AMEDIP: Webinar by Professors Luciana B. Scotti and Candela Villegas on Rethinking Private International Law – 9 September 2021 at 5 pm (Mexico City time CDT) – in Spanish

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The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on 9 September 2021 at 5:00 pm (Mexico City time – CDT), 12:00 am (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is Rethinking Private International Law (a look through its sources and methods) and will be presented by Professors Luciana B. Scotti and Candela Villegas (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/83622646486?pwd=ZzZwbFJ2R1NLaHFxUGNNUnE0M2FHQT09

Meeting ID: 836 2264 6486

Password: BMAAMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

Course: European Union and Third Countries – Issues on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Foreign Judgments

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On 16 and 17 September 2021 an online course on European Union and Third Countries. Issues on jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments will take place as a part of the activities of the European Family Law Module funded by the EU ErasmusPlus programme led by Professor Elisabetta Bergamini of the University of Udine, Italy.

Excellent group of lecturers from different EU Member States will be discussing EU Regulations on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement when those issues arise in situations connected with third States. The course will offer an overview of different aspects to this issue, having regard to EU rules both on civil and commercial matters and on family and succession matters. The course will be either in Italian or in English. The details of the programme are available in Flyer_E2106_EU_and_Third_Countries.

Participation is free of charge, but registration is required by 13 September here.

Can a Foreign Company that is not registered in Nigeria maintain an action in Nigerian Courts?

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This note briefly analyses the recent decision of the Nigerian Supreme Court in BCE Consulting Engineers v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation[1]on the issue of a foreign company that is not registered in Nigeria having the capacity to sue in Nigeria.

Generally, Section 78 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020 requires that a foreign company must be registered in Nigeria before it can carry on business in Nigeria. This provision is a carryover of the former Section 54 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990, which contains a similar provision.

However, Section 84(b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020, makes express provisions for a foreign company to sue and be sued in its corporate name or that of its agent (despite the fact that it is not a registered or incorporated company in Nigeria for the purpose of carrying on business (under Section 78). The same provision was previously enacted in Section 60(b) of the Company and Allied Matters Act 1990. Section 60(b) of the Company and Allied Matters Act 1990 has been applied by Nigerian courts in some cases prior to the enactment of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020.

In Companhia Brasileira De Infraestrututira (INFAZ) v Companhia Brasileira De Entrepostos E Commercio (COBEC) (Nig) Ltd,[2] the plaintiff-appellant was a company allegedly registered in accordance with Brazilian law. The plaintiff-appellant was also a shareholder with some Nigerian persons, which constituted the defendant-respondent company. There was a change in the name of the plaintiff-appellant to Companhia Brasileira De Infraestutura Fazendaria, which was allegedly in accordance with Brazilian law. The plaintiff-appellant prayed for the winding-up of the defendant-respondent company. The application was dismissed by the trial court and the appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed as well.  One of the issues for consideration was whether the plaintiff-appellant was competent to sue and be sued in Nigeria.

The Court of Appeal held that by virtue of Section 60(b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990, a foreign company not registered in Nigeria can sue and be sued in Nigerian courts provided that said foreign company was duly incorporated according to the laws of a foreign state recognised in Nigeria. But, if there is a change in the name of that foreign company, evidence of compliance with the law of the land where it was incorporated must be given. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal held that there was no material evidence placed before the court to establish the change of name of the plaintiff-appellant company, and the resolution for change of name in Brazil that was provided before the court was deemed insufficient.[3]

In Edicomsa International Inc and Associates v CITEC International Estates Ltd,[4] the plaintiff-appellant was a foreign company incorporated in the United States of America. However, it was not registered in Nigeria. The plaintiff-appellant was engaged by the defendant-respondent to provide some services. Subsequently, there was a disagreement between the parties on payments due to the plaintiff-appellant, which led to the action before the court. The defendant-respondent, inter alia, challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court on the basis that the plaintiff-appellant was not registered in Nigeria. The trial court upheld the submission of the defendant-respondent. The plaintiff-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which unanimously allowed the appeal. The majority of the Court of Appeal rightly applied Section 60(b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 to the effect that the plaintiff-appellant, though not registered in Nigeria, could sue in Nigeria.[5]

