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The Contractual Function of a Choice of Court Agreement in Nigerian Jurisprudence (Part 2)
- Introduction
In my last blog post, I made mention of a Nigerian Court of Appeal decision that applied the principle of contract law exclusively to a foreign jurisdiction clause.[1] In that case, applying the principles of Nigerian contract law, the Nigerian Court of Appeal held that the alleged choice of court agreement in favour of Benin Republic was unenforceable because the terms were not clear and unambiguous in conferring jurisdiction on a foreign forum.[2]
The purpose of this blog post is to analyse a more recent Nigerian Court of Appeal decision where the court gave full contractual effect to the parties’ choice of court agreement by strictly enforcing a Dubai choice of court agreement.[3]
2. Facts
Damac Star Properties LLC v Profitel Limited (“Damac”)[4] was the fall out of an investment introduced to the 1st plaintiff/respondent by the 2nd respondent allegedly on behalf of the defendant/appellant wherein the 1st plaintiff/respondent paid a deposit of 350,000.00 US Dollars for 9 apartments in Dubai and being 20% of the total cost of the apartments. The contract between the 1st plaintiff/respondent and defendant/appellant contained an exclusive choice of court clause in favour of Dubai. There was a dispute between the parties as to some of the terms of the contract. This resulted in the defendant/appellant selling the apartments to another buyer. The 1st plaintiff/respondent requested for a refund of the deposit that was paid to the defendant/appellant, but its request was declined. As a result of this, the 1st plaintiff/respondent initiated a suit for summary judgment in High Court, Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria, against the defendant/appellant and the 2nd respondent, and got an order to serve the defendant/appellant through the 2nd respondent, its alleged agent in Nigeria. At this stage, the defendant/appellant did not appear and was unrepresented in proceedings at the High Court. The High Court proceeded to hear the suit and entered judgment against the defendant/appellant with an order to refund the sum of 350,000.00 US Dollars with 10% interest from date of judgment till the judgment sum was fully liquidated. The defendant/appellant applied to the High Court to set aside the judgment, but the court dismissed the application.
3. Decision
The defendant/appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal. The Court of Appeal held on the basis of the exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of Dubai – which it regarded as valid – the lower court should not have assumed jurisdiction.
4. Judicial statements in Support of Damac
As stated in my last blog post, there is now a trend among appellate Courts in Nigeria (Court of Appeal and Supreme Court) to give choice of court agreements a contractual function. Damac Star Properties LLC (supra) is one of the cases where the Court of Appeal simply gives a choice of court agreement a contractual function without considering whether the choice of court agreement ousted the jurisdiction of the Nigerian courts, or whether Nigeria was the forum conveneins for the action.[5] This point is important, as it appears that there is now some movement in Nigerian jurisprudence towards giving choice of court agreements a contractual function. Given that Nigeria is a common law jurisdiction, it is worth quoting statements from some Nigerian Supreme Court and Court of Appeal judges that have given a choice of court agreements a contractual function.
