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Public international law requirements for the effective enforcement of human rights
Written by Peter Hilpold, University of Innsbruck
Note: This blogpost is part of a series on „Corporate social responsibility and international law“ that presents the main findings of the contributions published in August Reinisch, Stephan Hobe, Eva-Maria Kieninger & Anne Peters (eds), Unternehmensverantwortung und Internationales Recht, C.F. Müller, 2020.
1. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) have set forth a process by which Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) rules are to be further specified. The approach followed is not to impose specific results but to create procedures by which CSR is given further flesh on the basis of a continuing dialogue between all relevant stakeholders.
2. The operationalization of this concept takes place by a three pillar model („protect“, „respect“, „remedy“) based on an approach called „embedded liberalism“ according to which the creation of a liberal economic order allowing also for governmental and international intervention is pursued.
3. The „remedies“ pillar is the least developed one within the system of the Guiding Principles. Intense discussion and studies are still needed to bring more clarity into this field.
4. In the attempt to bring more clarity into this area guidance can be obtained by discussions that have taken place within the UN in the field of general human rights law and by ensuing academic studies referring to the respective documents.
5. The remedies mentioned in the Guiding Principles are formulated in a relatively „soft“ manner, after attempts to create „harder“ norms have failed. There are, however, initiatives underway to create a binding instrument in this field. According to the „Zero Draft“ for such a treaty much more restrictive rules are envisaged. It is, however, unlikely that such an instrument will meet with the necessary consensus within the foreseeable future.
6. In Europe, within the Council of Europe as well as within the European Union, various attempts have been undertaken to give further substance to the „remedies”. The relevant documents contain both an analysis of the law in force as well as proposals for new instruments to be introduced. These proposals are, however, in part rather far-reaching and thus it is unclear whether they can be realized any time soon.
7. If some pivotal questions shall be identified that have emerged as an issue for further discussion, the following can be mentioned:
7.1. The extraterritorial application of remedies
a) In this context, first of all, the specific approach taken by the US Courts when applying the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has to be mentioned. However, after „Kiobel“ this development seems to have come to a halt.
b) Some hopes are associated with the application of tort law in Europe according to the „Brussels I”- and the „Rome II”-Regulation. However, on this basis European tort law can be applied to human rights violations by companies and subsidiaries abroad only to a very limited measure.
7.2. Criminal law as a remedy
According to some, remedies should be sought more forcefully within the realm of international criminal law. A closer look at the relevant norms reveals, however, that expectations should not be too high as to such an endeavour. International Investment Agreements (IIAs) and Counterclaims
Due to their „asymmetrical“ nature (As are intended to protect primarily the investor) IIAs do not offer, at first sight, a suitable basis for holding investors responsible for human rights abuses in the guest state. Recently, however, in the wake of the „Urbaser“ case, hopes have come up that counterclaims could be used to such avail. For the time being, however, these hopes are not justified. Nonetheless, attempts are under way to re-draft IIAs so that counterclaims are more easily available and, in general, to emphasize the responsibility of investors.
7.3. The national level
The national level is of decisive importance for finding remedies in the area of CSR. In this context, National Contact Points, National Action Plans and Corporate Social Reporting have to be mentioned. A wide array of initiatives have been taken in this field. Up to this moment the results are, however, not really convincing.
8. The Guiding Principles envisage a vast panoply of judicial and non-judicial initiatives, of State-based and non-State based measures. Many of these measures have to be further specified and tested. It is most probably too early to impose binding obligations in this field as the „Zero Draft“ ultimately intends. Further discussion and a further exchange of experience, as it happens within the „Forum on business and human rights”, seem to be the more promising way to follow.
Full (German) version: Peter Hilpold, Maßnahmen zur effektiven Durchsetzung von Menschen- und Arbeitsrechten: Völkerechtliche Anforderungen, in: August Reinisch, Stephan Hobe, Eva-Maria Kieninger & Anne Peters (eds), Unternehmensverantwortung und Internationales Recht, C.F. Müller, 2020, pp. 185 et seq.
