Tag Archive for: forum non conveniens

Law on Jurisdiction Clauses Changes in Canada

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In 2011 Facebook, Inc. used the name and picture of certain Facebook.com members as part of an advertising product.  In response, a class action was started in British Columbia on behalf of roughly 1.8 million British Columbia residents whose name and picture had been used.  The claim was based on section 3(2) of the province’s Privacy Act.  In response, Facebook, Inc. sought a stay of proceedings based on an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of California contained in the contracts of use for all Facebook.com members.

Canadian courts had repeatedly held that “strong cause” must be shown to displace an exclusive jurisdiction clause.  In addition, while there was some ambiguity, the leading view had become that the analysis about whether to stay proceedings due to such a clause is separate and distinct from the general forum non conveniens analysis (para 18).  The clause is not simply an important part of the forum non conveniens analysis – rather, it triggers a separate analysis.

In Douez v Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33 (available here) the Supreme Court of Canada confirms the second of these points: the analysis is indeed separate.  However, by a slim majority of 4-3 the court holds that the “strong cause” test operates differently in a consumer context than in the commercial context in which it was originally formulated.  The court overturns the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal and rejects a stay of proceedings, paving the way for the class action to proceed in British Columbia.

The Separate Analysis

All of the judges support the separation from forum non conveniens (paras 17, 20 and 131).  I have found this approach troubling as it has developed and so, while not a surprise, I am disappointed to see it confirmed by the court.  As I understand it, the core reason for the separate analysis is to make sure that the clause is not overcome by a series of less important factors aggregated under the forum non conveniens analysis.  So the separate analysis requires that the “strong cause” to overcome the clause has to involve something closely related or intrinsic to the clause itself.  The best explanation of this view is in Expedition Helicopters Inc. v Honeywell Inc., 2010 ONCA 351 (available here; see in particular para 24).  The problem is that courts, in their search for strong cause, frequently go beyond this and refer to factors that are well established under the forum non conveniens approach.

In its analysis, the court puts almost no emphasis on (and does not really even explain, in the way Expedition Helicopters does) how the separate approach differs from forum non conveniens in terms of how the clause gets displaced.  In places, it appears to actually be discussing forum non conveniens (see paras 29-30 and 155), in part perhaps due to its quite direct reliance on The Eleftheria, an English decision I think is more consistent with a unitary framework rather than a separate approach (a point noted in Expedition Helicopters at para 11).  In Douez, the plurality finds strong cause for two reasons: public policy and secondary factors (para 64).  Leaving public policy aside for the moment, it is telling that the secondary factors are “the interests of justice” and “comparative convenience and expense”.  These are the most conventional of forum non conveniens factors.  If this analysis is followed by lower courts, rather than that as explained in Expedition Helicopters, the separate analysis might end up not being very separate.

The Consumer Context

The majority (which is comprised of two decisions: a plurality by three judges and a separate solo concurrence) considers the unequal bargaining power and potential for the relinquishing of rights in the consumer context to warrant a different approach to the “strong cause” test (para 33).  In part, public policy must be considered to determine whether the clause is to be given effect.  As a matter of law, this may well be acceptable.  But one of the key features of the plurality decision is the basis on which it concludes that strong cause has been shown on the facts.  It reaches this conclusion because the contract is one of adhesion with notable inequality of bargaining power and because the claim being brought relates to “quasi-constitutional rights” (para 58), namely privacy.  If these factors are sufficient, then a great many exclusive jurisdiction clauses in standard form contracts with consumers are subject to being defeated on a similar basis.  Lots of consumer contracts involve unequal bargaining strength and are in essence “take it or leave it” contracts.  And it may well not be that difficult for claims to be advanced, alongside other claims, that involve some form of quasi-constitutional rights (the breadth of this is untested).  This possibility that many other clauses do not provide the protection once thought is likely the most notable dimension of the decision.

