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Draft Withdrawal Agreement, Continued
It is not quite orthodox to follow on oneself’s post, but I decided to make it as a short answer to some emails I got since yesterday. I do not know why Article 63 has not been agreed upon, although if I had to bet I would say: too complicated a provision. There is much too much in there, in a much too synthetic form; per se this does not necessarily lead to a bad outcome , but here… it looks like, rather. Just an example: Article 63 refers sometimes to provisions, some other to Chapters, and some to complete Regulations. Does it mean that “provisions regarding jurisdiction” are just the grounds for jurisdiction, without the lis pendens rules (for instance), although they are in the same Chapter of Brussels I bis?
One may also wonder why a separate rule on the assessment of the legal force of agreements of jurisdiction or choice of court agreements concluded before the end of the transition period in civil and commercial matters (Regulation 1215/2912) and maintenance (Regulation 4/2009): does the reference to “provisions regarding jurisdiction” not cover them already? Indeed, it may just be a reminder for the sake of clarity; but taken literally it could lead to some weird conclusions, such as the Brussels I Regulation taken preference over the 2005 Hague Convention “in the United Kingdom, as well as in the Member States in situations involving the United Kingdom”, whatever these may be. Of course I do not believe this is correct.
At any rate, for me the most complicated issue lies with the Draft Withdrawal Agreement provisions regarding time. As I already explained yesterday, according to Article 168 “Parts Two and Three, with the exception of Articles 17a, 30(1), 40, and 92(1), as well as Title I of Part Six and Articles 162, 163 and 164, shall apply as from the end of the transition period”, fixed for December 31st, 2020 (Article 121). In the meantime, ex Article 122, Union Law applies, in its entirety (for no exception is made affecting Title VI of Part Three). What are the consequences? Following an email exchange with Prof. Heredia, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, let’s imagine the case of independent territorial insolvency proceedings – Article 3.2 Regulation 2015/848: if opened before December 31st, 2020, they shall be subject to the Insolvency Regulation. If main proceedings are opened before that date as well, the territorial independent proceedings shall become secondary insolvency proceedings – Article 3.4 Insolvency Regulation. If the main proceedings happen to be opened on January 2nd, 2021, they shall not – Article 63.4 c) combined with Article 168 Draft Withdrawal Agreement (I am still discussing Articles 122 and 168 with Prof. Heredia).
Another not so easy task is to explain Article 63.1 in the light of Articles 122 and 168. The assessment of jurisdiction for a contractual claim filed before the end of the transition period will be made according to Union Law, if jurisdiction is contested or examined ex officio before December 31st, 2020; and according to the provisions regarding jurisdiction of Regulation 1215/2012 (or the applicable one, depending on the subject matter, see Article 63.1 b, c, d) Draft Withdrawal Agreement, if it -the assessment- happens later. Here my question would be, what situations does the author of the Draft have in mind? Does Article 63.1 set up a kind of perpetuatio iurisdictionis rule, so as to ensure that the same rules will apply when jurisdiction is contested at the first instance before the end of the transition period, and on appeal afterwards (or even only afterwards, where it is possible)? Or is it a rule to be applied at the stage of recognition and enforcement where the application therefor is presented after the end of the transition period (but wouldn’t this fall under the scope of Article 63.3)?
That is all for now – was not a short answer, after all, and certainly not the end of it.
(Addenda: as for the UK, on 13 July 2017, the Government introduced the Withdrawal Bill to the House of Commons. On 17 January 2018, the Bill was given a Third Reading and passed through the House of Commons. Full text of the Bill as introduced and further versions of the Bill as it is reprinted to incorporate amendments (proposals for change) made during its passage through Parliament are available here. The Bill aims at converting existing direct EU law, including EU regulations and directly effective decisions, as it applies in the UK at the date of exit, into domestic law.)
Draft Withdrawal Agreement 19 March 2018: Still a Way to Go
Today, the European Union and the United Kingdom have reached an agreement on the transition period for Brexit: from March 29 of next year, date of disconnection, until December 31, 2020. The news are of course available in the press, and the Draft Withdrawal Agreement of 19 March 2018 has already been published… coloured: In green, the text is agreed at negotiators’ level and will only be subject to technical legal revisions in the coming weeks. In yellow, the text is agreed on the policy objective but drafting changes or clarifications are still required. In white, the text corresponds to text proposed by the Union on which discussions are ongoing as no agreement has yet been found. For ongoing judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters (Title VI of Part III, to be applied from December 31, 2020: see Art. 168), this actually means that subject to “technical legal revisions”, the following has been accepted:
- Art. 62: The EU and the UK are in accordance as to the application by the latter (no need to mention the MS for obvious reasons) of the Rome I and Rome II regulations to contracts concluded before the end of the transition period, and in respect of events giving rise to damage, and which occurred before the end of the transition period.
