Tag Archive for: Greece

Ficticious service still active outside Europe

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With the EU Service Regulation being active for more than 20 years, and the Hague Service Convention being ratified by almost all European countries, there is little space for practicing fictitious service of proceedings in Europe. However, for service to third countries outside Europe, and especially to continents, such as Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, remise au parquet is still the ground rule for many European countries. A recent judgment issued by the Piraeus Court of Appeal provides a clear picture of how the mechanism operates in Greece [Piraeus Court of Appeal, judgment nr. 142/2024, available here].

I. THE FACTS:

The parties are two companies active in the international maritime sector. The claimant, a Greek company with its seat in Piraeus, filed an action before the Piraeus Court of First Instance, seeking the award of the total sum of $29,163,200. The defendant, an Iranian company with its seat in Tehran, did not appear in the hearing. The action was upheld as being well founded in substance by the Piraeus Court of 1st Instance. The defendant was ordered to pay the equivalent of $28. 663,200.

Both the action and the first instance judgment were duly served on the Piraeus District Attorney, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 134 §§ 1 and 2, and 136 § 1 Code of Greek Civil Procedure (henceforth CCP), due to the defendant’s domicile in a non-member state of the European Union, thus excluding the application of EU law, and because Iran has not acceded to the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965, which requires actual service of documents by one of the methods provided for therein. Finally, the court underlined the absence of a bilateral agreement between Iran and Greece, which would possibly regulate the issues of service in a different manner.

The defendant lodged an appeal. The appeal was however untimely filed, because it was brought after the expiry of the sixty [60] days period following service of the judgment, provided for in Article 518 § 1 CCP, which began with the fictitious service of the judgment on the Public Prosecutor, to be sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in order to be transmitted through diplomatic channels to the addressee, as provided for by Article 134 §§ 1 and 3 CCP.

The Iranian company acknowledged that the time-limit had expired without effect. For this reason, it filed a request for restitutio in integrum in accordance with Article 152 CCP, requesting that the appeal be considered as timely lodged, claiming that the delay in lodging the appeal was due to force majeure. In particular, it is asserted that the Iranian company did not receive notification of both the claim, which resulted in a default judgment without its participation in the trial at first instance, and of the judgment given in default of appearance, due to the service method selected, i.e., ficticious service to the Public Prosecutor, which sets the time-limit for the appeal. Secondly, the appellant asserts that that it acted within the time-limit laid down in Article 153 CCP, that is to say, immediately after real service.

The appellant invokes the delay caused by the Piraeus Prosecutor’s Office and the diplomatic services of the Country, which did not take care to complete service within two months. In other words, it relies on the omission of third parties, which it could not prevent, and which prevented the appellant from being aware of the fictitious service and the commencement of the time-limit for lodging an appeal in Greece.

II.THE JUDGMENT OF THE PIRAEUS COURT OF APPEAL

The appellate court ruled as follows: The lawsuit was forwarded by the Piraeus Prosecutor’s Office to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in order to be served at the defendant’s headquarters in Tehran. The diplomatic authorities of Greece did indeed send and their counterparts in Iran did receive and forward the statement of claim to its addressee. However, the Iranian company’s agents, namely the secretariat and the clerk in the Legal Affairs Department, refused to receive it. This is evident from the “Letter of confirmation for declaration of received documents from foreign countries” issued by the International Affairs Department of the Judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This document states that the defendant, through its aforementioned nominees, refused to receive the disputed “document”.

The reason for that refusal is not specified. However, from the document of the Consular Office of the Embassy of Greece in Iran, and the attached document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it can be inferred that the refusal was made because the document to be served was not accompanied by an official translation into Farsi. Iranian law does indeed appear to permit refusal to accept service of a foreigner’s statement of claim against an Iranian national on that ground (a legal opinion of Mr., a lawyer at the Central Iranian Bar Association was submitted to the CoA by the appellant). Still, domestic Greek law does not make the validity of service of an action dependent on the attachment of a translated copy of the action in the language of the State of destination. Therefore, service of the action, if it had been completed, would always be valid under Greek law.

In addition, the mere attempt to serve the action made it clear to the defendant in any event, irrespective of whether it had been aware of its content from the outset, that a claim has being brought against it in a Greek court and triggered its obligation under Article 116 CCP to monitor the progress of the proceedings from that time onwards, even if it chose not to participate in the proceedings, which the defendant was able to do, by behaving in a prudent and diligent manner, and by following the fate of the action brought in Greece.

