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First Instance where a Mainland China Civil Mediation Decision has been Recognized and Enforced in New South Wales, Australia
I Introduction
Bank of China Limited v Chen [2022] NSWSC 749 (‘Bank of China v Chen’), decided on the 7 June 2022, is the first instance where the New South Wales Supreme Court (‘NSWSC’) has recognised and enforced a Chinese civil mediation decision.
II Background
This case concerned the enforcement of two civil mediation decisions obtained from the People’s Court of District Jimo, Qingdao Shi, Shandong Province China (which arose out of a financial loan dispute) in Australia.[1]
A foreign judgement may be enforced in Australia either at common law or pursuant to the Foreign Judgements Act 1991(Cth).[2] As the People’s Republic of China is not designated as a jurisdiction of substantial reciprocity under the Foreign Judgements Regulation 1992 (Cth) schedule 1, the judgements of Chinese courts may only be enforced at common law.[3]
For a foreign judgement to be enforced at common law, four requirements must be met:[4] (1) the foreign court must have exercised jurisdiction in the international sense; (2) the foreign judgement must be final and conclusive; (3) there must be identity of parties between the judgement debtor(s) and the defendant(s) in any enforcement action; and (4) the judgement must be for a fixed, liquidated sum. The onus rests on the party seeking to enforce the foreign judgement.[5]
Bank of China Ltd (‘plaintiff’) served the originating process on Ying Chen (‘defendant’) pursuant to r 11.4 and Schedule 6(m) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (‘UCPR’) which provides that an originating process may be served outside of Australia without leave of the court to recognise or enforce any ‘judgement’.[6] Central to this dispute was whether a civil mediation decision constituted a ‘judgement’ within the meaning of schedule 6(m).
III Parties’ Submission
A Defendant’s Submission
The defendant filed a notice of motion seeking for (1) the originating process to be set aside pursuant to rr 11.6 and 12.11 of the UCPR, (2) service of the originating process on the defendant to be set aside pursuant to r 12.11 of the UCPR and (3) a declaration that the originating process had not been duly served on the defendant pursuant to r 12.11 of the UCPR.[7]
The defendant argued that the civil mediation decisions are not ‘judgements’ within the meaning of UCPR Schedule 6(m).[8] Moreover, the enforcement of foreign judgment at common law pre-supposes the existence of a foreign judgement which is absent in this case.[9]
The defendant submitted that the question that must be asked in this case is whether the civil mediation decisions were judgements as a matter of Chinese law which is a question of fact.[10] This was a separate question to whether, as a matter of domestic law, the foreign judgements ought to be recognised at common law.[11]
B Plaintiff’s Submission
In response, the plaintiff submitted that all four common law requirements were satisfied in this case.[12] Firstly, there was jurisdiction in the international sense as the defendant appeared before the Chinese Court by her authorised legal representative.[13] The authorised legal representative made no objection to the civil mediation decisions.[14] Secondly, the judgement was final and conclusive as it was binding on the parties, unappealable and can be enforced without further order.[15] Thirdly, there was an identity of parties as Ying Chen was the defendant in both the civil mediation decisions and the enforcement proceedings.[16] Fourthly, the judgement was for a fixed, liquidated sum as the civil mediation decisions provided a fixed amount for principal and interest.[17]
In relation to the defendant’s notice of motion, the plaintiff argued that the question for the court was whether the civil mediation decisions fell within the meaning of ‘judgement’ in the UCPR, that is, according to New South Wales law, not Chinese law (as the defendant submitted).[18] On this question, there was no controversy.[19] While the UCPR does not define ‘judgement’, the elements of a ‘judgement’ are well settled according to Australian common law and Chinese law expert evidence supports the view that civil mediation decisions have those essential elements required by Australian law.[20]
Under common law, a judgement is an order of Court which gives rise to res judicata and takes effect through the authority of the court.[21] The plaintiff relied on Chinese law expert evidence which indicated that a civil mediation decision possesses those characteristics, namely by establishing res judicata and having mandatory enforceability and coercive authority.[22] The expert evidence noted that a civil mediation decision is a type of consent judgement resulting from mediation which becomes effective once all parties have acknowledged receipt by affixing their signature to the Certificate of Service.[23] The Certificate of Service in respect of the civil mediation decisions in this case had been signed by the legal representatives of the parties on the day that the civil mediation decisions were made.[24] While a civil mediation decision is distinct to a civil judgement,[25] a civil mediation decision nonetheless has the same binding force as a legally effective civil judgement and can be enforced in the same manner.[26]