- Art. 64: There is also agreement as to the handling of ongoing cooperation procedures, whereby requests for service abroad, the taking of evidence and in the frame of the European Judicial Network are meant.
- Art. 65: There is agreement as well as to the way Council Directive 2003/8/EC (legal aid), Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matter, and Council Directive 2004/80/EC (relating to compensation to crime victims) will apply after the transition period.
Conversely, no agreement has been found regarding Art. 63, i.e., how to deal with jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions, and related cooperation between central authorities (but whatever is agreed will also be valid in respect of the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 as applicable by virtue of the agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark, see Art. 65.2, in green).
In the light of this it may be not really worth to start the analysis of the Title as a whole: Art. 63 happens to be the less clear provision. Some puzzling expressions such as “as well as in the Member States in situations involving the United Kingdom” are common to approved texts, but may change in the course of the technical legal revision. So, let’s wait and see.
NoA: Another relevant provision agreed upon – in green- is Art. 124, Specific arrangements relating to the Union’s external action. Title X of Part III, on pending cases and new cases before the CJEU, remains in white.
And: On the Draft of February 28, 2018 see P. Franzina’s entry here. The Draft was transmitted to the Council (Article 50) and the Brexit Steering Group of the European Parliament; the resulting text was sent to the UK and made public on March 15.
Religious Conversion and Custody – Important New Decision by the Malaysian Federal Court
A saga that has kept Malaysians engaged for years has finally founds its conclusion. A woman, named (rather improbably, at least for European observers) Indira Gandhi, was fighting with her ex husband over custody. The ex-husband had converted to Islam and had extended the conversion to their three children, with the consequence that the Syariah courts gave him sole custody. What followed was a whole series of court decisions by civil courts on the one hand and Syariah courts on the other, focusing mainly on the jurisdictional question which set of courts gets to decide matters of religious status and which law—Islamic law or civil law—determines the question. The Malaysian Federal Court now quashed the conversion as regards the children, thereby claiming, at least for children, a priority of the Constitution and the jurisdiction of civil courts.
Although the case is mostly discussed in the context of religious freedom and (civil) judicial review, it also raises core issues of conflict of laws. Malaysia is a country with an interpersonal legal system, which leaves jurisdiction over certain matters of Islamic law to the Syariah courts. Indira Gandhi’s ex-husband here used this system, effectively, for a form of forum shopping: converting to Islam enabled him, ostentatiously, to opt into a system more favorable to his own situation. The background, from the perspective of conflict of laws, is that the decisive connecting factor, namely a person’s religion, is open to manipulation in a way in which other connecting factors are not. According to Article 121 of the Federal Constitution, the civil courts have no jurisdiction over matters of the Syariah Courts. On the other hand, Art. 12(4) of the Constitution provides that a minor’s religion is determined by his parent or guardian, a provision the Syariah Courts neglected here. Letting the Constitution trump leads to a desirable result in this case, but it does not, by itself, resolve the underlying conflict-of-laws issues. Here, as in comparable situations, the doctrinal problem appears to lie first in the issue of unilateral determination of personal status and second in a conflation of issues of jurisdiction and applicable law.
The case is Indira Gandhi v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak u.a., [2018] 1 LNS 86 (Federal Court of Malaysia); it is available here. A short summary is here, another one, including a useful timeline of events, is here. For a very helpful analysis of the case and its background and implications by Jaclyn L. Neo, focusing especially on questions of jurisdiction and judicial review, see here. A longer discussion by Dian A.H. Shah focuses also on two other cases and more broadly on the issues of religious freedom: Dian A.H. Shah, Religion, conversions, and custody: battles in the Malaysian appellate courts, in Law and Society in Malaysia: Pluralism, Religion and Ethnicity (Andrew Harding/Dian A.H. Shah eds., 2018). The affair is also discussed in Yvonne Tew‘s article ‘Stealth Theocracy,’ which is forthcoming with the Virginia Journal of International Law.
News
3rd edition – Cycle of seminars – Jean Monnet Module con Cross-Border Litigation – Università degli Studi, Milan – 8 March – 18 May 2023
On 8 March 2023, the latest edition of the cycle of seminars – entirely in English – on cross-border civil and commercial litigation will begin, as part of the European project Jean Monnet Module on Multilevel, Multiparty and Multisector Cross-Border Litigation in Europe, organized by the Department of Italian and Supranational Public Law of the University of Milan.
