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Mutual Trust: Judiciaries under Scrutiny – Recent reactions and preliminary references to the CJEU from the Netherlands and Germany
I. Introduction: Foundations of Mutual Trust
A crucial element element for running a system of judicial cooperation on the basis of mutual trust is sufficient trust in the participating judiciaries. EU primary law refers to this element in a more general way in that it considers itself to be based on „the rule of law“ and also „justice“. Article 2 TEU tells us: „The Union is founded on the values of (…) the rule of law (…). These values are common to the Member States in a society in which „(…) justice (…) prevail.“ Subparagraph 2 of the Preamble of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, recognized by the EU as integral part of the Union’s foundational principles in Article 6 (1) TEU, confirms: „Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union (…) is based on (…) the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by (…) by creating an area of freedom, security and justice“. Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial when EU law is „implemented“ in the sense of Article 51 of the Charter, as does Article 6(1) European Convention on Human Rights generally.
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has indeed become a primary objective of the EU. According to Article 3 (1) TEU, „[t]he Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.“ Article 3 (2) TEU further spells out these objectives: „The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime“. Only in the following subparagraph, in Article 3 (2) Sentence 1 TEU, the original objective of the EU is listed: „The Union shall establish an internal market“.
II. No „blind trust“ anymore
Based on these fundaments, the CJEU, in its Opinion Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, paras 191 and 192, against the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, explained: “[t]he principle of mutual trust between the Member States is of fundamental importance in EU law (…). That principle requires (…) to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (…). Thus, when implementing EU law, the Member States may, under EU law, be required to presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so that not only may they not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State than that provided by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU”. Hence, the Court concluded, at para. 194, that “[i]n so far as the ECHR would, in requiring the EU and the Member States to be considered Contracting Parties not only in their relations with Contracting Parties which are not Member States of the EU but also in their relations with each other, including where such relations are governed by EU law, require a Member State to check that another Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member States, accession is liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law”. This is why (inter alia) the CJEU held that the accession of the EU to the ECHR would be inadmissible – based on the promise in Article 19(1) Sentences 2 and 3 TEU: „[The CJEU] shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.“ When it comes to judicial cooperation, these Member States are primarily the Member States of origin, rather than the Member States of destination, unless „systemtic deficiencies“ in the Member States of origin occur.
It did not come as a surprise that the European Court of Human Rights rejected the claim made by the European Court of Justice that mutual trust trumps human rights: In Avoti?š v. Latvia (ECtHR, judgment of 23 May 2016, Application no. 17502/07), the applicant was defendant in civil default proceedings in Cyprus. The successful claimant sought to get this judgment recognized and enforced in Latvia against the applicant under the Brussels I Regulation. The applicant argued that he had not been properly served with process in the proceedings in Cyprus and hence argued that recognition must be denied according to Article 34 no. 2 Brussels I Regulation. The Latvian courts nevertheless granted recognition and enforcement. Thereupon, the applicant lodged a complaint against Latvia for violating Article 6 (1) ECHR. The ECHR observed, at paras. 113 and 114:
„[T]he Brussels I Regulation is based in part on mutual-recognition mechanisms which themselves are founded on the principle of mutual trust between the member States of the European Union. (…). The Court is mindful of the importance of the mutual-recognition mechanisms for the construction of the area of freedom, security and justice referred to in Article 67 of the TFEU, and of the mutual trust which they require. (…). Nevertheless, the methods used to create that area must not infringe the fundamental rights of the persons affected by the resulting mechanisms (…)“.
The Court further held, in direct response to Opinion 2/13 of the ECJ that „[l]imiting to exceptional cases the power of the State in which recognition is sought to review the observance of fundamental rights by the State of origin of the judgment could, in practice, run counter to the requirement imposed by the Convention according to which the court in the State addressed must at least be empowered to conduct a review commensurate with the gravity of any serious allegation of a violation of fundamental rights in the State of origin, in order to ensure that the protection of those rights is not manifestly deficient“.