Nnamani JSC opined that: “I think that in the interest of international commercial relations courts have to be wary about departing from fora chosen by parties in their contract. There ought to be very compelling circumstances to justify such a departure.”[6]
Tobi JSC observed: “The bill of lading contains the contractual terms [foreign jurisdiction clause] between the parties and therefore binding on the parties. Parties are bound by the conditions and terms in a contract they freely enter into… The meaning to be placed on a contract is that which is the plain, clear and obvious result of the terms used… When construing documents in dispute between two parties, the proper course is to discover the intention or contemplation of the parties and not to import into the contract ideas not potent on the face of the document… Where there is a contract regulating any arrangement between the parties, the main duty of the court is to interpret that contract and to give effect to the wishes of the parties as expressed in the contract document… The question is not what the parties to the documents may have intended to do by entering into that document, but what is the meaning of the word used in the document… While a contract must be strictly construed in accordance with the well-known rules of construction, such strict construction cannot be aground for departing from the terms which had been agreed by both parties to the contract… It is the law that parties to an agreement retain the commercial freedom to determine their own terms. No other person. Not even the court, can determine the terms of contract between parties thereto. The duty of the court is to strictly interpret the terms of the agreement on its clear wordings… Finally, it is not the function of a court of law either to make agreements for the parties or to change their agreements as made.”[7]
In Conoil Plc v Vitol SA,[8] the Supreme Court Justices were unanimous on the contractual effect of a choice of court agreement. Nweze JSC in his leading judgment stated that: “In all, the truth remains that if parties, enter into an agreement, they are bound by its terms.”[9] Okoro JSC concurred that: “The law is quite’ settled that parties are bound by the contract they voluntarily enter into and cannot act outside the terms and conditions contained in the said contract. When parties enter into a contract, they should be careful about the terms they incorporate into the contract because the law will hold them bound by those terms. No party will be allowed to read into the contract terms on which there has been no agreement. Any of the parties who does so violates the terms of that contract…. Having agreed that any dispute arising from the contract should be settled at the English court, the appellant was bound by the terms of the contract.”[10] Eko JSC also concurred that: “Where parties, fully cognizant of their rights, voluntarily elect and nominate the forum for the resolution of any dispute arising from their contract, with international flavour as the instant, the courts always respect and defer to their mutual wishes and intention. The courts only need to be satisfied that, in their freedom of contract, the parties negotiated and agreed freely to subject their dispute to the laws and country of their choice.”[11]
Owoade JCA held that: “…it is pertinent to observe that as a general rule in the relationship between national law and international Agreements, freely negotiated private international agreement, unsullied by fraud, undue influence or overwhelming bargaining power would be given full effect. This means that, where such contract provides for a choice of forum, such clause would be upheld unless upholding it would be contrary to statute or public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought.”[12]
In Beaumont Resources Ltd v DWC Drilling Ltd,[13] the Court of Appeal Justices were unanimous on the contractual effect of a choice of court agreement. Otisi JCA held that: “…it is settled that, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation and illegality, parties to an agreement or contract are bound by the terms and conditions of the contract they signed… It is also well established that the Court cannot make contracts for the parties, rewrite the contract or go outside the express terms of the contract to enforce it…”[14] Sankey JCA concurred that: “The Court of law, on the other hand, must always respect the sanctity of the agreement of the parties – the role of the Court is to pronounce on the wishes of the parties and not to make a contract for them or to rewrite the one they have already made for themselves. The judicial attitude or disposition of the Court to terms of agreement freely entered into by parties to contract is that the Court will implement fully the intention of the contracting parties. This is anchored on the reasoning that where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the duty of the Court is to give effect to them and on no account should it re-write the contract for the parties. In the absence of fraud, duress or misrepresentation, the parties are bound to the contract they freely entered into.”[15]
The above judicial statements are replete with applying the principles of Nigerian contract law to the terms of a choice of court agreement. In essence, parties are bound by the clear and unambiguous terms of a choice of court agreement, which the Nigerian court will strictly enforce. On this score, Damac is on strong footing and unassailable.