This year’s edition will focus on the following three topics:
– Binding effects and res iudicata in a multilevel dimension (seminars on 8-9-15-16-17-22-23 March 2023);
– Collective redress and group litigation (seminars on 29 March-12-13-19-20-26-27-28 April 2023);
– Main procedural issues of climate litigation (seminars on 3-4-10-11-17-18 May 2023).
The seminars (currently being accredited by the Milan Bar Council) can be followed both face-to-face and remotely, on the MS Teams platform.
All information on the program and how to register may be found here.
HCCH Monthly Update: February 2023
Conventions & Instruments
On 1 February 2023, the 1980 Child Abduction Convention entered into force for Botswana. The Convention currently has 103 Contracting Parties. More information is available here.
On 17 February 2023, Azerbaijan deposited its instrument of accession to the 1965 Service and 2007 Child Support Conventions. The 1965 Service Convention, which now has 80 Contracting Parties, will enter into force for Azerbaijan on 1 September 2023, subject to the Article 28 procedure. As for the 2007 Child Support Convention, with the accession of Azerbaijan 46 States and the European Union are now bound by it. It will enter into force for Azerbaijan on 28 February 2024. More information is available here.
Meetings & Events
On 7 and 8 February 2023, the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH co-organised the Regional Conference “The HCCH and the relevance of its work for Southern Africa”, together with Finland and South Africa, with the participation of Namibia and Tanzania, as well as other Southern African Development Community States, and hosted by the University of Pretoria (South Africa). More information is available here.
From 13 to 15 February 2023, the International Transfer of Maintenance Funds Experts’ Group met for the fourth time. Pursuant to its mandate, the Experts’ Group continued its work discussing good practices in relation to the cross-border transfer of maintenance payments, with a view to identifying solutions that are cost-effective, transparent, prompt, efficient and accessible. More information is available here.
From 13 to 17 February 2023, the Working Group on Matters Related to Jurisdiction in Transnational Civil or Commercial Litigation met for the fourth time. Pursuant to its mandate, the Working Group made further progress on the development of draft provisions for a possible future instrument on parallel litigation in civil or commercial matters. More information is available here.
Upcoming Events
Registrations are open for the conference “The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: Cornerstones – Prospects – Outlook”, which will be held in person on 9-10 June 2023 at the University of Bonn in Germany. More information is available here.
Vacancies
Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships for the period from July to December 2023. The deadline for the submission of applications is 31 March 2023 (18:00 CEST). More information is available here.
These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.
Reviewing Sanctions in Arbitration: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Private International Law Analysis
by Naimeh Masumy, [nmasumy@gmail.com]
The growing role of arbitration as a peaceful means for resolving investment, commercial and inter-state disputes is now impacted by an increasing number of sanction regimes borne out of the recent geopolitical conflicts. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many regulators across various jurisdictions sought to move towards greater coordination of sanction implementation and enforcement efforts. The recent tranche of sanctions has sparked a debate on the appropriate standards of review that arbitral tribunals ought to apply when dealing with disputes involving sanctions.
In this short note, we look at the case of Sofregaz v. NGSC, which provides a sobering exposition of the challenges faced by the adjudicative bodies when assessing the legality of unilateral Extra-territorial sanctions under international law. This case concerns the annulment of an arbitral award rendered in Paris 2018 in favor of NGSC, pursuant to the Rules of Arbitration of the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC Rules). In 2018, the ICC tribunal found against Sofregaz and awarded NGCS an amount of over USD 2.4 million for an unpaid invoice and down payment drawn by Sofregaz under certain guarantees. Sofregaz applied to set aside the award before the Paris Court of Appeal. It sought an annulment application based on NGSC’s exposure to US secondary sanction. Sofregaz argued, inter alia, that the tribunal had failed to carry out its mandate and had not considered the impact of sanctions against Iran on the performance of the contract. In Sofregaz’s view, this resulted in an award contrary to French international public policy in that it gave effect to a contract that could not be performed without breaching the designated sanctions. The Court of Appeal dismissed the annulment application brought by the Sofregaz, using private international law analysis to dismiss the legality of U.S. sanctions.
This note will highlight why invoking such a private international law analysis when determining the validity and the scope of applicable sanctions will undermine international arbitration. Then, it will show that such an analysis is inconsistent with the overriding objectives of international arbitration – arguably, the creation of an autonomous dispute resolution system for the effective and expeditious resolution of disputes in a delocalized fashion.
The Relevance of Private International Law Analysis to Arbitration
Private international law provides a judicial tool for courts to address the distinction between forum law and foreign law and promotes a smooth functioning of the international legal regime by mitigating jurisdictional conflicts, especially in a legal relationship involving several applicable laws. Courts weigh private and public policy concerns of the forum law and foreign law when determining whether to apply the laws of a foreign jurisdiction over the forum law.
