Tag Archive for: child abduction

Child Abduction and Habitual Residence in the Supreme Court of Canada

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The Supreme Court of Canada, in Office of the Children’s Lawyer v Balev (available here), has evolved the law in Canada on the meaning of a child’s habitual residence under Article 3 of the Hague Convention.  The Convention deals with the return of children wrongfully removed from the jurisdiction of their habitual residence.

A majority of the court identifies [paras 4 and 39ff] three possible approaches to habitual residence: the parental intention approach, the child-centred approach, and the hybrid approach.  The parental intention approach determines the habitual residence of a child by the intention of the parents with the right to determine where the child lives.  This approach has been the dominant one in Canada.  In contrast, the hybrid approach, instead of focusing primarily on either parental intention or the child’s acclimatization, looks to all relevant considerations arising from the facts of the case.  A majority of the court, led by the (now retired) Chief Justice, holds that the law in Canada should be the hybrid approach [paras 5 and 48].  One of the main reasons for the change is that the hybrid approach is used in many other Hague Convention countries [paras 49-50].

The dissent (three of the nine judges) would maintain the parental intention approach [para 110].  One of its central concerns is the flexibility and ambiguity of the hybrid approach [para 111], which the judges worry will lead to less clarity and more litigation.  Wrongful removal cases will become harder to resolve in a timely manner [paras 151-153].

The majority did not apply the law to the facts of the underlying case, it having become moot during the process of the litigation [para 6].  The court rendered its decision to provide guidance going forward.  The dissent would have denied the appeal on the basis that the child’s habitual residence was in Germany (as the lower courts had held).

The court briefly addresses the exception to Article 3 in what is commonly known as “Article 13(2)” (since it is not numbered as such) – a child’s objection to return – setting out its understanding of how to apply it [paras 75-81 and 157-160].

The Supreme Court of Canada has recently adopted the practice of preparing summaries of its decisions (available here for this decision) to make them more accessible to the media and the public.  These are called “Cases in Brief”.

Intersection of Child Abduction Process and Refugee Claim

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The Court of Appeal for Ontario has released its decision in A.M.R.I. v. K.E.R. (available here).  The decision deals with the intersection of the law relating to children who advance a refugee claim and the law on returning abducted children under the Hague Convention.

A girl of 12 had travelled from Mexico, where she lived with her mother (who had custody), to Ontario to visit her father (who had access rights).  There she disclosed that she had been abused by her mother.  She made a refugee application and the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada found her to be a refugee as a result of the abuse.  After she had lived in Ontario for about 18 months, the mother applied under the Hague Convention for her return to Mexico.  The Superior Court of Justice ordered that she be returned, and she was – in quite a remarkable way which violated her right to dignity and respect (para. 7).  On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed that decision.  It set aside the order of return and ordered a new hearing on the Hague Convention application.

One of the key concerns for the court was the child’s lack of participation in the Hague Convention application.  That application was, in effect, heard ex parte, with no submissions in support of the child’s remaining in Ontario (para. 31).  The court set out some important procedural protections that must be provided to the child (para. 120).

The court also had to grapple with the interplay of the statutes that implemented the Refugee Convention and the Hague Convention.  It rejected the argument that the implementation of the latter (provincial law) was unconstitutional by virtue of it violating the implementation of the former (federal law).  The court held that the two could be read and applied together without a division of powers conflict (paras. 62-71).

The court held that when a child has been determined to be a refugee, a rebuttable presumption arises that there is a risk of persecution if the child is returned (para. 74) and thus a risk of harm (para. 78).  This then must impact the analysis under the Hague Convention.

The application judge had not accorded any weight to the refugee status and accordingly had erred in law.  The judge also failed to consider the exceptions in the Hague Convention that allowed the court to refuse to order a child’s return.