To that end, it was sufficient simply to appoint a lawyer in Greece, who would arrange for the translation of the documents, and would attend the ongoing proceedings at first instance. Such an action was made by the appellant only after actual service of the judgment.

Similarly, the applicant does not explain the reason why it did not act by appointing a lawyer in Greece, after the refusal to receive the summons of the claimant, even though it was also sent to it accompanied by a translation of the summons in English. That omission gives the impression that the refusal to receive the summons was made in order to prolong the proceedings, and to prepare for the lodging of the appeal and the application for restitutio in integrum, which on the whole is considered to be abusive.

Consequently, the application for restitutio in integrum was dismissed as unfounded and the appeal, which was nevertheless brought out of time, was dismissed as inadmissible.

III. COMMENT

The judgment of the Piraeus CoA is interesting because it goes a step further in the examination of fictitious service: It did not simply reiterate the wording of the domestic rules; moreover, it scrutinized the facts, and avoided a stringent application of Article 134 CCP. Due process and right to be heard were included in the court’s analysis. Finally, the court dismissed the legal remedies of the appellant due to its reluctance to demonstrate proactivity, and its intention to bring the Greek proceedings to a stalemate.

New York Convention applies to the recognition and enforcement of Basketball Arbitral Tribunal awards

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It has been widely supported in legal scholarship that arbitral awards issued by the Basketball Arbitral Tribunal may be recognized and declared enforceable by virtue of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. A recent judgment rendered by the Thessaloniki Court of first Instance examined a pertinent application, and granted recognition and enforcement of the BAT award in Greece.

 

THE PROCEEDINGS IN GENEVA

The Greek Player V.K. and his Agency, S. Enterprise Ltd., filed a claim against the Greek Club A. B.C. 2003 for outstanding salaries, bonuses, agent fees, declaratory relief and interest. The Claimant submitted that the Respondent breached the contractual relationship by failing to pay several salary instalments as well as the agent fees. The Respondent did not participate in the proceedings. The claim was partially upheld by the Arbitrator. The Tribunal ordered the Club to pay a series of amounts and costs to the applicants.

THE PROCEEDINGS IN THESSALONIKI

Less than a month later, the award creditors filed an application for the recognition and enforcement of the BAT award before the Thessaloniki 1st Instance Court. For this purpose, they submitted a true copy of the award and the arbitration agreement, both duly translated in Greek.

The Club countered with a number of defences:

  • It was not summoned to the BAT proceedings, which resulted in its default of appearance.
  • After the application in Greece, the parties signed a private agreement, following which the player agreed to downsize his claim to the sum of 85.000 Euros, and both applicants agreed to be paid by instalments.
  • The Club had already paid the amount of 51.000 Euros, which should not be declared enforceable.
  • By seeking recognition of the BAT award before the court, the applicants violated the private agreement, where it was agreed that both parties would refrain from any legal action during its implementation.
  • It was also agreed that the player would apply for discontinuance, and in the event of payment default, the applicants were obliged to send the Club a notice in written, which however was omitted.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE THESSALONIKI COURT

  • The court saw no violation of the audience rights of the Club: the latter was duly and timely served with the application and the summons to appear in the proceedings, as evidenced by the documents submitted to the court.
  • By signing the private agreement, the court saw a tacit acceptance of the BAT award by the Club.
  • The court dismissed the Club’s request to deny the enforceability of the amount already paid. It underlined that this would mean a revision on the merits. Apart from the above, the court continued, the Club is not deprived of its right to request partial stay of execution in the enforcement stage.
  • For the same grounds the court refrained from the examination of the particulars of the agreement, considering that the allegations of the Club against the applicants are out of the scope of the exequatur proceedings.
  • With respect to the grounds of refusal, the court dismissed the public policy defence raised by the Club in regards to the costs of the arbitration proceedings: The total amount of 12.500 Euros is not excessive, given the subject matter of the dispute (140.000 Euros).

