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The Tango Between Brussels Ibis Regulation and Rome I Regulation under the Beat of Package Travel Directive

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Written by Zhen Chen, doctoral candidate at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands

The article titled ‘The Tango Between Art.17(3) Brussels Ibis and Art.6(4)(b) Rome I under the Beat of Package Travel Directive’ is published on Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law with open access, available at https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1023263X211048595

In the field of European private international law, Brussels Ibis Regulation and Rome I Regulation are dancing partners that work closely with different roles. When it comes to consumer protection, Brussels Ibis Regulation is the leader and Rome I Regulation is the follower, since special protective rules over consumer contracts were first introduced in Articles 13–15 Brussels Convention[1] and then followed by Article 5 Rome Convention.[2]

  1. Package travel in Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis and Article 6(4)(b) Rome I

Package travel tourists are explicitly protected as consumers under Article 6(4)(b) Rome I, but not under Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis since it does not expressly mention the term ‘package travel’. Instead, the term used in Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis is the same as that in Article 5(5) Rome Convention, which has been abandoned by its successor Article 6(4)(b) Rome I. Such discrepancy is widened with the replacement of Directive 90/314 by Directive 2015/2302 with the enlarged notion of package travel. This means that when Article 6(4)(b) Rome I Regulation is dancing under the beat of Directive 2015/2302, Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis Regulation is still dancing under the beat of Article 5(5) 1980 Rome Convention.

  1. A uniform concept of package travel under Directive 2015/2302

The CJEU clarified in the Pammer judgment that the concept ‘a contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation’ in Article 15(3) Brussels I should be interpreted in line with Article 6(4)(b) Rome I by reference to Directive 90/314.[3] The CJEU did not follow the opinion of the Advocate General, according to which the concept prescribed in Article 15(3) Brussels I has to be interpreted in exactly the same way as the term ‘package’ enshrined in Article 2(1) Directive 90/314.[4] The court stated that the concept in Article 15(3) Brussels I is ‘close to’[5] the notion package in Directive 90/314. The wording ‘close to’, instead of ‘identical’ or ‘the same as’, indicates that the CJEU did not intend to interpret such two terms as having exactly the same meaning.

Since Article 15(3) Brussels I remains unchanged in its successor Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis, this article argues that Art.17(3) Brussels Ibis Regulation has been two steps behind Art.6(4)(b) Rome I when it comes to the protection of consumers in package travel contracts. In order to close the gap, a uniform concept of package travel should be given. It is suggested that Art.17(3) Brussels Ibis should adopt the concept of package travel provided in Directive 2015/2302.

  1. Deleting package travel contracts from the exception of transport contracts

Despite the adoption of a uniform concept, Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis and Article 6 Rome I only cover packages containing transport, as an exception of transport contracts. Packages not including transport do not fall under the exception of transport contracts. Since all package travel contracts should be protected as consumer contracts, regardless of containing transport or not, it is more logical to delete package travel contracts from the exception of transport contracts in Art.6(4)(b) Rome I as well as Art.17(3) Brussels Ibis and establish a separate provision to regulate package travel contracts.

To this end, Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis and Article 6(4)(b) Rome I can be simplified as ‘This Section/article shall not apply to a contract of transport/carriage’, whereas package travel contracts are expressly regulated as consumer contracts in a separate provision. In this regard, the framework in Article 5 Rome Convention is a better solution, according to which package travel contracts can be expressly included in Article 17 Brussels Ibis/Article 6 Rome I as follows:

Notwithstanding Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis/Article 6(4)(b) Rome I, this Section/article shall apply to a contract relating to package travel within the meaning of Council Directive 2015/2302/EU of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements.

[1] The predecessor of Articles 17-19 Brussels Ibis Regulation.

[2] The predecessor of Article 6 Rome I Regulation.

[3] Joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, ECLI:EU:C:2010:740, para. 43

[4] Joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, ECLI:EU:C:2010:273, opinion of advocate general, para. 49.

[5] Case C-585/08 Pammer, ECLI:EU:C:2010:740, para. 36.