Thus, a court must, under all circumstances, even within the scope of the „Bosphorus presumption“ (European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 30 June 2005 – Bosphorus Hava Yollar? Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim ?irketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, paras. 160-65, ECHR 2005?VI), „[v]erify that the principle of mutual recognition is not applied automatically and mechanically to the detriment of fundamental rights – which, the CJEU has also stressed, must be observed in this context. In this spirit, where the courts of a State which is both a Contracting Party to the Convention and a member State of the European Union are called upon to apply a mutual-recognition mechanism established by EU law, they must give full effect to that mechanism where the protection of Convention rights cannot be considered manifestly deficient. However, if a serious and substantiated complaint is raised before them to the effect that the protection of a Convention right has been manifestly deficient and that this situation cannot be remedied by European Union law, they cannot refrain from examining that complaint on the sole ground that they are applying EU law“. To cut it short: mutual trust does not (fully) trump human rights – “no blind trust” (Koen Lenaerts, La vie après l’avis: Exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust, Common Market Law Review 54 (2017), pp. 805 et seq.).
III. What does this mean, if a Member State (Poland) undermines the independence of its judiciary?
This question has been on the table ever since Poland started “reforming” its judiciary, first by changing the maximum age of the judges at the Polish Supreme Court and other courts during running appointments, thereby violating against the principle of irremovability of judges. The Polish law („Artyku?i 37 i 111 ust?p 1 of the Ustawa o S?dzie Najwy?szym [Law on the Supreme Court] of 8 December 2017 [Dz. U. of 2018, heading 5]) entered into force on 3 April 2018, underwent a number of amendments (e.g. Dz. U. of 2018, heading 848 and heading 1045), before it was ultimately set aside (Dz. U. of 2018, heading 2507). The CJEU declared it to infringe Article 19 (1) TEU in its judgment of 24 June 2019, C- 619/18 – Commission v. Poland. The Court rightly observed, in paras. 42 et seq.: “[t]he European Union is composed of States which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them, EU law being based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values. That premiss both entails and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States and, in particular, their courts that those values upon which the European Union is founded, including the rule of law, will be recognised, and therefore that the EU law that implements those values will be respected“. Indeed, the principle of irremovability is one central aspect of judicial independence; see e.g. Matthias Weller, Europäische Mindeststandards für Spruchkörper: Zur richterlichen Unabhängigkeit, in Christoph Althammer/Matthias Weller, Europäische Mindeststandards für Spruchkörper, Tübingen 2017, pp. 3 et seq.). Later, and perhaps even more worrying, further steps of the justice “reform” subjected judgments to a disciplinary control by political government authorities, see CJEU, Ordonnance de la Cour (grande chambre), 8 avril 2020, C?791/19 R (not yet available in English; for an English summary see the Press Release of the Court). The European Court of Human Rights is currently stepping in – late, but may be not yet too late. The first communications about filings of cases concerning the independence of Poland’s judiciary came up only in 2019. For an overview of these cases and comments see e.g. Adam Bodnar, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Republic of Poland and Professor at the University of the Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw, Strasbourg Steps in, Verfassungsblog, 7 July 2020.