In the recent case of BCE Consulting Engineers v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation[6] the Nigerian Supreme Court did not consider Section 60(b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (now Section 84(b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020), though its final decision was correct. In that case, the claimant/1st appellant claimed that it entered into a consultancy service agreement with the defendant/respondent which the latter unlawfully terminated. The plaintiff/1st appellant therefore filed an action via originating summons in the Federal High Court, Lagos State Judicial Division, seeking declaratory reliefs to that effect. It further claimed the total value of outstanding claims on invoices submitted by it, special and general damages. One of the issues canvassed at the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the contract entered into by the claimant-1st appellant a foreign company without incorporation in Nigeria was illegal and unenforceable? The Supreme Court Justices unanimously agreed with Peter-Odilli JSC who held as follows in her leading judgment:

“I agree with learned counsel for the appellants that section 54 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act [Cap C20 LFN 2004][7] does not apply to the facts of this case because the situation before the court in this case is one of a firm registered in Nigeria and entering into contract with the respondent but subsequently to the execution of the contract incorporating itself outside Nigeria as a limited liability company”.[8]

It is submitted that the Supreme Court should also have had regard to Article 60(b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (now Section 84(b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020) in holding that assuming the claimant-1st appellant was a foreign company that was not registered in Nigeria, it was capable of maintaining an action in Nigeria. This would have put to rest any question as to the capacity of a foreign company that is not registered in Nigeria to sue or be sued in Nigeria. It would also have made the Supreme Court’s decision exhaustive in this regard.

 

 

[1] (2021) All FWLR (Pt. 1083)  359.

[2](2004) 13 NWLR 376.

[3]Companhia Brasileira De Infraestrututira v Cobec (Nig) Ltd (2004) 13 NWLR 376, 391, 395 (Aderemi JCA, as he then was) (overturned on the point of proof of change of the name of the foreign company, but the decision that the foreign company could sue and be sued was affirmed by the Nigerian Supreme Court in INFAZ v COBEC (Nig) Ltd (2018) 12 NWLR 127). See also Watanmal (Singapore) Pte Ltd v. Liz Olofin and Company Plc (1997) LPELR-6224(CA) 13 (Musdapher JCA as he then was); NU Metro Retail (Nig) Ltd v. Tradex S.R.L & Anotherr (2017) LPELR-42329(CA) 41-2 (Garba JCA as he then was).

[4](2006) 4 NWLR 114.

[5]Edicomsa International Inc and Associates v CITEC International Estates Ltd (2006) 4 NWLR 114, 125-26 (Rhodes-Vivour JCA, as he then was), 130 (Omage JCA).  See also B.C.N.N. Ltd. v. Backbone Tech. Net. Inc.  (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1480) 511. Cf.  AG Butler (Nig) (Ltd) v The Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd (2020) LPELR -51141 (CA). Cf. Hung & Ors v. EC Investment Co. (Nig) Ltd (2016) LPELR -42125 (CA) (Tur JCA dissenting).

[6] (2021) All FWLR (Pt. 1083)  359

[7] “Subject to sections 56 to 59 of this Act, every foreign company which before or after the commencement of this Act was incorporated outside Nigeria, and having the intention of carrying on business in Nigeria, shall take all steps necessary to obtain incorporation as a separate entity in Nigeria for that purpose, but until so incorporated, the foreign company shall not carry on business in Nigeria or exercise any of the powers of a registered company and shall not have a place of business or an address for service of documents or processes in Nigeria for any purpose other than receipt of notices and other documents, as matters preliminary to incorporation under this Act.” This provision is now contained in Section 78 of the the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020.

 

[8] ibid, 396.

Out now: Programme for the Summer Course 2022 of the Hague Academy of International Law

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The Hague Academy of International Law has recently published its programmes for the Summer Courses in 2022. The part on public international law will take place from 11 to 29 July 2022, the part on private international law will follow from 1 to 19 August 2022.

This latter part will start with an inaugural lecture by Dominique Hascher, the general course will be given by Louis d’Avout, and special courses will be offered by Marco Frigessi di Rattalma, João Bosco Lee, Ulla Liukkunen, Kermit Roosevelt III, Tiong Min Yeo, and Arnaud Nuyts – a truly impressive global gathering of expertise – highly recommended! Opening of the registration period: November 1st, 2021. Further information can be found here.

