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Comparative Analysis of Doctrine of Separability between China and the UK
Written by Jidong Lin, Wuhan University Institute of International Law
- Background
Separability is a world-recognized doctrine in commercial arbitration. It means that an arbitration clause is presumed to be a separate and autonomous agreement, reflecting contractual commitments that are independent and distinct from its underlying contract.[1] Such a doctrine is embraced and acknowledged by numerous jurisdictions and arbitral institutions in the world.[2]
However, there are different views on the consequences of separability. One of the most critical divergences is the application of separability in the contract formation issue. Some national courts and arbitral tribunals held that in relatively limited cases, the circumstances giving rise to the non-existence of the underlying contract have also resulted in the non-existence of the associated arbitration agreement, which is criticized as an inadequacy of the doctrine of separability.[3] On the contrary, other courts hold the doctrine of separability applicable in such a situation, where the non-existence of the underlying contract would not affect the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. This divergence would directly affect the interest of commercial parties since it is decisive for the existence of the arbitration agreement, which is the basis of arbitration.
Two contrary judgements were recently issued by two jurisdictions. The Chinese Supreme People’s Court (hereinafter “SPC”) issued the Thirty-Sixth Set of Guiding Cases, consisting of six guiding cases concerning arbitration. In Guiding Case No. 196 Yun Yu v. Zhong Yun Cheng, the SPC explains the Chinese version of separability should apply when the formation of the underlying contract is in dispute.[4] Although the SPC’s Guiding Cases are not binding, they have an important persuasive effect and Chinese courts of the lower hierarchy are responsible for quoting or referring to the Guiding Cases when they hear similar cases. On the other hand, the English Court of Appeal also issued a judgement relating to separability, holding this doctrine not applicable in the contractual formation issue.[5]
- Chinese judgment
The Chinese case concerns a share transfer transaction between Yun Yu Limited. (hereinafter “YY”) and Shenzhen Zhong Yuan Cheng Commercial Investment Holding Co. Limited. (hereinafter “ZYC”). On 9th May 2017, YY sent the Property Transaction Agreement (hereinafter “PTA”) and the Settlement of Debts Agreement (hereinafter “SDA”) to ZYC. The PTA was based on the Beijing Stock Exchange (hereinafter “BSE”) model agreement. PTA and SDA included a dispute resolution clause in which the parties agreed that the governing law should be Chinese law and the dispute should be submitted to Beijing Arbitration Commission. On 10th May 2017, ZYC returned the PTA and SDA to YY with some revisions, including a modification on the dispute resolution clause, which changed the arbitration institution to the Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration. On 11st May 2017, YY commented on the revised version of the PTA and SDA but kept the dispute resolution clause untouched. In the accompanying email, YY stated, “Contracts confirmed by both parties would be submitted to Beijing Stock Exchange and our internal approval process. We would sign contracts only if we got approval from BSE and our parent company.” On the same day, ZYC returned the PTA and SDA with its stamp to YY. On 27th October 2017, YY announced to ZYC that the negotiation was terminated. On 4th April 2018, ZYC commenced arbitration based on the dispute resolution clause in PTA and SDA.
The SPC held that separability means the arbitration agreement could be separate and independent from the main contract in its existence, validity and governing law. To support its opinion, the SPC refers to Article 19 of the People’s Republic of China’s Arbitration Law (hereinafter “Arbitration Law”), which stipulates that: “An arbitration agreement shall exist independently, the amendment, rescission, termination or invalidity of a contract shall not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement.” SPC submits that the expression “(t)he arbitration agreement shall exist independently” is general and thus should cover the issue of the existence of the arbitration agreement. This position is also supported by the SPC’s Interpretation of Several Issues concerning the Application of Arbitration Law (hereinafter “Interpretation of Arbitration Law”), [6]Article 10 of which stipulates: “Insofar as the parties reach an arbitration agreement during the negotiation, the non-existence of the contract would not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement.” Thus, the SPC concluded that the existence of an arbitration clause should be examined separately, independent from the main contract. Courts should apply the general rules of contractual formation, to examine whether there is consent to arbitrate. If the court found the arbitration clause formed and valid, the very existence of the main contract should be determined by arbitration, unless it is “necessary” for the court to determine this matter. The SPC concludes that the PTA and SDA sent by YY on 11st May 2017 constituted an offer to arbitrate. The stamped PTA and SDA sent by ZYC on the same day constituted an acceptance and came into effect when the acceptance reached YY. Thus, there exists an arbitration agreement between the parties. It is the arbitral tribunal that should determine whether the main contract was concluded.
