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The thing that should not be: European Enforcement Order bypassing acta jure imperii
In a dispute between two Cypriot citizens and the Republic of Turkey concerning the enforcement of a European Enforcement Order issued by a Cypriot court, the Thessaloniki CoA was confronted with the question, whether the refusal of the Thessaloniki Land Registry to register a writ of control against property of the Turkish State located in Thessaloniki was in line with the EEO Regulation.
I. THE FACTS
The dispute began in 2013, when two Cypriot citizens filed a claim for damages against the Republic of Turkey before the Nicosia Disctrict Court. The request concerned compensation for deprivation of enjoyment of their property since July 1974 in Kyrenia, a city occupied by the Turkish military forces during the 1974 invasion on the island. The Kyrenia District Court (Eparchiakó Dikastírio Kerýneias), which operates since July 1974 in Nicosia, issued in May 2014 its ruling, granting damages to the claimants in the altitude of 9 million €. Almost a year later, the latter requested the same court to issue a certificate of European Enforcement Order. The application was granted. Within the same year, the claimants filed an application before the Athens Court of first Instance for the recognition and enforcement of the Cypriot judgment. Prima facie it seems to be a useless step, however there was a rationale behind it; I will come back to the matter later on. The Athens court granted exequatur (Athens CFI 2407/2015, unreported).
Following almost a year of inactivity, the claimants decided to proceed to the execution of their title by attaching property of the Turkish State in Thessaloniki. Pursuant to domestic rules, the enforcement agent serves the distraint order to the debtor; afterwards, (s)he requests the order to be registered at the territorially competent land registry. Both actions are imperative by law. At this point, the chief officer of the land registry refused to proceed to registration, invoking Article 923 Greek Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) which reads as follows: Compulsory enforcement against a foreign State may not take place without a prior leave of the Minister of Justice. The claimants challenged the registrar’s refusal by filing an application pursuant to Article 791 CCP, which aims at the obligation of the registrar to proceed to registration by virtue of a court order. The Thessaloniki 1. Instance court dismissed the application (Thessaloniki CFI 8363/2017, unreported). The claimants appealed.
II. THE RULING
The Thessaloniki CoA dismissed the appeal, confirming the first instance ruling in its entirety. It began from the right of the land registrar to a review of legality, thus the right to examine the request beyond possible formality gaps. It then referred to Articles 6.1 ECHR, 1 of the 1. Additional Protocol to the ECHR, and Articles 2.3 (c) and 14 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in order to support the right to enforcement against a foreign State. The appellate court continued by analyzing Article 923 CCP and its importance in the domestic legal order. It emphasized the objective of the provision, i.e. to estimate potential repercussions and to avoid possible tensions with the foreign State in case of execution. The court founded its analysis on two ECHR rulings, i.e. the judgments in the Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (59021/00), and Vlastos v. Greece (28803/07) cases, adding two rulings of the Full Bench of the Greek Supreme Court from 2002. Finally, the court concluded that there has not been a violation of the EEO Regulation, stating that the process under Article 923 CCP is not to be considered as part of intermediate proceedings needed to be brought in the Member State of enforcement prior ro recognition and enforcement; hence, the rule in Article 1 of the EEO Regulation is not violated.
III. COMMENTS
In general terms, one has to agree with the outcome of the case. Nevertheless, there are a number of issues to be underlined, so that the reader gets the full picture of the dispute.
- The claim before the Kyrenia District Court bears some similarities with the ruling of the ECJ in the Apostolidis/Orams case: The Court decided then that: The suspension of the application of the acquis communautaire in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of that Member State does not exercise effective control, provided for by Article 1(1) of Protocol No 10 on Cyprus to the Act concerning the conditions of accession [to the European Union] … does not preclude the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters to a judgment which is given by a Cypriot court sitting in the area of the island effectively controlled by the Cypriot Government, but concerns land situated in areas not so controlled. In both cases, the property under dispute was located in the Kyrenia district. The difference lies in the defendants: Unlike the Orams case, the respondent here was a foreign State. Article 4 Brussels I Regulation grants the right to claimants to avail themselves of domestic rules of jurisdiction, which is presumably what the claimants did in the case at hand.
- The issue of the EEO certificate seems to run contrary to Article 2.1 EEO Regulation. The matter was not examined by the Thessaloniki courts, which focused on the subject matter, i.e. the refusal of the land registrar on the grounds of Article 923 CCP.