IV. What are the other Member States doing?
1. The Netherlands: Suspending cooperation
One of the latest reactions comes from the Netherlands in the context of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, namely in respect to the execution of a European Arrest Warrant under Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. In two rulings of 24 March and one of 26 March 2020 (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2020:1896, 24 March 2020; ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2020:1931, 24 March 2020; ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2020:2008, 26 March 2020) the Rechtbank Amsterdam stopped judicial cooperation under this instrument and ordered the prosecutor and the defence to take the entering into force of the latest judicial reforms in Poland into account before deciding to transfer a person to Poland. For a comment on this case line see Petra Bárd, John Morijn, Domestic Courts Pushing for a Workable Test to Protect the Rule of Law in the EU Decoding the Amsterdam and Karlsruhe Courts’ post-LM Rulings (Part II). Marta Requejo Isidro, on the EAPIL’s blog yesterday, rightly asked the question what a decision to reject judicial cooperation in criminal matters would mean in relation to civil matters. For myself, the answer is clear: if the fundaments for mutual trust are substantially put into question (see above on the ongoing actions by the Commission and the proceedings before the CJEU since 2016 – for a summary see here), the Member States may and must react themselves, e.g. by broadening the scope and lowering the standards of proof for public policy violations, see Matthias Weller, Mutual Trust: In search of the future of European Private International Law, Journal of Private International Law 2015, pp. 65, at pp. 99 et seq.).
2. Germany: Pushing standards beyond reasonable degrees
Against these dramatic developments, the decision of the Regional Court of Erfurt, Germany, of 15 June 2020, Case C-276/20, for a preliminary reference about the independence of German judges appears somewhat suprising. After referring a question of interpretation of EU law in relation to the VW Diesel scandal, the referring court added the further, and unrelated question: „Is the referring court an independent and impartial court or tribunal for the purpose of Article 267 TFEU, read in conjunction with the third sentence of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?“ The referring court criticizes blurring lines between the executive and the judiciary – which is the very issue in Poland. It explained:
„The referring court, a civil court in the Thuringia region of Germany, shares the concerns and doubts of the Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden (Administrative Court, Wiesbaden, Germany) as to the institutional independence of the German courts and their right of reference pursuant to Article 267 TFEU … . The court refers to the question referred by the Administrative Court, Wiesbaden, on 28 March 2019 and the proceedings pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union (… C-272/19 …). (…). According to the [CJEU’s] settled case-law, a court must be able to exercise its functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever (see judgment of 16 February 2017, C-503/15, paragraph 36 et seq.). Only then are judges protected from external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardise their independence and influence their decisions. Only that can dispel any reasonable doubt in the mind of an individual seeking justice as to the imperviousness of the courts to external factors and their neutrality with respect to the conflicting interests before them.
The national constitutional situation in Germany and in Thuringia does not meet those standards (see, with regard to the lack of independence of the German prosecution service, judgment of 27 May 2019, C-508/18). It only recognises a functional judicial independence in the key area of judicial activity, which is a personal independence. However, that is not sufficient to protect judges from all forms of external influence. The additional institutional independence of the courts required for that is by no means guaranteed. However, the independence of individual judges is guaranteed by the independence of the judiciary as a whole.
In Thuringia, as in every other federal state in Germany, the executive is responsible for the organisation and administration of the courts and manages their staff and resources. The Ministries of Justice decide on the permanent posts and the number of judges in a court and on the resources of the courts. In addition, judges are appointed and promoted by the Ministers for Justice. The underlying assessment of judges is the responsibility of the ministries and presiding judges who, aside from any judicial activity of their own, must be regarded as part of the executive. The Ministers for Justice and the presiding judges who rank below them administratively and are bound by their instructions act in practice as gatekeepers. In addition, the presiding judges exercise administrative supervision over all judges.
The formal and informal blurring of numerous functions and staff exchanges between the judiciary and the executive are also typical of Germany and Thuringia. For example, judges may be entrusted with acts of administration of the judiciary. The traditional practice of seconding judges to regional or federal ministries is one particular cause for concern. Seconded judges are often integrated into the ministerial hierarchy for years. It is also not unusual for them to switch back and forth between ministries and courts and even between the status of judge and the status of civil servant.
The judge sitting alone who referred the question has personally been seconded three times (twice to the Thuringia Ministry of Justice and once to the Thuringia State Chancellery).
This exchange of staff between the executive and the judiciary infringes both EU law and the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct applied worldwide (see Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, www.unodc.org, p. 36: ‘The movement back and forth between high-level executive and legislative positions and the judiciary promotes the very kind of blurring of functions that the concept of separation of powers intends to avoid.’).