Chinese Court Enforces Singaporean Judgment based on De Jure Reciprocity

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By Zheng Sophia Tang, Wuhan University Institute of International Law and Academy of International Law and Global Governance

Chinese courts recognize and enforce foreign civil and commercial judgments under two circumstances: the existence of treaty obligations and the existence of reciprocity. In the past, Chinese courts relied solely on de facto reciprocity to enforce foreign judgments, which requires evidence to prove the courts in the foreign country enforced Chinese judgments in previous cases. Some courts have adopted an even tougher approach and rejected enforcing foreign judgments even though one positive precedent exists in the foreign country, arguing one case is not enough to prove reciprocity. The application of de facto reciprocity causes difficulty to enforce foreign judgments in Chinese courts. It makes enforcement impossible if no application was made to the foreign court to enforce Chinese judgment in the past, and if the other country also adopts the de facto reciprocity. It also makes proving reciprocity difficulty, especially if the foreign country has no comprehensive case report system.

After China commenced the One-Belt-One-Road initiative, efforts were made to relax the threshold to prove reciprocity. The Supreme Court has proposed, in two OBOR opinions, that China should adopt a presumed reciprocity approach, which presumes reciprocity exists if the other country demonstrates intention to establish judicial cooperation with China and no negative precedence exists.[1] However, since these opinions are not legally binding, they are not enough to reverse court practice. Although more Chinese courts enforce foreign judgments after 2013, they still need the proof of one positive case in the foreign country.

20 July, 2021, Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court decided to recognize and enforce the Singaporean monetary judgment.[2] Although de facto reciprocity already exists between China and Singapore and Chinese courts enforced Singaporean judgments based on de facto reciprocity in the past,[3] this case justifies the decision based on de jure reciprocity. The judgment states: “The reciprocal relationship exists between China and Singapore, because Chinese judgments can be recognized and enforced in Singapore under the same conditions. On the other hand, Singaporean High Court recognized and enforced Chinese judgments in the past, and precedents to recognize and enforce Singaporean judgments also exist in Chinese courts. It shows de facto reciprocal relationship also exists between China and Singapore.”

It is clear that this judgment discusses both de facto and de jure reciprocity. The court considers whether Chinese judgments may be recognized and enforced in Singapore as a matter of law. However, proving de jure reciprocity is not easy. Unless the foreign law completely prohibits enforcing foreign judgments in the absence of treaty obligations, most law will provide conditions for foreign judgments enforcement. The conditions would allow foreign judgments enforced in certain circumstances and not others. In other words, no law would say foreign judgments can be recognized in all circumstances. How to assess if these conditions are enough to make enforcement possible in law? What if the foreign law provides different conditions to enforce foreign judgments from Chinese law? What if the foreign law require de facto reciprocity and China has not yet enforced judgments from this country, rendering enforcement of Chinese judgments practically impossible in the foreign court?

The Shanghai court adopts the equivalent condition test. It takes the seat of Singaporean court and imagine what may happen if this application is a Chinese judgment seeking Singaporean enforcement. It concludes that as far as Singaporean court can enforce Chinese judgments under the same condition, de jure reciprocity exists. In other words, it applies the Singaporean standard to assess enforceability of this judgment. The problem is it may lead to the result that between two countries de jure reciprocity exits in some cases but not others. As reciprocity refers to the relationship between two countries, it should be a systematic status, and not variable according to the different fact of a case.

Another difficulty is that it is usually hard for Chinese courts to know exactly how judicial decision of a foreign court may be made, especially how judicial discretion is going to be exercised in a foreign country. The assessment of the potential enforceability of Chinese judgments in the foreign court in the same condition can only be based on black-letter law which may not be so precise to test de jure reciprocity. Of course, it is arguable that de jure reciprocity only needs a general possibility for a foreign court to enforce Chinese judgments, but not specific Chinese judgments are definitely enforceable in the foreign country. If so, the equivalent condition test is not appropriate to assess de jure reciprocity.

One may suggest the legal comparability test. It argues that de jure reciprocity depends on whether the foreign law provide legally comparable conditions for FJR as Chinese law. This suggestion is also problematic, because many countries’ law provide much lower threshold to enforce foreign law than Chinese law. For example, they do not require reciprocity as a pre-condition. These laws are not comparable to Chinese law, but it is hard to argue that Chinese judgments cannot be enforced in those countries as a matter of law.