The Dissent

The dissent would not modify the “strong cause” test (paras 125 and 171).  It stresses the need for certainty and predictability, which are furthered by exclusive jurisdiction clauses (paras 124 and 159).  The dissent concludes the clause became part of the contract, is clear and is not unconscionable.  It reviews possible factors which could amount to strong cause and finds none of them present.  It is critical of the majority for its use of public policy as a factor in the strong cause analysis.  If the clause is enforceable – and in its view it is, even with the inequality of bargaining power – then it is wrong to rely on the factors used by the plurality to find strong cause (para 173).  In the immediate aftermath of the decision I think the dissent has the better of the argument on whether strong cause has been shown in this particular case.

Territorial versus Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The proposed class action relies on a statutory provision.  That statute contains a provision (section 4) that provides that the British Columbia Supreme Court must hear and determine claims under the statute.  The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that this provision addresses subject matter jurisdiction and not territorial jurisdiction (para 14).  The dissent agrees with that view (para 142).  In contrast, the plurality conflates the two types of jurisdiction.  While it accepts that the provision is not one which overrides jurisdiction clauses (para 41), in the public policy analysis it is concerned that in litigation in California the plaintiff class would have no claim (para 59).  But as the dissent points out, it is open to the California courts to apply the statute under its choice of law analysis (paras 165-66).  No evidence was adduced to the contrary.  Section 4, properly interpreted, does not prevent that.  Even more worrying is the analysis of Justice Abella in her solo concurring decision.  She concludes that section 4 deals with territorial jurisdiction and so overrides any jurisdiction clause to the contrary (paras 107-08).  This is a remarkable interpretation of section 4, one which would see many other provisions about subject matter jurisdiction instead read as though they addressed territorial jurisdiction (which she does in footnote 1 in para 109).

Conclusion

The split between the judges as to what amounts to strong cause sufficient to set aside an exclusive jurisdiction clause is the most dramatic aspect of the decision.  They see what is at stake very differently.  On one view, this is a case in which consumers should not be deprived of important statutory rights by a clause to which they did not truly agree.  On another view, this is a case in which contracting parties should be held to their agreement as to the forum in which any disputes which arise should be resolved because, even though the contract involves consumers, the agreement is not unfair and has not been shown to deprive them of any substantive rights.  This debate will now play out across a wide range of consumer contracts.

Conflicts Conference in Toronto

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The following information is provided by the conference organizers.  Given how rare conflict of laws conferences are in Canada, I am delighted to pass this along.

The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress

In 2016, the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act marks its tenth year in force.  Adopted in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, the CJPTA has clarified and advanced the law of judicial jurisdiction. This symposium will assess the progress made by the CJPTA across the range of issues addressed and critically evaluate the capacity of the CJPTA: to provide leadership for the law in other parts of Canada; to enable further development in the law; and to meet the needs of Canadians in the years ahead in a world of increasing cross-border dealings.

Details:

Friday, October 21, 2016 (expected to run from 9am to 4:30pm)

University Club of Toronto (380 University Avenue, just north of the American consulate)

Co-chaired by Professor Janet Walker (Osgoode) and Lisa Munro (Lerners LLP) with the assistance of Dr. Sagi Peari and Gerard Kennedy

We are excited to bring you a fantastic lineup of speakers and panelists discussing a wide range of topics pertaining to CJPTA and judicial jurisdiction.

Space is limited. Kindly RSVP to

Sagi Peari (SPeari@osgoode.yorku.ca)
or
Gerard Kennedy (GerardKennedy@osgoode.yorku.ca)

by October 3, 2016.

New Book on Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act

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Thomson Reuters Carswell has just published Statutory Jurisdiction: An Analysis of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act by Vaughan Black, Stephen G.A. Pitel and Michael Sobkin.  More information is available here.
 
The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act puts the important topic of the jurisdiction of Canadian provincial courts in civil and commercial cases on a clearer statutory footing.  It is in force in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia.  The approach to jurisdiction adopted under the CJPTA is different in several respects from the common law approach, and so provinces that have adopted it are undergoing a period of transition.  One of the key issues for courts in applying the CJPTA is interpreting its provisions and explaining how they operate.  Statutory Jurisdiction: An Analysis of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act examines the growing body of cases and provides a comprehensive account of how the CJPTA is being interpreted and applied by the courts. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has, in its April 2012 decisions on jurisdiction, indicated a willingness to develop the common law in a way that is highly mindful of the approach taken under the CJPTA.  As a result, the analysis of the CJPTA will also be of use to those in Canadian common law provinces and territories that have not enacted the CJPTA. 
 