Most importantly, these informal practices sometimes appear to be arbitrary. While the courts guarantee the absence of arbitrariness outwardly, informal practices may expose judges to the threat of arbitrariness and administrative decisionism. Inasmuch as ‘expression-of-interest’ procedures have been initiated recently, including in Thuringia, as awareness of the problem increases, for example on secondments and trial periods in higher courts or on the management of working groups for trainee lawyers, there is still no justiciability (enforceability).
All this gives the executive the facility to exert undue influence on the judiciary, including indirect, subtle and psychological influence. There is a real risk of ‘reward’ or ‘penalty’ for certain decision-making behaviours (see Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, Germany) order of 22 March 2018, 2 BvR 780/16, … , paragraphs 57 and 59).”
The close interlock in Germany between the judiciary and the executive and the hierarchical structure and institutional dependence of the judiciary are rooted in the authoritarian state of 19th century Germany and in the Nazi principle of the ‘führer’. In terms of administrative supervision, the entire German judiciary is based on the president model (which under National Socialism was perverted and abused by applying the principle of the ‘führer’ to the courts … ).“
These submissions appear to go way over the top: mechanisms to incentivise (which inenvitably contain an aspect of indirect sanction) are well-justified in a judiciary supposed to function within reasonable time limits; comparing the voluntary (!) temporary placement of judges in justice ministries or other positions of the government (or, as is regularly the case, in EU institutions), while keeping a life-time tenure under all circumstances (!) can hardly be compared or put into context with methods of the Nazi regime at the time, whereas cutting down currently running periods of judges and disciplinary sanctions in relation to the contents and results of judgments evidently and clearly violate firmly established principles of judicial independence, as well as a direct influence of the government on who is called to which bench. Yet, the German reference illustrates how sensitive the matter of judicial independence is being taken in some Member States – and how far apart the positions within the Member States are. It will be a delicate task of the EU to come to terms with these fundamentally different approaches within the operation of its systems of mutual recognition based on mutual trust. Clear guidance is needed by the CJEU in the judicial dialogue between Luxemburg and the national courts. One recommendation put on the table is to re-include the Member States in its trust management, i.e. the control of compliance with the fundaments of judicial cooperation accordingly; concretely: to re-allow second and additional reviews by the courts of the receiving Member States in respect to judicial acts of a Member State against which the EU has started proceedings for violation of the rule of law in respect to the independence of its judiciary.
A few thoughts on the HCCH Guide to Good Practice on the grave-risk exception (Art. 13(1)(b)) under the Child Abduction Convention, through the lens of human rights (Part II)
Written by Mayela Celis – The comments below are based on the author’s doctoral thesis entitled “The Child Abduction Convention – four decades of evolutive interpretation” at UNED (forthcoming)
As indicated in a previous post, the comments on the HCCH Guide to Good Practice on the grave-risk exception (Art. 13(1)(b)) under the Child Abduction Convention (subsequently, Guide to Good Practice or Guide) will be divided into two posts. In a previous post, I analysed the Guide exclusively through the lens of human rights. In the present post, I will comment on some specific legal issues of the Guide but will also touch upon on some aspects of human rights law.
Please refer to Part I. All the caveats mentioned in that post also apply here.
The Guide to Good Practice is available here.
I would like to touch upon three topics in this post: 1) the examples of assertions that can be raised under Article 13(1)(b) and their categorisation; 2) measures of protection and 3) domestic violence.
1) One of the great accomplishments of the Guide to Good Practice is the categorisation of the examples of assertions that can be raised under Article 13(1)(b) of the Child Abduction Convention. While at first sight the categorisation may appear to be too simplistic, it is very well thought through and encompasses a wide range of scenarios.