A special feature of the 2022 programme will be a conference in memoriam of Emmanuel Gaillard who passed away last year, far too early (for a memorial note on CoL by Ralf Michaels see here). Contributors will be Yas Banifatemi, Diego P. Fernández Arroyo, Dominique Hascher, Horatia Muir Watt, Luca Radicati di Brozolo.

 

 

 

 

More and more participants decide to take part in both parts, which of course is the best of all choices, as the two branches of international law have much in common and the lines more and more blur (again). In addition, most of the global challenges of our time can only be dealt with adequately if tackled in an integrated approach. Therefore, it is with good reason that, following to the two parts on public and private international law courses, the Academy’s Centre for Studies and Research again addresses such a cross-over topic in its programme from 22 August to 9 September 2022: Climate Change and the Testing of International Law. For more information see here.

Out now: Holger Jacobs, Das Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen vom 2. Juli 2019, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2021, pp. 432

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An important publication on the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention has come out: Holger Jacob’s PhD thesis, “Das Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen vom 2. Juli 2019“, supervised by our esteemed colleague Peter Huber, University of Mainz, Germany. The book is certainly the most comprehensive treatise on the subject matter in German language at this moment, and it is highly recommended: thorough analysis and precision invite anyone interested in the topic to study concepts and details of the new core element of the “Hague system” for judicial cooperation in civil matters.

New Principles of Sovereign Immunity from Enforcement in India: The Good, The Bad, And The Uncertain (Part I)

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This post was written by Harshal Morwale, an India-qualified international arbitration lawyer working as an associate with a premier Indian law firm in New Delhi; LLM from the MIDS Geneva Program (2019-2020); alumnus of the Hague Academy of International Law. 

Sovereign immunity from enforcement would undoubtedly be a topic of interest to all the commercial parties contracting with state or state entities. After all, an award is only worth something when you can enforce it. The topic received considerable attention in India recently, when the Delhi High Court (“DHC”) ruled on the question of immunity from enforcement in case of commercial transactions (KLA Const Tech v. Afghanistan Embassy). This ruling is noteworthy because India does not have a consolidated sovereign immunity law, and this ruling is one of the first attempts to examine immunity from enforcement.

This post is part I of the two-part blog post. This part examines the decision of the DHC and identifies issues emanating from it. The post also delves into the principles of international law of state immunity and deals with the relevance of diplomatic immunity in the current context. The second part (forthcoming) will explore the issue of consent to the arbitration being construed as a waiver of immunity from enforcement and deal with the problem of whether the state’s property can be attached to satisfy the commercial arbitral award against a diplomatic mission.

DHC: No Sovereign Immunity From Enforcement In Case Of Commercial Transactions

In the case of KLA Const Tech v. Afghanistan Embassy, KLA Const Technologies (“claimant”) and the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in India (“respondent”) entered into a contract containing an arbitration clause for rehabilitation of the Afghanistan Embassy. During the course of the execution of works, a dispute arose between the parties. The claimant initiated the arbitration. An ex parte award was passed in favor of the claimant by the Sole Arbitrator. Since the respondent did not challenge the award, the claimant seeks its enforcement in India in line with Section 36(1) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996, whereby enforcement cannot be sought until the deadline to challenge the award has passed. In the enforcement proceedings, the DHC inter alia focused on immunity from enforcement of the arbitral award arising out of a commercial transaction.

The claimant argued that the respondent is not entitled to state immunity because, in its opinion, entering into an arbitration agreement constitutes “waiver of Sovereign Immunity.” Further, relying on Articles 10 and 19 of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (“UNCJIS”), the claimant argued that the states cannot claim immunity in case of commercial transactions and the UNCJIS expressly restricts a Foreign State from invoking sovereign immunity against post-judgment measures, such as attachment against the property of the State in case of international commercial arbitration.

After analyzing the claimant’s arguments and relevant case laws, the DHC reached the following decision:

  1. In a contract arising out of a commercial transaction, a foreign state cannot seek sovereign immunity to stall the enforcement of an arbitral award rendered against it.
  2. No separate consent for enforcement is necessary, and consent to arbitrate is sufficient to wave the immunity. The DHC opined that this ruling is in “consonance with the growing International Law principle of restrictive immunity.”