The book may also appeal as a comparative law resource on conflict of laws, especially to those interested in how traditional rules can be affected, directly and indirectly, by statutory reform.

 

New Canadian Framework for Assumption of Jurisdiction

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After 13 months the Supreme Court of Canada has finally released its decisions in four appeals on the issue of the taking and exercising of jurisdiction.  The main decision is in Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda (available here) which deals with two of the appeals.  The other two decisions are Breeden v Black (here) and Editions Ecosociete Inc v Banro Corp (here).

The result is perhaps reasonably straightforward: in all four cases the court upholds the decisions of both the motions judges and the Court of Appeal for Ontario.  All courts throughout held that Ontario had jurisdiction in these cases and that Ontario was not a forum non conveniens.

The reasoning is more challenging, and it will take some time for academics, lawyers and lower courts to work out the full impact of these decisions.  The court’s reasoning differs in several respects from that of the courts below.

The court notes that a clear distinction needs to be drawn between the constitutional and private international law dimensions of the real and substantial connection test.  This is an interesting observation, particularly in light of the fact that the court’s own decision is not as clear on this distinction as it could be.  I expect that going forward there will be different interpretations of what the court is truly saying on this issue.

The court is reasonably clear that the real and substantial connection test should not be used as a conflicts rule in itself.  It is not a rule of direct application.  Rather, it is a principle that informs more specific private international law rules governing the taking of jurisdiction.  This is a change from the approach used by provincial appellate courts, especially the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which arguably had been using the real and substantial connection test as its rule, at least in part, for establishing jurisdiction in service ex juris cases.

The court states that it is establishing the framework for the analysis of jurisdiction.  Going forward, a real and substantial connection must be found through a “presumptive connecting factor” which is a factor that triggers a presumption of such a connection.  The presumption can be rebutted.  If the plaintiff cannot establish such a presumption, the court cannot take jurisdiction.  This last point is perhaps the largest change made to the law.  On the law as it stood, the plaintiff could establish jurisdiction through a variety of non-presumptive factual connections that collectively amounted to a real and substantial connection to the forum.  That approach is rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court does not purport to set out a complete list of presumptive connections.  It confines itself to identifying some such connections that could apply in tort cases, namely that (a) the defendant is domiciled or resident in the forum, (b) the defendant carries on business in the forum, (c) the tort was committed in the forum, and (d) a contract connected with the dispute was made in the forum.  It is quite open, on the language in the decisions, as to what other presumptive connections lower courts will need to be finding in other cases.  One possible solution is that lower courts will largely continue to follow the recent approach of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that the enumerated bases for service ex juris, subject to some exceptions, amount to such presumptive connections.

The decisions also address the test for the doctrine of forum non conveniens.   Three points can be made about that analysis.  First, the language suggests the burden is always on the defendant/moving party.  Second, emphasis is placed on “clearly” in “clearly more appropriate”, suggesting that it will be harder to displace the plaintiff’s choice of forum.  Third, the court cautions against giving too much weight to juridical advantage factors.  Judges should avoid invidious comparisons across forums and refrain from “leaning too instinctively” in favour of the judge’s own forum.

The decisions are not a radical break with the earlier cases but they do change the law on taking jurisdiction in several respects.  In addition, the court makes several points along the way, as asides, that will impact other aspects of the conflict of laws.  For example, the court confirms the propriety of taking jurisdiction based on the defendant’s presence in the forum.

Quebec Court Refuses Jurisdiction on Forum of Necessity Basis

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There has not been much to report from Canada for the past few months.  The Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisdiction decision in the Van Breda quartet of cases is still eagerly awaited.  There was some thought these decisions would be released by the end of February but it now appears that will not happen.  These cases were argued in March 2011.

Fortunately, Professor Genevieve Saumier of McGill University has written the following analysis of a recent Quebec Court of Appeal decision which might be of interest in other parts of the world.  The case is ACCI v. Anvil Mining Ltd., 2012 QCCA 117 and it is available here (though only in French, so I appreciate my colleague’s summary).  I am grateful to Professor Saumier for allowing me to post her analysis.