5. Judicial decisions that might be against Damac
Some of the above stated judicial cases, though giving a choice of court agreement a contractual function also considered whether such agreements oust the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court, and whether Nigeria was the more appropriate forum to resolve such disputes despite the presence of a choice of court agreement. Damac is one of the few Court of Appeal cases that exclusively give a choice of court agreement a contractual function without a consideration of whether it is an ouster clause or the Nigerian Court is the forum conveniens.[16]
5.1 Ouster Clause
On the issue of ouster clause, in the early case of Ventujol v Compagnie Francaise De L ’ Afrique Occidentale,[17] Ames J held that in a contract of employment which was entered into in France to be performed in Nigeria, where the defendant also had agents (in Nigeria), the clause for submission of disputes to a Tribunal de Commerce de Marseilles (a French Court at that time) was an agreement to oust the jurisdiction of the court and of no effect. Similarly, in Allied Trading Company Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Line,[18] the plaintiff sought to recover damages for non-delivery of goods. The defendant entered an unconditional appearance, admitted the goods were lost, and denied liability on the grounds, inter alia, that the court had no jurisdiction since the parties had agreed that all disputes arising under or in connection with the bill of lading should be determined in the People’s Republic of China. It was held, inter alia, that this provision purported to oust the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court entirely and was therefore contrary to public policy. In Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Partenreedri MS Norwind[19] Oputa JSC opined that as a matter of public policy Nigerian Courts “should not be too eager to divest themselves of jurisdiction conferred on them by the Constitution and by other laws simply because parties in their private contracts chose a foreign forum … Courts guard rather jealously their jurisdiction and even where there is an ouster clause of that jurisdiction by Statute it should be by clear and unequivocal words. If that is so, as is indeed it is, how much less can parties by their private acts remove the jurisdiction properly and legally vested in our Courts? Our courts should be in charge of their own proceedings. When it is said that parties make their own contracts and that the courts will only give effect to their intention as expressed in and by the contract, that should generally be understood to mean and imply a contract which does not rob the Court of its jurisdiction in favour of another foreign forum.”[20]
If the above judicial postulations were given literal effect by the Court of Appeal in Damac the exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of Dubai would be regarded as null and void. In effect, treating a choice of court agreement as an ouster clause has the effect of making a choice of court agreement illegal, unlawful or at best unenforceable. Recently, Nweze JSC has interpreted the concept of ouster clause to the effect “that our courts will only interrogate contracts which are designed to rob Nigerian courts of their jurisdiction in favour of foreign fora or where, by their acts, they are minded to remove the jurisdiction, properly and legally, vested in Nigerian courts.”[21] I will interpret Nweze JSC’s statement to mean that where a Nigerian court as a matter of state interest is exclusively vested by statute, the constitution or common law with a subject matter, then no foreign court can have jurisdiction in such matters.[22] Under common law, a clear example of this is a matter relating to immovable property, where the Nigerian court has exclusive jurisdiction. So the implication of this is that the concept of ouster clause has very limited effect in Nigerian jurisprudence.
5.2 Brandon Tests
Damac did not consider the application of the Brandon tests in Nigerian jurisprudence. The Brandon test is a form of application of forum non conveniens to choice of court agreements.
Brandon J, in The Eleftheria,[23] delivered a brilliant decision on this subject. The decision provided comprehensive guidelines that the English court should take into account in deciding whether to give effect to a foreign jurisdiction clause. This is often referred to as “the Brandon test” in Nigerian jurisprudence. Nigerian courts have regularly referred to the Brandon test and utilised it with approval in decided cases.[24] The test is stated hereunder as follows (as it has been referred to and applied) in the Nigerian context: 1. Where plaintiffs sue in Nigeria in breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign court, and the defendants apply for a stay, the Nigerian court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within the jurisdiction is not bound to grant a stay but has a discretion whether to do so or not. 2. The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay unless strong cause for not doing it is shown. 3. The burden of proving such strong cause is on the plaintiffs. 4. In exercising its discretion the court should take account of all the circumstances of the particular case. 5. In particular, but without prejudice to (4), the following matters where they arise, may be properly regarded: (a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of trial as between the Nigerian and foreign courts. (b) Whether the law of the foreign court applies and, if so, whether it differs from Nigerian law in any material respects. (c) With what country either party is connected and how closely (d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages. (e) Whether the plaintiff s would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign country because they would (i) be deprived of security for that claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a time-bar not applicable in Nigeria; or (iv) for political, racial, religious, or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial (v) the grant of a stay would amount to permanently denying the plaintiff any redress.
