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Egyptian Court of Cassation on the application of the Hague Service Convention
[The author wishes to thank Justice Hossam Hesham Sadek, Vice President of the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the Court of Cassation, and reporting judge in the case at hand, for granting access to the Supreme Court’s ruling].
1. Introduction
In a recent ruling (22/05/2017), the Egyptian Court of Cassation tackled with the issue of service of process abroad. The facts of the case were the following: The claimant (and appellant) was an Egyptian Medical Equipment company, situated in Cairo. The respondents and appellees were a Chinese company, with its seat in Nanshan district, Shenzen, the Egyptian General Organization for Import and Export Control, and an Egyptian company, with its seat in Heliopolis, Cairo.
2. Facts and instance ruling
The Appellant filed a lawsuit against the Chinese Company and the Second Appellee at Cairo Court of Appeal, requesting a judgment obliging the First Appellee to pay the amount of ten million Egyptian pounds as monetary and moral compensation resulting from the contract’s termination. The Appellant asserted that it had been assigned as the sole agent of the First Appellee in Egypt, for selling ultrasonic wave devices, and that it was unexpectedly notified by the First Appellee that the contract was terminated.
The first instance court ordered that the lawsuit be dismissed for lack of proper service to the Chinese company. The Appellant claimed that service had been effected through the Public Prosecution Office, following all necessary procedures through diplomatic channels in China, pursuant to article 13 (9) of the Egyptian Civil and Commercial Code of Procedure (CCCP), and by notification of the claim to the first Appellee’s legal representative (Commercial Agent) pursuant to article 13 (5) CCCP.
Article 13 (9) CCCP states that, if no international treaty or a specific provision of law is applicable, service shall be made by delivering the documents to the public prosecutor, who then forwards them to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to be delivered through diplomatic channels to the country of destination. Art. 13 (5) CCCP stipulates that, if service is addressed to a foreign company that has a branch or agent in Egypt, domestic service shall be effected (i.e. to the branch or agent located in Egypt).
3. The Supreme Court ruling
The Court of Cassation referred initially to Art. 13 (5) & (9) CCCP. It then mentioned Articles 3 & 14 of the Judicial Cooperation Treaty on Civil, Commercial and Criminal Matters between the Arab Republic of Egypt and The People’s Republic of China, signed on 21/4/1994, which stipulates that: “For the purposes of requesting and providing judicial assistance, parties shall communicate through their central authorities unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty. Central authorities of both parties are represented by the Ministries of Justice. Both parties shall serve judicial documents in civil and commercial matters pursuant to Hague Convention on the service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in civil or Commercial Matters concluded on 15/11/1965’’.
Based on the above, the Court of Cassation decided as follows: The Hague Convention exclusively stipulates methods, means and conditions for serving judicial documents unless agreed between the Parties on other methods pursuant to Article 11 of the same Convention, and obliges the judge to stay proceedings, save when a document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the State addressed, or when the document was actually served to the defendant in its residence under one of the methods prescribed in the Convention in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence.
Since the legislator has permitted in Article 13(5) CCCP that foreign companies may be served by delivering a copy to its branch or agent in Egypt, their existence is considered a question of fact under the exclusive competence of the court. Accordingly, the Court of Cassation confirmed the instance decision, which ruled that service made to the first Appellee through the third appellee (Trade And Importing Company in Heliopolis), ostensibly being its commercial agent and representative, was improper, since the representative of the latter denied its relation with the first Appellee.
Finally, delivering the document to the Public Prosecution in order to take necessary actions towards service by diplomatic channels is not sufficient, because notice was not delivered / served to the first Appellee.
4. Conclusion
The judgment offers a valuable insight into the practice of Egyptian courts in regards to notification of documents abroad. It is noteworthy that the Court of Cassation examined carefully all legal regimes related to the subject matter: It referred to domestic law (CCCP), the Egyptian – Chinese bilateral treaty, and the multilateral convention, to which the bilateral convention refers. The question whether service of process abroad was necessary or not was decided on a substantive level: Given that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the third appellee was the representative of the Chinese company, the court rightfully considered that service solely to the local Transmission Authority through the Prosecutor’s Office does not suffice. Hence, whenever the Hague Service Convention applies, the Court of Cassation dismisses fictitious service (remise au parquet).
