l’économie de marché! Reflexoins autour de la Loi n°14 en date de 7 novembre 2021 relative au statut personnel des étrangers non-musulmans dans l’Emirat d’Abou Dhabi” in Mélanges offerts en l’honneur du Professeur Mohamed Kamel Charfeddine (CPU, 2023) 905 ff.
[2] Law No. 14/2021 of 7 November 2021 on the “Personal Status for Non-Muslims” as modified by the Law No. 15/2021 of 8 December 2021 which changed the Law’s title to “Law on Civil Marriage and its Effects” (hereafter “2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law”) and its Procedural Regulation issued by the Resolution of the Chairman of the Judicial Department No. 8/2022 of 1 February 2022, hereafter the “2022 Procedural Regulation”
[3] Federal Legislative Decree No. 41/2022 of 3 October 2022 on “Civil Personal Status” (hereafter “2022 Federal Civil Personal Status”) and its Implementing Regulation issued by the Order of the Council of Ministers No. 1222 of 27 November 2023.
[4] See below IV(1)(i). On the difference between the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status on this particular point, see below IV(1).
[5] Article 2 of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law.
[6] Article 16 of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law; article 4 of the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status.
[7] The text of the decision is not clear on this point. Some comments online explain that the marriage was concluded pursuant to 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law.
[8] The text of the decision particularly mentions the presence and consent of Y’s matrimonial guardian (wali), which is a necessary requirement for the validity of marriage between Muslims, but not a requirement under the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law.
[9] The ADCFC, which was established specifically to deal with family law matters falling under the purview of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law, holds subject-matter jurisdiction in this regard.
[10] cf. Möller, “Abu Dhabi Introduces Personal Status for non-Muslim Foreigners” op. cit.
[11] For an affirmative view, see Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 7.
[12] Some comments online explain that the marriage was concluded using foreign passports with no-Arabic names and no indication of the parties’ religion.
[13] On the problems of interpretation of this provision, see Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 7.
[14] The Procedural Regulation further expands the scope of application of the Civil Marriage Law to cover cases where “the marriage was concluded abroad in a country whose family law is not primarily based on Islamic Sharia as determined by Abu Dhabi authorities” (Article 5(3)) and in any other case determined by the Chairman of the Judicial Department and about which an order is issued (Article 5(5)).
[15] See supra n (7).
[16] However, this rule appears to be devoid of any legal basis.
[17] Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 2.
[18] For a comparision, see Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 13-15.
Advocate General in Case Mirin (C-4/23): Refusal of recognition of a new gender identity legally obtained in another Member State violates the freedom of movement and residence of EU citizens
The following case note has been kindly provided by Dr. Samuel Vuattoux-Bock, LL.M. (Kiel), University of Freiburg (Germany).
On May 7, 2024, Advocate General Jean Richard de la Tour delivered his opinion in the case C-4/23, Mirin, concerning the recognition in one Member State of a change of gender obtained in another Member State by a citizen of both States. In his opinion, Advocate General de la Tour states that the refusal of such a recognition would violate the right to move and reside freely within the Union (Art. 21 TFEU, Art. 45 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and the right of respect for private and family life (Art. 7 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). Read more
The Kenyan Supreme Court holds that Scottish Locus Inspection Orders must be Examined by the Kenyan Courts for Recognition and Enforcement in Kenya
Miss Anam Abdul-Majid (LLM, University of Birmingham; LLB, University of Nairobi; BSC.IBA, United States International University; Advocate and Head of Corporate and Commercial Department, KSM Advocates, Nairobi, Kenya).
Dr Chukwuma Okoli (Assistant Professor in Commercial Conflict of Laws at the University of Birmingham; Senior Research Associate; Private International Law in Emerging Countries, University of Johannesburg)
We would like to thank Joy Chebet, Law Student at Kenyatta University, for her research assistance and comments. We would also like to thank Professor Beligh Elbalti for his critical comments on the draft blogpost.