The only reported cases where the plaintiff(s) have successfully relied on the Brandon test is where their claim is statute barred in the forum chosen by the parties.[25] Indeed, the burden is on the plaintiff to show strong cause why Nigerian proceedings should be stayed in breach of a choice of court agreement; if not Nigerian courts will give effect to the choice of court agreement.[26]
In Damac, the plaintiff did not demonstrate strong reasons why the choice of court agreement should not be enforced. So even if the Brandon test was considered by the Court of Appeal, the claimant will not have succeeded.
6. Some Reservations
There are three reservations I have about the Court of Appeal’s decision in Damac. First, the Court of Appeal should have ordered a stay of proceedings rather than holding that the lower court did not have jurisdiction. This is what is done in other common law countries. There is wisdom in this approach. If it turns out that the claimant cannot institute its claims in Dubai, the Nigerian forum should remain available to promptly institute its actions against the defendant in this case.
Second the Court of Appeal held that jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal. This statement only applies to substantive jurisdiction. Procedural jurisdiction cannot be raised on appeal for the first time. Thus, if it is established that the defendant/appellant did not promptly raise the issue of choice of court agreement in favour of Dubai at the High court, this might be a ground upon which the defendant/appellant can successfully challenge the decision of the Court of Appeal. This is because the issue of choice of court agreement is a procedural matter and a defendant that wants to raise the issue of choice of court agreement must do so promptly, or it will be deemed to have waived its right by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court.
Finally, the Court of Appeal made wrong reference to choice of venue rules[27] as applicable, assuming the choice of court agreement in this case is invalid. Choices of venue rules are only applicable to determine the judicial division to institute a matter for geographic convenience. For example, Lagos State has four judicial divisions: Lagos, Ikeja, Epe and Ikorodu. In the event there is a dispute as to which of the judicial divisions should hear a matter, the rules of court are to be relied on.[28] Choice of venue rules do not apply to determine private international law matters as in this case.
In particular, given that Damac was a contractual private international law matter where the defendant was neither resident or submitted to the jurisdiction of the court,[29] Order 8(1)(e)(ii) of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2018 may have been considered.[30] Order 8(1)(e)(ii) provides that the court may allow any originating or other processes to be served outside Nigeria where: the claim is brought against a defendant to enforce, rescind, dissolve, annul or otherwise affect a contract or to recover damages or other relief for or in respect of a contract made by or through an agent residing or carrying on business within jurisdiction on behalf of a principal residing or carrying on business outside jurisdiction.
7. Conclusion
Damac is a recent trend among Nigerian courts to give a choice of court agreement a contractual function. Indeed, Damac is one of the few cases where issues of ouster clause and forum non conveniens no longer feature in the judgment of the court. There are good reasons why a choice of court agreement should be strictly enforced contractually. It promotes certainty and enhances the efficacy of international commercial transactions. However, given contractual enforcement to a choice of court agreement should only be regarded as a general rule and not an absolute rule. Nigerian courts should retain its discretion not to enforce choice of court agreements especially in the interest of justice and the protection of economically weaker parties.
[1]Kashamu v UBN Plc (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1746) 90.
[2] Ibid 114-6.
[3] Damac Star Properties LLC v Profitel Limited (2020) LPELR-50699(CA).
[4] Ibid.
[5]For an extended analysis see generally CSA Okoli and RF Oppong, Private International Law in Nigeria (Hart, 2020) 107 – 125.
[6]Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Partenreedri MS Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520, 541.
[7] Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008 ) 16 NWLR 509, 542-3.
[8] ( 2018 ) 9 NWLR 463, 489.
[9] Ibid
[10]Ibid 500-1.
[11]Ibid 502.
[12] Captain Tony Nso v Seacor Marine ( Bahamas) Inc ( 2008 ) LPELR-8320 (CA) 12-3.
[13]( 2017 ) LPELR-42814.
[14] Ibid 30.
[15]Ibid 49-50.
[16] See also Megatech Engineering Limited v Sky Vision Global Networks Llc (2014) LPELR-22539 (CA); Kashamu v UBN Plc (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1746) 90; Unipetrol Nigeria Ltd v Prima Alfa Enterprises (Nig) Ltd ( 1986 ) 5 NWLR 532.
