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Draft Withdrawal Agreement 19 March 2018: Still a Way to Go

Today, the European Union and the United Kingdom have reached an agreement on the transition period for Brexit: from March 29 of next year, date of disconnection, until December 31, 2020. The news are of course available in the press, and the Draft Withdrawal Agreement of 19 March 2018 has already been published… coloured: In green, the text is agreed at negotiators’ level and will only be subject to technical legal revisions in the coming weeks. In yellow, the text is agreed on the policy objective but drafting changes or clarifications are still required. In white, the text corresponds to text proposed by the Union on which discussions are ongoing as no agreement has yet been found. For ongoing judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters (Title VI of Part III, to be applied from December 31, 2020: see Art. 168), this actually means that subject to “technical legal revisions”, the following has been accepted:

  • Art. 62: The EU and the UK are in accordance as to the application by the latter (no need to mention the MS for obvious reasons) of the Rome I and Rome II regulations to contracts concluded before the end of the transition period, and in respect of events giving rise to damage, and which occurred before the end of the transition period.
  • Art. 64: There is also agreement as to the handling of ongoing cooperation procedures, whereby requests for service abroad, the taking of evidence and in the frame of the European Judicial Network are meant.
  • Art. 65: There is agreement as well as to the way Council Directive 2003/8/EC (legal aid), Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matter, and Council Directive 2004/80/EC (relating to compensation to crime victims) will apply after the transition period.

Conversely, no agreement has been found regarding Art. 63, i.e., how to deal with jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions, and related cooperation between central authorities (but whatever is agreed will also be valid in respect of the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 as applicable by virtue of the agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark, see Art. 65.2, in green).

In the light of this it may  be not really worth to start the analysis of the Title as a whole: Art. 63 happens to be the less clear provision. Some puzzling expressions such as “as well as in the Member States in situations involving the United Kingdom” are common to approved texts, but may change in the course of the technical legal revision. So, let’s wait and see.

NoA: Another relevant provision agreed upon – in green-  is Art. 124, Specific arrangements relating to the Union’s external action. Title X of Part III, on pending cases and new cases before the CJEU, remains in white.

And: On the Draft of February 28, 2018 see P. Franzina’s entry here. The Draft was transmitted to the Council (Article 50) and the Brexit Steering Group of the European Parliament; the resulting text was sent to the UK  and made public on March 15.

Religious Conversion and Custody – Important New Decision by the Malaysian Federal Court

A saga that has kept Malaysians engaged for years has finally founds its conclusion. A woman, named (rather improbably, at least for European observers) Indira Gandhi, was fighting with her ex husband over custody. The ex-husband had converted to Islam and had extended the conversion to their three children, with the consequence that the Syariah courts gave him sole custody. What followed was a whole series of court decisions by civil courts on the one hand and Syariah courts on the other, focusing mainly on the jurisdictional question which set of courts gets to decide matters of religious status and which law—Islamic law or civil law—determines the question. The Malaysian Federal Court now quashed the conversion as regards the children, thereby claiming, at least for children, a priority of the Constitution and the jurisdiction of civil courts.

Although the case is mostly discussed in the context of religious freedom and (civil) judicial review, it also raises core issues of conflict of laws. Malaysia is a country with an interpersonal legal system, which leaves jurisdiction over certain matters of Islamic law to the Syariah courts. Indira Gandhi’s ex-husband here used this system, effectively, for a form of forum shopping: converting to Islam enabled him, ostentatiously, to opt into a system more favorable to his own situation. The background, from the perspective of conflict of laws, is that the decisive connecting factor, namely a person’s religion, is open to manipulation in a way in which other connecting factors are not. According to Article 121 of the Federal Constitution, the civil courts have no jurisdiction over matters of the Syariah Courts. On the other hand, Art. 12(4) of the Constitution provides that a minor’s religion is determined by his parent or guardian, a provision the Syariah Courts neglected here. Letting the Constitution trump leads to a desirable result in this case, but it does not, by itself, resolve the underlying conflict-of-laws issues. Here, as in comparable situations, the doctrinal problem appears to lie first in the issue of unilateral determination of personal status and second in a conflation of issues of jurisdiction and applicable law.