 

SHORT COMMENT

The judgment of the Greek court is a positive sign for the free circulation of BAT awards in national jurisdictions. The losing party failed to prove any grounds of refusal. The last bastion is now the application for a stay of execution. However, a re-examination on the merits is strictly forbidden in this stage; the Club’s only hope is to trace potential flaws in the enforcement proceedings.

Finally, free circulation is also guaranteed for CAS rulings, as evidenced by a judgment issued by the same court nearly seven years ago.

No execution of a Baltimore expired money judgment, even if previously given full faith and credit in Greece

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Creditors in international business transactions need to follow a three step plan in order to secure the satisfaction of their claims: Secure an enforceable judgment in their jurisdiction; declare the latter enforceable in the country of the judgment debtor; and proceed swiftly or at least timely to execution measures. Practice shows that the problems are usually appearing in steps 1 or 2. A recent ruling of the Greek Supreme Court demonstrates that potential pitfalls are to be expected even beyond.

 

THE FACTS

The parties are a Greek [GR] and an American company [US]. Following litigation before the courts of Baltimore, Maryland, US was in possession of an enforceable money judgment against G issued in October 1999. US moved to recognize the above judgment in Greece. Its application was successful, and no appeal was lodged by GR against the judgment of the Athens Court of 1st instance [Nr. 4138/2002, unreported].

For reasons not clarified in the ruling, US entered the enforcement stage only in June 2013, i.e. nearly 14 years after the Baltimore court had issued its judgment. Soon afterwards, i.e. early July same year, US rushed to the Baltimore court’s clerk, requesting the judgment’s renewal. The clerk granted the request late July. January 2014 GR filed an application to revoke the renewal which was sustained. In particular, the Baltimore court considered the request for renewal as inadmissible, because it was not filed timely, i.e. within 12 years following the judgment’s date of entry, in accordance with Rule 2-625 Maryland Rules, Title 2. Civil Procedure–Circuit Court.

Nevertheless, US moved ahead with enforcement in Greece. As it was to be expected, GR applied for stay of execution, which was however dismissed by the Athens 1st Instance Court [Nr. 6235/2015, unreported]. US appealed successfully [Athens CoA Nr. 3074/2016, unreported].

THE RULING

The reasoning of the Supreme Court’s ruling may be summarized as follows:

  • An expired foreign judgment previously declared enforceable in Greece does not affect the exequatur proceedings ex post.
  • The judgment debtor may however file an application for reversal or request the court to confirm the foreign judgment’s lack of enforceability in the state of origin. If enforcement has already begun, the judgment debtor may file an application for stay of execution.
  • The validity and enforceability of the foreign judgment are examined in accordance with the law of the country of origin, i.e. the country where the judgment was rendered.
  • The domestic judgment, i.e. the one issued in the exequatur proceedings, does not replace the original enforceable title; moreover, it simply extends its enforceability in the country of destination. If the foreign judgment is no longer enforceable in the country of origin, execution may not begin in the country of destination.
  • If execution may not take place for the main claim, it is equally forbidden for subsequent claims included in the foreign judgment, such as interest claims.
  • The fact that Greek law provides for a longer limitation time (20 years) may not lead to the assumption that the same rule should apply for the foreign judgment, simply because it has been recognized by a Greek court of law.
  • There’s no contradiction between the fact that the recognition of the foreign judgment in Greece is final and conclusive, and the fact that the US judgment may not be enforced due to its expiry pursuant to the rules of the law of origin.

AREIOS PAGOS Nr. 767/2019, unreported.

COMMENTS

I start with the provision which was the game-changer in the ordinary process of execution:

RULE 2-625. EXPIRATION AND RENEWAL OF MONEY JUDGMENT: A money judgment expires 12 years from the date of entry or most recent renewal. At any time before expiration of the judgment, the judgment holder may file a notice of renewal and the clerk shall enter the judgment renewed.

US showed negligence and paid for it. It is somehow questionable, why the clerk at the Baltimore court decided to grant renewal: The wording of the rule is clear and the maths could be done easily even by a child in elementary school.

The ruling of the Supreme Court is in line with standard case law in the country, which covers all foreign judgments irrespective of their origin.

 

 

From anti-suit injunctions to ‘quasi’ anti-suit injunctions and declaratory relief for breach of a choice of court agreement: a whiter shade of pale?