I include below the assertions as stated in the Guide:
Examples of assertions that can be raised under Article 13(1)(b)
a. Domestic violence against the child and / or the taking parent
b. Economic or developmental disadvantages to the child upon return
c. Risks associated with circumstances in the State of habitual residence
d. Risks associated with the child’s health
e. The child’s separation from the taking parent, where the taking parent would be unable or unwilling to return to the State of habitual residence of the child
i. Criminal prosecution against the taking parent in the State of habitual residence of the child due to wrongful removal or retention
ii. Immigration issues faced by the taking parent
iii. Lack of effective access to justice in the State of habitual residence
iv. Medical or family reasons concerning the taking parent
v. Unequivocal refusal to return
f. Separation from the child’s sibling(s)
Nevertheless, while this categorisation is very comprehensive, there are a few matters that are mentioned only very briefly in the Guide and could have benefited from a more in-depth discussion. One of them is the extensive case law on what constitutes “zone of war” or a place where there is conflict. See footnotes 88 and 89 of the Guide under the heading c. Risks associated with circumstances in the State of habitual residence.
Perhaps due to political sensitivities, it would be hard to pinpoint in the Guide jurisdictions that have been discussed by the courts as possibly being a “zone of war”. Among these are Israel (most of the case law), Monterrey (Mexico – during the war on drugs) and Venezuela. See for example: Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) [INCADAT reference: HC/E/USf 530] (United States); Kilah v. Director-General, Department of Community Services [2008] FamCAFC 81 [INCADAT reference: HC/E/AU 995] (Australia) and other references in footnotes 88 and 89 of the Guide.
Some of course may argue that “zone of war” is a gloss on the Convention and that as such it should not be analysed. However, one may also describe such situations without labelling them as “zone of war”, such as a State where there is conflict, be it military, social, political, etc. Perhaps this could have been expanded under the heading c. Risks associated with circumstances in the State of habitual residence of the Guide referred to above.
While the “zone of war” exception has hardly been successful, it would have been beneficial to discuss some of the arguments set forth by the parties such as: the fluctuation of violence throughout the years, terrorist attacks, a negative travel advice by a government concerning the State of habitual residence of the child, the specific place where the family lives and the risks of terrorism, the violence of drug cartels, and the fact of being a political refugee in the State where the child was abducted. The negative travel advice is particularly apposite to our times of Covid-19 as that would have given some guidance to the courts.
Another assertion made under Article 13(1)(b) of the Child Abduction Convention that could have been analysed in more depth by the Guide – perhaps under a. Domestic violence against the child and/or the taking parent – is the sexual abuse of children. The Guide includes very brief references to sexual abuse in the glossary, paragraphs 38 and 57, and footnote 76.
Undoubtedly, sexual abuse is a terrible and unbearable experience for children but it is still a taboo to single out this topic, let alone explain the current trends existing in the case law when this issue has been raised. Nevertheless, from my research there seems to be a very clear distinction in the case law: when the sexual abuse has been raised in the State of habitual residence and no action or insufficient action was taken by such authorities, and there is evidence of sexual abuse, the State where the child has been abducted tends to reject the return of the child to his or her State of habitual residence. In cases where this is not the case, the child is ordered back to the State of habitual residence, often with measures of protection. See for example: the multiple-layered decisions in the case of Danaipour v. McLarey, see for example the decision Danaipour v. McLarey, 386 F.3d 289 (1st Cir. 2004) [INCADAT reference: HC/E/USf 597] (United States). This brings us to:
2) The second topic of this post: measures of protection (also referred to as protective measures). The paragraphs dedicated to this topic in the Guide are 43-48. The Guide is absolutely at the forefront of the latest developments and social research on the effectiveness of measures of protection. It has answered the call of many professors/scholars and practitioners, who have cautioned about the indiscriminate use of measures of protection, in particular of undertakings, when the person causing the violence is known to infringe orders and not to heed the warnings of the courts. The Guide is to be commended for this great step forward.