The DHC ordered the respondent to declare inter alia all its assets, bank accounts in India, etc., by a stipulated date. Since the respondent did not appear and did not make any declaration by that date, the DHC has granted time to the claimant to trace the attachable properties of the respondent.

The decision has been well received in the Indian legal community and has been lauded as a pro-arbitration decision as it promotes prompt enforcement of arbitral awards in India, regardless of the identity of the award-debtor. The decision is also one of the first attempts to define immunity from ‘enforcement’ in India. The existing law of sovereign immunity in India is limited to section 86 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code, which requires the permission of the Central Government in order to subject the sovereign state to civil proceedings in India. Therefore, the DHC’s decision is critical in the development of sovereign immunity jurisprudence in India.

Difference Between Jurisdictional Immunity And Enforcement Immunity Under The UNCJIS

It is worth noting that the DHC did not explicitly address the claimant’s argument regarding the UNCJIS. Regardless, it is submitted that the claimant’s argument relying on articles 10 and 19 of the UNCJIS is flimsy. This is particularly because the UNCJIS recognizes two different immunities – jurisdiction immunity and enforcement immunity. Article 10 of the UNCJIS, which provides for waiver of immunity in case of commercial transactions, is limited to immunity from jurisdiction and not from enforcement. Further, Article 20 of the UNCJIS clearly states that the state’s consent to be subjected to jurisdiction shall not imply consent to enforcement. As argued by the late Professor James Crawford, “waiver of immunity from jurisdiction does not per se entail waiver of immunity from execution.”

Notwithstanding the above, even the DHC itself refrained from appreciating the distinction between immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from enforcement. The distinction is critical not only under international law but also under domestic statutes like the English Sovereign Immunity Act (“UKSIA”). It is submitted that Indian jurisprudence, which lacks guidance on this issue, could have benefitted from a more intricate analysis featuring the rationale of different immunities, the standard of waivers, as well as the relevance of Article 20 of UNCJIS.

Curious Framing Of The Question By The DHC

In the current case, the DHC framed the question of sovereign immunity from enforcement as follows: Whether a Foreign State can claim Sovereign Immunity against enforcement of arbitral award arising out of a commercial transaction? On the face of it, the DHC decided a broad point that the award is enforceable as long as the underlying transaction is commercial. The real struggle for the claimants would be to determine and define which property would be immune from enforcement and which wouldn’t.

The framing of the issue is interesting because the sovereign state immunity from enforcement has generally been perceived as a material issue rather than a personal issue. In other words, the question of state immunity from enforcement has been framed as ‘what subject matter can be attached’ and not ‘whether a particular debtor can claim it in a sovereign capacity’. In one of the case laws analyzed by the DHC (Birch Shipping Corp. v. The Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania), the defendant had argued that under the terms of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, its “property” was “immune from the attachment.” Further, in the operative part of the judgment, the US District Court stated, “the property at issue here is not immune from attachment.” Unlike the DHC’s approach, the question of immunity from enforcement in the Birch Shipping case was argued and ruled upon as a material issue rather than a personal one.

While the decision of the DHC could have a far-reaching impact, there is a degree of uncertainty around the decision. The DHC ruled that as long as the transaction subject to arbitration is commercial, the award is enforceable. There remains uncertainty on whether this ruling means that all properties of the sovereign state can be attached when the transaction is commercial. Would this also mean diplomatic property could be attached? The DHC still has the opportunity to clarify this as the specific properties of the respondent for the attachment are yet to be determined, and the claimant has been granted time to identify the attachable properties.

Diplomatic Immunity or Sovereign Immunity: Which One Would Apply? 

While state immunity and diplomatic immunity both provide protection against proceedings and enforcements in the foreign court or forum, the subjects of both immunities are different. While sovereign immunity aims to protect the sovereign states and their instrumentalities, diplomatic immunity specifically covers the diplomatic missions of the foreign states. The law and state practice on sovereign immunity are not uniform. On the other hand, the law of diplomatic immunity has been codified by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”). Unlike the UNCJIS, the VCDR is in force and has been adopted by over 190 states, including India and Afghanistan.

