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Implementation of the EAPO in Greece
By virtue of Article 42 Law 4509/2017, a new provision has been added to the Code of Civil Procedure, bearing the title of the EU Regulation. Article 738 A CCP features 6 paragraphs, which are (partially) fulfilling the duty of the Hellenic Republic under Article 50 EAPO. In brief the provision states the following:
- 1: The competent courts to issue a EAPO are the Justice of the Peace for those disputes falling under its subject matter jurisdiction, and the One Member 1st Instance Court for the remaining disputes. It is noteworthy that the provision does not refer to the court, but to its respective judge, which implies that no oral hearing is needed.
- 2: The application is dismissed, if
- it does not fulfil the requirements stipulated in the Regulation, or if
- the applicant does not state the information provided by Article 8 EAPO, or if
- (s)he does not proceed to the requested amendments or corrections of the application within the time limit set by the Judge.
Notice of dismissal may take place by an e-mail sent to the account of the lawyer who filed the application. E-signature and acknowledgment of receipt are pre-requisites for this form of service.
The applicant may lodge an appeal within 30 days following notification. The hearing follows the rule established under Article 11 EAPO. The competent courts are the ones established under the CCP.
- 3: The debtor enjoys the rights and remedies provided by Articles 33-38 EAPO. Without prejudice to the provisions of the EU Regulation, the special chapter on garnishment proceedings (Articles 712 & 982 et seq. CCP) is to be applied.
- 4: If the EAPO has been issued prior to the initiation of proceedings to the substance of the matter, the latter shall be initiated within 30 days following service to the third-party.
If the applicant failed to do so, the EAPO shall be revoked ipso iure, unless the applicant has served a payment order within the above term.
- 5: Upon finality of the judgment issued on the main proceedings or the payment order mentioned under § 4, the successful EAPO applicant acquires full rights to the claim.
- 6: The liability of the creditor is governed by Article 13 Paras 1 & 2 EAPO. Article 703 CCP (damages against the creditor caused by enforcement against the debtor) is applied analogously.
Some additional remarks related to the Explanatory Report would provide a better insight to the foreign reader.
- There is an explicit reference to the German and Austrian model.
- The placement of the provision (i.e. within the 5th Book of the CCP, on Interim Measures) clarifies the nature of the EAPO as an interim measure, despite its visible connotations to an order, which is regulated in the 4th chapter of the 4th Book, on Special Proceedings. Nevertheless, the explanatory report acknowledges resemblance of the EAPO to a payment order.
- There is no need to provide information on the authority competent to enforce the EAPO, given that the sole person entrusted with execution in Greece is the bailiff.
The initiative taken by the MoJ is more than welcome. However, a follow-up is imperative, given that Article 738 A CCP does not provide all necessary information listed under Article 50 EAPO.
Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments among China (PRC), Japan and South Korea
Written by Dr. Wenliang Zhang, Lecturer in the Law School of Renmin U, China (PRC)
Against the lasting global efforts to address the issue of recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments (“REJ”), some scholars from Mainland China, Japan and South Korea echoed from a regional level, and convened for a seminar on “Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments between China, Japan and South Korea in the New Era”. The seminar was held in School of Law of Renmin University of China on December 19, 2017 and the participants were involved in discussing in depth the status quo and the ways out in relation to the enduring REJ dilemma between the three jurisdictions, especially that between China and Japan. (more…)
The ECtHR rules on the compatibility with the right to respect for private and family life of the refusal of registration of same-sex marriages contracted abroad
By a judgment Orlandi and Others v. Italy delivered on December 14 the ECtHR held that the lack of legal recognition of same sex unions in Italy violated the right to respect of private and family life of couples married abroad.
The case concerned the complaint of six same sex-couples married abroad (in Canada, California and the Netherlands). Italian authorities refused to register their marriages on the basis that registration would be contrary to public policy. They also refused to recognize them under any other form of union. The complaints were lodged prior to 2016, at a time when Italy did not have a legislation on same-sex unions.
The couples claimed under articles 8 (right to respect of private and family life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention, taken in conjunction with article 8 and 12 (right to marry), that the refusal to register their marriages contracted abroad, and the fact that they could not marry or receive any other legal recognition of their family union in Italy, deprived them of any legal protection or associated rights. They also alleged that “the situation was discriminatory and based solely on their sexual orientation” (§137).
