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Disentangling Legal Knots: Intersection of Foreign Law and English Law in Overseas Marriages
Written by Muhammad Zubair Abbasi, Lecturer at School of Law, Oxford Brookes University (mabbasi@brookes.ac.uk)
Introduction:
In a recent judgment Tousi v Gaydukova [2024] EWCA Civ 203, the Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of the relevance of foreign law to the remedy available under English law in respect of an overseas ceremony of marriage. Earlier the High Court had held that the foreign law determines not only the validity or invalidity of the ceremony of marriage but also the ramifications of the validity or invalidity of the ceremony. The Court of Appeal disagreed and reiterated the rule that lex loci celebrationis is limited to the determination of the validity or invalidity of the ceremony of marriage. Therefore, English law will apply to provide a remedy or relief upon the breakdown of the relationship of the parties to a marriage ceremony that took place abroad.
Egyptian Supreme Court on the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments – Special Focus on the Service Requirement
I . Introduction
Egypt and its legal system occupy a unique position within the MENA region. Egyptian law and scholarship exert a significant influence on many countries in the region. Scholars, lawyers, and judges from Egypt are actively involved in teaching and practicing law in many countries in the region, particularly in the Gulf States. Consequently, it is no exaggeration to say that developments in Egyptian law are likely to have a profound impact on neighboring countries and beyond, and warrant special attention. Read more
International Jurisdiction between Nationality and Domicile in Tunisian Private International Law – Has the Perennial Debate Finally been Resolved?
I would like to thank Prof. Lotfi Chedly for providing me with the text of the decision on which this post is based.
I. Introduction
Scholars of private international law are well familiar with the classic debate on nationality and domicile as connecting factors in the choice of applicable law (see, for example, L. I. de Winter, “Nationality or Domicile? The Present State of Affairs” 128 Collected Courses III (1969) pp. 357 ff). In Tunisian private international law, this controversy has been particularly pronounced with regard to the role of nationality as a ground for the international jurisdiction of Tunisian courts. Since the enactment of the Tunisian Private International Law Code (“PILC”) in 1998 (for an English translation, see J. Basedow et al. (eds.) Encyclopedia of Private International Law – Vol. IV (Elgar Editions, 2017) 3895 and my own translation of the provisions dealing with international jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments in 8 Journal of Private International Law 2 (2012) pp. 221 ff)), the debate between opponents and proponents of nationality as a ground for international jurisdiction, especially in family law matters, has never ceased to be intense (for detailed analyses, see eg. Salma Triki, “La compétence internationale tunisienne et le critère de nationalité” in Ben Achour/Triki (eds.), Le Code de droit international privé – Vingt ans d’application (1998-2018) (Latrach edition, 2020) 119ff). This divergence in academic opinion is also reflected in the judicial practice of the courts, with the emergence of two opposing trends: one extends the international jurisdiction of the Tunisian courts when the dispute involves a Tunisian party, in particular as a defendant even when domiciled abroad. The other firmly rejects nationality as a ground for international jurisdiction.
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English and EU Perspectives on Hague 2019: Hybrid Seminar at UCL Laws
Ugljesa Grusic (UCL) has kindly shared the following invitation with us.
On 24 March 2025, at 6pm UK time, Marta Pertegás (Maastricht University; University of Antwerp; a fulltime member of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law between 2008 and 2017) and Alex Mills (UCL; a Specialist Editor of Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, with particular responsibility for, inter alia, the rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments) will give a seminar on The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention – English and EU Perspectives at the Faculty of Laws, University College London. The event will be delivered in a hybrid format and the readers of the blog are welcome to join either in person or on line.
The seminar is part of the International Law Association (British Branch) Lecture Series and will be chaired by Ugljesa Grusic.
On 1 July 2025, the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters will enter into force in England and Wales. This historic regime establishes a general treaty basis for the recognition and enforcement of civil judgments between Convention States, supplementing the existing national rules and the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005. Perhaps most significantly, it will provide common rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments from England and Wales in EU Member States, and conversely, for EU Member State judgments to be recognised and enforced in England and Wales, to some extent filling a ‘gap’ created by Brexit.
This seminar will address the significance of this development from both an English and EU perspective, examining the main features of the 2019 Convention and considering the opportunities and challenges it presents.
To register, please follow this link.
U.S. District Court’s Order in the Venezuelan Deportees Case Was Not Extraterritorial
The following post was kindly provided by Hannah Buxbaum, Vice President for International Affairs, Professor of Law and John E. Schiller Chair, Indiana University, and is cross-posted on tlblog.org
As was widely reported yesterday, the Trump administration permitted two planes carrying Venezuelan deportees to continue on their way to El Salvador after receiving a judicial order to turn the flights back to the United States. A story in Axios quotes an administration official who explains that they were not in fact “actively defying” the judge—the order just came too late, since the planes were already out of U.S. airspace. This seems to be an extraterritoriality argument, suggesting that the judge lacks authority to order an action to take place outside U.S. borders.
The administration has this completely wrong. The judge is ordering the administration to take action inside the United States—that is, to instruct the planes to turn around. That instruction will in turn cause something to happen elsewhere (the pilots will change course), but that doesn’t make the order impermissibly extraterritorial. This is exactly the same the basis on which courts in garden-variety civil disputes order parties subject to their jurisdiction to procure evidence or turn over assets that are located abroad. Moreover, since the planes were reportedly over international waters at the time the order was entered, compliance would not have required any actions by a foreign actor or within the territory of another state—in other words, it wouldn’t have created a conflict of laws.
Now that the deportees are already in El Salvador, that picture is more complicated, since local authorities there might refuse to take action. Even the existence of such a conflict, though, doesn’t mean that Judge Boasberg’s order exceeds his authority. It remains to be seen whether any of the other justifications the White House offered up for ignoring that order are any more compelling, but the argument that it didn’t apply once the planes had left the United States is certainly not.
For further leading expert input on extraterritoriality see one of our previous posts here.
Reminder: Quo Vadis Preferential Law Approach? A Survey on the Interpretation of Article 6(2) Rome I Regulation Across EU Member States
Benedikt Schmitz (University of Groningen) has kindly shared the following reminder of his Call for Participants with us.
The project concerns the interpretation of Article 6 (2) Rome I Regulation in the EU Member States and is very limited in nature. Time commitments are therefore very limited. Click here for more information.
We are still looking for scholars from Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Romania, and Slovenia. Danish scholars may also participate on the basis of Article 5(2) Rome Convention. Read more