[17] (1949) 19 NLR 32.
[18] (1980) (1) ALR Comm 146.
[19](1987) 4 NWLR 520.
[20] Ibid 544-5.
[21] Conoil Plc v Vitol SA ( 2018 ) 9 NWLR 463, 489
[22]See generally CSA Okoli and RF Oppong, Private International Law in Nigeria (Hart, 2020) 117 – 124.
[23]The Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Ship or Vessel ‘ Elftheria ’ v ‘ The Elftheria ’ (Owners), ‘ Th e Elft heria ’ [1969] 1 Lloyd ’ s Rep 237.
[24] See generally GBN Line v Allied Trading Limited ( 1985 ) 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 74 ; Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520 ; Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation ( 2008 ) 16 NWLR 509 ; Captain Tony Nso v Seacor Marine ( Bahamas ) Inc ( 2008 ) LPELR-8320 (CA) ; Beaumont Resources Ltd v DWC Drilling Ltd ( 2017 ) LPELR-42814 (CA) .
[25] Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520.
[26] Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008) 16 NWLR 509.
[27] In applying the choice of venue rules of Abuja on matters of contract, it considered where the contract was made, place of performance and residence of the parties as prescribed in the rules of court.
[28] Order 4 of the High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 (formerly Order 2 of the High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules 2012).
[29]In Nigerian common law private international law, a court has jurisdiction as a matter of right where the defendant is either resident or submits to the jurisdiction of the court. See generally CSA Okoli and RF Oppong, Private International Law in Nigeria (Hart, 2020) 50 -86.
[30]This is on the assumption that there was no valid choice of court agreement.
Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co., Ltd, Hague Service Convention and Judgment Enforcement in China
Jie (Jeanne) Huang, University of Sydney Law School, Australia
Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd. v. Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII is a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of California on April 2, 2020. The certiorari to the Supreme Court of the US was denied on 5 October 2020. It is a controversial case concerning the interpretation of the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters of November 15, 1965 (the “Hague Service Convention”) for service of process in China.
- Facts:
Changzhou SinoType Technology Co. (SinoType) is based in China. Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII (Rockefeller) is an American investment firm. In February 2008, they signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which provided that:
“6. The parties shall provide notice in the English language to each other at the addresses set forth in the Agreement via Federal Express or similar courier, with copies via facsimile or email, and shall be deemed received 3 business days after deposit with the courier.
7. The Parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the Federal and State courts in California and consent to service of process in accord with the notice provisions above.
8. In the event of any disputes arising between the Parties to this Agreement, either Party may submit the dispute to the Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Service in Los Angeles for exclusive and final resolution pursuant to according to [sic] its streamlined procedures before a single arbitrator who shall have ten years judicial service at the appellate level, pursuant to California law, and who shall issue a written, reasoned award. The Parties shall share equally the cost of the arbitration. Disputes shall include failure of the Parties to come to Agreement as required by this Agreement in a timely fashion.”
Due to disputes between the parties, in February 2012, Rockefeller brought an arbitration against SinoType. SinoType was defaulted in the arbitration proceeding. According to the arbitrator, SinoType was served by email and Federal Express to the Chinese address listed for it in the MOU. In November 2013, the arbitrator found favorably for Rockefeller.
Instead of enforcing the award in China according to the New York Convention,[1] Rockefeller petitioned to confirm the award in State courts in California. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1290.4(a) provides that a petition to confirm an arbitral award “shall be served in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement for the service of such petition and notice.” Therefore, Rockefeller transmitted the summons and its petition to SinoType again through FedEx and email according to paragraph 7 of the MOU. SinoType did not appear and the award was confirmed in October 2014. SinoType then appeared specially and applied to set aside the judgment. It argued that the service of the Californian court proceeding did not comply with the Hague Service Convention; therefore, it had not been duly served and the judgment was void.
- Decision
The California Supreme Court rejected SinoType’s argument.