I. INTRODUCTION
Kenya is one of the countries that make up East Africa and is therefore part of the broader African region. As such, developments in Kenyan law are likely to have a profound impact on neighbouring countries and beyond, consequently warranting special attention.
In the recent case of Ingang’a & 6 others v James Finlay (Kenya) Limited (Petition 7 (E009) of 2021) [2023] KESC 22 (KLR), the Kenyan Supreme Court dismissed an appeal for the recognition and enforcement of a locus inspection order issued by a Scottish Court. The Kenyan Supreme Court held that ‘decisions by foreign courts and tribunals are not automatically recognized or enforceable in Kenya. They must be examined by the courts in Kenya for them to gain recognition and to be enforced’ [para 66]. In its final order, the Court recommended that in Kenya:
‘The Speakers of the National Assembly and the Senate, the Attorney-General, and the Kenya Law Reform Commission, attended with a signal of the utmost urgency, for any necessary amendments, formulation and enactment of statute law to give effect to this judgment and develop the legislation on judicial assistance in obtaining evidence for civil proceedings in foreign courts and tribunals.’
This Case is highly significant, because it extensively addresses the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Kenya and the principles to be considered by the Kenyan Courts. It is therefore a Case that other African countries, common law jurisdictions, and further parts of the globe could find invaluable.
II. FACTS
The Case outlined below pertained to the enforcement of a foreign judgment/ruling in Kenya, specifically, a Scottish ruling. As a brief overview, the Appellants were individuals who claimed to work for the Respondent, the latter being a company incorporated in Scotland. However, their place of employment was Kenya, namely, Kericho. The nature of the claim consisted of work-related injuries, attributed to the Respondent’s negligence due to the Appellants’ poor working conditions at the tea estates in Kericho. The claim was filed before the courts in Scotland, where inspection orders were sought by the Appellants and granted by the Courts. The purpose of the locus inspection order was to collect evidence by sending experts to Kenya and submit a report which can be used by the Scottish court to determine the liability of the Respondent. However, the respondent fearing compliance with the Scottish locus inspection order, sought an order from Kenyan Court to prevent the execution of the locus inspection order in Kenya, leading to a petition being filed by the Appellants before the Employment and Labour Relations Court in Kenya.
Nevertheless, the trial court ruled against the Appellants and stated that the enforcement of foreign judgments in Kenya, especially interlocutory orders, required Kenyan judicial aid to ensure that the foreign judgments aligned with Kenya’s public policy. This was further affirmed by the Court of Appeal, which expressed the same views and reiterated the need for judicial assistance in enforcing foreign judgments and rulings in Kenya. The Court of Appeal held that decisions issued by foreign courts and tribunals are not automatically recognised or enforceable in Kenya and must be examined by the Kenyan courts to gain recognition and be enforced.
The matter was then brought before the Supreme Court of Kenya.
III. SUMMARY OF THE JUDGMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF KENYA
With regard to the enforcement of foreign judgments, the Supreme Court had to determine ‘whether the locus inspection orders issued by the Scottish Court could be executed in Kenya without intervention by Kenyan authorities.’
However, the Appellants argued that the locus inspection orders were self-executing and did not require an execution process. Instead, inspection orders only required the parties’ compliance. Conversely, the Respondents argued that any decision not delivered by a Kenyan court should be scrutinised by the Kenyan authorities before its execution.
In its decision, the Supreme Court relied on the principle of territoriality, which it referred to as a ‘cornerstone of international law’ [para 51], and further elaborated on the importance of sovereignty. Based on the principle of territoriality, while upholding the principle of sovereignty, the Supreme Court stated that the ‘no judgment of a Court of one country can be executed proprio vigore in another country’ [para 52]. The Supreme Court’s view was that the universal recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions leads to the superiority of foreign nations over national courts. It likewise paves the way for the exposure of arbitrary measures, which are then imposed on the residents of a country against whom measures have been taken abroad. In its statements, the Supreme Court concreted the decision that foreign judgments in Kenya cannot be enforced automatically, but must gain recognition in Kenya through acts of authorisation by the Judiciary, in order to be enforced in Kenya.