- English judgment
The English case concerns a proposed voyage charter between DHL Project & Chartering Limited (hereinafter “DHL”) and Gemini Ocean Shipping Co. Limited (hereinafter “Gemini”). The negotiations were carried on through a broker. On 25th August 2020, the broker circulated what was described as the Main Terms Recap. It is common ground that the recap accurately reflected the state of the negotiations thus far. Within the Recap, both parties agreed that the vessel would be inspected by Rightship. This widely used vetting system aims to identify vessels suitable for the carriage of iron ore and coal cargoes. Also, both parties agreed that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration. There was an attached proforma, including a provision that the vessel to be nominated should be acceptable to the charterer. Still, that acceptance in accordance with detailed requirements set out in clause 20.1.4 “shall not be unreasonably withheld”. By 3rd September, however, Rightship approval had not been obtained. DHL advised that “(p)lease arrange for a substitute vessel” and finally, “(w)e hereby release the vessel due to Rightship and not holding her any longer.” In this situation, the attached proforma was not approved by DHL, and there is no “clean” fixture, [7]which means the parties did not reach an agreement. After that, Gemini submitted that there is a binding charter party containing an arbitration clause and commenced arbitration accordingly.
The Court of Appeal made a detailed analysis of separability. Combining analysis of numerous cases, including Harbour v. Kansa, [8]Fiona Trust, [9]BCY v. BCZ[10] and Enka v. Chubb, [11]and analysis of International Commercial Arbitration written by Prof. Gary Born, the Courts of Appeal concluded that separability should not be applied if the formation of the underlying contract is in dispute. Separability applies only when the parties have reached an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration, which they intend (applying an objective test of intention) to be legally binding. In other words, disputes as to the validity of the underlying contract in which the arbitration agreement is contained do not affect the arbitration agreement unless the ground of invalidity impeaches the arbitration agreement itself. But separability is not applicable when the issue is whether an agreement to a legally binding arbitration agreement has been reached in the first place. In this case, the parties agreed in their negotiations that if a binding contract were concluded as a result of the subject being lifted, that contract would contain an arbitration clause. However, based on the analysis of the negotiation and the commercial practice in the industry, the Court of Appeal concludes that either party was free to walk away from the proposed fixture until the subject was lifted, which it never was. Thus, there was neither a binding arbitration agreement between the parties.
- Comments
Before discussing the scope of the application of separability, one thing needed to be clarified in advance: Separability does not decide the validity or existence of the arbitration agreement in itself. Separability is a legal presumption based on the practical desirability to get away from a theoretical dilemma. However, separability does not mean the arbitration agreement necessarily exists or is valid. It only means the arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying contract, and it cannot escape the need for consent to arbitrate.[12] Therefore, the existence of the arbitration agreement should not be considered when discussing the scope of application of the arbitration agreement.
The justification of the doctrine of separability should be considered when discussing its scope of application. The justification for the doctrine of separability can be divided into three factors: (a) The commercial parties’ expectations. Parties to arbitration agreements generally “intended to require arbitration of any dispute not otherwise settled, including disputes over the validity of the contract or treaty. (b) Justice and efficiency in commerce. Without the separability doctrine, “it would always be open to a party to an agreement containing an arbitration clause to vitiate its arbitration obligation by the simple expedient of declaring the agreement void.” and (c) Nature of the arbitration agreement.[13] The arbitration agreement is a procedural contract, different from the substantive underlying contract in function. If these justifications still exist in the contract formation issue, the doctrine of separability should be applied.