Since the party to the contract, the arbitration, and the enforcement proceedings in the current case is an embassy, which is independently protected by the diplomatic immunity, the decision of the DHC could have featured analysis on the diplomatic immunity in addition to the state immunity. Like the UNCJIS, the VCDR recognizes the distinction between jurisdictional and enforcement immunities. Under Article 32(4) of the VCDR, the waiver from jurisdictional immunity does not imply consent to enforcement, for which a separate waiver shall be necessary.

Additionally, the DHC had an opportunity to objectively determine whether the act was sovereign or diplomatic. In Re P (Diplomatic Immunity: Jurisdiction), the English Court undertook an objective characterization of the entity’s actions to determine whether they were sovereign or diplomatic. The characterization is critical because it determines the kind of immunity the respondent is subject to.

In the current case, the contract for works entered into by the embassy appears to be an act undertaken in a diplomatic capacity. Hence, arguably, the primary analysis of the DHC should have revolved around diplomatic immunity. It is not to argue that the conclusion of the DHC would have been different if the focus was on diplomatic immunity. However, the analysis of diplomatic immunity, either independently or together with the sovereign immunity, would have substantially bolstered the significance of the decision considering that the interplay between sovereign and diplomatic immunities under Indian law deserves more clarity.

One might argue that perhaps the DHC did not deal with diplomatic immunity because it was raised neither by the claimant nor by the non-participating respondent. This raises the question – whether the courts must raise the issue of immunity proprio motu? The position of law on this is not entirely clear. While section 1(2) of the UKSIA prescribes a duty of the Court to raise the question of immunity proprio motu, the ICJ specifically rejected this approach in the Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France) (para 196). Both of these approaches, however, relate to sovereign immunity, and there lacks clarity on the issue in the context of diplomatic immunity.

Conclusion

As noted above, despite being one of the first Indian decisions to deal with state immunity from an international law perspective, the decision leaves several questions open, such as the determination of attachable properties and the relevance of diplomatic immunity in the current context. It remains to be seen what approach the DHC takes to resolve some of these issues in the upcoming hearings.

The next part of the post explores the issue of consent to the arbitration being construed as a waiver of immunity from enforcement. The next part also deals with the problem – whether the state’s property can be attached to satisfy the commercial arbitral award against a diplomatic mission.

 

JLMI Call for papers: The interplay of physical and digital trade law

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The Journal of Law, Market & Innovation (JLMI) is a new initiative of the Turin Observatory on Economic Law and Innovation. The JLMI is an open access journal of the University of Turin that aims at fostering research with respect to the regulatory challenges posed by markets and innovation in our times. The JLMI relies on an interdisciplinary methodology. More information at https://www.ojs.unito.it/index.php/JLMI.

In its yearly Special Issue, which is a joint initiative with the Master in International Trade Law and to which this call for papers is addressed, it focuses on international and comparative approaches to trade law with the goal of offering to the readers challenging ideas, critical insights and new perspectives.

This Call concerns the first Special Issue to be published in Spring 2022 on The interplay of physical and digital trade law. The Call aims at gathering contributions that question to what extent technology and digital trust are changing global trade law, and discuss the implications, for the regulation of global trade, of the interplay of physical trade and the digitalization of the economy.

The editors of the issue are University of Turin’s dr Lorenza Mola, Professor of International Law and 2020-2021 scientific director of the Master, dr Cristina Poncibò, Professor of Comparative Private Law and member of the Scientific Committee of the Master, and dr Elena D’Alessandro, Professor of Civil Procedure and member of the Scientific Committee of the Master.

The following topics and perspectives may be taken into considerations, among others: Trade, Digital Trust and Human Trust; Contract Digitalization and B2B platforms; Trade, DLTs, Blockchain; E-customs; Digital Justice and Trade; Perspectives from China and the Global South. The editors invite submissions addressing the legal aspects underpinning questions such as: Are the main drivers of physical trade challenged?; Trade and essential infrastructures: what lessons learned from the Suez Channel case?; Does digitalization really change trade?; Is global trade really going digital?; How to adapt dispute settlement mechanisms to digital trade? How is the Belt and Road Initiative shaping the physical/digital interplay in global trade? What is the impact of COVID-19 on such interplay?