The case is Indira Gandhi v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak u.a., [2018] 1 LNS 86 (Federal Court of Malaysia); it is available here. A short summary is here,  another one, including a useful timeline of events, is here. For a very helpful analysis of the case and its background and implications by Jaclyn L. Neo, focusing especially on questions of jurisdiction and judicial review, see here.  A longer discussion by Dian A.H. Shah focuses also on two other cases and more broadly on the issues of religious freedom: Dian A.H. Shah, Religion, conversions, and custody: battles in the Malaysian appellate courts, in  Law and Society in Malaysia: Pluralism, Religion and Ethnicity (Andrew Harding/Dian A.H. Shah eds., 2018). The affair is also discussed in Yvonne Tew‘s article ‘Stealth Theocracy,’ which is forthcoming with the Virginia Journal of International Law.

Mutual trust and judicial cooperation in the EU’s external relations – the blind spot in the EU’s Foreign Trade and Private International Law policy?

Further to the splendid conference How European is European Private International Law? at Berlin on 2 and 3 March 2018, I would like to add some thoughts on an issue that was briefly raised by our fellow editor Pietro Franzina in his truly excellent conference presentation on “The relationship between EU and international Private International Law instruments”. Pietro rightly observed an “increased activity on the external side”, meaning primarily the EU’s PIL activities on the level of the Hague Conference.

At the same time, there seems to be still a blind spot for the EU’s Private International Law policy when it comes to the design of the EU’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Although there is an increasingly large number of such agreements and although “trade is no longer just about trade” (DG Trade) but additionally about exchange or even export of values such as “sustainability”, human rights, labour and environmental standards and the rule of law, there seems to be no policy by DG Trade to include in its many FTAs a Chapter on judicial cooperation with the EU’s respective external trade partners.

To my knowledge there are only the following recent exceptions: The Association Agreements with Georgia and Moldova. Both Agreements entered into force on 1 July 2016.

Article 21 (Georgia) and Article 20 (Moldova) provide:

“Legal cooperation: 1. The Parties agree to develop judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters as regards the negotiation, ratification and implementation of multilateral conventions on civil judicial cooperation and, in particular, the conventions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in the field of international legal cooperation and litigation as well as the protection of children.”

Article 24 of the Association Agreement of 29 May 2014 with the Ukraine reads slightly differently:

“Legal cooperation: 1. The Parties agree to further develop judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, making full use of the relevant international and bilateral instruments and based on the principles of legal certainty and the right to a fair trial.2. The Parties agree to facilitate further EU-Ukraine judicial cooperation in civil matters on the basis of the applicable multilateral legal instruments, especially the Conventions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in the field of international Legal Cooperation and Litigation as well as the Protection of Children.”

All other FTAs, even those currently under (re-) negotiation, do not take into account the need for the management of trust in the judicial cooperation of the trade partners in their deepened and integrated trade relations. Rather, foreign trade law and PIL seem to have remained separate worlds, although the business transactions that are to take place and increase within these trade relations obviously rely heavily on both areas of the law.

Some thoughts on why there is no integrated approach to foreign trade and PIL in the EU, why this is a deficiency that should be taken care of and how this could possibly be done are offered here.

News

Venezuela: Negative choice and UNIDROIT Principles in determining Law applicable to bill of exchange

by Claudia Madrid Martínez

On 17 March 2023, the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice issued a decision whereby it annulled a judgment on appeal and decided the merits of the case, which concerned a bill of exchange issued in Curaçao, binding Venezuelan citizens domiciled in Venezuela.