The Guide defines undertakings as follows: “an undertaking is a voluntary promise, commitment or assurance given by a natural person – in general, the left-behind parent – to a court to do, or not to do, certain things. Courts in certain jurisdictions will accept, or even require, undertakings from the left-behind parent in relation to the return of a child. An undertaking formally given to a court in the requested jurisdiction in the context of return proceedings may or may not be enforceable in the State to which the child will be returned.” Because undertakings are a voluntary promise, their enforcement is fraught with problems, especially if the left-behind parent refuses to comply once the child has been returned. Where the primary carer (usually the mother) returns with the child to a “domestic violence” situation and it is not possible to enforce undertakings, both the mother and the child may be subject to a grave risk of harm. For more information, see Taryn Lindhorst, Jeffrey L. Edleson. Battered Women, Their Children, and International Law: The Unintended Consequences of the Hague Child Abduction Convention (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2012). This leads us to:
3) The third topic of this post: domestic violence. Many claim that domestic violence is a human rights violation. In a wider context, there is indeed a correlation between domestic violence and human rights and this has been recognised by resolutions of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. See for example AT (Ms) v. Hungary, (Decision) CEDAW Committee and Opuz v. Turkey (Application No. 33401/02), respectively.
While the issue of domestic violence in the context of Article 13(1)(b) of the Child Abduction Convention was the one topic that sparked concern among the Contracting States to the Child Abduction Convention, as well as judges and the legal profession alike, the Guide only dedicates a few paragraphs to it. See paragraphs 57-59 of the Guide. It also arrives at a conclusion, which raises some doubts.
In particular, the Guide states that “Evidence of the existence of a situation of domestic violence, in and of itself, is therefore not sufficient to establish the existence of a grave risk to the child.” There are a few problems with such a statement. Domestic violence comes in different shapes and sizes and the level of violence can be high or low. This statement is a “one-size-fits-all” and thus is necessarily flawed. In addition, it does not say what it means by “in and of itself”, does it mean prima facie? Also, it does not elaborate on what is necessary to invoke and substantiate domestic violence in order for this assertion to be considered sufficient. It also appears to set a standard of proof when it says that it “is not sufficient”, which might perhaps not be appropriate for a soft law instrument, such as a Guide to Good Practice, to do.
Some scholars have analysed and criticised this statement of the Guide. In particular, Rhona Schuz and Merle H. Weiner in the following article “A Small Change That Matters: The Article 13(1)(b) Guide to Good Practice” (Family Law LexisNexis©, January 2020) I refer to their arguments and prefer not to replicate them in this post.
Despite the weakness mentioned above and in Part I of this post, I believe that this Guide would be of great benefit to the legal profession.
Having all the above in mind, I would like to conclude with some words of the renowned American judge Richard Posner: “[t]here is a difference between the law on the books and the law as it is actually applied, and nowhere is the difference as great as in domestic relations.” (Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2005) [INCADAT reference: HC/E/USf 812] (United States)).
Same Region, Two Different Rulings on Fake News at the Internet
Fernando Pedro Meinero
Recently, two criminal court decisions investigating the spread of fake news show the difficulty of determining the scope of national court jurisdiction over the internet.
In Argentina, Google was successful in reversing a decision that determined the deindexation of a person’s name from search engines hosted outside the country. In this case, the searcher associated a person’s name with crimes of possession of drugs and weapons, something that proved to be false. But in Brazil, Twitter and Facebook were forced to globally block the access of investigated people to their respective accounts. These people are investigated for participating in the dissemination of defamatory publications through these internet platforms against members of the Legislative and Judiciary.
Although these are decisions taken in the context of criminal cases, the issues raised by them reflect difficulties that also arise in civil cases. Both decisions were taken against companies that have branches in the countries where the courts exercise their jurisdiction – Argentina and Brazil, but they see differently the scope of that jurisdiction for the fulfillment of an order outside the territory.