It is necessary to distinguish the contract formation issue and contract validity issue, especially the substantive validity issue, when discussing the applicability of those justifications. The contract formation issue concerns whether parties have agreed on a contract. The ground to challenge the formation of a contract would be that the parties never agree on something, or the legal condition for the formation is not satisfied. The contract substantive validity issue is where the parties have agreed on a contract, but one party argue that the agreement is invalidated because the true intent is tainted. The grounds to challenge the substantive validity would be that even if the parties have reached an agreement, the agreement is not valid because of duress, fraud, lack of capacity or illegality. The formation and validity issues are two different stages of examining whether the parties have concluded a valid contract. The validity issue would only occur after the formation of the contract. In other words, an agreement can be valid or invalid only if the agreement exists.
It is argued that separability should be applicable to the formation of contract. Firstly, separability satisfies the parties expectation where most commercial parties expect a one-stop solution to their dispute, irrespective of whether it is for breach of contract, invalidity or formation. Furthermore, the application of separability would achieve justice and efficiency in commerce. Separability is necessary to prevent the party from vitiating the arbitration obligation by simply declaring a contract not concluded. In short, since the justifications still stand in the issue of contract formation, separability should also apply in such an issue.
The English Court of Appeal rejected the application of separability in the formation of contract holding the parties’ challenge to the existence of the main contract would generally constitute a challenge to the arbitration clause. However, the same argument may apply for invalidity of the underlying contract. Since the arbitration agreement is indeed concluded in the same circumstances as the underlying contract the challenging to the validity of the contract may also challenge the validity of the arbitration clause, while separability still applies. On the contrary, the Chinese approach probably is more realistic. The SPC ruled that separability applies where the formation of the underlying contract is disputed. But before referring the dispute to arbitration, the SPC separately considered the formation of the arbitration clause. Only after being satisfied the arbitration clause is prima facie concluded, the court declined jurisdiction and referred the parties to arbitration.
[1] Ronan Feehily, Separability in international commercial arbitration; confluence, conflict and the appropriate limitations in the development and application of the doctrine, 34 Arbitration International 355 (2018), p. 356.
[2] See Blackaby Niegel, Constantine Partasides et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International; Oxford University Press 2015, pp. 104–107.
[3] See Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (3rd edition), Kluwer Law International 2021, pp. 492-493.
[4] The Guiding Case No. 196: Dispute in Validity of Arbitration Agreement between YunYu Limited and Shenzhen ZhongYuanCheng Commercial Investment Holding Co. Limited.
[5] DHL Project & Chartering Ltd v Gemini Ocean Shipping Co Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1555 (24 November 2022)
[6] SPC’s Interpretation of Several Issues concerning the Application of Arbitration Law, Fa Shi?2006?No. 7.
[7] Clean Fixture is a concept in the maritime area. It means the Parties’ confirmation that the contract has been concluded and that there are no further Subjects and/or restrictions to the execution of the agreed Contract. The Fixture is not clean until both parties have waived their subjects/restrictions.
[8] Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd [1993] QB 701.
[9] Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40, [2007] 4 All ER 951.
[10] BCY v BCZ [2016] SGHC 249, [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 583.
[11] Enka Insaat ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38, [2020] 1 WLR 4117
[12] See McNeill M. S. & Juratowitch B., Agora: Thoughts on Fiona Trust: The Doctrine of Separability and Consent to Arbitrate, 3 Arbitration International 475 (2008).
[13] See Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (3rd edition), Kluwer Law International 2021, p. 428.
The standard of human rights review for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments: ‘due satisfaction’ or ‘flagrant denial of justice’?
Note on Dolenc v. Slovenia (ECtHR no. 20256/20, 20 October 2022)
by Denise Wiedemann, Hamburg Read more
Out now: Talia Einhorn, Private International Law in Israel, 3rd edition
It is my pleasure to recommend to the global CoL community a real treat: Talia Einhorn’s “Private International Law in Israel”, an analysis of the country’s private international law of no less than almost 900 pages, now in its third edition. This monograph, significantly enlarged and extended, grounds on the respective country report for the International Encyclopedia of Laws/Private International Law amongst a large series of country reports on which the “General Section” by Bea Verschraegen, the editor of the entire series, builds.
According to the Encyclopedia’s structure for country reports, the text covers all conceivable aspects of a national private international law, from “General Principles (Choice of Law Techniques)” in Part I, including the sources of PIL, the technical and conceptual elements of choice of law rules (“determination of the applicable law”) as well as “basic terms”. Part II unfolds a fascinating tour d’horizon through the “Rules of Choice of Law” on persons, obligations, property law, intangible property rights, company law, corporate insolvency and personal bankruptcy, family law and succession law. Part III covers all matters of international civil procedure, including jurisdictional immunities, international jurisdiction, procedure in international litigation, recognition and enforcement and finally international arbitration.