Private international law requirements for the effective enforcement of human rights
Written by Tanja Domej, University of Zurich
Note: This blogpost is part of a series on „Corporate social responsibility and international law“ that presents the main findings of the contributions published in August Reinisch, Stephan Hobe, Eva-Maria Kieninger & Anne Peters (eds), Unternehmensverantwortung und Internationales Recht, C.F. Müller, 2020.
1. It is essential for the effective enforcement of human and workers’ rights to create effective local institutions and procedures. This encompasses functioning, trustworthy and accessible civil courts, but also other public, private and criminal institutions and mechanisms (e.g. permission, licencing or inspection procedures to ensure safety in the workplace; accident insurance; trade unions). Civil litigation cannot be a substitute for such mechanisms – particularly if it takes place far away from the place where the relevant events occurred.
2. This, however, is not a reason against ensuring effective enforcement mechanisms, including judicial mechanisms, for private law claims arising from violations of human rights or claims aiming to prevent or to terminate such violations. Such judicial proceedings can also help to promote the establishment of effective local mechanisms for preventing and remedying violations.
3. The usual difficulties arising in cross-border litigation tend to be aggravated in cases concerning human rights violations in developing countries. In addition to issues of jurisdiction and choice of law, there are often considerable challenges particularly with respect to litigation funding, fact-finding and establishing the content of foreign law, if required.
4. Legal aid alone usually is not a viable financial basis for corporate human rights litigation. The funding of such claims largely depends on market mechanisms, particularly on success-based lawyers’ fees or commercial litigation funding. Because of the moral hazard that may arise in this context, it is desirable to promote the establishment of public-interest litigation funders. Nevertheless, “entrepreneurial litigating” in the field of corporate human rights cases cannot be considered as per se abusive. There seems to be a need, however, to monitor practices in this field closely to assess whether further regulation is required.
5. Where cross-border judicial cooperation is not functioning, taking of evidence located in a foreign state without involving authorities of the state where such evidence is located becomes increasingly important. A generous approach should be adopted in cases where “direct” taking of evidence neither violates legitimate third-party interests nor involves the use or threat of compulsion in the territory of a foreign state.
6. In cases where liability for damage inflicted by the violation of human rights standards depends on a business’s internal operations, it is essential for an effective access to remedy that either the burden of proof with respect to the relevant facts is on the business or that there is a disclosure obligation that ensures access to relevant information. Where such disclosure could endanger legitimate confidentiality interests (particularly with respect to trade secrets), appropriate mechanisms to protect such interests should be put in place.
7. Collective redress mechanisms can improve access to justice with respect to corporate human rights claims. Meanwhile, reducing an excessive burden on the courts that could result from a large number of parallel proceedings currently does not seem to be as important a consideration in practice in the field of corporate human rights litigation as it can be in other fields of mass tort litigation. Appropriate safeguards have to be put in place to protect both the legitimate interests of defendants and those of the members of the claimant group. When designing such safeguards, it is important to ensure that they do not lead to the obstruction of legitimate claims. Particularly in collective redress proceedings, the court should have strong case management and control powers, both during the proceedings and in the case of a settlement.
8. In addition to claims aiming at remedies for victims of violations, private law claims brought by non-government organisations, by public bodies or by individuals can at least indirectly contribute to the enforcement of human rights standards. Possible examples are claims on the basis of unfair competition, and possibly also contractual claims, because of false statements about production standards. Actions by associations or popular actions for injunctive or declaratory relief could also contribute to private enforcement of human rights standards. It remains to be seen whether litigation among businesses concerning contractual obligations to comply with human rights standards will play a meaningful role in this field in the future as well.
9. Soft law mechanisms and alternative dispute resolution can supplement judicial law enforcement mechanisms, but they are not a substitute for judicial mechanisms. In particular, human rights arbitration depends on a voluntary submission. Its practical effectiveness therefore requires the cooperation of the parties to the dispute. It would, however, be possible to create incentives for such cooperation.