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Nearly a year ago I reported on a Greek judgment refusing execution of two English orders issued on the basis of a High Court judgment which granted declaratory relief to the applicants. This came as a result of proceedings initiated in Greece, in breach of the settlement agreements and the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favor of English courts. A recent judgment rendered by the same court confirmed the incidental recognition of the same High Court judgment, which resulted in the dismissal of the claim filed before Greek courts due to lack of jurisdiction.

Piraeus Court of Appeal Nr. 89/31.01.2020

THE FACTS

The facts of the case are clearly presented in the case Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG [2014] EWHC 3068 (Comm) (26 September 2014. The UK defendants invoked before the Piraeus first instance court the judgment aforementioned, and requested incidental recognition in Greece. The Piraeus court granted recognition, and dismissed the claim. The plaintiffs appealed, seeking reversal on two grounds: Lack of res iudicata and violation of Article 34 (1) Brussels I Regulation.

THE RULING

The Piraeus CoA founded its ruling on point 39 of the English judgment:

  1. So far as the Hellenic settlement agreement is concerned, clause 2 expressly provides that the payment of U.S.$4.8 million is “in full and final settlement of all and any claims they may have under the Policy in relation to the loss of [the vessel] against the Underwriters and/or against any of its servants and/or agents..” As with the CMI and LMI settlement agreements, that wording settles claims under the policy in relation to the loss of the vessel. Accordingly, by application of the reasoning of Longmore LJ in the Court of Appeal, as set out at [32] to [35] above, the claims against Hellenic in Greece are within the settlement and indemnity provisions in the Hellenic settlement agreement and in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Hellenic settlement agreement and the arbitration clause in the underlying Policy…

Res iudicata and public policy

The Piraeus court had no difficult task in establishing the finality of the English judgment: It simply referred to the certificate issued by the English court.

The public policy defence was also considered as unfounded, by reference to Article 35 (2 and 3) Brussels I Regulation.

No anti-suit injunction order

It then stressed out that the foreign judgment solidifies the exclusive international jurisdiction of English courts, without ordering the claimants/appellants to refrain from filing an action or moving ahead with the proceedings before Greek courts, by imposing any measures for this purpose. Hence, the court continues, the foreign judgment in question fulfils the criteria under Article 32 Brussels I Regulation, and therefore it is not considered as an anti-suit injunction, because it does not hinder the Greek court to examine their jurisdiction. For the above reasons, the English judgment may be incidentally recognized, which means that the Greek court is bound by its findings on the international jurisdiction issue. Finally, it should be underlined that no reference to the Gothaer  ruling of the CJEU was made by the Piraeus court.

Clarifications

Finally, the Piraeus court explained the reasons which led to a different outcome from that of the judgment issued by the same court a year ago. First of all, the court was not bound by the res iudicata of the 2019 judgment, because the defendants were not the same. Secondly, the 2019 judgment examined an application for the enforcement of the English orders, whereas in the present case the subject matter was the existence or non-existence of the choice of court clause.

For all the above reasons, the appeal was dismissed.

SHORT COMMENT

Following the case law of the CJEU on anti-suit injunctions, and the non-recognition of the orders, which were labelled by the 2019 judgment as ‘quasi’ anti-suit injunctions, the defendants used the seemingly sole remaining tool for avoiding a re-examination of international jurisdiction on the merits by the Greek courts; the outcome proves them right. The question however remains the same: Are declaratory orders stating that English courts have exclusive jurisdiction and that proceedings in other Member States are in breach of an English exclusive jurisdiction agreement in line with the mutual trust principle? In his thesis [pp. 146 et seq.], Mukarrum Ahmed  argues that those orders are at odds with the above principle.

The Greek Supreme will have the final word.

Of course, a preliminary request remains a possibility.

First contact of Greek courts with the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention

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The Choice of Court Convention is already close to its 5th year of application. Case law is still scarce. A Greek court tackled with the question, whether to apply the Convention or not. It decided that it should apply, but at the end it considered that the agreement was asymmetric, therefore outside the scope of the Convention.