Authors are invited to address questions and issues arising from the specific area of law relating to their topic. All types of legal approaches will be considered for publication. However, please note that any analysis solely limited to a national legal system will fall outside the scope of the Journal. An international, supranational or transnational legal dimension is imperative. The Board of Editors will select articles based on quality of research and writing, diversity, and relevance of topic. The contributions from the Alumni of the Master programme are particularly welcomed. The novelty of the academic contribution is also an essential requirement.

Prospective articles should be submitted in the form of abstract (around 800 words) or draft articles (see below) to submissions.jlmi@iuse.it within August 31, 2021. Accepted authors will be notified within September 10, 2021. Final articles shall be delivered within December 10, 2021 and should conform to the journal style guide that is based on OSCOLA. Typically, the JLMI accepts contributions within the range of 10.000 to 15.000 words, including footnotes, but both shorter and longer articles will be considered. Pre-selected articles will be subject to single-blind peer review. For further information, or for consultation on a potential submission, you can contact us by email at editors.jlmi@iuse.it.

Conference and open access book: The Private Side of Transforming our World – UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030 and the Role of Private International Law – 9 to 11 September 2021

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In 2015, the United Nations formulated 17 ambitious goals towards transforming our world – the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 2030). Their relation to public international law has been studied, but private law has received less attention in this context and private international law none at all. Now renowned and upcoming scholars from multiple countries and disciplines analyze, for each of the 17 SDGs, what role private international law actually plays towards these goals and how private international law could, or should, be reformed to help achieve them.
The resulting findings will be published in an open access volume with Intersentia  and presented in the framework of a Conference to be held on 9 to 11 September 2021 at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg.

The Conference will take place in a hybrid format, i.e. both at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg and virtually via Zoom. English-Spanish and Spanish-English simultaneous translation for the Conference will be provided by professional interpreters.

The Conference Program and further information can be found via this LINK.

Please register for participation at the Conference via Zoom HERE.

 

 

 

 

 

HCCH Monthly Update: August 2021

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Conventions & Instruments

On 23 July 2021, New Zealand deposited its instrument of ratification of the HCCH 2007 Child Support Convention. With the ratification of New Zealand, 42 states and the European Union are bound by the Child Support Convention. It will enter into force for New Zealand on 1 November 2021. More information is available here.

On 1 August 2021, the HCCH 1996 Child Protection Convention entered into force for Costa Rica. It currently has 53 Contracting Parties. More information is available here.

Meetings & Events

As announced on 3 August 2021, registration for the 12th International Forum on the electronic Apostille Programme (e-APP) is now open to the general public. The event will be hosted online on 4 October 2021. The deadline for registration is Friday, 10 September 2021, 5.00 p.m. CEST. More information is available here.

On 9 August 2021, the HCCH and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States co-hosted a webinar on international child abduction.

On 19 August 2021, the HCCH, the Council of ASEAN Chief Justices and the Malaysian Judiciary co-hosted a virtual HCCH-ASEAN Masterclass. More information is available here.

Other

Vacancy: Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships from January to June 2022. The deadline for the submission of applications is 24 September 2021 (18:00 CEST). More information is available here.

Reminder: Submissions for the HCCH|Approach Essay Competition and the HCCH|Approach Media and Design Competition are due on 1 October 2021. The competitions are organised as part of the Advancing and Promoting the Protection of All Children (Approach) Initiative, launched in celebration of the 25th anniversary of the HCCH 1996 Child Protection Convention. More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP) No 2/2021: Abstracts

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 The second issue of 2021 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) has been released. It features:

Christian Kohler, Honorary Professor at the University of Saarland, Limiting European Integration through Constitutional Law? Recent Decisions of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and their Impact on Private International Law (in English)