The Justice Initiative Frankfurt am Main 2017
Written by Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Burkhard Hess, Executive Director Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law
Against the backdrop of Brexit, an initiative has been launched to strengthen Frankfurt as a hot spot for commercial litigation in the European Judicial Area. On March 30, 2017, the Minister of Justice of the Federal State Hessen, Ms Kühne-Hörmann, organized a conference at which the Justice Initiative was presented. More than 120 stakeholders (lawyers, judges, businesses) attended the conference. The original paper was elaborated by Professors Burkhard Hess (Luxembourg), Thomas Pfeiffer (Heidelberg), Christian Duve (Heidelberg) and Roman Poseck (President of the Frankfurt Court of Appeal). Here, we are pleased to provide an English translation of the position paper with some additional information on German procedural law for an international audience. The proposal has, as a matter of principle, been endorsed by the Minister of Justice. Its proposals are now being discussed and shall be implemented in the next months to come. The paper reads as follows: Read more
Paris, the Jurisdiction of Choice?
On January 17th, the President of the Paris Commercial Court (Tribunal de commerce) inaugurated a new international division.
The new division, which is in fact the 3rd division of the court (3ème Chambre), is to be staffed with nine judges who speak foreign languages, and will therefore be able to assess evidence written in a foreign language. For now, the languages will be English, German and Spanish, as one juge speaking Spanish and two speaking German are currently on the court.
In an interview to the Fondation de droit continental (Civil law initiative), the President of the Court explained that the point was to make French justice more competitive and attract international cases. It also made clear that France was following Germany’s lead, where several international divisions were established in 2009 in Hamburg and Cologne.
French Commercial Courts
It should be pointed out to readers unfamiliar with the French legal system that French commercial courts are not staffed with professional judges, but with members of the business community working part-time at the court (and for free). In Paris, however, many of these judges work in the legal department of their company, and are thus fine lawyers.
Also, French commercial courts (and French civil courts generally) virtually never hear witnesses, so the issue of the language in which they may address the court does not arise.
Some issues
So, the new international division will be able to read documents in several foreign languages. However, nothing suggests that parties or lawyers will be able either to speak, or to write pleadings, in any other language than French. Lawyers arguing these cases will still need to file their pleadings in French, and thus to translate them in English beforehand for their clients. Furthermore, the interview of the Court’s President seems to suggest that using a foreign language will not be a right for the parties. Quite to the contrary, it seems that it will not be possible if one of the parties disagrees, and demands documents be translated in French.
Will that be enough to attract additional commercial cases to Paris?
I wonder whether introducing class actions in French civil procedure would have been more efficient in this respect.
For the full interview of the Court’s President, see after the jump.
News
Just released: Lenka Válková on ‘Choice-of-Court Agreements under the EU Regulations in Family and Succession Matters’
A comprehensive and detailed volume by Dr. Lenka Válková was just released providing a dedicated analysis of the private international law framework as it applies to jurisdiction agreements in the framework of the EU Regulations in family and succession matters.
The blurb reads:
Party autonomy has been traditionally considered as one of the leading principles used in cross-border trade law. In fact, choice-of-court agreements have been embedded into the majority of EU Regulations governing civil and commercial matters. On the other hand, mandatory approach to family and succession law slowed down the progress of recognition of party autonomy in these fields. Only in recent years, the trend towards acknowledging choice-of-court agreements has spread into almost all areas of international family and succession law. This publication follows this development: firstly, it analyses the reasons and concerns of the recognition of choice-of-court agreements in civil and commercial matters, whereby it is questioned whether the considerations established in relation to commercial contracts may apply also for personal relationships. Consequently, different treatment of choice-of-court agreements family and succession law, where the freedom to choose the competent court is far from being unlimited, is examined. Accordingly, the attention must be paid to functions of choice-of-court agreements in family law. The second chapter subsequently investigates the position of parties in personal law relations and their protection. In particular, partial and full exclusion of party autonomy, formal and substantive validity, time limits, substantive review and public policy and overriding mandatory rules are considered as tools for protection of vulnerable parties in family and succession law relations when entering into choice-of-court agreements. Finally, last chapter provides for in-depth analysis of rules on choice-of-court agreements under different EU Regulations (the Brussels IIa and Brussels IIter Regulations, Maintenance Regulation, Regulations on Property Regimes and Succession Regulation), where the strengths and gaps of the rules are highlighted. This analysis includes also an attempt to clarify the problem of derogation from jurisdiction in favour of Third States in presence of choice-of-court agreements. Lastly, effectiveness of the rule on lis pendens in stress-tested.