Full (German) version: Tanja Domej, Zivilrechtliche Rechtsdurchsetzungsmechanismen, in: August Reinisch, Stephan Hobe, Eva-Maria Kieninger & Anne Peters (eds), Unternehmensverantwortung und Internationales Recht, C.F. Müller, 2020, pp. 229 et seq.
Third-party liability of classification and certification societies in the context of conflict of laws and public international law – a comment on the CJEU’s recent ‘Rina judgement’
Written by Yannick Morath
Yannick Morath, doctoral candidate at the University of Freiburg, has kindly provided us with his thoughts on the CJEU’s judgement in the case of LG and Others v Rina SpA, Ente Registro Italiano Navale (C-641/18 – ECLI:EU:C:2020:349)
(See also the earlier post by Matthias Weller concerning the CJEU’s judgement).
- Introduction
Private-law classification and certification societies play a vital role in modern economies. Especially in the maritime sector, external auditors issue certificates dealing with public tasks such as the seaworthiness and safety of vessels. Not only their contractual partners but also third parties rely on the accuracy of such certificates. Due to cross-border mobility of certificates and certified items, issues of Private International Law have to be taken into account when dealing with a certifiers’ liability.
When not applying the appropriate level of care, classification and certification agencies can – according to the CJEU – be sued in the courts of the Member State where the agency is seated. By finding this ruling, the CJEU had to deal with two interesting questions: Firstly, it had to establish whether an action for damages, brought against private certifiers falls within the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’, and therefore, within the scope of the Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels I). Secondly, the CJEU had to examine the legitimacy of the certifier’s plea based on the principle of customary international law concerning immunity from state jurisdiction.
2. Facts of the ‘Rina-case’
In 2006, the Al Salam Boccaccio ’98, a ship sailing under the flag of the Republic of Panama, sunk in the Red Sea, tragically causing the loss of more than 1,000 lives. Relatives of the victims and survivors have brought an action under Italian law before the Tribunale di Genova (District Court, Genoa, Italy) against two private law corporations (the Rina companies), that are seated in Genoa and were responsible for the classification and certification of the ship.
The applicants argue that the defendants’ operations, carried out under a contract concluded with the Republic of Panama, are to blame for the ship’s lack of stability and its lack of safety at sea, which are the causes of its sinking. Therefore, they claim compensation from the Rina companies for the losses they suffered.
The Rina companies counter that the referring court lacks jurisdiction, relying on the international-law principle of immunity from jurisdiction of foreign States. They state that they are being sued in respect of activities, which they carried out as delegates of the Republic of Panama. The activities in question were a manifestation of the sovereign power of a foreign State and the defendants carried them out on behalf of and in the interests of that State.
The applicants, however, argue in favour of the case’s civil law nature, within the meaning of Article 1 (1) of Regulation 44/2001. As the Rina companies are seated in Genoa, the Italian courts should have jurisdiction under Article 2 (1) of that regulation. They submit that the plea of immunity from jurisdiction does not cover activities that are governed by non-discretionary technical rules, which are, in any event, unrelated to the political decisions and prerogatives of a State.
The Tribunale di Genova decided to stay the proceedings and consult the CJEU for further clarification under Article 267 TFEU.
3. Background: The dual role of classification and certification societies
When dealing with the classification and certification of ships it is important to be aware of the dual role private-law societies play in this area. Traditionally they are hired by a shipowner to attest that a ship is built in accordance with the standards of a specific ship class. Those ‘class rules’ are developed by the classification societies themselves. The maritime industry depends on these services, as the classification of a ship is necessary to evaluate its insurability and marketability. Therefore, these voluntary classifications are mainly prompted by private interest. This is referred to as the ‘private function’ of classification.