The Supreme Court grounded the theoretical basis for enforcing foreign judgments in Kenyan common law as comity. It approved the US approach (Hilton v Guyot) to the effect that: ‘The application of the doctrine of comity means that the recognition of foreign decisions is not out of obligation, but rather out of convenience and utility’ [para 59]. The Court justified comity as:
‘prioritizing citizen protection while taking into account the legitimate interests of foreign claimants. This approach is consistent with the adaptability of international comity as a principle of informed prioritizing national interests rather than absolute obligation, as well as the practical differences between the international and national contexts.’ [para 60]
The Kenyan Supreme Court further established the importance of reciprocity and asserted that the Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 2018 was the primary Act governing foreign judgments. The Court recognised that as a constituent country of the United Kingdom, Scotland is a reciprocating country under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act. However, the orders sought did not fall under the above Act, as locus inspection orders are not on the list of decisions that are expressly mentioned in the Act. Moreover, locus inspection orders are not final orders. Thus, the Supreme Court’s position was that the locus inspection orders could not fall within the ambit of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, and the trial court and the Court of Appeal were incorrect in extending the application of the Act to these orders.
Consequently, the Supreme Court highlighted the correct instrument to be relied on for the above matter. It was the Supreme Court’s position that although the Civil Procedure Act does not specifically establish a process for the judicial assistance of orders to undertake local investigations, the same process as for judicial assistance in the examination of witnesses could be imitated for local investigation orders. Thus, the Supreme Court stated that:
‘The procedure of foreign courts seeking judicial assistance in Kenya for examination of witnesses was the same procedure to be followed for carrying out local investigations, examination or adjustment accounts; or to make a partition. That procedure was through the issuance of commission rogatoire or letter of request to the High Court in Kenya seeking assistance. That procedure was not immediately apparent. The High Court and Court of Appeal were wrong for extending the spirit of the beyond its application as that was not the appropriate statute that was applicable to the instant case.’ [para 26]
The process is therefore as under the Sections 54 and 55 of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 28 of the Civil Procedure Rules, as well as the Practice Directions to Standardize Practice and Procedures in the High Court made pursuant to Section 10 of the Judicature Act. It entails issuing a commission rogatoire or letter of request to the Registrar of the High Court in Kenya, seeking assistance. This would then trigger the High Court in Kenya to implement the Rules as contained in Order 28 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 [92 – 99].
IV. COMMENTS
An interesting point of classification in this case might be whether this was simply one of judicial assistance for the Kenyan Courts to implement Scottish locus inspection orders in its jurisdiction. Seen from this light, it was not a typical case of recognising and enforcing foreign judgment. Nevertheless, the case presented before the Kenyan Courts, including the Kenyan Supreme Court was premised on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
The Kenyan Supreme Court has settled the debate on the need for foreign judgments to be recognised in Kenya before they can be enforced. The Court also settled that owing to the principle of finality, interim orders could not fall within the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act. It is owing to this principle of finality that the Supreme Court refused to extend the application of the Act to local investigation orders, but rather proceeded to tackle the latter in the same manner as under the Civil Procedure Act and Civil Procedure Rules.
The Supreme Court was correct in establishing that recognition is necessary before foreign judgments can be enforced in Kenya. The principles upon which the Supreme Court came to this conclusion were also correct since territoriality and sovereignty dictate the same. The Supreme Court set a precedent that the Civil Procedure Act and the Civil Procedure Rules are the correct instruments to be relied upon in issuing orders for local investigations, in contrast to the position of the Court of Appeal, which placed local investigations in the ambit of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act. The Supreme Court adopted its position based on section 52 of the Civil Procedure Act, which empowers courts to issue commission orders and lists local investigations under commission orders.