In April 2011, a Quebec court concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear a civil liability claim against Anvil Mining Ltd. for faults committed and damages inflicted in the Democratic Republic of Congo where the defendant exploits a copper mine.

The facts behind the claim related to actions alleged to have been taken by the defendant mining company in the course of a violent uprising in Kilwa in the Democratic Republic of Congo in October 2004 that caused the deaths of several Congolese (the number is disputed). In essence, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant collaborated with the army by providing them with trucks and logistical assistance.

The defendant, Anvil Mining Ltd, is a Canadian company with its head office in Perth, Australia. Its principal if not its only activity is the extraction of copper and silver from a mine in Congo. Since 2005, the company has rented office space in Montreal for its VP (Corporate Affairs) and his secretary. It is on the basis of this connection to the province of Quebec that the plaintiff launched the suit there. The plaintiff is an NGO that was constituted for the very purpose of instituting a class action against the defendant, for the benefit of the victims of the 2004 insurgency in Congo.

The defendant contested both the Quebec court’s jurisdiction and, in the alternative, invoked forum non conveniens to avoid the exercise of jurisdiction. At first instance, the court held that it had jurisdiction over the defendant on the basis of its establishment in Quebec (the office in Montreal) and that the claim was related to the activities of the defendant in Montreal (the two conditions for jurisdiction under 3148(2) Civil Code of Quebec given the foreign domicile of the defendant). Interpreting this second conditions broadly, the court held that the VP’s frequent visits to Congo and his activities to attract investors in Quebec were linked to the defendant’s activities in Congo and therefore to the claims based on those activities.

In rejecting the alternative forum non conveniens defense to the exercise of jurisdiction, the court considered the other fora allegedly available to the plaintiffs, namely Congo and Australia. A claim had already been made before a Congolese military court but it had been rejected. The plaintiff claimed that the process before the Congolese court, competent to hear the claim, was in breach of fundamental justice for a number of reasons. As to the Australian court, the plaintiff claimed that an attempt to secure legal representation in that country had failed because of threats made by the Congolese regime against both the victims and the lawyers they were seeking to hire in Australia. The Quebec court accepted this evidence and held that the defendants had failed to show that another forum was more appropriate to hear the case, a requirement under art. 3135 C.C.Q. It appears that the plaintiffs had also presented an argument based on art. 3136 C.C.Q. (“forum of necessity”), but since jurisdiction was established under art. 3148 and forum non conveniens was denied, the court decided not to respond to the argument based on forum of necessity. Still, the court did state that “at this stage of the proceedings, it does appear that if the tribunal declined jurisdiction on the basis of art. 3135 C.C.Q., there would be no other forum available to the victims,” suggesting that Quebec may well be a “forum of necessity” in this case.

Leave to appeal was granted and the Quebec Court of Appeal reversed, in a judgment published on 24 January 2012. The Court of Appeal held that the conditions to establish jurisdiction under art. 3148(2) C.C.Q. had not been met. As a result of that conclusion, it did not need to deal with the forum non conveniens aspect of the first instance decision. This made it necessary to deal with the “forum of necessity” option, available under art. 3136 C.C.Q. The Court found that the plaintiff had failed to show that it was impossible to pursue the claim elsewhere and that there existed a sufficient connection to Quebec to meet the requirements of article 3136 C.C.Q. In other words, the plaintiff had the burden to prove that Quebec was a forum of necessity and was unable to meet that burden.

The reasons for denying the Quebec court’s jurisdiction under art. 3148(2) C.C.Q. are interesting from the perspective of judicial interpretation of that provision but are not particular to human rights litigation. Essentially the Court of Appeal found that the provision did not apply because the defendant’s Montreal office was open after the events forming the basis of the claim. This holding on the timing component was sufficient to deny jurisdiction under 3148(2) C.C.Q. The Court also held that even if the timing had been different, it did not accept that there was a sufficient connection between the activities of the vice president in Montreal and the actions underlying the claim to satisfy the requirements of the provision.

