Views
Toothless vs. Shark-Teeth: How Anti-Suit Injunctions and Anti-Anti-Suit Orders Collide in the UniCredit Saga
by Faidon Varesis, University of Cambridge
Background
The dispute in the UniCredit v. RusChem saga arose from bonds issued by UniCredit to guarantee performance under contracts for Russian construction projects, where RusChem, after terminating the contracts due to EU sanctions, initiated Russian proceedings for payment in breach of an English-law governed arbitration agreement that mandates resolution in Paris under ICC rules.
UniCredit sought an anti-suit injunction in the UK to stop these Russian proceedings, arguing that the arbitration clause must be enforced under English law. Teare J at first instance held that the English court lacked jurisdiction—finding that the arbitration agreements were governed by French substantive rules and that England was not the appropriate forum—whereas the Court of Appeal reversed this decision by granting a final anti-suit injunction requiring RCA to terminate its Russian proceedings.
CJEU in Albausy on (in)admissibility of questions for a preliminary ruling under Succession Regulation
In a recent ruling, the CJEU adds another layer to the ongoing discussion on which national authorities can submit questions for preliminary rulings under the Succession Regulation, and its nuanced interpretation of what constitutes a ‘court.’
Albausy (Case C-187/23, ECLI:EU:C:2025:34, January 25, 2025) evolves around the question of competence to submit a request for preliminary ruling under the Succession Regulation (Regulation 650/2012 on matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession).
Although the CJEU finds that the request in that case is inadmissible, the decision is noteworthy because it confirms the system of the Succession Regulation. Within the regulation, the competence to submit questions for preliminary ruling is reserved for national courts that act as judicial bodies and are seized with a claim over which they have jurisdiction based on Succession Regulation’s rules on jurisdiction.
The opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona is available here.
A Judgment is a Judgment? How (and Where) to Enforce Third-State Judgments in the EU After Brexit
In the wake of the CJEU’s controversial judgment in H Limited (Case C-568/22), which appeared to open a wide backdoor into the European Area of Justice through an English enforcement judgments (surprisingly considered a ‘judgment’ in the sense of Art. 2(a), 39 Brussels Ia by the Court), international law firms had been quick to celebrate the creation of ‘a new enforcement mechanism‘ for non-EU judgments.
As the UK had already completed its withdrawal from the European Union when the decision was rendered, the specific mechanism that the Court seemed to have sanctioned was, of course, short-lived. But crafty judgment creditors may quickly have started to look elsewhere.
In a paper that has just been published in a special issue of the Journal of Private International Law dedicated to the work of Trevor Hartley, I try to identify the jurisdictions to which they might look. Read more
News
The Role of Precedents in Final Appeal Proceedings: Germany, Israel, USA — Panel Discussion (On-Site/Remote), Bonn, 20 January 2026, 6 p.m. German time
The Regional Hubs Bonn, Cologne and Düsseldorf of the German-American Lawyers’ Association (DAJV), together with the German-Israeli Lawyers’ Association (DIJV), the leading law firm Redeker Sellner Dahs and the University of Bonn, invite to a panel discussion at the Bonn offices of Redeker Sellner Dahs.
Germany has recently introduced a “precedent procedure” (“Leitentscheidungsverfahren”) in the German Code of Civil Procedure (“Zivilprozessordnung”, ZPO). The new legislation, only applicable if the outcome is relevant to a “multitude” (“Vielzahl”) of other proceedings, entered into force on 31 October 2024. On that very day, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) immediately made use of this new tool and elevated to a “precedent procedure” a pending litigation against Facebook on damages for immaterial harm from “scraping” according to Article 82 European General Data Protection Regulation (“Scraping Complex”). This was to ensure that the Court be able to deliver an opinion on the relevant question of law even if the parties were to settle the case meanwhile. In the following, the parties did not settle, and the Court delivered its regular judgment soon afterwards, on 18 November 2024. Since then, the Court has not yet used this tool again, as it seems.
Germany is a civil law jurisdiction where, formally speaking (and leaving some exceptions aside), there are no binding precedents. Yet, there has been a long debate on “persuasive precedents”, i.e. the expectation and practice that lower courts follow the judgments of the Federal Court of Justice (and other highest courts), unless they put forward thorough legal reasoning for departing. A plethora of fundamental and practically relevant questions arises in this context: Do judgments of the courts create “law” or do they merely tell us what the law says that the legislator enacted? What, if any, are the constitutional constraints on judicial development of the law? Is the concept of “persuasive precedents” a satisfactory calibration between rendering justice in the individual case and stability of the legal system? What is the status of an opinion of the German Federal Court of Justice in the new precedent procedure in this context? Why does it only cover cases with relevance to a multitude of other proceedings? Is this “multitude” the same as the relevance of the point in law for a “multitude” of cases to grant access to first and final appeal (“fundamental relevance” [“grundsätzliche Bedeutung”])? What is the role of the three layer appeal system in its entirety in this regard? How does the independence of the judiciary come into play and how does this institutional guarantee relate to available disciplinary measures against “slow” and “ineffective” judges? To what extent do judges tend to discipline themselves by following precedents to promote themselves for higher-ranking posts?
All of these questions are highly relevant in other jurisdictions as well, but they are placed in fundamentally different contexts. Israel is a mixed jurisdiction with elements from common law and civil law. How do the Israeli Supreme Court and the lower courts deal with these issues? What is the law-making role of the Supreme Court in the context of constitutional tradition and practice? Is it advisable to combine the function of final appeal with judicial review of the executive and legislative branches of the state? Is there a particular politicization of final appeal proceedings as well, next to this trend in regard to judicial review proceedings? What effect should the role of precedents have on the procedure of appointing judges to the Supreme Court? Similar questions appear with a view to the United States, but there these questions are placed within a common law context. Having regard to recent decisions of the Supreme Court, how binding is precedent, and when can it be overturned? Also, what is the purpose of the “shadow docket”, and what does its apparently increased use signify in current Supreme Court practice? How important is precedent for the rule of law?
These and other questions will be addressed by a distinguished panel that represents the three jurisdictions and diverse perspectives:
Panelists:
Dr Thomas von Plehwe, Attorney admitted to the Bar of the German Federal Court of Justice (“Rechtsanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof”), Karlsruhe, Germany.
Professor Barak Medina, The Landecker-Ferencz chair in the study of Protection of Minorities and Vulnerable Groups, Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel.
Professor Russell A. Miller, J.B. Stombock Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law, Lexington, USA.
Moderators:
RA Professor Dr Peter Andreas Brand, Redeker Sellner Dahs Rechtsanwälte, Berlin Offices.
Professor Dr Matthias Weller, Mag.rer.publ., MAE, Director of the Institute for German and International Civil Procedural Law, Regional Board Member for Bonn of the DAJV.
The venue is Willy-Brandt-Allee 11, 53113 Bonn. Participation is possible on site or via video conference.
We are looking forward to seeing you there!
Registration at sekretariat.weller@jura.uni-bonn.de
Report on the 4th Asian Private International Law Academy (APILA) Conference
The 4th Asian Private International Law Academy (APILA) Conference was held on 13–14 December 2025 in Doshisha University (Kyoto, Japan). The two-day Conference explored a wide variety of questions and issues on private international law in Asia. It featured 21 papers delivered by leading and emerging scholars. Each paper was followed by a Q&A and discussion session among over 40 attendees. Attendees thoroughly enjoyed the rich intellectual exchanges within the close-knit (and expanding) community of APILA, and also the reception (with an impressive selection of food and drinks) on the first night of the Conference.