The interesting thing about this judgment is that the Civil Chamber set aside the reasoning of the court of appeals according to which, since there are no international treaties in force between Venezuela and Curaçao, and there are no rules on bills of exchange in the Venezuelan Act on Private International Law, the Inter-American Convention on Conflicts of Laws concerning Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and Invoices should be applied by analogy and, consequently, “the Law of the place where the obligation was contracted” (art. 1), i.e., the Law of Curaçao, should be applied to the bill of exchange.

It should be noted that, on the one hand, the only Conventions in force for Venezuela regarding bills of exchange are the Inter-American Convention on Conflicts of Laws regarding Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and Invoices, and the Bustamante Code. On the other hand, the Act on Private International Law does not establish rules on International Commercial Law, since —as stated in the Explanatory Memorandum— this matter must be developed within the Commercial Law itself in accordance with the general principles set forth in the Act on Private International Law.

In addition, Article 1 of the Act on Private International Law provides two tools to integrate the gaps in the Act and, in general, the gaps in the Venezuelan Private International Law system. This rule refers to analogy and to the generally accepted principles of Private International Law.

In the past, case law has admitted the application of treaties in force for Venezuela, but not for the other States involved in a specific case, either by analogy (Supreme Court of Justice, Political Administrative Chamber, judgment of 23 February 1981), or on the understanding that their solutions can be characterized as generally accepted principles of Private International Law (Second Court of First Instance in Commercial Matters of the Federal District and Miranda State, judgments of 29 February  1968 and 12 March 1970). Therefore, in this case, the arguments used by the court of appeal in analogically applying the Inter-American Convention were not erroneous.

The Civil Cassation Chamber, however, had another idea when it understood that the judge of appeal erred in the application of the Law of Curaçao to settle the case. Thus, the Chamber began by reaffirming the existence of “relevant foreign elements, such as the place of issuance of the bill of exchange, i.e., Curaçao, and the domicile of the parties involved in Venezuela”. The latter criterion, in fact, is not a foreign element, since it is located in the forum.

The Chamber then cites Article 1 of the Act on Private International Law, and concludes that there are no treaties in force, applicable to the case since Curaçao has not ratified any of the aforementioned treaties, and proceeds to the application of the domestic rules of Private International Law.

In particular, the Civil Chamber intends to determine, in the first place, the Law applicable to the form of the bill of exchange, which is why it resorts, rightly, to Article 37 of the Act on Private International Law, a rule that governs the form of all kinds of legal acts, which is perfectly applicable to bills of exchange, and also, as is well known, it establishes the locus regit actum principle in an alternative manner. Indeed, the rule allows the judge to choose between the Law of the place of conclusion of the act, which governs the substance of the act, and the Law of the domicile of the person doing the act, or of the common domicile of the persons doing the act.

Under Article 37, the choice of the connecting factor applicable to the specific case will depend on the favor validitatisprinciple, i.e., the judge must determine the Law applicable in order to favor the formal validity of the act. In this case, the Civil Chamber decided to apply the domicile criterion, without explaining why, although, basically, the reason can be intuited from the fact that the judge ended up applying Venezuelan law.

The Civil Chamber then begins its examination of the Law applicable to the merits and, in this regard, “finds it pertinent to bring up the provisions of Article 30 of the Act on Private International Law”, a rule that establishes the Law applicable to international contracts in cases where the parties have not chosen it. The nature of a bill of exchange can certainly be discussed, but it is not a contract.

In any case, the Civil Chamber does not justify its action, that is to say, it does not indicate the reason why a rule governing contracts should be applied to a bill of exchange. However, I do not know if this was consciously done, but it did leave out a series of points that are of great interest in the field of international contracts. Let us see.

The first thing the Chamber does is to identify, in accordance with Article 30 of the Law, the objective and subjective elements of the relationship, in order to determine with which Law the bill of exchange is more closely related and assumes for this purpose —although it does not quote it— the opinion expressed by Professor Fabiola Romero in her work “Derecho aplicable al contrato internacional” (in: Liber Amicorum, Homenaje a la Obra Científica y Académica de la profesora Tatiana B. de Maekelt, Caracas, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas, UCV, Fundación Roberto Goldschmidt, 2001, Volume I, pp. 203 ss.), understanding that the subjective elements refer to the parties and the objective ones to the relationship itself.