Recalling that States are still free to restrict access to marriage to different sex-couples, the Court indicated that nonetheless, since the Oliari and others v. Italy case, States have an obligation to grant same-sex couples “a specific legal framework providing for the recognition and the protection of their same-sex unions” (§192).
The Court noted that the “the crux of the case at hand is precisely that the applicants’ position was not provided for in domestic law, specifically the fact that the applicants could not have their relationship – be it a de facto union or a de jure union recognized under the law of a foreign state – recognized and protected in Italy under any form” (§201).
It pointed out that although legal recognition of same-sex unions had continued to develop rapidly in Europe and beyond, notably in American countries and Australia, the same could not be said about registration of same-sex marriages celebrated abroad. Giving this lack of consensus, the Court considered that the State had “a wide margin of appreciation regarding the decision as the whether to register, as marriage, such marriages contracted abroad” (§204-205).
Thus, the Court admitted that it could “accept that to prevent disorder Italy may wish to deter its nationals from having recourse in other States to particular institutions which are not accepted domestically (such as same-sex marriage) and which the State is not obliged to recognize from a Convention perspective” (§207).
However, the Court considered that the refusal to register the marriages under any form left the applicants in “a legal vacuum”. The State has failed “to take account of the social reality of the situation” (§209). Thus, the Court considered that prior to 2016, applicants were deprived from any recognition or protection. It concluded that, “in the present case, the Italian State could not reasonably disregard the situation of the applicants which correspond to a family life within the meaning of article 8 of the Convention, without offering the applicants a means to safeguard their relationship”. As a result, it ruled that the State “failed to strike a fair balance between any competing interests in so far as they failed to ensure that the applicants had available a specific legal framework providing for the recognition and the protection of their same-sex union” (§ 210).
Thus, the Court considered that there had been a violation of article 8. It considered that, giving the findings under article 8, there was no need to examine the case on the ground of Article 14 in conjunction with article 8 or 12. (§212).
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Out now: ‘Direct Jurisdiction’ by Anselmo Reyes and Wilson Lui
The second thematic volume in the series Studies in Private International Law – Asia looks into direct jurisdiction, that is, the situations in which the courts of 15 key Asian states (Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India) are prepared to hear a case involving cross-border elements. For instance, where parties are habitually resident abroad and a dispute has only some, little or no connection with an Asian state, will the courts of that state accept jurisdiction and hear the case and (if so) on what conditions? More specifically, the book’s chapters explore the circumstances in which different Asian states assume or decline jurisdiction not just in commercial matters, but also in other types of action (such as family, consumer and employment disputes).
The Introduction defines terminology and identifies similarities in the approaches to direct jurisdiction taken by the 15 Asian states in civil and commercial litigation. Taking its cue from this, the Conclusion assesses whether there should be a multilateral convention or soft law instrument articulating principles of direct jurisdiction for Asia. The Conclusion also discusses possible trajectories that Asian states may be taking in respect of direct jurisdiction in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the political tensions currently besetting the world. The book suggests that enacting suitable rules of direct jurisdiction requires an Asian state to strike a delicate balance between affording certainty and protecting its nationals. At heart, direct jurisdiction involves sometimes difficult policy considerations and is not just about drawing up lists of jurisdictional grounds and exceptions to them.
For further information please visit: https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/direct-jurisdiction-9781509936427/
CJEU on donation mortis causa under the Succession Regulation in the case UM, C-277/20
This Thursday, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the case UM, C-277/20, where it clarifies whether a donation mortis causa may fall within the scope of the notion of “agreement as to succession” in the sense of the Succession Regulation.
AG Saugmandsgaard Øe on action for unjust enrichment and contract/tort distinction under Brussels I Regulation in the case HRVATSKE ŠUME, C-242/20
AG Saugmandsgaard Øe observes in his Opinion presented today in the case HRVATSKE ŠUME, C-242/20, the Court of Justice has already faced requests for a preliminary ruling where arose a question on qualification of an action for unjust enrichment for the purposes of the Brussels I Regulation. He notes that no conclusive finding has been made so far as to its qualification as a “matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” in the sense of Article 5(3) of the Regulation (point 4). By contrast, the present case is supposed to create an opportunity to provide a definitive conclusion to the jurisprudential saga in question.