This decision is crucial, because not only did the Supreme Court lay to rest any confusion over what should constitute the applicable law for local investigations, it also sets down the procedure for foreign courts seeking judicial assistance in Kenya with regard to all four commission orders, as under the Civil Procedure Act. The Civil Procedure Act is the primary Act governing civil litigation in Kenya, while the Civil Procedure Rules 2010 are the primary subsidiary regulations for the same. Commission orders under this Act are divided into four as highlighted above: examination of witnesses, carrying out local investigations, examination or adjustment accounts, or making a partition.
This decision thus did not only tackle orders of local investigation but concluded the process for all four commission orders as highlighted above. In doing so, it established a uniform process for all four of the commission orders, in accordance with the Primary Act and Rules governing civil litigation in Kenya. Although it may appear that the Supreme Court has stretched the application of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 in the same way that the Court of Appeal stretched the application of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act; the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 are more relevant, given that the rules touch on these four commission orders and are tackled in turn, in the same category, under the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. Moreover, while it is true that there is currently a gap in the law as the process for local investigations has not been outlined in the same way that it has been for examination of witnesses, by parity of reasoning the Supreme Court’s reasoning fits, and the logic behind adopting the same process is laudable.
Another interesting aspect of the Supreme Court’s decision is the endorsement of the US approach of comity as the basis of recognising and enforcing foreign judgments in Kenyan common law. This is indeed a radical departure from the common law approach of the theory of obligation, which prevails in other Commonwealth African Countries. In an earlier Case, the Kenyan Court of Appeal in Jayesh Hasmukh Shah vs Navin Haria & Anor [para 25 – 26] adopted the US principle of comity to recognise and enforce foreign judgments. The principle of comity also formed the sole basis of enforcing a US judgment in Uganda in Christopher Sales v Attorney General, where no reciprocal law exists between the state of origin and the state of recognition. Consequently, it is safe to say that some East African judges are aligning more with the US approach of comity in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments at common law, while many other common law African countries continue to adopt the theory of obligation.
An issue that was not explicitly directed to the Kenyan Supreme Court was that this was a business and human rights case, and one involving the protection of weaker parties. This may have provoked policy reasons from the Court that would have been very useful in developing the law as it relates business and human rights issues, and protection of employees in cross-border matters.
On a final note, the robust reasoning of their Lordships must be commended in this recent Supreme Court decision, given that it adds significant value to the jurisprudence of recognising and enforcing foreign judgments in the Commonwealth as a whole, in East Africa overall, and particularly in Kenya. The comparative approach adopted in this judgment will also prove to be edifying to anyone with an interest in comparative aspects of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments globally.
News
Virtual Early-Career Conference: ‘Global Harm, Local Justice | The Future of Cross-Border Torts’ (University of Groningen, 6 Feb 2026)
We are delighted to share the Call for Papers for a virtual early-career conference on ‘Global Harm, Local Justice | The Future of Cross-Border Torts’, hosted by K.C. (Kirsten) Henckel and M.A.S. (Martin) Bulla from the University of Groningen on 6 February 2026.
Abstracts of 300–500 words must be submitted by 1 December 2025.
Second Issue of the Chinese Journal of Transnational Law for 2025
The second issue of the Chinese Journal of Transnational Law for 2025 was just published. It contains a special issue on “Private International Law and Sustainable Development in Asia” with Ralf Michaels, Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Hans van Loon as guest editors. It builds on The Private Side of Transforming our World – UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030 and the Role of Private International Law.
Ralf Michaels, Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Hans van Loon, “Private International Law and Sustainable Development in Asia”
Since the publication of ‘The Private Side of Transforming our World – UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030 and the Role of Private International Law’ in 2021, the importance of private international law for sustainable development is increasingly being recognised. The article describes the background to that project and surveys its subsequent reception and further development in scholarly literature. Moreover, it traces the need for, and trend towards, regionalization of the relevant research, including in Latin America, Africa and Asia-Pacific. It can thus serve as introduction to the special issue on private international law and sustainable development in Asia.