Thus, the Civil Chamber includes in the subjective elements the nationality and domicile of the parties —all located in Venezuela—; and, within the objective elements, the place of subscription of the bill of exchange —Curaçao—, the place of payment —understanding as such the place indicated next to the name of the drawee and located in Curaçao—, and the fact that the bill is intended to be enforced and performed in Venezuela.

Then, in accordance with the last part of Article 30 of the Act on Private International Law, according to which the judge “shall also take into account the general principles of International Commercial Law recognized by international organizations”, the Civil Chamber analyzes such principles. And it does so considering their so-called conflictual function, since in this case they will be used, not to settle the merits, but to search for the Law applicable.

However, the principles sought by the Civil Chamber are contained in international treaties. Firstly, the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts —now absorbed by the 2008 Rome I Regulation—, which refers to the closest links, but based rather on the questioned criterion of the characteristic performance. Secondly, Article 9 of the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, rule that inspired the solution of Article 30 of the Act on Private International Law.

After reaffirming the application of the Law with which the bill of exchange is most closely connected, the Civil Chamber refers Article 31 of the Act on Private International Law, and understands that “in the event of a dispute regarding the Law to be applied, in the case of a contract or obligation of international origin, in the absence of a choice of Law by the parties or when it is ineffective, the judge shall apply ‘…when appropriate…’, that is, according to the specific case, the Lex mercatoria, which includes the usages, customs and commercial practices of general international acceptance”.

This rule leads the Chamber to consider the UNIDROIT Principles and it decides to apply them on the basis of the so-called negative choice —a discussed solution in the world of arbitration—, admitted by the Preamble of the Principles. Indeed, the Principles may be applied “when the parties have not chosen any law to govern their contract”.

Thus, the Civil Chamber ends up understanding that, in the absence of indication by the parties, in case of a monetary obligation, the place of performance will be “at the obligee’s place of business” (art. 6.1.6[1][a]).

“Now, considering the objective and subjective elements that are directly linked to the referred bill of exchange, as well as the general principles of International Commercial Law accepted by international organizations, the customs and manners of international trade, known as Lex mercatoria, according to Articles 30 and 31 of the Act on Private International Law, it is concluded that the Law applicable to the performance of the bill of exchange shall be the Law of the place of performance, it is concluded that the Law applicable to resolve the merits of the case is Venezuelan Law, given that the parties are Venezuelans, their domicile is in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the commercial instrument, although signed in Curaçao, is intended to be enforceable in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. It is hereby declared”.

The Civil Chamber applied Venezuelan Law to both the form and the substance of the bill of exchange. But there is more, when deciding on the merits, instead of following the solution of the UNIDROIT Principles and calculating interest according to the Law of the State of the currency of payment (art. 7.4.9), it did so instead “at the rate of five percent (5%) per annum, according to Article 456, ordinal 2° of the Venezuelan Commercial Code… for which the conversion into bolivars must be made at the rate established by the Central Bank of Venezuela for the day of payment, all this through a complementary expert opinion, in accordance with Article 249 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not as erroneously requested by the plaintiff, that is to say, calculated at the legal interest rates that have been fixed for each semester by the Central Bank for Curaçao and St. Martin (Centrale Bank Curaçao en Sint Maarten)” (bold in the original).

There are undoubtedly some noteworthy aspects of this decision that hopefully will be taken into account in the future in cases related to international contracting. Others, such as the characterization of a bill of exchange as a contract, the disregard of the possibility of applying international treaties by analogy or as general principles, and the calculation of interest on an international obligation, denominated in foreign currency, in accordance with Venezuelan Law, could rather be forgotten.

Translated by the author from her original post in Spanish.