On the one hand, the idea that the imposition of removing content or access implies an obligation to do so outside the national territory. Therefore, this decision, in order to produce effects outside the territory, should pass through the control mechanisms of international cooperation, since otherwise there would be an invasion of foreign jurisdictions. Not to mention the issues that arise from the point of view of the applicable law, according to what each State considers as a defamatory act and what is the limit of freedom of speech.
On the other hand, the understanding that this obligation to comply, imposed on a company with legal personality in the country, based on national legislation, must be fulfilled by that company, regardless of where and how it will become effective. In this way, speculations about an eventual violation of foreign sovereignty are eliminated, as well as with regard to laws that may eventually consider such publications to be non-defamatory and just an exercise of freedom of speech.
This divergence exposes, in essence, issues related to international jurisdiction, applicable law and international legal cooperation, the three traditional pillars of Private International Law, and the challenges that the ubiquity of internet impose to this field of study.
Case no. CPF 8553/2015/4 / CA3 “C., E. – provisional measure – 1st Panel of the Federal Criminal and Correctional Chamber – Argentina
Last June 16, 1st Panel of the Federal Criminal and Correctional Chamber – Argentina – Appeal in Case no. CPF 8553/2015/4 / CA3 “C., E. – provisional measure”, decided in favor of Google Inc. in a case concerning fake news.
The giant of the internet appealed a decision that extended a provisional measure determining the removal of the indexation of a content in the search engine. The content – proved to be fake – referred to an alleged arrest of Enrique Santos Carrió in Mexico for drugs and weapons possession. He is the son of Elisa Carrió, an important figure in Argentine politics, currently serving as National Deputy.
The questioned order extended the restriction to domains hosted outside the national territory, namely: www.google.com, www.google.com.es and www.google.mx.
In its allegations, Google argued that, by virtue of the principle of state sovereignty, the implementation of that measure would represent a violation of the sovereignty of other states, which would affect services subject to foreign law. The company understood that the restrictive measure should be directed at the sites that published the fake news, and not at the search engine that, according to the company, is a mere intermediary between the users and the publishers.
Also, according to Google, the removal of the contents of www.google.com would require the deletion of them on global servers, which would represent that an Argentine judge could decide about the information that can be accessed worldwide. In turn, it believes that this type of measure constitutes a serious threat to freedom of expression and the right to seek, receive and disseminate information freely.
The Court, granting the appeal, understood that the categorization of the news as fake is typical of the activity of the intervening court. However, these categorizations cannot be imposed on foreign jurisdictions, except through judicial cooperation mechanisms that do not violate their legal order. In its understanding “the core of this controversy concerns the principle of the territoriality of the law, which prevents the possibility of taking for itself the prerogative to prohibit the global dissemination of certain contents published by the press, whose disclosure would be prohibited under the local regulatory framework, but its circulation may be authorized in the context of another territory, according to the legal provisions and the categorization that this content could be granted ”(in free translation).
By this basis, the Chamber decided to leave the proposed precautionary measure ineffective, understanding that, if it so wishes, the judge a quo may request measures of judicial cooperation from foreign authorities and thus limit the dissemination of such news.
The full text of the decision can be found here (in Spanish).
Criminal Investigation no. 4781 from Distrito Federal – Brazil. Justice Alexandre de Moraes (Monocratic Decision), Supreme Federal Court, Brazil.
On the other hand, we find in Brazil a decision that went in a very opposite direction if compared to the previous one.
In the context of the Criminal Investigation no. 4781 from Distrito Federal – Brazil, the Supreme Federal Court investigates the existence of organized use of accounts on social networks to create, publish and disseminate false information (commonly known as fake news). On May 26, 2020, Alexandre de Moraes, Minister of the Supreme Federal Court, ordered the blocking of Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts belonging to a group of allies of Jair Bolsonaro, current President of Brazil. Such profiles would be used to commit crimes against honor in concurrence with criminal association (typified in the Penal Code in arts. 138, 139, 140 and 288) and crimes against national security (typified in Act 7.170/1983, in arts. 18, 22, 23 and 26). Specifically, the investigation refers to attacks to the Supreme Federal Court and the National Congress.