On the other hand, the same societies fulfil a ‘public function’ as well. Under international maritime law, states have a duty to take appropriate measures for ships flying under their flag to ensure safety at sea (Article 94 (3) of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea). For this purpose ships have to be surveyed by a qualified personnel to make sure it meets all relevant safety and environmental standards. Flag states can perform these tasks themselves; however, most of them delegate executive powers to classification societies. Pursuant to Article 3 (2) of Directive 2009/15 this is also possible under EU law. When executing these powers classification agencies are subject to two contracts: The first one is the agreement on the delegation of powers with the flag state, the second contract is the actual certification agreement with the owner of the ship that is about to be surveyed. Whereas shipowners are free to choose one of the recognized classification societies, the certification itself is compulsory.
It must be noted that the classification according to class rules (private function) is a prerequisite for the statutory inspection and certification (public function). In the case at hand, the Rina companies were responsible for both aspects. They classified the ship in accordance with their class rules and then issued the statutory certificate on behalf of and upon delegation from the Republic of Panama. This public law background caused the need for clarification by the CJEU.
4. The CJEU on the interpretation of ‘civil and commercial matters’
Under Article 1(1) of Regulation 44/2001, the scope of that regulation is limited to ‘civil and commercial matters’. It does not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters. In order to ascertain whether Italian courts have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 2 (1) of that regulation it is necessary to interpret the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’. This concept is subject to an autonomous European interpretation. By determining whether a matter falls within the scope of the Regulation, the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the dispute is crucial. It must be noted that the mere fact that one of the parties might be a public authority does not exclude the case from the scope of the Regulation. It is, however, essential whether the party exercises public powers (acta iure imperii). These powers are ‘falling outside the scope of the ordinary legal rules applicable to relationships between private individuals’ (para. 34).
Following the Advocate General’s opinion and the CJEU’s judgement in Pula Parking (C-551/15 – ECLI:EU:C:2017:193), the Court notes that ‘it is irrelevant that certain activities were carried out upon delegation from a State’ (para. 39). The fact that the operations were carried out on behalf of and in the interest of the Republic of Panama and that they fulfil a public purpose, do not, in themselves, ‘constitute sufficient evidence to classify them as being carried out iure imperii’ (para. 41.).
In fact it must be taken into account that ‘the classification and certification operations were carried out for remuneration under a commercial contract governed by private law concluded directly with the shipowner of the Al Salam Boccaccio ’98’ (para. 45). Moreover, it is the responsibility of the flag state to interpret and choose the applicable technical requirements for the certification necessary to fly their flag.
The CJEU continues to examine the agency’s decision-making power. If the agency decides to withdraw a certificate, the respective ship is no longer able to sail. It argues, however, that this effect does not originate from the decision of the agency but rather from the sanction which is imposed by law (para. 47). The role of the certifier simply ‘consists in conducting checks of the ship in accordance with the requirements laid down by the applicable legislative provisions.’ As it is for the States to fix those provisions, it is ultimately their power to decide on a ship’s permission to sail.
Whereas the general remarks on the interpretation of ‘civil and commercial matters’ are convincing and based on settled case law, the findings about the ‘decision making power’ of recognised organisations give rise to further questions. If a ship does not comply with the relevant requirements, the statutory certificate must not be issued and the shipowner is not allowed to sail under the flag of the respective state. Even though this legal consequence is finally imposed by law, it is the certifier’s application of that law that leads to this effect. Whenever a certification agency refuses to issue a certificate, the ship is initially not able to sail. The CJEU’s technical perspective in paragraph 47 does not sufficiently appreciate the factual decision making of the certifier. The judgement does unfortunately not explicitly address the issue of legal discretion and its consequences on the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’.
However, there are other grounds to qualify the case a ‘civil matter’. As the CJEU pointed out as well, it follows from Regulation 6 (c) and (d) of Chapter I of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, that the final responsibility is allocated to the flag state (para. 48). Therefore, the state is subject to far-reaching supervisory duties. Even though this is not expressively regulated by international or EU law, it appears like the flag state can at any time overrule an agency’s decision to issue or withdraw the certificate. This would result in a limitation to the finality of the agency’s powers and prepare the ground for a civil law qualification. Some further remarks by the CJEU about this aspect would have been interesting.