The Chinese Foreign Relations Law (‘the FRL’) – a collection of rules legalizing China’s foreign policies – was enacted in 2023. While technically a set of policy goals and public law rules, it provides an opportunity to orient Chinese private international law (‘PIL’) towards sustainable development. Notably, the FRL connects Chinese PIL with sustainable development for the first time and revisits the conceptions of what is being understood as ‘domestic’ versus ‘foreign’, and ‘public’ versus ‘private’. This article explores how PIL can leverage this shift to accommodate sustainability as a normative value, foster positive interactions with foreign laws and courts, and develop a robust and tailored regulatory function. By doing so, Chinese PIL, as a form of foreign relations law, can expand its function beyond conflict resolution and develop a role in China’s foreign policy and global sustainability governance.
Ke Mu, “The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals”
In this paper, I argue that the civil registration and its distance from the private international law (PIL) pose peculiar challenges for achieving the goal of ‘Providing Legal Identity for All’ among the Asian intra-regional circular migrants. Civil registration of personal and family status combines public administration with private law. More public registration of personal status means more involvement of local public order and interest. Therefore, registration regulations are less attentive than PIL to the potential foreign-related legal situations. Hence, will greater public involvement in registration raise a conflict between the defence of ordre public and individuals’ aspirations to maintain their personal status? The territorial limits of administrative act have so far foreclosed the possibility of transnational civil registration. When it comes to the identity that does not fit into the domestic categories, questions arise whether and how to recognize them in the domestic legal system. This poses special burdens and additional costs for intra-regional circular migrants if their legal identity cannot be well defined and recognized in the several jurisdictions concerned, which is essentially contrary to the presumed erga omnes effect of individuals’ identity rights.
Despite the growing incidence of child abduction facilitated by the mobility and prevalence of non-resident marriages involving Indian and Nepalese citizens with foreign nationals, both India and Nepal have refrained from acceding to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The Indian executive has vocally supported criticisms against the Abduction Convention, advocating for the inclusion of domestic violence as a basis for exception under the Abduction Convention and proposed domestic legislation. In contrast, the official position of Nepal remains undisclosed, with recent case law offering limited insight into its engagement with the Abduction Convention. Against this backdrop, the article scrutinizes the recognition of gender perspectives in statutory provisions and case law in India and Nepal concerning international child abduction. It should be noted that Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5, which calls for the elimination of all forms of violence against women and girls in the public and private spheres – including trafficking, sexual and other types of exploitation – also includes addressing domestic violence in family spheres. This article, therefore, considers the inclusion of gender considerations within the realm of child abduction as a core consideration in the attainment of SDG 5.
Second Issue of the Journal of Private International Law for 2025
The third issue of the Journal of Private International Law was published today. It contains the following articles
Andrew Tettenborn, “English conflicts law at sea – the transfer and creation of proprietary interests in ships”
Surprisingly, the law applicable to the creation and transfer of proprietary interests in ships remains remarkably obscure as a matter of the English conflict of laws. In this article an attempt is made to investigate the relevant authorities and to reconcile them. The conclusion is that, subject to exceptions, English courts will recognise transfers if they are effective under any one or more of (1) the lex situs, (2) the law of the registry and (3) (in the case of equitable interests) English law.
Gerard McCormack, “Hands up for UK joining the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 but lukewarm on the UK returning to the Lugano Convention 2007”
This article considers the relative merits of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 and the Lugano Convention 2007 for the UK in the post-Brexit era viewed primarily from the extent of the insolvency exceptions in both Conventions (and in the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005) as they apply to UK schemes of arrangement and UK restructuring plans for companies. The article briefly takes account of some broader issues relating to arbitration and exclusive choice of court agreements, primarily through the lens of The Prestige litigation, before reaching a conclusion in favour of the UK having become a Party to the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 in 2025 and against the UK rejoining the Lugano Convention 2007.