The analyses offered seem to be extremely thorough and precise, including in-depth evaluations of key judgments, which enables readers to grasp quickly core concepts and issues beyond basic information and the mere black letter of the rules. For example, Chapter 4 of Part III on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments explains that Israel is a State Party to only one rather specific convention, the UN Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance 1956 (apparently operated without any implementing legislation, see para. 2434). Further, Israel entertains four bilateral treaties (with Austria, Germany, Spain and the UK) that provide generally for recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. These four treaties, however, seem to differ substantially from each other and from the domestic statutory regime under the Israeli Foreign Judgments Enforcement Law (“FJEL”), see para. 2436. These differences are spelled out down to the level of decisions of first instance courts of the respective foreign State Party, see e.g. footnote 1927 with reference to recent jurisprudence (of the German Federal Court of Justice and) of the local court of Wiesbaden on Article 8(2) of the bilateral treaty with Germany stipulating, according to these courts’ interpretation, a far-reaching binding effect to the findings of the first court. This is contrasted with case law of the Israeli Supreme Court rejecting recognition and enforcement of a German judgment, due to the lack of a proper implementation of the Treaty in Israeli domestic law, see paras. 2437 et seq. – a state of things criticized by the author who also offers an alternative interpretation of the legal constellation that would have well allowed recognition and enforcement under the Treaty, see para. 2440. Additionally, interpretation of the domestic statutory regime in light of treaty obligations of the State of Israel, irrespective of a necessity of any specific implementation measures, is suggested, para. 2447. On the level of the domestic regime, the FJEL, in § 3 (1), prescribes as one out of a number of cumulative conditions for enforcement that “the judgment was given in a state, the courts of which were, according to its laws, competent to give it”, see para. 2520. Indeed, “the first condition is puzzling”, para. 2526, but by no means unique and does even appear in at least one international convention (see e.g. Matthias Weller, RdC 423 [2022], at para. 251, on Art. 14(1) of the CEMAC 2004 Agreement and on comparable national rules). At the same time, and indeed, controlling the jurisdiction of the first court according to its own law appears hardly justifiable, all the more, as there is no control under § 3 FJEL of the international jurisdiction according to the law of the requested court / State, except perhaps in extreme cases under the general public policy control in § 3 (3) FJEL. Additionally, on the level of domestic law, English common law seems to play a role, see paras. 2603, but the relation to the statutory regime seems to pose a question of normative hierarchy, see para. 2513, where Einhorn proposes that the avenue via common law should only be available as a residual means. In light of this admirably clear and precise assessment, one might wonder whether Israel should considering participating in the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention and the reader would certainly be interested in hearing the author’s learned view on this. The instrument is not listed in the table of international treaties dealt with in the text, see pp. 821 et seq., nor is the HCCH 2005 Choice of Court Agreements Convention. Of course, these instruments do not (yet?) form part of the Israeli legal system, but again, the author’s position whether they should would be of interest.
As this very brief look into one small bit of Einhorn’s monograph shows, this is the very best you can expect from the outsider’s and a PIL comparative perspective, probably as well from the insider’s perspective if there is an interest in connecting the own with the other. Admirable!
News
Webinar on Multistate Torts Ahead of the EAPIL Winter School, 2 December 2024
On 2 December 2024, at 6 pm CET, a free webinar will take place in preparation of the 2025 edition of the EAPIL Winter School on Multistate Torts, which will be held on-site in Como between 10 and 15 February 2025 (see here for the full program and further details).
The webinar will give a glimpse of what the Winter School will be about and will briefly present some of its hot topics, such as online defamation, climate change litigation, artificial intelligence and crypto values.
The speakers are some of those who will be lecturing at the Winter School, namely Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia), Anatol Dutta (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich), Thomas Kadner Graziano (University of Geneva), Tobias Lutzi (University of Augsburg), Satu Heikkilä (Administrative Law Judge), Silvia Marino (University of Insubria), Nadia Rusinova (The Hague University, attorney at law), Geert van Calster (KU Leuven) and Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University).