The reasoning on art. 3136 C.C.Q. and the forum of necessity, however, are directly relevant to human rights litigation in an international context. Indeed, one of the challenges of this type of litigation is precisely the difficulty of finding a forum willing to hear the claim and able to adjudicate it according to basic principles of fundamental justice.  In the Anvil case, the victims had initially sought to bring a claim in the country where the injuries were inflicted and suffered. While the first instance court had accepted evidence from a public source according to which that process was tainted, the Court of Appeal appeared to give preference to the defendant’s expert evidence (see para. 100).

The Court of Appeal does not quote from that expert’s evidence whereas the trial judge’s reasons contain a long extract of the affidavit. And while the extract does not include the statement referred to by the Court of Appeal, it does include a statement according to which an acquittal in a penal court is res judicata on the issue of fault in a civil proceeding based on the same facts.

The obvious alternative forum was in Perth, Australia, where the defendant company had its headquarters (and therefore its domicile under Quebec law). There too the victims had sought to bring a claim but were apparently unable to secure legal representation or pursue that avenue due to allegedly unlawful interference by the defendant and government parties in the Republic of Congo. While the first instance judge had accepted the plaintiff’s evidence that Australia was not an available forum, the Court of Appeal quickly dismissed this finding, without much discussion.

Finally, the Court of Appeal returned to its initial findings regarding the interpretation of art. 3148 C.C.Q. to conclude that there was, in any event, an insufficient connection between Anvil and Quebec to meet that condition for the exercise of the forum on necessity jurisdiction. The court did not consider that under art. 3136 C.C.Q. it is unlikely that the timing of the connection should be the same as under 3148(2) C.C.Q. given the exceptional nature of the former basis for jurisdiction and the likelihood that the connections to the forum of necessity could arise after the facts giving rise to the claim.

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Quebec is disappointing in so far as its interpretation of the forum of necessity provision in the Civil Code of Quebec is quite narrow, particularly as regards the condition of a connection with Quebec; moreover, its application of the provision to the facts of the case deals rather summarily and dismissively with findings of fact made by the first instance judge without sufficient justification for its rejection of the evidence provided by the plaintiff and relied upon by the trial judge. Given the nature of the claims and of the jurisdictional basis invoked, it was incumbent on the Court of Appeal to provide better guidance for future plaintiffs as to what type of evidence will be required to support an article 3136 C.C.Q. jurisdictional claim and to what extent trial court findings in relation to such evidence will be deferred to in the absence of an error of law.

Tourism and Jurisdiction to take Centre Stage in Supreme Court of Canada

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On March 21, 22 and 25, 2011 the Supreme Court of Canada will hear appeals in four private international law cases.  Each is a case in which the Ontario court has held that it has jurisdiction to hear the dispute and that the proceedings should not be stayed in favour of another forum. 

Two of the cases – Van Breda (information here) and Charron (information here) – involve Ontarians who were killed or severely injured while on holiday in Cuba.  They now seek to sue various foreign defendants in Ontario.  These cases involve tourists in the traditional sense of the word.  Two of the cases – Banro (information here) and Black (information here) – involve claims for defamation over the internet and damage to reputation in Ontario.  There is some allegation that these cases involve what has become known as “libel tourism”, especially in England and in the United States.

Several parties have already been granted leave to appear as intervenors and others are seeking such leave.  The decisions in these four cases could be very important for the Canadian law on jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada now posts PDFs of the written submissions of litigants as they are received, so those wanting more details about the cases should click on the “factums” button for each case.

Quebec Court Stays Palestinian Claim Against West Bank Builders

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Things have certainly been quiet on the Canadian front over the past few months.  Ending the lull, in a decision filled with different conflict of laws issues, the Quebec Superior Court held, in Bil’In Village Council and Yassin v. Green Park International Inc. (available here), that Israel is the most appropriate forum for the dispute and therefore it stayed the proceedings in Quebec.

The plaintiffs, resident in the occupied West Bank, sued two corporations incorporated in Quebec for their involvement in building housing for Israelis in the West Bank.  The plaintiffs alleged violation of several international law principles.