Guangjian Tu and Tiezheng Yang., “The doctrine of public policy in Chinese courts’ choice of law in the modern age”
It is generally agreed that in private international law the doctrine of public policy plays a fundamentally important role in the application of foreign law and can work as a safety valve. This doctrine has also been reflected in Chinese legislation as in many other jurisdictions. However, the application of this doctrine in Chinese courts is inconsistent, which could not only lead to uncertainty but also jeopardise justice. This article examines how the doctrine of public policy has been applied in choice of law in Chinese courts since 2010 when the new Chinese choice of law codification was made. It finds that there are basically four main types of cases in which Chinese courts have applied the doctrine of public policy to exclude the application of foreign laws. After detailed analysis and reflection, it is suggested that this doctrine continue to be applied for some of those cases but not for others.
Katja Karjalainen, “Acquiring a child abroad and paths to parenthood in Finland: The difference between private adoptions and international surrogacy arrangements”
The article delves into issues of legal tourism and global justice. By referencing the Hague Adoption Convention as well as Finnish legal approaches and case law with respect to the confirmation of a child-parent relationship following private intercountry adoptions and international surrogacy arrangements (ISAs), the article elaborates on the problematics of recognition. Doubts with respect to ethical and commercial aspects of arrangements and the deprivation of rights of vulnerable individuals have been presented with respect to both cases. The article shows the paradox between the legal approaches in these two cases that both entail an independent endeavour to get a child abroad. In doing so, the article underlines how the regulatory framework built up by the Hague Adoption Convention for the area of intercountry adoptions creates more space for global justice and collective interests than non-regulation, but may, in some cases, be detrimental to individual rights and interests. Non-regulation of ISAs underlines individual rights and interests and at the same time erodes domestic legal norms.The article delves into issues of legal tourism and global justice. By referencing the Hague Adoption Convention as well as Finnish legal approaches and case law with respect to the confirmation of a child-parent relationship following private intercountry adoptions and international surrogacy arrangements (ISAs), the article elaborates on the problematics of recognition. Doubts with respect to ethical and commercial aspects of arrangements and the deprivation of rights of vulnerable individuals have been presented with respect to both cases. The article shows the paradox between the legal approaches in these two cases that both entail an independent endeavour to get a child abroad. In doing so, the article underlines how the regulatory framework built up by the Hague Adoption Convention for the area of intercountry adoptions creates more space for global justice and collective interests than non-regulation, but may, in some cases, be detrimental to individual rights and interests. Non-regulation of ISAs underlines individual rights and interests and at the same time erodes domestic legal norms.
Maria Hook, “Are “extraterritorial” consumer laws anti-internationalist?”
This article asks whether extraterritorial consumer laws, defined as laws that create a risk of regulatory overlap, are anti-internationalist. Drawing on New Zealand law as a case study, the article argues that extraterritorial consumer laws may recognise intersecting but legitimate regulatory interests. If the plaintiff gets to choose the law, indirectly or directly, there is an appropriate process for identifying the applicable law based on the principle of favor laesi. In this sense, extraterritorial consumer laws do not just give effect to local interests, to be balanced with competing internationalist concerns. Rather, they themselves may reflect an internationalist approach to private international law, even if the approach is not universally adopted. The article then explores potential implications of this argument for the court’s analysis of the applicable law and jurisdiction. Courts may be more willing to embrace an extraterritorial interpretation of consumer laws, and to lean into the plaintiff’s ability to rely on foreign law despite local law also being applicable in principle (as has happened in New Zealand). Courts may also treat the plaintiff’s choice of forum with deference when they decide whether to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine of forum (non) conveniens.
Aleksandrs Fillers, “Venue in the Brussels Ia Regulation”
Anybody who has even superficial knowledge of EU private international law has heard about its cornerstone – the Brussels Ia Regulation. Typically, the major issue when dealing with the said regulation is to determine which Member State can hear the dispute. However, the Brussels Ia Regulation has a second layer. In addition to rules of international jurisdiction, the Regulation, as interpreted by the CJEU, contains venue rules that determine which specific court can hear a case. This issue is far less known to courts and practitioners and often glossed over by scholars. The article aims to provide a comprehensive study of venue rules in the Brussels Ia Regulation.