The Court discerned three principles for the application of the Hague Service Convention. First, the Convention applies only to “service of process in the technical sense” involving “a formal delivery of documents”. The Court distinguished “service” and “notice” by referring to the Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention, published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (‘Handbook’). The Court cited that
“the Convention cannot—and does not—determine which documents need to be served. It is a matter for the lex fori to decide if a document needs to be served and which document needs to be served. Thus, if the law of the forum states that a notice is to be somehow directed to one or several addressee(s), without requiring service, the Convention does not have to be applied.”[2]
Second, the law of the sending forum (i.e. the law of California) should be applied to determine whether “there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.”
Third, if formal service of process is required under the law of the sending forum, the Hague Convention must be complied for international transmission of service documents.
The court held that the parties have waived the formal service of process, so the Hague Service Convention was not applicable in this case.[3]
- Comments
The Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd has a number of interesting aspects and has been commented such as here, here and here.
First, the Hague Service Convention is widely considered as ‘non-mandatory’ but ‘exclusive’.[4] Addressing the non-mandatory nature of the Convention, the Handbook states that “the Convention can not—and does not—determine which documents need to be served. It is a matter for the lex fori to decide if a document needs to be served and which document needs to be served.”[5] However, this statement does not necessarily mean, when judicial documents are indeed transmitted from a member state to another to charge a defendant with notice of a pending lawsuit, a member state can opt out of the Convention by unilaterally excluding the transmission from the concept of service. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v Schlunk decided by the Supreme Court of the US and Segers and Rufa BV v. Mabanaft GmbH decided by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) are the two most important cases on the non-mandatory nature of the Convention. Both cases concentrate on which law should be applied to whether a document needed to be transmitted abroad for service.[6] However, Rockefeller is different because it is about which law should be applied to determine the concept of service when the transmission of judicial documents takes place in the soil of another member state. The Handbook provides that the basic criterion for the Convention to apply is “transmission abroad” and “place of service is determining factor”.[7] When judicial documents are physically transmitted in the soil of a member state, allowing another member state to unilaterally determine the concept of service in order to exclude the application of the Convention will inappropriately expand the non-mandatory character of the Convention. This will inevitably narrow the scope of the application of the Convention and damage the principle of reciprocity as the foundation of the Convention. The Hague Convention should be applied to Rockefeller because the summons and petitions were transmitted across border for service in China.
Second, as part of its accession to the Hague Convention, China expressly stated that it does not agree to service by mail. Indeed, the official PRC declarations and reservations to the Hague Convention make it clear that, with the limited exception of voluntary service on a foreign national living in China by his country’s own embassy or consulate, the only acceptable method of service on China is through the Chinese Central Authority. Therefore, although China has recognized monetary judgments issued in the US according to the principle of reciprocity, the judgment of Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd probably cannot be recognized and enforced in China.
The California Supreme Court decision has important implications. For Chinese parties who have assets outside of China, they should be more careful in drafting their contracts because Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd shows that a US court may consider their agreement on service by post is a waiver of China’s reservation under the Hague Service Convention. For US parties, if Chinese defendants only have assets in China for enforcement, Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd is not a good case to follow because the judgment probably cannot be enforced in China.
[1] China is a party to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (“New York Convention”).
[2] Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention (4th ed. 2016) par. 54, p. 23, fn. Omitted.
[3] The Court emphasized that their conclusions should be limited to Section 1290.4, subdivision (a): “Our conclusions as to California law are narrow. When parties agree to California arbitration, they consent to submit to the personal jurisdiction of California courts to enforce the agreement and any judgment under section 1293. When the agreement also specifies the manner in which the parties “shall be served,” consistent with section 1290.4, subdivision (a), that agreement supplants statutory service requirements and constitutes a waiver of formal service in favor of the agreed-upon method of notification. If an arbitration agreement fails to specify a method of service, the statutory service requirements of section 1290.4, subdivisions (b) or (c) would apply, and those statutory requirements would constitute formal service of process. We express no view with respect to service of process in other contexts.”
