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The $24 Billion Judgment Against China in Missouri’s COVID Suit
This article was written by Prof. William S. Dodge (George Washington University Law School) and first published on Transnational Litigation Blog. The original version can be found at Transnational Litigation Blog. Reposted with permission.
On March 7, 2025, Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr. (Eastern District of Missouri) entered a default judgment for more than $24 billion against the People’s Republic of China and eight other Chinese defendants for hoarding personal protective equipment (PPE) during the early days of the COVID pandemic in violation of federal and state antitrust laws. The Eighth Circuit had previously held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) barred most of Missouri’s claims but that the hoarding claim fell within the act’s commercial activity exception.
Missouri now has the judgment against China that it wanted. But Missouri may find that judgment hard to enforce. As discussed below, there appear to be significant procedural problems with the judgment that at least some defendants might raise. More broadly, the properties of foreign states and their agencies or instrumentalities are entitled to immunity from execution under the FSIA. Immunity from execution is broader than immunity from suit, and it is not clear that any of the defendants have property in the United States that can be used to satisfy the judgment. Read more
Trending Topics in German PIL 2024 (Part 1 – Illegal Gambling and “Volkswagen”)
At the end of each year I publish an article (in German) about the Conflict of Laws developments in Germany of the last twelve months, covering more or less the year 2024 and the last months of 2023. I thought it would be interesting for the readers of this blog to get an overview over those topics that seem to be most trending.
The article focuses on the following topics:
- Restitution of Money lost in Illegal Gambling
- Applicable Law in the Dieselgate litigation
- The (Non-)Valitidy of Online Marriages
- New German conflict-of-law rules regarding gender afiliation / identity
- Reforms in international name law
I will start in this post with the two first areas that are mainly dealing with questions of Rome I and Rome II while in my follow-up post I will focus on the three areas that are not harmonized by EU law (yet) and are mainly questions of family law.
Chinese Judicial Practice on Asymmetric Choice of Court Agreements in International Civil & Commercial Disputes
By Yuchen Li, a PhD student at Wuhan University.
A. Introduction
An asymmetric choice of court agreement is commonly used in international commercial transactions, especially in financial agreements, which usually allows one party (option holder) an optional choice about the forum in which proceedings may be brought but the other (non-option holder) an exclusive choice to sue in a designated court.[1] A typical example is as follows:
‘(A) The courts of England have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any disputes ….
(B) The Parties agree that the courts of England are the most appropriate and convenient courts … to settle Disputes and accordingly no Party will argue to the contrary.
(C) This Clause is for the benefit of the Finance Parties only. As a result, no Finance Party shall be prevented from taking proceedings relating to a Dispute in any other courts with jurisdiction. To the extent allowed by law, the Finance Parties may take concurrent proceedings in any number of jurisdictions.’ [2]
In recent years, issues concerning asymmetric choice of court agreements have been controversial in cases within some jurisdictions.[3] Despite the significant amount of research on asymmetric choice of court agreements, little attention has been paid to Chinese stance on this topic. With Chinese private parties actively engaging in international transactions, Chinese attitude towards such clauses is important for commercial parties and academic researchers. This article gives a glimpse of how Chinese courts handle asymmetric choice of court agreements in international and commercial civil litigations.[4] Read more
News
AMEDIP: Annual seminar to take place from 22 to 24 October 2025 (in Spanish)
The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) will be holding its XLVIII Seminar entitled “Reflections regarding the Inter-American system in the 50th Anniversary of the CIDIP-I and the latest developments of Private International Law in Mexico” (Reflexiones en torno al sistema interamericano en el 50 Aniversario de la CIDIP-I y la actualidad del Derecho Internacional Privado en México) from 22 to 24 October 2025. The venue of the seminar will be the Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro (Querétaro, Mexico). Read more
University of East Anglia Law Podcast Series on (Private and Public) International Law: Series 3 out now
All episodes of Series 3 of the University of East Anglia Law School Podcast are now out. Hosted by Rishi Gulati, they cover the following topics:
- The Future of International Investment Law (Muthucumarasamy Sornarajah)
- Double Standards in International Law (Patryk Labuda)
- The launch of the Elgar Companion to UNIDROIT (Edward Elgar, 2024)
- The Rise of International Commercial Courts (Giesela Rühl)
- The exercise of self-defence in outer space (Chris O’Meara)
- Greenland, Self-Determination, and the Geopolitical Contest (Maria Ackrén).
All episodes are available at SoundCloud, Apple Podcasts, and Spotify
Where do Children Reside? Where they are “at Home”
The Supreme Court of Canada has released its reasons for dismissing the appeal (which it did orally on December 9, 2024) in Dunmore v Mehralian, 2025 SCC 20. The narrow issue was the meaning of “habitual residence” for a child in the statutory context of the Children’s Law Reform Act (Ontario). The SCC had earlier explained that a hybrid approach to the meaning of habitual residence is to be used under the Hague Convention: Office of the Children’s Lawyer v Balev, 2018 SCC 16. In the convention, there is no definition of habitual residence. In contrast, the CLRA does provide elements of a definition of habitual residence (in s 22) though it leaves “resides” undefined. This generated the issue: under the statute, does the same hybrid approach apply or is the definition different because of the statute?