 

THE FACTS

The claimant is a ship owner company registered in Monrovia, Liberia. While the claimant’s ship was on its way to Novorossiysk, Russia, the claimant agreed with a company registered in Hong Kong [defendant], having however a branch in Piraeus, to buy a quantity of petrol, to be delivered at the port of the Russian city. A few days later, both the ship and the fuel were in Novorossiysk. During bunkering, the 1st engineer of the ship requested the interruption of the supply. He was suspicious that petrol was not of the agreed quality. A technical inspection a couple days later proved that the engineer was right. As a result, litigation ensued before the Piraeus courts. The defendant did not challenge the court’s international jurisdiction. At the same time, he filed an interpleader action against the petrol supplier. The latter, a company registered in Monaco, challenged the jurisdiction of the Greek court, by invoking a choice of forum agreement between the parties, stipulated on the invoice issued as a standard term of the deal.

 

THE RULING

The court engaged in a thorough analysis of the issue: It confirmed that the agreement was falling under the scope of the convention both ratione temporis and ratione materiae. The agreement was signed after the entry into force of the Convention (1/10/2015) and concerned a genuinely commercial dispute. It then examined the content of the choice of forum clause, and considered that the agreement was asymmetric, i.e. unilaterally in favor of the seller, and to the detriment of the buyer. As a second step, the court found that the Brussels Ia Regulation was also not applicable, because the conditions provided by Article 25, lit. a – c were not met. Following the above, the court resumed to domestic provisions of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, in order to establish its international jurisdiction (Article 31, similar actions).

 

COMMENT

The wording of the choice of court clause reads as follows: The contract is governed by English law; the contracting parties accept the exclusive jurisdiction of English courts for the resolution of any dispute related to the present contract [translated by the author]. I don’t think I need to say anything here; there’s nothing asymmetric in this clause. I will just reproduce a passage from the Explanatory Report prepared by Professors Hartley and Dogauchi:

105 Asymmetric agreements. Sometimes a choice of court agreement is drafted to be exclusive as regards proceedings brought by one party but not as regards proceedings brought by the other party. International loan agreements are often drafted in this way. A choice of court clause in such an agreement may provide, “Proceedings by the borrower against the lender may be brought exclusively in the courts of State X; proceedings by the lender against the borrower may be brought in the courts of State X or in the courts of any other State having jurisdiction under its law.”

 

The final point I want to make is that the court shouldn’t go that far with the examination of the matter. As mentioned above, the parties in question were registered in Hong Kong and Monaco. Both countries are not signatory members to the Hague Convention. Hence, the analysis was unnecessary.

 

Conclusion: Bad publicity is still publicity. There are of course drawbacks in the court’s analysis; still, on the other side, it is very fortunate that the court examined the facts from the Hague Convention’s point of view too. The worst case scenario would have been to ignore completely the Convention’s existence, which regrettably occurs occasionally, both for Hague Conventions and sometimes for EU Regulations as well.

 

[Piraeus Court of First Instance nr. 3106/2019, available (in Greek) here]

Talaq v Greek public policy: Operation successful, patient dead…

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A talaq divorce is rarely knocking at the door of Greek courts. A court in Thessaloniki dismissed an application for the recognition of an Egyptian talaq, invoking the public policy clause, despite the fact that the application was filed by the wife. You can find more information about the case, and check my brief comment here.

What puzzles me though is whether there are more jurisdictions sharing the same view. Personally I don’t feel at ease with this ruling for a number of reasons. But prior to that, a couple of clarifications:

  1. This case bears no resemblance to the Sahyouni saga. The spouses have no double nationality: The husband is an Egyptian, the wife a Greek national.
  2. There was no back and forth in their lives: they got married in Cairo, and lived there until the talaq was notarized. Following that, the spouse moved to Greece, and filed the application at the place of her new residence.
  3. Unlike Egypt, Greece is not a signatory of the 1970 Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations.
  4. There is no bilateral agreement between the two countries in the field.

I’m coming now to the reasons of my disagreement with the judgment’s outcome.