[4] Martin Davies et al., Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia 36 (10th ed. 2020).
[5] Paragraph 54 of the Handbook.
[6] Ibid., paragraphs 31-45, and 47.
[7] Ibid., paragraph 16.
The Contractual Function of a Choice of Court Agreement in Nigerian Jurisprudence
Many international commercial parties usually provide for a choice of court agreement as a term of their contract. This is done to enhance predictability, certainty and reduction of costs in the event a dispute arises between the parties. Since a choice of court agreement is a term of the contract, does the principle of contract law apply to determine a choice of court agreement? Though this is a matter of controversy in Nigerian law,[1] some recent appellate courts (Court of Appeal and Supreme Court) have given a foreign choice of court agreement a contractual function.[2]
Kashamu v UBN Plc[3] is a most recent Court of Appeal decision that analyses a foreign choice of court agreement exclusively from the principles of contract law. In this case, The Banque International Du Benin (“BIDB”), a limited financial institution in Benin Republic, granted medium term loan facilities, in different sums, to the Societe d’ Egrenage Industrial De Cotonu du Benin (“SEIC-B”), a private limited company registered in Benin Republic, for construction of its Cotton Ginning factory. The facilities were secured by, inter alia, SEIC-B’s goodwill, factory and land. In addition, the defendant/appellant, the alter ego of SEIC-B, personally guaranteed the facilities in a personal guarantee agreement. The loan agreement between BIDB and SEICB provided that the law and courts of Benin Republic should determine their dispute. However, the guarantee agreement between BIDB and the defendant/appellant did not explicitly provide for a choice of court agreement.
SEIC-B defaulted in the repayment of the loans despite repeated demands. As a result, BIDB appointed the plaintiff/respondent, a public limited financial institution in Nigeria, as its attorney to recover the outstanding facility. Further to the donated power of attorney, the plaintiff/respondent claimed recovery of the debt from the defendant/appellant in the Lagos High Court, Nigeria. The defendant/appellant counter-claimed and also challenged the jurisdiction of the Lagos High Court as being the wrong forum to institute the action. The Lagos High Court held that it had jurisdiction.
The defendant/appellant was dissatisfied with this decision and appealed to the Court of Appeal. The defendant/appellant argued that the proper forum for the action was the Courts in Benin Republic, given that the loan agreement between BIDB and SEICB provided that the law and courts of Benin Republic should determine their dispute. He argued that the choice of court agreement in the loan contract should also be incorporated into the guarantee agreement, so that it was the intention of the parties that the courts of Benin Republic should determine their dispute. He also argued that the execution and performance of the contract were to be in Benin Republic hence the agreement was in French Language.
The plaintiff/respondent argued that the loan agreement and guarantee agreement were distinct. It observed that the parties were bound by the terms in the guarantee agreement. It added that the parties in the guarantee agreement did not agree that the court in Benin Republic would have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from it. It asserted that the guarantee agreement was not expressly incorporated in the loan agreement. It opined that the defendant/appellant was not privy to the loan agreement and would not take a benefit from or enforce it for want of privity of contract. It claimed that the content of the guarantee agreement was clear and must be given its literal meaning.
The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal. In construing the loan and guarantee agreement to determine if the parties chose the courts of Benin Republic, it applied the principles of Nigerian contract law to the effect that courts are allowed to read a document holistically so as to reach and garner harmonious results of its content. In construing a document, the court is enjoined or mandated by law to apply the literal rule as a canon of interpretation, that is, to accord the words employed there in their ordinary grammatical meaning without any embellishment.[4] It then held that for the document of parties to a private contract to confer jurisdiction on a court, the words used must be clear and explicit and devoid of woolliness and ambiguity. In the instant case, the guarantee contract did not precisely confer jurisdiction on the Benin Republic court.[5] It further held that loan contract did not in any way allude to the guarantee to benefit from the doctrine of incorporation by reference. The doctrine of incorporation could not be invoked because of the want of connection between the two documents.[6]
Kashamu’s case demonstrates the recent attitude of some Nigerian appellate courts to treat choice of court agreements as a term of the contract which should be construed strictly according to the literal and ordinary words used in the contract. In effect in the absence of vitiating circumstances, the parties are bound by the terms of a choice of court agreement, and a Nigerian court will not add or subtract from the way the parties drafted the contract. The Court of Appeal’s approach in Kashamu reflected Nigeria’s law that interprets contractual documents strictly. Kashamu is a modern approach that applies the principles of contract law to choice of court agreements.