- The exequatur proceedings in Greece seem to be superfluous, given that a EEO may be enforced without the need for a declaration of enforceability (Article 5 EEO Regulation). One reason which possibly triggered additional exequatur proceedings might have been the fact that, unlike the EEO Regulation, the acta iure imperii clause was not included in the Brussels I Regulation (see Article 1.1). Still, the matter was examined in the Lechouritou case even before the entry into force of the Brussels I bis Regulation. Hence, it would not have made a difference in the first place.
- The appellate court focused on the compatibility of Article 923 CCP with the EEO Regulation. However, the claimants carried out the execution in Greece on the grounds of the Cypriot judgment, not the EEO certificate.
Finally, two more points which should not be left without a comment.
- Throughout the proceedings, the Turkish State demonstrated buddhistic apathy. There was not a single remedy brought forward, neither in Cyprus nor in Greece. It was a victory in absentia. A reason for this stance was surely the following: The property of the Turkish state in Thessaloniki hosts one of its General Consulates in Greece. This is not just another Turkish Consulate around the globe: It is built upon the place where the father of the Turkish Republic (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) was born. It also includes the house where he was raised.
- The Thessaloniki CoA emphasized that a potential refusal of the Greek Minister of Justice to grant leave for execution would not harm the essence of the Cypriot judgment: Enforceability and res iudicata remain untouched; hence, the claimants may seek enforcement of the judgment in the foreign country, i.e. Turkey… The argument was ‘borrowed’ by the ruling of the ECJ in the Krombach case (which is cited in the text of the decision); therefore, it is totally alien to the case at hand. Even if the claimants were to find any assets of the Turkish Republic in the EU, like the Villa Vigoni in Italy, the ruling of the ICJ in the case Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) would serve as a tool to grant jurisdictional immunity to the Turkish state.
IV. CONCLUSION
Article 923 CCP is the first line of defence for foreign states in Greece. In the unlikely event that the Greek Minister of Justice grants leave for execution, a judgment creditor will be confronted with a second hurdle, if (s)he’s aiming at the seizure of property similar to the case discussed here: the maxim ne impediatur legatio (ad hoc see Greek Supreme Court, 29 November 2017, decision no. 1937/2017, reported in English here). Hence, the chances to capitalize on the enforceable title are close to zero.
Rethinking COMI in the Age of Multinational, Digital and Glocal Enterprises
Written by Renato Mangano, Professor of Commercial Law at the University of Palermo (Italy).
Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings failed to provide a definition of COMI (centre of main interests), either in Article 2, which was specifically devoted to definitions, or in Article 3, which regulated international jurisdiction.
For its part, Article 3(1) merely provided that “the courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor’s main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings”. Article 3(1) further stipulated that “in the case of a company or legal person, the place of the registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the contrary.”
Recital 13 specified that “the ‘centre of main interests’ should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties”, but different views have been expressed as regards, in particular, the relation between the concept of ‘administration’ and the concept of ‘ascertainability by third parties’.
As a result, Article 3 of Regulation No 1346/2000 gave rise a number of disputes and was the object of several requests to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for preliminary rulings, with Eurofood being the first case in point.
Eventually, Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (Recast) laid down new rules on COMI — a definition of COMI was introduced; the presumption aiming at better ascertaining COMI was extended to individuals as well; the judicial rule of thumb that evaluated negatively a debtor who had moved his/her/its COMI shortly before the request to open insolvency proceedings was incorporated into a mandatory rule; and eleven recitals, aiming at making this framework clearer and more easily applicable, were introduced (Recitals 25 to 34, and 53).
However, one may doubt whether these efforts have succeeded. The many disputes involving NIKI Luftfahrt GmbH are illuminating. NIKI was an insolvent company under Austrian law incorporated in Austria. However, NIKI was also a subsidiary of the Air Berlin PLC & Co. Luftverkehrs KG, better known as Air Berlin. This is a company under German law incorporated in Germany.
Therefore, the crucial question was: which Member State had jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings against NIKI? Did Austria or Germany have jurisdiction? The question was clear-cut but the answers to this question were various and contradictory. The NIKI dispute has at long last been settled, but the dynamic of the NIKI case is intriguing because it demonstrates that the new COMI rules still give rise to doubts as regards both the relation between the two elements constituting the COMI definition (i.e.between “the place where the debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis” and the place “which is ascertainable by third parties”), and the relation between the definition of COMI and the presumptions that are provided to make it easier to apply this definition.