The reasons address several interesting issues: 1. whether the defendants are protected by state immunity as agents of Israel [no], 2. whether decisions of the High Court of Justice in Israel in which the plaintiffs participated were recognizable in Quebec [yes], 3. whether these judgments statisfied the test for res judicata [no], 4. whether the plaintiffs had the necessary legal interest required under Quebec law to bring the proceedings [yes for one, no for the other], 5. whether the cause of action had no reasonable hope of succeeding [no], 6. whether the court should stay the proceedings [yes].

On the appropriate forum issue, the factual connections massively pointed away from Quebec.  The defendants were incorporated there, but largely for tax purposes – they did no business there – and that was the only connection to Quebec.  A key issue was whether the issues raised in the proceedings could be fairly resolved by an Israeli court, but the court found the expert evidence on this point favoured the defendants, not the plaintiffs.  This may be the most controversial aspect of the decision.

The decision also contains lengthy analysis of the applicable law and some comments on the absence of proof of foreign law.

It is not common for Canadian courts to mention, as a factor in the forum non conveniens analysis, the state of access to the local courts for local plaintiffs (the docket-crowding issue American courts do consider).  In this case, however, this factor is noted by the court in its reasons for staying the proceedings.

Consultation Paper on Jurisdiction

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The Law Commission of Ontario has released a consultation paper written by Professor Janet Walker (Osgoode Hall Law School, York University).  The paper (available here) proposes that Ontario’s current law on the taking and retaining of jurisdiction in civil matters is in need of reform.  It offers a proposed statute which would reform the law in this area.  The proposals have some common elements with the Uniform Law Conference of Canada’s model statute, the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (available here), but also some important differences.

The Law Commission welcomes comments on the paper, and the process for commenting is explained in the paper.  Beyond this, those generally interested in how countries resolve issues of jurisdiction in civil matters should find the points raised in the paper of interest.

To date three Canadian provinces have moved away from the traditional approach, which is based on a combination of common law and rules of civil procedure, and have brought into force the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia).  Some other provinces have enacted the statute but not yet brought it into force, and some other provinces are considering adopting it.

Supreme Court of Canada Addresses Role of Parallel Proceedings in Stay Applications

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Canada’s highest court has delivered its judgment in Teck Cominco Metals Ltd. v. Lloyd’s Underwriters (available here).  The decision is quite brief and upholds the decision of both courts below, leaving some to wonder why leave to appeal was granted.

Teck has mining and smelting operations in British Columbia.  In 2004 it was sued in Washington State for environmental property damage caused by the discharge of waste material into the Columbia River, which flows from Teck’s Canadian operations into the United States.  Teck notified its insurers, looking to them to defend the claim, but they refused.

Teck therefore sued the insurers in Washington State to establish its entitlement under the insurance policies.  The insurers sued Teck in British Columbia to establish their lack of responsibility under the same policies.  So the issue became where the coverage issue would be resolved.

Stay applications were brought in both coverage actions.  The application failed in the United States.  It also failed in the courts of British Columbia, but those decisions were appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Teck wanted Canada’s highest court to take a different approach to applications for a stay in cases where a foreign court has already positively asserted jurisdiction.  This position was framed in a couple of different ways, but its essence was that the parallel proceedings should be an overriding and determinative factor in the analysis.  The court rejected that position, confirming that parallel proceedings are only one factor among many to be considered.

The court’s decision is under s. 11 of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 28.  However, the court confirms that s. 11 is a codification of the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, and so the reasoning should apply equally in provinces which have not adopted a jurisdiction statute (though it would have been helpful for the court to have expressly made this clear).

Most of the decision is unobjectionable and clear.  One point to consider, however, is the court’s reference (in para. 3o) to a distinction between interprovincial cases and international cases.  This raises the possibility that different considerations could arise as between sister provinces.  A refusal to stay proceedings in one province might be treated as determinative of the issue in another, in part because of the possibility of appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and its binding effect on all provinces, and in part if the other province were required to recognize the admittedly interlocutory decision on the stay application.  Both of these are debatable issues, and the orthodoxy would suggest that parallel proceedings in a sister province remain just one factor in the analysis.  More guidance from the court on this question would have been welcome.