[1]For an extended analysis see generally CSA Okoli and RF Oppong, Private International Law in Nigeria (Hart, 2020) 107 – 125.
[2]Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008 ) 16 NWLR 509, 542 (Tobi JSC); Conoil Plc
v Vitol SA ( 2018 ) 9 NWLR 489 – 490 (Nweze JSC); 497 (Kekere-Ekun JSC); 500 (Okoro JSC); 501 – 2
(Eko JSC); Captain Tony Nso v Seacor Marine ( Bahamas) Inc ( 2008 ) LPELR-8320 (CA); Megatech Engineering Limited v Sky Vision Global Networks Llc (2014) LPELR-22539 (CA); Beaumont Resources Ltd v DWC Drilling Ltd ( 2017 ) LPELR-42814 (CA); Kashamu v UBN Plc (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1746) 90. See also Felshade International (Nig.) Ltd v Trafugura Beheer BV Amsterdam (2020) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1743) 107, 144.
[3]Kashamu (Ibid)
[4] Kashamu (Ibid) 114-5 (Ogbuinya JCA).
[5] Kashamu (Ibid) 115 (Ogbuinya JCA).
[6] Kashamu (Ibid) 116 (Ogbuinya JCA).
News
Transatlantic Dialogue in Private International Law: family and personal status, 12-13 October, Coimbra
The Institute of Legal Research of the University of Coimbra is organising an event in their series of Transatlantic Dialogues in Private International law. On 12 and 13 October the topic is Family and Personal Status on the Move.
The programme includes the main developments in family law and personal status, name, multiple parenthood, gender and polyamorous relationships. Besides, there is a session for young researchers, for whom the organisers opened a call for papers. A 300-word abstract should be submitted by mail to dulcel@fd.uc.pt and paulavit@fd.uc.pt. by 20 September.
See the Call for papers booklet
The organisers are Dulce Lopez, Guillermo Palao Moreno, Nicolas Nord and Paula Távora Vítor.
The event is hybrid, but registration is required.
Review of: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Ferrari, Rosenfeld, & Kotuby Jr.)
Franco Ferrari, Friedrich Rosenfeld, & Charles T. Kotuby Jr., Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Concise Guide to the New York Convention’s Uniform Regime
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2023
178 pp. Hardback : £72 eBook: £20
Out Now: The Brussels I-bis Regulation (Lazic & Mankowski)
Vesna Lazic and Peter Mankowski, The Brussels I-bis Regulation: Interpretation and Implementation, Edward Elgar 2023 (602 pp)
This impressive book on the Brussels I-bis Regulation has just been published. It results from a project headed by Vesna Lazic (Utrecht University/T.M.C. Asser Institute) and the late Peter Mankowski (formerly University of Hamburg), in co-operation with Lucia Pein (Hamburg University), entitled ‘Regulation Brussels Ia: a standard for free circulation of judgments and mutual trust in the European Union’ (JUDGTRUST) funded by the European Commission’s Justice Programme (JUST-AG-2017/JUST-JCOO-AG-2017). The research for this project consisted among others of a questionnaire and national reports from all the Member States on the application of the Regulation. This book provides an extensive overview of the CJEU rulings and analysis of case law, which will be of great importance for future reference and the ongoing evaluation and revision of the Brussels I-bis Regulation.