  • On May 5, 2020 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfG) in Germany ruled that the Public Sector Purchase Programme (“PSPP”) of the European Central Bank (ECB) as well as the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in case C-493/17 were “ultra vires” because they exceeded the competences conferred on these institutions. Both the PSPP and the CJEU’s judgments were thus without effect in Germany. In order to assess the judgment of the BVerfG and to measure the ensuing conflict, a look at its case-law in matters of European integration is indispensable. In seminal judgments relating to the ratification of the Maastricht treaty (1993) and the treaty of Lisbon (2009), the Constitutional Court had previously explained its approach toward the European Union as being a confederation sui generis of sovereign states governed by the principle of conferral, and that any action of the German institutions relating to the European integration has to respect a twofold limitation: it has to remain within the limits of the competences conferred by the treaties, and it has to safeguard Germany’s “constitutional identity” as enshrined in the Basic Law. Any act taken in violation of these limits may be declared void by the Constitutional Court. The control exercised by the BVerfG has been further extended by a ruling of February 13, 2020: the Court held that the German law authorizing the ratification of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPC) was void as it had not been adopted by a majority of two thirds by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat as required by the Basic Law. This implies that from now on the Court will control not only the material but also the formal validity of an act relating to the European integration. Both the “Lisbon” judgment and the UPC ruling have implications for European private international law. Whereas these implications are well defined in the “Lisbon” judgment they are less visible but nevertheless present in the ruling of February 13, 2020.

Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, Professor at the University of Macerata, Il rinvio della legge italiana di riforma del diritto internazionale privato alle convenzioni internazionali, tra adeguamento al mutato contesto normativo e strumentalita` alla tutela dei valori ispiratori (The Reference to International Conventions Made in the Law Reforming the Italian System of Private International Law: Between Adaptation to the Changed Normative Context and Instrumentality to the Protection of the Underlying Principles)

  • A salient feature of the law providing for the reform of the Italian system of private international law (Law No. 218 of 31 May 1995) consists of the references it embodies to some private international law conventions for the purposes of relying on their rules in order to regulate issues not falling within their scope of application, consistently with the regime contained in the relevant convention. This article discusses the fate of those references, as a consequence of the fact that most of the conventions referred to have in the meantime been replaced by EU regulations, when not by subsequent conventions. While just one of the said references, that embodied under Article 45 of the said law, concerning the law applicable to maintenance obligations, has been updated so far by the Italian legislature, the author proposes that, as a matter of consistent interpretation, the other references made by the same law should be held as directed to the new instruments having replaced the conventions existing at the time the law was passed. As argued in the final part of the article, the proposed solution is also conducive to a more effective achievement of the objectives pursued already by the conventions initially referred to.

Zeno Crespi Reghizzi, Professor at the University of Milan, La “presa in considerazione” di norme straniere di applicazione necessaria nel regolamento Roma I (‘Considering’ Foreign Overriding Mandatory Provisions under the Rome I Regulation)

  • In its Nikiforidis judgment of 2016, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the limits set by Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation to the effects of foreign rules of mandatory application concern only their ‘application’ in the international private law sense, not also their ‘taking into account’ by substantive rules of the lex contractus. The present article discusses the reasons for this interpretative solution and highlights the need to specify its scope in order to preserve the Regulation’s systemic coherence.

The following comment is also featured:

Rebekka Monico, Research fellow at the University of Insubria, La disciplina europea sul Geo-blocking e il diritto internazionale privato e processuale (The EU Geo-Blocking Regulation and Private International and Procedural Law)

  • This article analyses the relationship between Regulation (EU) No 2018/302 on the prohibition of geo-blocking practices which are not justified on objective grounds and the rules of private international law contained in the Brussels I-bis, the Rome I and the Rome II Regulations. In this respect, Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2018/302 contains, in addition to a safeguard clause of the Union law concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters, the clarification that the mere fact that the trader complies with the prohibitions imposed by the Geo-blocking Regulation does not imply that he intentionally directs his activity towards the Member State of the consumer pursuant to Articles 17(1)(c) and 6(1)(b) of the Brussels I-bis and the Rome I Regulations, respectively. Although this clarification is consistent with the Pammer, Mühlleitner, Emrek and Hobohm judgments, the Author endorses a new interpretation of the directed-activity criterion by the Court of Justice of the European Union which would protect consumers and, at the same time, provide greater legal certainty for traders.

In addition to the foregoing, this issue features the following book review by Cristina M. Mariottini, Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg: Julia HÖRNLE, Internet Jurisdiction: Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, New York, 2021, pp. vii-485.