The third suggestion is the no higher threshold test. It suggests that if the foreign law does not make it more difficult to enforce Chinese judgments, de jure reciprocity exists. However, what if the foreign law adopts de facto reciprocity like most Chinese courts do in practice? Can we argue the foreign law provide higher threashold because one Chinese court uses de jure reciprocity? Or we consider these two laws provide simialr threshold and treat de jure reciprocity exists, even though the foreign court actually cannot enforce Chinese judgments because Chinese courts did not enforce judgments from this country before?

Anyway, although the test for de jure reciprocity is not settled, the Shanghai judgment shows a laudable progress. This is the first case that de jure reciprocity has been applied in a Chinese court. It shows a serious attempt to deviate from de facto reciprocity. Of course, since de facto reciprocity also exists between China and Singapore, this judgment does not bring significant difference in result. It is curious to see whether the Chinese court will apply de jure reciprocity alone to enforce foreign judgments in the future, and whether any new tests for de jure reciprocity may be proposed in the future judgments.

[1] Several Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Judicial Services and Protection Provided by People’s Courts for the Belt and Road Initiative], [2015] Fa Fa No. 9, para 6; The Opinions of the SPC Regarding the People’s Court’s Further Provision of Judicial Services and Guarantees for the Construction of the Belt and Road, Fa Fa [2019] 29, para 24.

[2] (2019) Hu 01 Xie Wai Ren No 22.

[3] Singaporean case, Giant Light Metal Technology (Kunshan) Co Ltd v Aksa Far East Pte ltd [2014] 2 SLR 545; Chinese case, Kolmar Group AG v. Jiangsu Textile Industry Import and Export Corporation, (2016) Su 01 Xie Wai Ren No 3.

The German Federal Court of Justice on the validity of a proxy marriage concluded in Mexico

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Written by Greta Siegert, doctoral candidate at the University of Freiburg.

In a recent decision of 29 September 2021 – case XII ZB 309/21, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) once again confirmed the validity of proxy marriages concluded abroad under the condition that they met the formal requirements of the applicable foreign law.

The parties, a German woman and a male citizen of Syria, had concluded a proxy marriage in Baja California Sur (Mexico). At the time of the marriage, neither of them was present in Mexico nor had ever met their respective representatives. The declarations of proxy had been prepared by a German notary both in English and Spanish. When the couple applied for a marriage name declaration in Germany, the responsible registry office denied such an entry, invoking the marriage’s formal invalidity.

Reviewing this case, the German Federal Court ruled that there were no doubts regarding the marriage’s formal validity, hence holding it valid in absence of other issues of concern.

The judges followed the line of argument brought forward by the higher regional court of Jena (Oberlandesgericht Jena), stating that the formal aspects of the marriage in question were ruled by Art. 11(1) of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code (EGBGB). Art. 11(1) EGBGB provides that a legal transaction is formally valid if it either complies with the formal requirements of the law governing the legal relationship forming the subject matter of the legal act (so-called lex actus) or with the legal formalities of the state where the transaction takes place (so-called lex loci).

The German Federal Court confirmed that, in this case, the proxy was merely a question of the marriage’s formal validity: since the parties had already – prior to the creation of their declaration of proxy – made their decision about the marriage and their respective spouse, the proxy solely served as a matter of representation in making the declarations of intention.

However, the judges acknowledged that, in other cases, proxies may also affect the substantive aspects of a marriage. This would be the case if the representation affected the substance of the partners’ decision, i.e. if the future spouses had not decided about the marriage or their spouse themselves but had instead transferred the decision to their respective agent.

Since Mexican law – as the relevant lex loci – allows proxy marriages, the German Federal Court concluded that the marriage in question was formally valid. The court added that this result was compatible with German public policy (Art. 6 EGBGB). When drafting Art. 11(1) EGBGB more than 30 years ago, the German legislature recognized and accepted the possibility of marriages concluded abroad according to the rules of the respective lex loci. Though there were repeated calls for a revision of this legislation afterwards, especially regarding proxies in the context of forced marriages, the legislature held on to the lex loci principle. Against this backdrop, the German Federal Court found no evidence that the marriage in dispute violated fundamental principles of the German legal system.