Overall, in her manuscript Dr. Válková successfully combines complex theoretical analysis with concrete propositions in a multifaceted and developing area of the law. Notably, Dr. Válková exemplifies the contribution of party autonomy in private international law in addressing the challenges arising in the context of family relations in the cross-border context: in doing so, she illustrates the complex status quo of party autonomy in this area of the law, its limitations, and how policies may be promoted via private international law. As such, her book is a highly recommended source for academics, notaries, and legal practitioners.
Lenka VÁLKOVÁ, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the EU Regulations in Family and Succession Matters (Wolters Kluwer / CEDAM, 2022), 548 pp., available for purchase here.
This volume is a welcome addition to Wolter Kluwer / CEDAM’s already thriving ‘Studi e pubblicazioni della Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale’ series.
Brussels IIa, habitual residence and forum necessitatis
Even after Brussels IIb‘s coming into force (that we reported on last week), the Court of Justice of the EU issued its judgment in case C-501/20. The case remains relevant, also under the new Regulation. The Court had the opportunity to not only add to its case law on habitual residence, but also to clarify three other matters: first, the Regulation’s and the Maintenance Regulation‘s relation to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, specifically with regard to diplomatic immunity; second, the Brussels IIa‘s relation to domestic bases of jurisdiction; and third (and related to the second point), the forum necessitatis.
The case concerned the divorce and related disputes between a Spanish national and a Portuguese national. The couple had two children, who had dual Spanish-Portuguese nationality. The family lived first in Guinea-Bissau and later in Togo. The parents were posted at these places as EU delegates of the European Commission. They separated factually while still living in Togo. The mother then brought divorce proceedings, including the issues of parental responsibility and maintenance, in Spain. This court had to decide on its jurisdiction, which raised various issues.
Concerning the habitual residence, which is the first stop to determine jurisdiction (Art. 3 and 8 of Brussels IIa and Art. 3 of the Maintenance Regulation), the Court reiterated the two main factors to determine the habitual residence of adults: “first, the intention of the person concerned to establish the habitual centre of his or her interests in a particular place and, second, a presence which is sufficiently stable in the Member State concerned” (para 44, referring to its case C-289/20 interpreting the Rome III Regulation on the law applicable to divorce proceedings). The Court added that the definition of habitual residence in the Brussels IIa and Maintenance Regulations should be “guided by the same principles and characterised by the same elements” (para 53). (The Court here did not refer to Rome III, but the same is true as we know from previous case law.) Both factors of habitual residence were absent in this case. First, there was no intention to move back to Spain. Second, the parents were physically absent from Spain for this period (except for the birth of the children and periods of leave). Therefore, they could not have been habitually resident in this Member State.
Concerning the habitual residence of the children, the Court referred to the factors in its previous case law, including the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the child’s stay, the child’s nationality, school and family and social relationships (para 73). To establish a habitual residence, it is essential that the child is physically present in this Member State (para 75). The mother’s nationality and the pace where she lived prior to her marriage (and prior to the child’s birth) are not relevant (para 76). The child’s nationality and the place where they are born, are relevant but not decisive (para 77).
Any diplomatic immunity cannot change this conclusion, as the Spanish court does not have jurisdiction (paras 61 and following). Even though Recital 14 states that “[t]his Regulation should have effect without prejudice to the application of public international law concerning diplomatic immunities,” this refers to a situation where a court in a EU Member State would have jurisdiction but cannot exercise it due to diplomatic immunity. In short, the existence of diplomatic immunity cannot grant jurisdiction.
The residual jurisdiction under Arts 6 and 7 of Brussels IIa, and specifically the situation that factual scenario that arose in this case, have long caused confusion. The legislator attempted to rectify this in Brussels IIb (Art. 6). The problem was that Art. 6 stated that if a spouse who is habitually resident in or a national of a Member State, may only be sued on the bases of jurisdiction in the Regulation, while Art. 7 referred to domestic bases of jurisdiction where no court in an EU Member State has jurisdiction. So, what is to be done where a spouse is a national of an EU Member State (Portugal in this instance) but there are no available bases of jurisdiction in the Regulation (as neither of the spouses are habitually resident in the EU and they do not have a common EU nationality)? Which provision should prevail? The Court found that Art. 7, and thus domestic bases of jurisdiction, cannot be used in this case; only the residual bases of jurisdiction of the Member State of the defendant’s nationality can come into play (Portugal in this instance). See also the Opinion of Advocate-General Szpunar.