Moreover, some legal counsels maintain that the new COMI rules could facilitate fraudulent COMI relocations. A company could move its registered office to another Member State which is less favourable towards its creditors; make the transfer public,e.g.by using the new address in correspondence; await the expiration of the three-month period laid down by the time limit to the presumption; and apply for a fraudulent, but a ‘legally authorized’ opening of insolvency proceedings in the new jurisdiction.
Mutatis mutandis, a similar idea is proposed as regards individuals. To our knowledge there is no evidence of cases where these proposals have facilitated fraudulent COMI relocations. However, the proposal to circumvent the new COMI rules deserves attention because it leverages some prescriptions which were conceived precisely to prevent a debtor from circumventing the COMI rules.
The problems with the new COMI rules do not end here, as I have demonstrated in a recent paper titled The Puzzle of the New European COMI Rules: Rethinking COMI in the Age of Multinational, Digital and Glocal Enterprises.
In fact, sometimes the investigation about ‘ascertainability by third parties’ could prove problematic. The more complex a business organization is, the more often this situation arises. This is because the more complex a business organization is, the easier it becomes for a firm to be split into many ‘units’ (the term is intentionally non-technical) which, on the one hand, are located in different countries and, on the other hand, are in contact with different groups of creditors: case by case, these groups of creditors may have differing perceptions as to where the firm is located.
Undoubtedly, problems of this nature may arise when insolvency occurs within a group of companies – Recital 53 of Regulation 2015/848 allows one single court to open one single set of insolvency proceedings concerning several companies belonging to the same group. But the investigation about ‘ascertainability by third parties’ could prove equally challenging when a firm conducts its relationships with suppliers and customers through digital networks, and even more so if this firm runs a business which is glocal, in the sense that it is characterized by both global and local considerations. The domain name “.com” gives no indication as to where a business is located and, even where the domain name uses a country code such as “.de” or “.fr”, there is no guarantee that the firm is established in that country, since it is relatively common practice to keep web servers geographically separated from the actual location of the enterprise.
It is highly probable that these shortcomings will result again in requests for preliminary rulings; it is also highly desirable that the ECJ provide an interpretation of the COMI rules which would prove crucial in resolving those specific issues that gave rise to such requests.
Arguably, this situation is less serious as regards the flaw affecting the rules which lay down the time limits to the applicability of the COMI presumptions – this flaw could probably be fixed by means of interpretation. However – as regards the flaw concerning the prerequisite of ‘ascertainability by third parties’– it is highly improbable that the ECJ will be able to solve this problem at the roots and, consequently, prevent subsequent litigation.
Even the most enthusiastic supporters of ECJ activism must admit that the European Court is not allowed to interpret the new COMI rules in a way that proves to be against both the letter and the spirit of the legal framework, for this power belongs to the regulator alone. To be more precise, this statement implies that the ECJ will be unable either to rule that the prerequisite ‘ascertainability by third parties’ would be unnecessary whenever this presence was de facto incompatible with that of ‘administration on a regular basis’, or to rule that the application of the COMI presumptions might disregard the COMI definition. Both rulings would infringe not only the letter of the new COMI rules but also the clearly traceable intention of the regulator.
Further, the ECJ might certainly rule that the COMI of a company X is located in a country Y by putting the COMI of that company into a system of relations with some elements which are considered as relevant to the case. However, since ascertainment of the COMI is case-sensitive and since the one-to-one relation between these factors and the debtor’s exact location cannot be established in a universal way, this ruling will not provide the interpreter with a general criterion that would hold good for any future cases.
US Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case concerning the determination of habitual residence under the Child Abduction Convention: Monasky v. Taglieri
On 10 June 2019, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Monasky v. Taglieri. By doing so, the US Supreme Court will finally resolve the split in the US Circuits regarding the standard of review and the best approach to follow in determining the habitual residence of a child under the HCCH Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Child Abduction Convention).
The questions presented are:
- Whether a district court’s determination of habitual residence under the Hague Convention should be reviewed de novo, as seven circuits have held, under a deferential version of de novo review, as the First Circuit has held, or under clear-error review, as the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held.
- Where an infant is too young to acclimate to her surroundings, whether a subjective agreement between the infant’s parents is necessary to establish her habitual residence under the Hague Convention.
Regarding the first question, it is important to note that findings of facts are reviewed for clear error and issues of law are reviewed de novo. This is of crucial importance as this would determine the extent to which the decision of the US district court can be reviewed by the US court of appeals, as these standards confer greater deference for findings of fact. The question then arises as to whether the determination of habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact or only a question of fact.