Second Issue of ICLQ for 2023

Further to my  post on first view articles for the second issue of ICLQ 2023, the second issue for ICLQ for 2023 was just published. It contains the following conflict of laws article that was not included in the first view articles:

S Camilleri, “Sense and Separability”:

This article explores the doctrine of separability, as understood in particular in the English legal tradition. It does so by reference to the decisions in Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros SA and others v Enesa Engelharia SA and others and ENKA ?n?aat ve Sanayi A.?. v OOO ‘Insurance Company Chubb’ & Ors that explore the relevance of the concept when determining the law applicable to the arbitration agreement. These decisions largely treat the doctrine as irrelevant to the determination of the law governing the arbitration agreement. They do so because of the way in which English law views separability as tied inimically to the concept of enforcement of the arbitration agreement. This is unsurprising given the content of section 7 of the Arbitration Act 1996 and the position of the doctrine of separability as a legal fiction that must be restricted to its defined purpose. Viewed against the potential reform of the Arbitration Act 1996, the author asks whether a broader view of separability can be adopted. The author’s view is that there are cogent and compelling reasons for adopting a broader view, that would promote certainty and consistency in a way that is not best served by the current approach.

Conference & call for papers Sustaining Access to Justice

Save the date

On 19-20 October 2023 a conference on ‘Sustaining Access to Justice: Developments and Views on Costs and Funding’ will be held at Erasmus University Rotterdam. The conference is organised by the project team Affordable Access to Justice, financed by the Dutch Research Council. Confirmed keynote speakers include Rachael Mulheron (Queen Mary University London) and Andreas Stein (European Commission, DG Justice and Consumers, head of unit). More information on the program and registration will follow soon.

Call for papers

For this conference we invite submissions of abstracts from early career researchers and young practitioners.

The conference’s theme: Access to civil justice is of paramount importance for enforcing citizens’ rights. At the heart access to civil justice lies litigation funding and cost management. Yet, over the past decades, access to justice has been increasingly put under pressure due to retrenching governments, high costs of procedure, and inefficiency of courts and justice systems. Within this context, the funding of litigation in Europe seems to be shifting from public to private. Private actors and innovative business models emerged to provide new solutions to the old problem of financial barriers of access to justice. With the participation of policymakers, practitioners, academics and civil society representatives from all over Europe, the conference seeks to delve deeper into the financial implications of access to justice and the different ways to achieve sustainable civil justice systems in Europe. The topics addressed will include the different methods of financing dispute adjudication, particularly in the context of group litigation (third-party funding, crowdfunding, blockchain technologies), public interest litigation, developments in ADR/ODR, and the new business models of legal professionals.

Call for Papers: During the second day of the Conference (20 October) a panel will be organised which is intended to function as a forum for young scholars and young practitioners to present their work in front of a distinguished and broad audience. We particularly invite Early Career Researchers, PhD candidates (at an advanced stage of their PhD), and young practitioners to participate and present their research on the conference’s topics and beyond. While the contributions should fall within the Conference broader topic (costs and funding of civil justice), authors are free to include matters they deem interesting to explore within this context. Proposals can be theoretical, empirical as well as policy oriented. Interdisciplinary approaches and/or a Law & Economics approach are especially encouraged.

Submissions and deadline: Please submit an extended abstract (max 1000 words) in English to dori@law.eur.nl and cordina@law.eur.nl on 7 July 2023 at the latest. Please include your name, affiliation, and a link to your research profile. Submissions will be selected based on quality, originality, interdisciplinarity and the capacity to incite fruitful debates. Accepted submissions will be notified on 30 July 2023 at the latest. The selected participants will be asked to submit their final manuscript in early 2024.

The organisers aim to include the best papers in the conference proceedings, to be published as an edited volume with a reputable publisher. Further details in this regard will be communicated in due time.

Funding for travel and accommodation is available for the selected authors.

The conference venue will be @ Erasmus University Rotterdam – Woudestein Campus. The conference is organised by Erasmus School of Law in the context of the VICI Project ‘Affordable Access to Justice’. More information at: http://www.euciviljustice.eu/.