  1. The result is not in line with the prevalent view in a number of European jurisdictions: From the research I was able to conduct, it is my understanding that Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland, do not see any public policy violation, when the wife takes the initiative to apply for recognition of the talaq.
  2. The reasoning of the court is a verbatim reiteration of an Athens Court of Appeal judgement from the ‘90s. It reads as follows: Solely the recognition of such an act would cause profound disturbance to the Greek legal order, if its effects are to be extended and applied in Greece on the basis of the Egyptian applicable rules. What is actually missing is the reason why recognition will lead to profound disturbance, and to whom. Surely not to the spouse, otherwise she wouldn’t file an application to recognize the talaq.
  3. It should be remembered that the public policy clause is not targeting at the foreign legislation applied in the country of origin or the judgment per se; moreover, it focuses on the repercussions caused by the extension of its effects in the country of destination. Given the consent of the spouse, I do not see who is going to feel disturbed.
  4. Recognition would not grant carte blanche for talaq divorces in Greece. As in other jurisdictions, Greece remains devoted to fundamental rights. What makes a difference here is the initiative of the spouse. In other words, the rule remains the same, i.e. no recognition, unless there’s consent by the wife. Consent need not be present at the time the talaq was uttered or notarized; it may be demonstrated at a later stage, either expressly or tacitly. I guess nobody would seriously argue that consent is missing in the case at hand.
  5. Talking about consent, one shouldn’t exclude an ex ante tacit agreement of the spouses for financial reasons. It has been already reported that all remaining options for a spouse in countries where Sharia is predominant are much more complicated, time-consuming, cumbersome, and detrimental to the wife. Take khul for example: It is indeed a solution, but at what cost for the spouse…
  6. Last but not least, what are the actual consequences of refusal for the spouse? She will remain in limbo for a while, until she manages to get a divorce decree in Greece. But it won’t be an easy task to accomplish, and it will come at a heavy price: New claim, translations in Arabic, service in Egypt (which means all the 1965 Hague Service Convention conditions need to be met; Egypt is very strict on the matter: no alternative methods allowed!); and a very careful preparation of the pleadings, so as to avoid a possible stay of proceedings, if the court requires additional information on Egyptian law (a legal information will most probably double the cost of litigation…).

For all the reasons aforementioned, I consider that the judgment is going to the wrong direction, and a shift in Greek case law is imperative, especially in light of the thousands of refugees from Arab countries who are now living in the country.

As I mentioned in the beginning, any information on the treatment of similar cases in your jurisdictions is most welcome.

 

 

Implementation of Art. 56 Brussels IIa in Greece

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Following the formation of a specialized law drafting committee nearly 4 years ago, the implementation Act on cross border placement of children in accordance with Art. 56 Brussels IIa has been published in the Official State Gazette on June 23, 2017. The ‘Act’ constitutes part of a law, dealing with a number of issues irrelevant to the subject matter in question. The pertinent provisions are Articles 33-46 Law 4478/2017.

Art. 33 establishes the competent Central Authority, which is the Department for International Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Criminal Cases, attached to the Hellenic MoJ. Art. 34 lists the necessary documents to be submitted to the Greek Central Authority. Art. 35-37 state the requirements and the procedure for the placement of a child to an institution or a foster family in Greece. Advance payment for covering the essential needs of the child, and the duty of foreign Authorities to inform the respective Greek Central Authority in case of changes regarding the child’s status, are covered under Art. 38 & 39 respectively.

Art. 40 regulates the reverse situation, i.e. the placement of a Greek minor to an institution or a foster family within an EU Member State. A prior consent of the competent foreign State Authority is imperative, pursuant to Art. 41. The necessary documents are listed under Art. 42, whereas the procedure to be followed is explained in Art. 43. The modus operandi regarding the transmission of the judgment to the foreign Authority is clarified in Art. 44. A duty of the Prosecution Office for minors to request information on the status of the child at least every six months is established under Art. 45. Finally, Art. 46 covers aspects of transitional nature.

Prima facie it should be stated that the implementing provisions are welcome. In a country where not a single domestic tool has been enacted in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters since the Brussels Convention era, this move allows us to hope for further initiatives by the government. However, swiftness is the key word in the matter at stake, and I wouldn’t be sure whether the procedure enacted would fully serve the cause.

Beyond that, there are some other hot topics related to the Brussels IIa Regulation and its implementation in Greece, the first and foremost being the rules and procedures for issuing the certificates referred to in Art. 39, 41 & 42 [Annexes I-IV of the Regulation]. Bearing in mind that the latter forms almost part of the court’s daily routine (at least in major first instance courts of the country), priority should have been given to an implementing act providing guidance on this issue, in stead of opting to elaborate on a matter with seemingly minimal practical implications.

Last but not least, it should be reminded that a relevant study has been released last year, commissioned by the Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee of the European Parliament, which may be retrieved here.