The second question deals with the case of newborn or young infants and whether a subjective agreement between the parents is necessary to establish a habitual residence under the Child Abduction Convention. Despite its simplicity, the Court may also take the opportunity to address the current split in the US circuits regarding the extent to which courts can rely on the parents’ last shared intent or the child’s acclimatization or both in determining the habitual residence of a child.
This is well summed up by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Redmond v. Redmond (2013): “In substance, all circuits – ours included – consider both parental intent and the child’s acclimatization, differing only in their emphasis. The crux of disagreement is how much weight to give one or the other, especially where the evidence conflicts.”
In my personal opinion, the hybrid approach, that is relying on both shared parental intent and the child’s acclimatization (without placing more emphasis on one or the other, except perhaps for the case of newborns or very young infants), as well as looking to all other relevant considerations arising from the facts of the particular case, is the right approach to follow. This would avoid that parents create artificial jurisdictional links in a State and thus engage in forum shopping. The flip side of this argument is that this would necessarily mean less party autonomy in these matters. By following this approach, the United States would align itself to case law in Canada (Balev case – Canadian Supreme Court, see our previous post here), the European Union (Mercredi v. Chaffe, confirmed in O.L.v. P.Q.) and the United Kingdom (A. v. A. (Children: Habitual Residence)).
To conclude with the words of the Balev case: “[…] the hybrid approach to habitual residence best conforms to the text, structure, and purpose of the Hague Convention. There is no reason to decline to follow the dominant trend in Hague Convention jurisprudence. The hybrid approach should be adopted in Canada”.
News
Regional Developments in International Law in Africa and Latin America – Annual Meeting of the German Branch of the ILA, Frankfurt, 7 July 2023
This year’s annual meeting of the German Branch of the International Law Association will take place at the Goethe-University in Frankfurt (Main) on Friday, 7 July 2023. The subject will be “Regional Developments in International Law in Africa and Latin America”. The list of distinguished speakers includes Prof. Dr. Thoko Kaime, University of Bayreuth, Alan Diego Vogelfanger, LL.M., University of Bonn/Universidad de Buenos Aires, Kholofelo Kugler, LL.B., M.A., University of Lucerne (Switzerland), and Priv.-Doz. Dr. Jan Peter Schmidt, Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative and International Private Law. The full program can be found here. For registration, please click here. A passive attendance via Zoom will be possible.
Conference Sustaining Access to Justice, 19-20 Oct 2023 – registration open
On 19-20 October 2023 the Conference Sustaining Access to Justice in Europe: New Avenues for Costs and Funding will take place at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Speakers from academia, policy, business and consumer associations from Europe, the US and Asia will discuss developments in funding, including third-party litigation funding and crowdfunding, collective actions, public interest litigation, ADR and ODR and entrepreneurial lawyering.
Description
Access to civil justice is of paramount importance for enforcing citizens’ rights. At the heart access to civil justice lies litigation funding and cost management. Yet, over the past decades, access to justice has been increasingly put under pressure due to retrenching governments, high costs of procedure, and inefficiency of courts and justice systems. Within this context, the funding of litigation in Europe seems to be shifting from public to private sources. Private actors and innovative business models have emerged to provide new solutions to the old problem of financial barriers to access to justice.
With the participation of academics, policymakers, practitioners, academics and representatives of civil society from all over Europe and beyond, the conference seeks to delve deeper into the financial implications of access to justice and the different ways to achieve sustainable civil justice systems in Europe. The topics addressed in this international academic conference include different methods of financing dispute resolution and regulating costs, such as third-party funding, crowdfunding, blockchain technologies, public interest litigation, developments in ADR/ODR, new business models of legal professionals as well as law and economics perspectives on litigation funding.
Program, registration and call for papers
The full program is available here and further information and registration is available here.
A call for papers for early career researchers is available here; deadline is 7 July 2023.
This conference is organised by Erasmus School of Law in the context of the NWO Vici Project: ‘Affordable Access to Justice’, funded by the Dutch Research Council.
Private International Law and the Voices of Children
Written by Christina Shin, University of Sydney Law School
On 1 June 2023, International Children’s Day, an online webinar discussing the issue of children’s protection in private international law (PIL) was organized in collaboration with conflictoflaw.net and American Society of International Law Private International Interest Group at the Sydney Law School Centre for Asian and Pacific Law (CAPLUS). In the first part of the webinar, five experts were invited to share their views on the status quo, challenges, and potential solutions to protect the welfare of children in the international and transnational context. The second part of the webinar involved a roundtable discussion among the experts. This event was moderated by Dr. Jeanne Huang, Associate Professor at the Sydney Law School and CAPLUS co-director. The guest speakers were as follows: