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I thought we were exclusive? Some issues with the Hague Convention on Choice of Court, Brussels Ia and Brexit
This blog post is by Dr Mukarrum Ahmed (Lancaster University) and Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Aberdeen). It presents a condensed version of their article in the August 2017 issue of the Journal of Private International Law. The blog post includes specific references to the actual journal article to enable the reader to branch off into the detailed discussion where relevant. It also takes account of recent developments in the Brexit negotiation that took place after the journal article was completed.
On 1 October 2015, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (‘Hague Convention’) entered into force in 28 Contracting States, including Mexico and all the Member States of the European Union, except Denmark. The Convention has applied between Singapore and the other Contracting States since 1 October 2016. China, Ukraine and the USA have signed the Convention indicating that they hope to ratify it in the future (see the official status table for the Convention on the Hague Conference on Private International Law’s website). The Brussels Ia Regulation, which is the European Union’s device for jurisdictional and enforcement matters, applies as of 10 January 2015 to legal proceedings instituted and to judgments rendered on or after that date. In addition to legal issues that may arise independently under the Hague Convention, some issues may manifest themselves at the interface between the Hague Convention and the Brussels Ia Regulation. Both sets of issues are likely to garner the attention of cross-border commercial litigators, transactional lawyers and private international law academics. The article examines anti-suit injunctions, concurrent proceedings and the implications of Brexit in the context of the Hague Convention and its relationship with the Brussels Ia Regulation. (See pages 387-389 of the article)
It is argued that the Hague Convention’s system of ‘qualified’ or ‘partial’ mutual trust may permit anti-suit injunctions, actions for damages for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements and anti-enforcement injunctions where such remedies further the objective of the Convention. (See pages 394-402 of the article) The text of the Hague Convention and the Explanatory Report by Professors Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi are not explicit on this issue. However, the procès-verbal of the Diplomatic Session of the Hague Convention reveal widespread support for the proposition that the formal ‘process’ should be differentiated from the desired ‘outcome’ when considering whether anti-suit injunctions are permitted under the Convention. Where anti-suit injunctions uphold choice of court agreements and thus help achieve the intended ‘outcome’ of the Convention, there was a consensus among the official delegates at the Diplomatic Session that the Convention did not limit or constrain national courts of Contracting States from granting the remedy. (See Minutes No 9 of the Second Commission Meeting of Monday 20 June 2005 (morning) in Proceedings of the Twentieth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau of the Conference, Intersentia 2010) 622, 623–24) Conversely, where the remedy impedes the sound operation of the Convention by effectively derailing proceedings in the chosen court, there was also a consensus of the official delegates at the meeting that the Convention will not permit national courts of the Contracting States to grant anti-suit injunctions.
However, intra-EU Hague Convention cases may arguably not permit remedies for breach of exclusive choice of court agreements as they may be deemed to be an infringement of the principle of mutual trust and the principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) which animate the multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order of the Brussels Ia Regulation (see pages 403-405 of the article; C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565). If an aggrieved party does not commence proceedings in the chosen forum or commences such proceedings after the non-chosen court has rendered a decision on the validity of the choice of court agreement, the recognition and enforcement of that ruling highlights an interesting contrast between the Brussels Ia Regulation and the Hague Convention. It appears that the non-chosen court’s decision on the validity of the choice of court agreement is entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Brussels Ia Regulation. (See C-456/11 Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG v Samskip GmbH EU:C:2012:719, [2013] QB 548) The Hague Convention does not similarly protect the ruling of a non-chosen court. In fact, only a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States. (See Article 8(1) of the Hague Convention) Therefore, the ruling of a non-chosen court is not entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Hague Convention’s system of ‘qualified’ or ‘partial’ mutual trust. This provides a ready explanation for the compatibility of anti-suit injunctions with the Hague Convention but does not proceed any further to transpose the same conclusion into the very different context of the Brussels Ia Regulation which prioritizes the principle of mutual trust.
The dynamics of the relationship between Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation and Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention is mapped in the article (at pages 405-408). In a case where the Hague Convention should apply rather than the Brussels Ia Regulation because one of the parties is resident in a non-EU Contracting State to the Convention even though the chosen court is in a Member State of the EU (See Article 26(6)(a) of the Hague Convention) one would expect Article 6 of the Convention to be applied by any non-chosen court in the EU. However, the fundamental nature of the Article 31(2) lis pendens mechanism under the Brussels Ia Regulation may warrant the pursuance of a different line of analysis. (See Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Interzuid Transport BV EU:C:2013:858, [2014] I.L.Pr. 10, [36]; See also to similar effect, Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG EU:C:2010:243, [2010] I.L.Pr. 35, [49]) It is argued that the Hartley–Dogauchi Report’s interpretative approach has much to commend it as it follows the path of least resistance by narrowly construing the right to sue in a non-chosen forum as an exception rather than the norm. The exceptional nature of the right to sue in the non-chosen forum under the Hague Convention can be effectively reconciled with Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. This will usually result in the stay of the proceedings in the non-chosen court as soon as the chosen court is seised. As a consequence, the incidence of parallel proceedings and irreconcilable judgments are curbed, which are significant objectives in their own right under the Brussels Ia Regulation. It is hoped that the yet to develop jurisprudence of the CJEU on the emergent Hague Convention and the Brussels Ia Regulation will offer definitive and authoritative answers to the issues discussed in the article.
The implications of Brexit on this topic are not yet fully clear. (See pages 409-410 of the article) The UK is a party to the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention as a Member State of the EU, the latter having approved the Convention for all its Member States apart from Denmark. The UK will do what is necessary to remain a party to the Convention after Brexit. In its recently published negotiating paper – only available after the article in the Journal of Private International Law was completed – the UK Government has explicitly stated that:
“It is our intention to continue to be a leading member in the Hague Conference and to participate in those Hague Conventions to which we are already a party and those which we currently participate in by virtue of our membership of the EU.” (see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework (PDF) at para 22).
The UK will no doubt avoid any break in the Convention’s application. Brexit will almost certainly see the end of the application of the Brussels Ia Regulation in the UK. The reason being that its uniform interpretation is secured by the CJEU through the preliminary ruling system under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The UK is not willing to accept that jurisdiction post-Brexit (“Leaving the EU will therefore bring an end to the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK, because the CJEU derives its jurisdiction and authority from the EU Treaties.” see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 20). So although the UK negotiators are asking for a bespoke deal with the EU to continue something like Brussels Ia (“The UK will therefore seek an agreement with the EU that allows for close and comprehensive cross-border civil judicial cooperation on a reciprocal basis, which reflects closely the substantive principles of cooperation under the current EU framework” see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 19) it seems improbable that the EU will agree to such a bespoke deal just with the UK when the UK does not accept the CJEU preliminary ruling system. The EU may well say that the option for close partners of the EU in this field is the Lugano Convention. The UK Government has indicated that it would like to remain part of the Lugano Convention (see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 22). In doing so it would continue to mandate the UK courts to take account of the jurisprudence of the CJEU -when that court is interpreting Brussels Ia or the Lugano Convention – when UK courts are interpreting the Lugano Convention (see the opaque statement by the UK Government that “the UK and the EU will need to ensure future civil judicial cooperation takes into account regional legal arrangements, including the fact that the CJEU will remain the ultimate arbiter of EU law within the EU.” see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 20). However, unless the Lugano Convention is renegotiated it does not contain a good solution in relation to conflicts of jurisdiction for exclusive choice of court agreements because it has not been amended to reflect Article 31(2) of Brussels Ia and therefore still gives priority to the non-chosen court when it is seised first and the exclusively chosen court is seised second in accordance with the Gasser decision of the CJEU (see Case C-116/02 [2003] ECR I-14693). Renegotiation of the Lugano Convention is not even on the agenda at the moment although the Gasser problem may be discussed at the Experts’ Meeting pursuant to Article 5 Protocol 2 of the Lugano Convention on 16 and 17 October 2017 in Basel, Switzerland (Professor Beaumont is attending that meeting as an invited expert). Revision of the Lugano Convention would be a good thing, as would Norway and Switzerland becoming parties to the Hague Convention. It seems that at least until the Lugano Convention is revised and a means is found for the UK to be a party to it (difficult if the UK does not stay in EFTA), the likely outcome post-Brexit is that the regime applicable between the UK and the EU (apart from Denmark) in relation to exclusive choice of court agreements within the scope of the Hague Convention will be the Hague Convention. The UK will be able to grant anti-suit injunctions to uphold exclusive choice of court agreements in favour of the courts in the UK even when one of the parties has brought an action contrary to that agreement in an EU Member State. The EU Member States will apply Article 6 of the Hague Convention rather than Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation when deciding whether to decline jurisdiction in favour of the chosen court(s) in the UK.
Whilst the Hague Convention only offers a comprehensive jurisdictional regime for cases involving exclusive choice of court agreements, it does give substantial protection to the jurisdiction of UK courts designated in such an agreement which will be respected in the rest of the EU regardless of the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. Post-Brexit the recognition and enforcement regime for judgments not falling within the scope of the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention could be the new Hague Judgments Convention currently being negotiated in The Hague (see Working Paper No. 2016/3- Respecting Reverse Subsidiarity as an excellent strategy for the European Union at The Hague Conference on Private International Law – reflections in the context of the Judgments Project? by Paul Beaumont). Professor Beaumont will continue to be a part of the EU Negotiating team for that Convention at the Special Commission in the Hague from 13-17 November 2017. It is greatly to be welcomed that the UK Government has affirmed its commitment to an internationalist and not just a regional approach to civil judicial co-operation:
“The UK is committed to increasing international civil judicial cooperation with third parties through our active participation in the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law… We will continue to be an active and supportive member of these bodies, as we are clear on the value of international and intergovernmental cooperation in this area.” See Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 21.
One good thing that could come from Brexit is the powerful combination of the EU and the UK both adopting a truly internationalist perspective in the Hague Conference on Private International Law in order to genuinely enhance civil judicial co-operation throughout the world. The UK can be one of the leaders of the common law world while using its decades of experience of European co-operation to help build bridges to the civil law countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America.
On the Global Community of Private International Law – Impressions from Brazil
From August 3-5 this year, the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro hosted the 7th biennial conference of the Journal of Private International Law. Ably organized by Nadia de Araujo and Daniela Vargas from the host institution, together with Paul Beaumont from Aberdeen, the conference was a great success, as concerns both the quality and quantity of the presentations. Instead of a conference report, I want to provide some, undoubtedly subjective, impressions as concerns the emerging global community of private international law.
First, no less than 168 participants attended, from all over the world. The Journal conference has, by now, become something like a World Congress of Private International Law. This is no small achievement. The Journal of Private International Law started out in 2005 as a very doctrinal publication focusing primarily on common law systems and European private international law. Fittingly, the first two conferences took place in the UK. It was a very wise decision to move, after that, to cities in other countries—New York (2009), Milan (2011), Madrid (2013) and now, after a return to the UK (Cambridge) for the ten-year anniversary in 2015, Rio de Janeiro (2017). By now, it can be said that Journal and conference both really represent the world. And what is emerging is a global community that comes together at these and other events.
Second, this first Journal conference in Latin America was an excellent opportunity to showcase the tremendous developments of the discipline on this Continent. Latin America, the region that created the Código Bustamante, has long produced excellent scholars in private international law. However, for some time the discipline appeared, at least to the outside observer, marginalized, caught between a very doctrinal approach on the one side and a very philosophical one on the other, both often without connection to actual practice. In recent years, this has changed, for a number of reasons: the Hague Conference established a bureau, led by Ignacio Goicoechea; a young generation of scholars connects theory and practice, doctrine and interdisciplinarity; legislators are, at long last, replacing antiquated legislation. Many Latin American scholars and practitioners at the conference proved that interest and quality. But the best sign for the vitality of the field were the many excellent Brazilian students who followed the conference with enthusiasm and expertise.
Third, and finally, this emerging globalization captures all regions, but not to the same degree. The great importance of Latin America in Rio was no surprise. Nor was the great role that European private international law, a testament not only both to the European background of the journal and the more generous travel budgets in European universities, but also to the legislative and scholarly developments in Europe. Asia was somewhat less well represented, as far as I could see, despite exciting developments there (including current work on Asian Principles of Private International Law), but several presentations dealt with Asian development. The most palpable absence concerned the United States. There were only two participants from the US, fewer than there were Nigerians. In a not so distant past, US private international law was the avant-garde of the discipline worldwide. When the Second Restatement was being discussed, the whole world was watching what the conflicts revolution would yield. Now, a third Restatement is underway. But I heard no word about that from participants in Rio, and the Restatement’s reporters did not use the occasion to advertise their project. The United States is no longer leading the globalization of the field. Will it at least follow?
Grounds for Refusal of Recognition of (Quasi-) Annex Judgements in the Recast European Insolvency Regulation
Written by Zoltán Fabók, Fellow of INSOL International, Counsel at DLA Piper (Hungary) and PhD Candidate at Nottingham Trent University
Insolvency-related (annex) actions and judgements fall within the scope of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation (‘Recast EIR’). That instrument both determines international jurisdiction regarding annex actions and sets up a simplified recognition system for annex judgements. However, tension between the Recast EIR’s provisions on jurisdiction and recognition arises when a court of a state different from the state of insolvency erroneously assumes jurisdiction for annex actions. Such ‘quasi-annex’ judgements rendered by foreign courts erroneously assuming jurisdiction threaten the integrity of the insolvency proceedings. Besides, the quasi-annex judgements may violate the effectiveness and efficiency of the insolvency proceedings as well as the principle of legal certainty.
In my paper, it is argued that even the current legal framework may offer some ways to avoid the recognition of such quasi-annex judgements. First, the scope of the public policy exception may be extended in order to protect the integrity of the insolvency proceedings from the quasi-annex judgements rendered by foreign courts erroneously assuming jurisdiction. Second, it may be argued that quasi-annex judgements do not equal real annex judgements and therefore do not enjoy the automatic recognition system provided by the Recast EIR. At the same time, their close connection to the insolvency proceedings – disregarded by the forum erroneously assuming jurisdiction – may exclude quasi-annex judgements from the scope of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, as well. As a consequence, those quasi-annex judgements may fall within the gap between the two regulations, meaning that no European instrument instructs the courts of the member state addressed to recognise quasi-annex judgements.
My research article has been accepted for publication by International Insolvency Review. The paper can be accessed in the Early View section at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/iir.1284/full.
News
Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2/2023: Abstracts
The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:
(These abstracts can also be found at the IPRax-website under the following link: https://www.iprax.de/en/contents/)
H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner: Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2022: Bewegung im internationalen Familienrecht
This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from January 2022 until December 2022. It presents newly adopted legal instruments and summarizes current projects that are making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. Furthermore, the authors look at areas of law where the EU has made use of its external competence. They discuss important decisions and pending cases before the CJEU pertaining to the subject matter of the article. In addition, the article also looks at current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.
N. Elsner/H. Deters: Of party requested service by post and courts as transmitting agencies under the EU Service Regulation
On 1 July 2022, the EU Regulation on the Service of Documents No. 1784/20 (Recast) (EU Service Regulation) took effect and changed the law on service by postal services in cross-border proceedings. This calls for a revisiting of the divergent opinions and ways of interpretation of service by postal services according to Art. 14 EU Service Regulation 2007 and its relation to Art. 15 EU Service Regulation 2007. Against this background, this article discusses a decision of the Higher Regional Court Frankfurt (OLG Frankfurt) holding that service by postal services pursuant to Art. 14 EU Service Regulation 2007 is in principle only open to a court when effecting service in cross-border proceedings. A party shall effect service according to Art. 15 EU Service Regulation 2007 by contacting directly the foreign authorities designated to effect service in the other member state.
Firstly, the reasoning of the court and the opinions in legal scholarship on the admissibility of service by postal services effected by parties are assessed critically. Subsequently, the authors propose a different application of Art. 14 and 15 EU Service Regulation 2007 in Germany. It will be argued that the OLG Frankfurt was indeed correct in stating that service by postal services must be effected through a transmitting agency according to Art. 2 EU Service Regulation 2007. Under German law, only courts are considered transmitting agencies. However, this does not preclude parties from effecting this type of service. When parties are required to effect service themselves under German law, they may send the documents to the court, inform the court of the address of the other party and apply for service in accordance with Art. 14 EU Service Regulation 2007. The court then acts as a mere transmitting agency on behalf of the party, and thus, in its administrative capacity.
S. Schwemmer: Direct tort claims of the creditors of an insolvent company against the foreign grandparent company
In its ruling of 10 March 2022 (Case C-498/20 – ZK ./. BMA Nederland), the ECJ had to deal with a so-called Peeters/Gatzen-claim under Dutch law brought by the insolvency administrator. The court had already ruled in an earlier judgement that these claims fall under the Brussels I Regulation (recast). So the main question was now where the harmful event occurred within the meaning of Art. 7 para. 2 of the Regulation. The ECJ opts for the seat of the insolvent company, basing its analysis on the differentiation between primary damage and consequential damage. The same analysis is also used to determine the applicable law under the Rome II Regulation. In this context, however, the ECJ examines more closely the specific breach of duty of care to determine whether the claim falls under the scope of the Rome II Regulation or under the rules of international company law.
A. Kronenberg: Disapproved overriding mandatory provisions and factual impossibility
Two years after the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht, OLG) of Frankfurt am Main, the OLG Munich also had to rule on a lawsuit filed by an Israeli against Kuwait Airways. The plaintiff had demanded to be flown from Munich to Sri Lanka with a stopover in Kuwait City in accordance with the contract the parties had concluded. The OLG Munich dismissed the claim with regard to a Kuwaiti Israel boycott law, which, although inapplicable, according to the court had the effect that it was factually impossible for the defendant airline to transport Israeli nationals with a stopover in Kuwait. The ruling shows that in cases of substantive law level consideration of disapproved foreign overriding mandatory provisions the legally required result can be undesirable. However, this result depends on the circumstances of the individual case as well as on certain prerequisites that must be observed when taking into consideration overriding mandatory provisions. The article sets out these prerequisites and shows why the OLG Munich probably should have ordered the defendant to perform its obligation. It also explains why, in cases in which factual impossibility indeed exists, the result of the dismissal of the action most likely cannot be changed even by enacting a blocking statute.
C. Thomale/C. Lukas: The pseudo-foreign British one man-LLC
The Higher Regional Court of Munich has decided that a Bristish one man-LLC, which has its real seat in Germany, under German conflict of laws and substantive rules lacks legal personality altogether. This case note analyzes this decision’s implications for the conflict of company laws, notably for the interpretation of the TCA and application of the so-called “modified real seat theory”.
M. Brinkmann: Discharge in England and subsequent declaratory judgement against debtor in Germany – Binding effects of judgement trump recognition of prior bankruptcy proceedings
The Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf (OLG Düsseldorf) had to decide upon an action for the payment of damages based on a declaratory judgement. The declaratory judgement had established the defendant’s liability and was, at the time, not challenged by the defendant. In his defense against the action for payment the defendant now tries to invoke a discharge, which he had already obtained in insolvency proceedings in the UK in March 2012, i.e. prior to the declaratory judgement.
The OLG argued that under the applicable EIR, the English insolvency proceedings were, in principle, subject to automatic recognition. Under Art. 17 EIR 2002, these proceedings produce the same effects in all Member States. The OLG Düsseldorf nevertheless precluded the defendant from invoking the discharge. As the English bankruptcy proceedings were concluded before the action for the declaratory judgement was initiated, the defendant should have invoked the discharge already in the proceedings that led to the declaratory judgement in March 2013.
The OLG correctly found that the declaratory judgement was procedurally binding between the parties and hence barred the defendant from invoking the discharge in subsequent proceedings.
M. Andrae: Modification or suspension of enforcement of a decision under Article 12 of the Hague Child Abduction Convention?
The article discusses which procedural options exist if, after a final decision pursuant to 12 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, circumstances arise which would justify the refusal of an application for the return of the child. A procedure to change the decision is only permissible if the international jurisdiction of the German courts exists. For child abduction from EU Member States, this is determined in principle according to Art. 9 of the Regulation (EU) n 1111/2019 and for child abduction from other Contracting States of The Hague Protection of Children Convention according to Art. 7 of the Convention. As long as jurisdiction thereafter lies with the courts of the state in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention keep, the German courts are limited to ordering the temporary stay of enforcement.
J. Oster: Facebook dislikes: The taming of a data giant through private international data protection law
Just as the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) suffers from a deficit concerning both its public and its private enforcement. Among other things, this deficit is owed to the fact that European data protection law still raises many questions regarding jurisdiction and the applicable law. In its interlocutory judgment that will be discussed in this article, the Rechtbank Amsterdam established its jurisdiction and declared the GDPR as well as Dutch data protection and tort law applicable to a lawsuit by the Dutch Data Protection Foundation for alleged violations of rules of data protection and unfair competition. This article agrees with the Rechtbank’s findings, but it also draws attention to weaknesses in its reasoning and to unresolved questions of European private international data protection law.
Repeal of the RECJA and transfer of countries to the REFJA
Singapore’s Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act 1921 (‘RECJA’) is based on the UK Administration of Justice Act 1920 and its Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 1959 (‘REFJA’) is based on the UK Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. In 2019, the government amended the REFJA in significant ways (previously detailed here), expanding its scope to include the registration of judgments from non-superior courts of gazetted countries, judicial settlements, non-money judgments and interlocutory judgments. At the same time, the RECJA was repealed from a date to be determined by the government.
That date has now (very nearly) arrived. The RECJA will be repealed on 1 March 2023. When the REFJA was amended in 2019, the intention at that time was to transfer over the countries gazetted under the RECJA gradually to the newly amended REFJA, with negotiations conducted on a country-by-country basis to determine what reciprocal arrangements would be suitable in each case. Only HK SAR has ever been gazetted under the REFJA. On 1 March 2023, it will be joined by Brunei Darussalam, Australia, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (see here). These countries were previously gazetted under the RECJA. An omission is the Windward Islands, which does not appear in the new list. The list now also includes all the States of India; previously the State of Jammu and Kashmir was excluded under the RECJA.
Of particular note, however, is that the terms of the reciprocal arrangements generally remain the same as under the RECJA. Only money judgments rendered by the listed courts of the gazetted countries which are final and conclusive between the parties can be registered under the REFJA. Clearly, the full promise of the REFJA – with its potential for a wider range of foreign judgments to be registered under its scope – will have to be realised another day.
Career Opportunities at the American Society of International Law
The American Society of International Law (ASIL) is looking for a Director of Programmes (responsible for the oversight of the Society’s Programs Department, including major conferences, educational programming, substantive Interest Group activities, international organization engagement, and international law career training) and a Director of Finance and Administration (leading all aspects of the Society’s financial and human resources operations and oversees its general administrative operations, in partnership with the Executive Director).
More information is available on their Career opportunities page.