5. The CJEU on state immunity from jurisdiction
Doubts regarding the jurisdiction of the Italian courts arose from the Rina companies’ plea based on the principle of customary international law concerning immunity from jurisdiction. Pursuant to the principle par in parem non habet imperium, a State cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of another State. ‘However, in the present state of international law, that immunity is not absolute, but is generally recognised where the dispute concerns sovereign acts performed iure imperii. By contrast, it may be excluded if the legal proceedings relate to acts which do not fall within the exercise of public powers’ (para. 56).
The CJEU held that this principle does not preclude the application of the Regulation in this case, although it is the referring court that has to examine whether the Rina companies had recourse to public powers within in the meaning of international law. It must be noted that a rule of customary international law will only exist where a given practice actually exists that is supported by a firm legal view (opinio iuris). Following the Advocate General, the CJEU finds that the case-law cited by the defendants ‘does not support the unequivocal conclusion that a body carrying out classification and certification operations may rely on immunity from jurisdiction in circumstances such as those of the present case` (c.f. para. 109 of his opinion).
In regard of state immunity, the CJEU changes its perspective on the case. Whereas the interpretation of ‘civil and commercial matters’ was driven by EU law, the doctrine of state immunity requires a different methodological approach, as it originates from international law. Nevertheless, the CJEU’s overall convincing remarks are in line with its earlier findings, setting a high bar for statutory certification societies to plead for state immunity.
6. Final remarks
The CJEU established legal security for the victims of maritime disasters such as the sinking of the Al Salam Boccaccio ’98. The judgement indirectly clarified the applicability of the Brussels I Regulation in cases where maritime certifiers operate only in their private function. When statutory certifications are a civil matter, this must a fortiori be the case for voluntary classifications. Having consistent results when establishing jurisdiction in such cases, also meets with the principle of foreseeability. The remarks on the applicability of the Brussels I regulation are also of significant relevance when dealing with the Brussels Ibis and the Rome I and II Regulations, as all of them apply the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’.
Moreover, the judgement underlines the responsibility of private-law certifiers and recognises their vital role as regulators that operate in the public interest. Even though the CJEU’ findings on the interpretation of ‘civil matters’ are consistent with its earlier developed broad understanding of the concept, further clarification regarding privatised decision making powers would have been desirable.
News
Revue Critique de droit international privé – issue 2023/2
The second issue of the Revue critique de droit International privé of 2023 was released in August. It contains four articles and several case notes.
The first part of the issue features the doctrinal work of two young authors, who confront PIL techniques with contemporary developments in social sciences.
The first article Pour une approche décoloniale du droit international privé (A Decolonial Approach to Private International Law) is authored by Dr Sandrine Brachotte (Université Saint-Louis & Université de Lille). Following her doctoral work on The Conflict of Laws and Non-secular Worldviews: A Proposal for Inclusion (see presentation over at EAPIL), Dr Brachotte discusses colonial studies’ implications for PIL scholarship. She examines how plural normativities challenge the traditional conception of conflict of laws and then outlines the potential form of a decolonial PIL. An English translation of the article is available on the website of the editor. Its abstract reads as follows:
Call for Paper: Private International Law and Business Compliance in Asia Pacific
This national conference will be held on 21 February 2024 at The University of Sydney Law School in Australia.
Business compliance in international transactions across the Asia-Pacific region holds immense importance for organizations seeking to expand their activities within this dynamic and evolving landscape. Multinational corporations operating in Asia Pacific often confront unique compliance challenges due to the swiftly changing regulatory and geopolitical environment in the region.
The 2023 NGPIL Lecture Series
Originally posted today on the NGPIL website.
On the 23rd November 2023, 5pm (WAT/Lagos/Abuja) the NGPIL will host our guest speaker Professor Wale Olawoyin SAN, FCIArb at this year’s conference. The event will explore the coming into force of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2023 and how, from a private international law perspective, the arbitration appeal process in Nigeria can be enhanced. Discussions will build on practice thus far, and will allow practitioners, judges and academics alike to develop knowledge and insight into its utility.
To register: https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_q5pY1JWARiaUxi1TIw8xBQ