The same contradiction does not exist in the case of jurisdiction over children: Art. 14 simply states that where no court in a Member State has jurisdiction on the basis of the Regulation, domestic jurisdiction rules apply. Thus, Spanish residual bases of jurisdiction could be used concerning the parental responsibility.
The Maintenance Regulation does not have such reference to domestic bases of jurisdiction, but contains a complete harmonisation of jurisdiction, for all situations. It is in this context that there is also a forum necessitatis: if no court in a Member State has jurisdiction and it would be impossible or cannot reasonably expected of the parties to bring the proceedings in the third State to which the dispute is connected, a court in a Member State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case (Art. 7). The Court explained that this can only come into play if no court in a Member State has jurisdiction, also not on the basis of the link of the case to the status or parental responsibility, and also not on the basis of the choice of the parties (para 101 and following). If this is the case, it is not required that the parties first attempt to institute proceedings in the third State, but the court “cannot rely solely on general circumstances relating to deficiencies in the judicial system of the third State, without analysing the consequences that those circumstances might have for the individual case” (para 112).
Greek court recognizes UK custody order to the non-biological parent in the context of a married same-sex couple
Greece still forms part of the EU Member States group not recognizing same-sex marriage. Same-sex couples do enjoy however some rights. The latest challenging issue concerned custody rights of a same-sex couple married abroad. The Thessaloniki Court of Appeal reversed the first instance ruling, and recognized an English custody order [Thessaloniki CoA, decision published on January 24, 2022, unreported].
FACTS: The appellant (Parent A) is a woman of Greek and American nationality. Her partner was a woman of American national (Parent B). They registered their partnership in the UK on 20 August 2013. Nearly a month later, Parent B gave birth to a child. The partners married in January 2015. Parent A. filed an application for child custody and parenting arrangements order in the UK. The court granted the application, and ordered that the child stays with the psychological (non-biological) mother on the basis of previous decisions concerning parental responsibility rights issued in the same country. In addition, the court ordered that the child reside with Parent A., and it issued an order to remove the child permanently to Greece. Finally, the same court arranged the contact rights of the biological mother. The UK order was issued by the High Court – Family Division in Chelmsford, and it was final. Parent A. filed an application for the recognition and enforcement of the UK order before the Court of First Instance in Thessaloniki.
The Court refused recognition. It entered into an analysis of the public policy defense, culminating in the conclusion, that the forum judge is obliged to defend national public policy, while at the same time demonstrating respect towards the state’s international obligations. To that end, a proportionality test of the domestic public policy with Article 8 ECHR standards is imperative. Following the above introduction, the court declared that same-sex marriage, and any subsequent relations emanating thereof are not allowed in Greece. A detailed presentation of the first instance court reasoning may be found here.
Parent A appealed.
THE DECISION: Unlike the lower instance court, the Thessaloniki CoA primarily underlined the European context of the dispute, citing Articles 21 et seq of the Brussels II bis Regulation. It then referred to a significant number of pertinent provisions, such as: Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights; articles 23 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); articles 7 and 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; the Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation; Greek Civil Union law nr. 4356/2015; article 21 of the Greek Constitution, on the protection of family; directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; and finally, articles 2 and 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ratified in Greece by law nr. 2101/1992.
On the grounds of the above references, the CoA found no violation of the Greek public policy, and reversed the ruling of the first instance court. In particular, the CoA emphasized two points:
- The diversity of views, i.e., the non-recognition of same sex marriage in Greece may not result to the infringement of the child’s best interests, reflected in the UK court findings.
- The ruling of the first instance court results to the discrimination of children on the grounds of their parents’ sexual orientation.
The battle for full equality is not yet won. A couple of days after the decision of the Thessaloniki CoA was published, the Athens CoA refused recognition to a South African adoption decree issued upon the application of a same-sex (male) couple. Yet again, public policy was the defense hindering recognition. To sum up: Same sex couples may not marry or adopt children in Greece; they may however be appointed as foster parents, and exercise custody rights. Hence, equality evolves in a piecemeal fashion. And last but not least, let us not forget: the Supreme Court has the final word.