Some of those investigated, however, evaded the order, changing the location settings on the sites, as if they were publishing from other countries. Therefore, on 07/28/2020, the said magistrate provided that the aforementioned social networks must block for access from any IP (Internet Protocol), from Brazil or abroad. To guarantee compliance, he imposed a daily fine of R $ 20,000.00 for each unblocked profile.
Twitter announced that it would comply with that decision, though it would appeal.
Differently, Facebook Serviços Online do Brasil Ltda. stated that it would refuse to comply with that decision, alleging its illegality. Thus, it would maintain the access of those investigated and the possibility of posting by accessing to the accounts abroad, allowing the viewing of content in the national territory. Facebook argued: “We respect the laws of the countries in which we operate. We are appealing to the Supreme Federal Court against the decision to block the accounts globally, considering that Brazilian law recognizes limits to its jurisdiction and the legitimacy of other jurisdictions”.
In view of this declaration, Minister Alexandre de Moraes issued a new decision, which raised the daily fine to R $ 100,000.00 for unblocked profile.
In his reasons, the Magistrate understood that “like any private entity that carries out its economic activity in the national territory, the social network Facebook must respect and effectively comply with direct commands issued by the Judiciary regarding facts that have occurred or with their persistent effects within the national territory; it is incumbent upon him, if deemed necessary, to demonstrate its non-conformity by means of the resources permitted by Brazilian law”. Then, he understood that “the blocking of social network accounts determined in this case, therefore, is based on the necessity to stop the continuity of the disclosure of criminal manifestations, which, in particular, materialize the criminal offenses found in this investigation and which continue to have its illicit effects within the national territory, including the use of subterfuge permitted by the social network Facebook”. Finally, he argued that “the issue of national jurisdiction over what is posted and viewed abroad is not discussed, but the dissemination of criminal facts in the national territory, through news and commentary by accounts banned.”.
After this decision, Facebook informed the observance of the global blocking of the investigated accounts.
Fernando Pedro Meinero is Professor of Private International Law at the Universidade Federal do Pampa, RS – Brazil.
News
Cycle de conférences: La refonte du règlement Bruxelles I Bis
Starting 30 November 2023, the French Cour de cassation is going to host a lecture series on the ongoing discussion of Brussels Ia reform under the direction of Marie-Elodie Ancel (Université Paris-Panthéon Assas) and Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne).
The programme of the first session – and the video stream! – can be found here.
18th Regional PIL Conference on 17 November 2023 at the University of Niš, Serbia
This post has been written by Sanja Marjanovic (Faculty of Law, University of Niš, Serbia) and Uglješa Grušic (UCL).
The 18th Regional Private International Law Conference will take place on 17 November 2023 at the Faculty of Law, University of Niš, Serbia, with the support of the Deutche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ). The theme of the Conference is Private International Law and International Organizations – Achievements and Challenges.
Navigating Global Jurisdiction: The Indian Courts’ Approach to Online IP Infringement
Written by Akanksha Oak, Jindal Global Law School, India
Introduction
The modern commerce landscape faces a significant challenge: the widespread infringement of intellectual property (“IP”) rights due to online interactions that enable instant global access. This issue is exacerbated by cross-border activities, necessitating the application of private international law (“PIL”). However, IP protection remains territorial, guided by the principle of “lex loci protectionis.” This results in complexities when it intersects with PIL. Online IP infringement further convolutes matters due to the internet’s omnipresence and accessibility, making the establishment of jurisdiction a complicated process for legal professionals. A pivotal development in this arena occurred in 2021 when the Delhi High Court rendered a judgement in the case of HK Media Limited and Anr v. Brainlink International Inc.,[1] illuminating India’s legal framework for determining jurisdiction in cases of online IP infringement within the context of cross-border disputes.