News

Revue Critique de droit international privé – issue 2024/1

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Written by Hadrien Pauchard (assistant researcher at Sciences Po Law School)

The first issue of the Revue Critique de droit international privé of 2024 was released a few months ago. It contains 2 articles and several case notes. Once again, the doctrinal part has been made available in English on the editor’s website (for registered users and institutions).

The opening article is authored by Dr. Nicolas Nord (Université de Strasbourg) and tackles the crucial yet often overlooked issue of L’officier d’état civil et le droit étranger. Analyse critique et prospective d’une défaillance française (Civil registrars and foreign law. A critical and prospective analysis of a French failure). Its abstract reads as follows:

In international situations, French civil registrars may frequently be confronted with the application of foreign law. However, by virtue of the General Instruction on Civil Status and other administrative texts, they are under no obligation to establish the content of foreign law and can be satisfied with the sole elements reported by requesting private individuals. This solution certainly has the advantage of simplifying the task of civil registrars, who are not legal professionals. However, it leads to inconsistencies within the French legal system. The article therefore recommends reversing the principle and creating a duty for the French authority in this area. However, the burden should be lightened by facilitating access to the content of foreign law. Concrete proposals are put forward to this end, both internally and through international cooperation.

In the second article, Prof. David Sindres (Université d’Angers) addresses the complex question of the scope of jurisdiction clauses, through the critical discussion of recent case law on whether Le « destinataire réel » des marchandises peut-il se voir opposer la clause attributive de compétence convenue entre le chargeur et le transporteur maritime ? (Can the “actual addressee” of the goods be submitted to the jurisdiction clause agreed between the shipper and the maritime carrier?). The abstract reads as follows:

In two notable decisions, the French Cour de cassation has ruled that the case law of the Court of Justice Tilly Russ/Coreck Maritime is strictly confined to the third-party bearer of a bill of lading or sea waybill, and cannot be applied to the “actual addressee” of the goods. Thus, unlike the third party bearer, the “actual addressee” cannot be submitted to the clause agreed between the shipper and the maritime carrier and inserted in a bill of lading or a sea waybill, even if he has succeeded to the rights and obligations of the shipper under the applicable national law, or has given his consent to the clause under the conditions laid down in article 25 of the Brussels I bis regulation. The distinction thus made by the Cour de cassation with regard to the enforceability against third parties of jurisdiction clauses agreed between shippers and carriers cannot be easily justified. Indeed, it is in no way required by the Tilly Russ and Coreck Maritime rulings and is even difficult to reconcile with them. Furthermore, insofar as it may lead to the non-application of a jurisdiction clause to an actual addressee who has nevertheless consented to it under the conditions of article 25 of the Brussels I bis regulation, it fails to meet the requirements of this text.

The full table of contents is available here.

The second issue of 2024 has been released and will be presented shortly on this blog.

Previous issues of the Revue Critique (from 2010 to 2022) are available on Cairn. 

Call for abstracts: TEGL Conference Re-imagining Law for Sustainable Globalization: Navigating Uncertainty in a Globalized Era – 16-17 December 2024

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A call for abstracts has been launched for the TEGL (Transformative Effects of Globalisation in Law) Conference entitled “Re-imagining Law for Sustainable Globalization: Navigating Uncertainty in a Globalized Era”, which will take place on 16-17 December 2024. For more information, click here.

Interested persons may submit a paper proposal abstract, a panel proposal abstract or an abstract to participate in the PhD session. Abstracts should be no more than 500 words. A short bio (of max. 200 words) should also be included. Both documents should be submitted by 15 September 2024 by using the following link.

As stated on its website, the topics are the following:

The conference focuses on the four TEGL research streams: 1) Constitutionalism and Subjects of Globalization; 2) Economic Law and Globalization’s Infrastructures; 3) Courts, Science and Legitimacy; 4) National and Regional Institutions as Global Actors.  It, therefore, welcomes submissions on a wide variety of topics. For reference, specific questions include but are not limited to:

  • How does law produce socio-economic inequalities in the context of uncertainty and across various areas?
  • How can existing categories of law be rethought in different areas to reduce these inequalities and the resulting sense of uncertainty?
  • How does law constrain or regulate uncertainties within global value chains, exploring its role in shaping and responding to crises in this interconnected world?
  • How does law guarantee or contribute to uncertainty in international economic exchanges, encompassing trade and investment?
  • How effective are legal mechanisms in mitigating uncertainties arising from the current climate crisis? Discuss how the law can contribute to sustainable solutions.
  • What is the role of law in empowering or disempowering individuals facing socio-economic inequalities and exploring potential legal reforms to address disparities?
  • How does the law address humanitarian concerns during the conflict, considering its effectiveness and proposing innovative solutions?
  • What role do principles play in risk regulation/environmental/climate change litigation (before international/EU/national courts)?
  • What role do experts play in decision-making and courts, and what role do NGOs/public interest litigation play?
  • What is the role of science and its legitimacy in courts?
  • How does uncertainty affect legal coherence and migration governance, and can uncertainty be considered a ‘governance strategy?’
  • How to regulate and control in times of uncertainty.
  • Proportionality in times of uncertainty.
  • What role should law play in navigating uncertainty in the digital age, including in platform regulation (e.g., the political economy of platforms, AI utilization in content moderation, design of platform interfaces, access to datasets), automated decision-making, digitization of lawmaking and the use of AI in courtrooms (Robot judge, natural language processing and automation in law).

This event is organized within and supported by the Sector Plan TEGL and the Globalization and Law Network of Maastricht University. For inquiries, please contact glawnet-fdr@maastrichtuniversity.nl.

TEGL research project is a collaboration between the law faculties of Maastricht University, Open Universiteit NL, Tilburg University and the University of Amsterdam. More information is available here.

The Hague Academy of International Law Centre for Studies and Research 2025: “Artificial Intelligence and International Law”

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As recently highlighted by contributions on this blog, new technologies have a significant impact on the development of the law. Hence, the Curatorium of the Hague Academy of International Law has chosen for the the 2025 edition of the Centre for Studies and Research (18 August – 5 September 2025) to focus on the emerging topic of “Artificial Intelligence and International Law“. This year, the selected researchers will be work under the guidance of the Directors of Research, Marion Ho-Dac (Université d’Artois) for the French-speaking section as well as Marco Roscini (University of Westminster) for the English-speaking section.

Interested candidates must be researchers and preferably hold an advanced degree (PhD or Doctorate degree). Registration for the 2025 Centre is open from 1 July to 15 October 2024 via the institution’s own Online Registration Form.

The Academy describes the scope of its 2025 Programme as follows (emphasis added to highlight passages of specific interest to col.net readers):

The increasing integration of digital technologies based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) into human activities requires a thorough re-examination of most normative frameworks in the international order. Advanced AI systems operate with ever greater autonomy, generating content, recommendations, predictions and decisions for States, organisations and individuals. AI thus offers enormous opportunities for humankind by facilitating (or even making possible) the performance of certain tasks. At the same time, however, it presents significant risks related, for instance, to potential biases and accountability gaps. In this context, is (public and private) international law capable of addressing the profound changes that the contemporary rise of AI is bringing? 

The Centre of Studies and Research 2025 of The Hague Academy of International Law aims to analyse these challenges and opportunities through the lenses of international law in a holistic manner by focusing on three different aspects: AI’s impact on the sources and institutions of the international legal order, AI’s impact on special regimes of international law, and AI’s role in addressing specific contemporary problems.

Selected researchers will be called to work on the following topics under the guidance of the Directors of Research:

  • AI and International/Regional Organisations
  • AI and International/Regional Courts and Tribunals
  • AI and the Making of (Public/Private) International Law
  • AI and the Practice of (Public/Private) International Law
  • International Governance of AI including Technical Standardisation
  • AI and the Risk-based Approach
  • AI and the International Law of Armed Conflict
  • AI and International Environmental Law
  • AI and Conflict of Laws 
  • AI and International Human Rights Law
  • AI and the Law of State Responsibility
  • AI and International Criminal Law
  • AI and International Business Law 
  • AI and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security
  • Lethal Autonomous Weapons and International Law
  • AI and the North-South Divide
  • AI and Cybersecurity
  • AI and Privacy  
  • AI and Humanitarian Action
  • AI and the Cross-border Movement of Persons
  • AI and (Mis)Information

For further information on the HAIL 2025 Centre and the Academy in general, please consult the HAIL Homepage or refer to the attached PDF Programme.

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