The webinar will also offer an opportunity to provide information about the EAPIL Winter School.
Join the free seminar to discover what awaits you during the Winter School week, and…if you want to know more, enrol and come to Como in February!
Those interested in attending the webinar shall write at eapilws@gmail.com in order to receive the Teams link.
SICL: Workshop on Providing Information on Foreign Law to Courts on 26 November
As foreign law assumes an increasingly significant role in judicial practice, the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law is pleased to announce a Workshop on Providing Information on Foreign Law to Courts, which will take place in Lausanne on November 26.
Renowned experts, both individuals and institutions, will delve into practical challenges and share insights, comparing practices from various countries, including England, France, Germany, Poland, Switzerland and USA.
Presentations will be conducted in English, in German or in French.
For further information, please contact: marie-laure.lauria@isdc-dfjp.unil.ch
The program for the workshop is available below or can be accessed here.
INDIVIDUAL EXPERTS
9.30-11.00
Chair: Dr. Lukas Heckendorn, Deputy Director, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law
- Experiences in Poland and Germany compared
Prof. Arkadiusz Wudarski, European University Viadrina Frankfurt
- A Common Law Experience
Prof. Franz Werro, University of Fribourg and Georgetown University
- French Experiences
Prof. Gustavo Cerqueira, Université Côte d’Azur
Discussion
11.00-11.30: Coffee break
INSTITUTIONAL EXPERTS
11.30-12.30
Chair: Dr. Ilaria Pretelli, Legal Adviser, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law
- The German Approach: The Max Planck Guidelines
Jan Peter Schmidt, Priv.-Doz., Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg
- The Swiss Approach: experience of SICL
Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler, Deputy Director, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law
Discussion
12.30-13-30 : Lunch
BARCAMP
13.30-16.00
Moderator: Prof. Nadjma Yassari, Director, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law
A Barcamp session is an open and interactive format that encourages collaboration and idea-sharing. Since all participants join every session, the process is highly collaborative, ensuring focused, inclusive, and enriching discussions for everyone involved.
- Proposing Topics: Any participant can suggest a topic, which will be guided by a moderator.
- Moderated Discussions: A designated moderator ensures the session stays focused and that everyone has the chance to contribute.
- Flexible Structure: Sessions can take the form of a short presentation, group discussion, or collaborative brainstorming.
- Open Exchange: Everyone is encouraged to actively contribute their ideas, perspectives, and questions.
- Shared Learning: The goal is to exchange knowledge, explore new approaches, and learn from each other.
16.00: closure of event
Issue 4 of Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly for 2024
Issue 4 of Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly for 2024 was just published. It contains the following articles, case notes, and book review:
Katherine Reece-Thomas, “State Immunity and Sunken Treasure: Finders will not Always be Keepers”
Anthony Kennedy, “Unanswered Questions”
Michael F Sturley†, “The Centenary of the Hague Rules: Celebrating a Century of International Conventions Overmining the Carriage of Goods by Sea”
2024 marks the centenary of the Hague Rules, which still play a central role in allocating the risk of cargo loss or damage. To celebrate that milestone, it is valuable to review the history, beginning with the pre-existing risk allocation. When maritime nations applied widely accepted principles differently, efforts began in the late nineteenth century to achieve uniformity by international agreement. Those efforts failed until domestic legislation exacerbated the problem and created greater pressure for a solution. Even after agreement was reached in 1924, however, another fourteen years passed before the Convention was widely in force. Since then, international uniformity has been challenged in multiple ways, and the story continues to this day.
Marcus Teo, “Foreign Law as Fact”
In English law, “foreign law”, as applied under choice-of-law rules, is a question of fact. This “fact doctrine”, however, faces scepticism for three reasons: it remains unclear whether foreign law is truly treated as a question of fact, why it is so treated, and what the precise fact-in-issue is. This article addresses these concerns. It demonstrates that, today, foreign law is treated like any other question of fact. It then argues that foreign law should be classified as a question of fact, and should refer to foreign legal rulings, because this facilitates the accurate prediction of foreign decisions.
Adrian Briggs, “Book Review – Dicey+100. Albert Venn Dicey: A Centennial Commemoration”