The expert evidence further noted that Mainland China civil mediation decisions have been recognised and enforced as foreign judgements in the Courts of British Columbia, Hong Kong and New Zealand.[27] The factors which characterise a ‘judgement’ under those jurisdictions are the same factors which characterise a ‘judgement’ under Australian law.[28]This supports the view that the same recognition should be afforded under the laws of New South Wales.[29]Accordingly, the plaintiff submitted the a civil mediation decision possesses all the necessary characteristics of a ‘judgement’ under Australian law such that service could be effected without leave under schedule 6(m).[30]
IV Resolution
Harrison AsJ noted that the judgements of Chinese courts may be enforceable at common law and found that all four requirements was satisfied in this case.[31] There was jurisdiction in the international sense as the defendant’s authorised legal representative appeared before the People’s Court on her behalf, the parties had agreed to mediation, the representatives of the parties came to an agreement during the mediation, and this was recorded in a transcript.[32] The parties’ representatives further signed the transcript and a civil mediation decision had been issued by the people’s courts.[33] Moreover, the civil mediation decision was final and binding as it had been signed by the parties.[34] The third and fourth requirements were also clearly satisfied in this case.[35]
In relation to the central question of whether the civil mediation decisions constituted ‘judgements’ in the relevant sense, Harrison AsJ found in favour of the plaintiff.[36] Harrison AsJ first noted that this question should not be decided on the arbitrary basis of which of the many possible translations should be preferred.[37] Moreover, the evidence of the enforcement of civil mediation decisions as judgements in the jurisdictions of British Columbia, Hong Kong and New Zealand was helpful, though also not determinative.[38]
Rather, this question must be determined by reference to whether civil mediation decisions constituted judgements under Australian law as opposed to Chinese law, accepting the plaintiff’s submission.[39] The civil mediation decisions were enforceable against the defendant immediately according to their terms in China without the need for further order or judgement of the People’s Court.[40] The parties could not vary or cancel the civil mediation decisions without the permission of the Jimo District Court.[41] The civil mediation decisions also had the same legal effects as a civil judgement.[42] Therefore, Harrison AsJ concluded that the civil mediation decisions were judgements for the purposes of Australian law as they established res judicata and were mandatorily enforceable and had coercive authority.[43] It then followed that the civil mediation decisions fell within the scope of UCPR schedule 6(m) and did not require leave to be served.[44]
V Orders
In light of the analysis above, Harrison AsJ held that the Chinese civil mediation decisions were enforceable and dismissed the defendant’s motion.[45] Costs were further awarded in favour of the plaintiff.[46]
Author: Hao Yang Joshua Mok, LLB Student at the University of Sydney Law School
Supervised by Associate Professor Jeanne Huang, Sydney Law School
References:
[1] Bank of China Limited v Chen [2002] NSWSC 749, [1], [16].
[2] Ibid [8]; citing Bao v Qu; Tian (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 588, [23]-[29].
[3] Ibid [8].
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid [9] – [11].
[7] Ibid [6].
[8] Ibid [57].
[9] Ibid [59], [84].
[10] Ibid [61].
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid [25].
[13] Ibid [18].
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid [20].
[16] Ibid [22].
[17] Ibid [24].
[18] Ibid [27].
[19] Ibid [28].
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid [37].
[22] Ibid [38].
[23] Ibid [39].
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid [41].
[26] Ibid [42].
[27] Ibid [49].
[28] Ibid [50].
[29] Ibid [51].
[30] Ibid [52].
[31] Ibid [83], [90].
[32] Ibid [86].
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid [87].
[35] Ibid [88]-[89].
[36] Ibid [105].
[37] Ibid [91]-[92].
[38] Ibid [93].
[39] Ibid [96].
[40] Ibid [103].
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid [105].
[44] Ibid [106].
[45] Ibid [107]-[108].
[46] Ibid [109]-[112].
Golan v. Saada – a case on the HCCH Child Abduction Convention: the Opinion of the US Supreme Court is now available
Written by Mayela Celis, UNED
Yesterday (15 June 2022) the US Supreme Court rendered its Opinion in the case of Golan v. Saada regarding the HCCH Child Abduction Convention. The decision was written by Justice Sotomayor, click here. For our previous analysis of the case, click here.
This case dealt with the following question: whether upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding. (our emphasis)
In a nutshell, the US Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. The syllabus of the judgment says: “A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures [also known as undertakings] before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.” The Court has also wisely concluded that “Nothing in the Convention’s text either forbids or requires consideration of ameliorative measures in exercising this discretion” (however, this is different in the European Union context where a EU regulation complements the Child Abduction Convention).
While admittedly not everyone will be satisfied with this Opinion, it is a good and well-thought through decision that will make a great impact on how child abduction cases are decided in the USA; and more broadly, on the way we perceive what the ultimate goal of the treaty is and how to strike a right balance between the different interests at stake and the need to act expeditiously.
In particular, the Court stresses that the Convention “does not pursue return exclusively or at all costs”. And while the Court does not make a human rights analysis, it could be argued that this Opinion is in perfect harmony with the current approaches taken in human rights law.
In my view, this is a good decision and is in line with our detailed analysis of the case in our previous post. In contrast to other decisions (see recent post from Matthias Lehmann), for Child Abduction – and human rights law in general – this is definitely good news from Capitol Hill.
Below I include a few excerpts of the decision (our emphasis, we omit footnotes):
“In addition, the court’s consideration of ameliorative measures must be guided by the legal principles and other requirements set forth in the Convention and ICARA. The Second Circuit’s rule, by instructing district courts to order return “if at all possible,” improperly elevated return above the Convention’s other objectives. Blondin I, 189 F. 3d, at 248. The Convention does not pursue return exclusively or at all costs. Rather, the Convention “is designed to protect the interests of children and their parents,” Lozano, 572 U. S., at 19 (ALITO , J., concurring), and children’s interests may point against return in some circumstances. Courts must remain conscious of this purpose, as well as the Convention’s other objectives and requirements, which constrain courts’ discretion to consider ameliorative measures
in at least three ways.
“First, any consideration of ameliorative measures must prioritize the child’s physical and psychological safety. The Convention explicitly recognizes that the child’s interest in avoiding physical or psychological harm, in addition to other interests, “may overcome the return remedy.” Id., at 16 (majority opinion) (cataloging interests). A court may therefore decline to consider imposing ameliorative measures where it is clear that they would not work because the risk is so grave. Sexual abuse of a child is one example of an intolerable situation. See 51 Fed. Reg. 10510. Other physical or psychological abuse, serious neglect, and domestic violence in the home may also constitute an obvious grave risk to the child’s safety that could not readily be ameliorated. A court may also decline to consider imposing ameliorative measures where it reasonably expects that they will not be followed. See, e.g., Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F. 3d 204, 221 (CA1 2000) (providing example of parent with history of violating court orders).
“Second, consideration of ameliorative measures should abide by the Convention’s requirement that courts addressing return petitions do not usurp the role of the court that will adjudicate the underlying custody dispute. The Convention and ICARA prohibit courts from resolving any underlying custody dispute in adjudicating a return petition. See Art. 16, Treaty Doc., at 10; 22 U. S. C. §9001(b)(4). Accordingly, a court ordering ameliorative measures in making a return determination should limit those measures in time and scope to conditions that would permit safe return, without purporting to decide subsequent custody matters or weighing in on permanent arrangements.
“Third, any consideration of ameliorative measures must accord with the Convention’s requirement that courts “act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.” Art. 11, Treaty Doc., at 9. Timely resolution of return petitions is important in part because return is a “provisional” remedy to enable final custody determinations to proceed. Monasky, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Convention also prioritizes expeditious determinations as being in the best interests of the child because “[e]xpedition will help minimize the extent to which uncertainty adds to the challenges confronting both parents and child.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 180 (2013). A requirement to “examine the full range of options that might make possible the safe return of a child,” Blondin II, 238 F. 3d, at 163, n. 11, is in tension with this focus on expeditious resolution. In this case, for example, it took the District Court nine months to comply with the Second Circuit’s directive on remand. Remember, the Convention requires courts to resolve return petitions “us[ing] the most expeditious procedures available,” Art. 2, Treaty Doc., at 7, and to provide parties that request it with an explanation if proceedings extend longer than six weeks, Art. 11, id., at 9. Courts should structure return proceedings with these instructions in mind. Consideration of ameliorative measures should not cause undue delay in resolution of return petitions.
“To summarize, although nothing in the Convention prohibits a district court from considering ameliorative measures, and such consideration often may be appropriate, a district court reasonably may decline to consider ameliorative measures that have not been raised by the parties, are unworkable, draw the court into determinations properly resolved in custodial proceedings, or risk overly prolonging return proceedings. The court may also find the grave risk so unequivocal, or the potential harm so severe, that ameliorative measures would be inappropriate. Ultimately, a district court must exercise its discretion to consider ameliorative measures in a manner consistent with its general obligation to address the parties’ substantive arguments and its specific obligations under the Convention. A district court’s compliance with these requirements is subject to review under an ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard.”
U.S. Supreme Court Restricts Discovery Assistance to International Arbitral Tribunals
Written by Matthias Lehmann, University of Vienna (Austria)
On 13 June 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that U.S. courts may not help arbitral tribunals sitting abroad in the taking of evidence. This is because in the opinion of the Court, such an arbitral tribunal is not a „foreign or international tribunal“ in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which allows federal district courts to order the production of evidence for use in proceedings before such tribunals.
The decision concerned an institutional and an ad-hoc arbitration. The first, ZF v. Luxshare, was a commercial arbitration between two companies under the rules of the German Arbitration Institution (DIS). The second, AlixPartners v. Fund for Protection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign States, was an investment arbitration involving a disgruntled Russian investor and a failed Lithuanian bank; it was conducted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
The opinion, written by Amy Coney Barrett, rejects assistance by U.S. courts in both cases, whether in the pre-arbitration phase or in the main arbitration proceedings. It was unanimously adopted by the Court.
The Supreme Court first relies on a dubious literal interpretation of § 1782. While it does not dispute that arbitral tribunals may be “tribunals”, this would change by the addition of the adjectives “foreign or international”, as this would require that one or several nations have imbued the tribunal with governmental authority. Alas, the drafters of the New York Convention on recognition and enforcement of “foreign” arbitral awards were wrong, and so apparently were the signatories – among them the U.S. As for the term “international”, numerous treatises on “international commercial arbitration” will now supposedly have to be rewritten or newly titled.
The opinion further argues that the “animating purpose” of § 1782 would be “comity” with other nations, and that it would be “difficult to see how enlisting district courts to help private bodies would help that end”. Yet other nations also have an interest in efficient arbitration proceedings, as evidenced by the New York Convention. This is even particularly clear for investment arbitration because of the involvement of a state party, but it is also true in commercial arbitration. What is decisive from the point of view of many countries is that arbitration as a dispute resolution method is equivalent to litigation, and should not be treated less favourably.
The Supreme Court further argues that if § 1782 were to be extended to commercial arbitral “panels”, it would cover everything, including even a university’s student disciplinary tribunal. Yet the absurdity of this argumentum ad absurdum lies not in the inclusion of arbitration in § 1782 but in the extension made by the Court, which was only asked about the former and not about the latter. If need be, it would have been easy to distinguish commercial and investment arbitral tribunals established under national or international rules and covered by international agreements such as the New York Convention from student disciplinary “tribunals” (rather: panels).
Finally, the Court notes that allowing district courts to proffer evidence to a foreign arbitral tribunal would create a mismatch with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which does not foresee such assistance for domestic arbitral tribunals. Yet the solution of this mismatch should have better been left to the legislator, who could either extend the FAA to discovery or exclude foreign and international arbitral tribunals from the scope of § 1782. At any rate, the worse situation of domestic arbitral tribunals does not seem a sufficient justification to also deprive arbitral tribunals abroad, who may have particular difficulties in gathering evidence in the U.S., of assistance by U.S. courts.
All in all, this is disappointing news from Capitol Hill for international arbitration. Whether on arbitration or abortion, the current Supreme Court seems to be willing to upend legal precedent and to question customary legal terminology. At least for arbitration, the consequences will not be life-threatening, because the practice will be able to adapt. But one can already see the next questions coming to the Supreme Court. How about this one: Are ICSID tribunals imbued with governmental authority?
News
European responses to global crises: Call for submissions for DynamInt Doctoral Conference 2024
The annual DynamInt Doctoral Conference will be held in Amsterdam on 28th and 29th August 2024 and is co-organised by the Graduate School DynamInt (Humboldt University of Berlin) and the Amsterdam Law School (University of Amsterdam). It takes place in the context of the European Law School’s Summer Academy. We invite early career researchers (doctoral and postdoctoral) working in European Union law to come together and to discuss responses to the most pressing crises currently facing the European Union, its Member states, and citizens. Within the framework of the three topics outlined below, participants may present their work and engage in discussion with fellow scholars. In addition, Faculty specialised in EU, international, and comparative law will give in-depth feedback on the contributions submitted prior to the conference.
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP) No 4/2023: Abstracts
The fourth issue of 2023 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:
Cristina Campiglio, Professor at the University of Pavia, Giurisdizione e legge applicabile in materia di responsabilità medica (ovvero a proposito di conflitti di qualificazioni) [Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Matters of Medical Liability (Namely, on the Issue of Conflicts of Characterisation); in Italian]
Extended Deadline: Symposium and Special Issue on Private International Law and Sustainable Development in Asia
The United Nations Agenda 2030 with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) seems to have a blind spot for the role of private and private international law. That blind spot is beginning to be closed. A collective volume with global outlook published in 2021 addressed “the private side of transforming our world”: each of the 17 SDGs was discussed in one chapter of the book devoted to the specific relevance of private law and private international law. In 2022, the IACL-ASADIP conference in Asunción, Paraguay discussed sustainable private international law with regard to Latin America; the contributions published in 2023 in a special issue of the University of Brasilia Law Journal – Direito.UnB., V.7., N.3 (2023).