Many scholars have strongly advocated the use of private international law analysis in international arbitration. The benefits of such analysis are particularly clear when arbitrators are faced with potentially conflicting laws, similar to the case of Sofregaz v. NGCS. where the tribunal was confronted with three different sets of laws: Iranian law governing the contract, French law as the law applicable at the seat of arbitration, and the U.S. law governing the sanctions regime, albeit extraterritorially imposed, which materially impacted on the performance of a contract. The tribunal did not consider the impact of US sanctions, and rendered an award in favor of NGSC due to the wrongful termination of a contract for the conversion of a gas field.
In such instances, private international law can operate as a mechanism of localization that permits tribunals to adjudicate in cases involving several legal orders by taking into account important considerations such as overriding mandatory rules at the seat of the arbitral tribunal.
Arbitrators are generally empowered to apply the law deemed “appropriate” or “applicable” in the absence of a governing law clause. Notably, Article 22(3) of the 2020 LCIA Rules also authorizes arbitrators, when determining the lex contractus, to apply the rules of law they deem appropriate. Such approaches can provide objective yardsticks for tribunals exercising their discretion to select the appropriate law. Having objective criteria aids predictability and efficiency and ensures tribunals do not act outside their designated mandates.
This is of particular significance as the uncertainty over the governing law may negatively affect the parties’ due process rights and may lead to the award being issued arbitrarily. Such concern was echoed in the Sofregaz application to set aside the award in 2019, in which it was claimed that the tribunal failed to take into account the impact of U.S. economic sanctions. Thus, that award recognition would be contrary to international public policy (“l’ordre public international”).
The court dismissed the claim observing that the Tribunal did not violate international public policy in failing to consider the impact of U.S. economic sanctions. To this end, the French court defined international public policy as “the body of rules and value whose violation the French legal order cannot tolerate, even in the international context.” In its reasoning, the court heavily endorsed French conflict-of-laws rules to determine the contour of mandatory rules. This approach means that if a tribunal relies on objective criteria to take into account essential regulations of the forum such as domestic and international mandatory law, the final award may remain immune from potential challenges. In other words, private international law analysis may be a desirable straight jacket to ensure that tribunals comply with regulatory provisions of the forum. As such, it may enable courts to establish trust in arbitration and refrain from inquiring into the merits of final awards.
Conflict of Rules Analysis: Undermining the Delocalization Theory
The delocalization theory of arbitration is a part of the much broader, which posits that international arbitration ought to be completely detached from the procedural and substantive law of the place of arbitration or the seat, or lex loci arbitri, and from national law in general. According to this theory, arbitration is a private activity, which can be considered favorably or unfavorably, but certainly does not need to be empowered by any state ex ante. While this theory found a firm grounding under the French law of international arbitration, in reality, this theory usually carries little weight, especially in enforcing an award that has been challenged. The theory of delocalization begins to wane, as the legal system of the forum country will be the primary source relevant to ascertaining the legal relationship of the final award and the mandatory provisions of the lex fori.
In addition, the New York Convention muddies the waters by making reference to domestic public policy in article V (2) (b) as a ground for non-recognition or enforcement of an award., Based on the literal reading of the Convention, the law of the seat of arbitration usually delineates. Thus, to contextualize international arbitration through the prism of absolute delocalization, a system wholly emancipated from the forum law will pose practical challenges.
The above is of relevance to the role of sanctions for arbitral awards. Private international law is predicated on the notion that the world is divided into nation states and national legal orders. This approach dramatically contrasts with what international arbitration delocalisation theory arguably has long sought: to free arbitration from national orders. According to this view, examining the validity and scope of sanctions through the prism of private international law analysis forces the arbitrator to draw upon domestic law. This, in turn, contravenes the main tenet of delocalization theory, which confirms that arbitration has no forum. Further, the arc of modern arbitration laws arguably negates the relevance of private international law analysis. Modern arbitration laws are mostly substantive laws, and the notions embedded in arbitration are substantially transnational rather than international, which undermines the viability of the private international law analysis.
Private International Law Analysis: A False Aura of Objectivity
Despite the widespread view that private international law provides a roadmap towards a more predictable and objective outcome for disputes involving sanctions, such framework is prone to inconsistent and divergent results. Private international law provides a basis of jurisdiction to apply foreign law when several laws may concurrently apply to the dispute. In doing so, private international law approaches balance competing interests according to notions such as reciprocity, expectation of courtesy and comity. The exact contours of these notions have remained imprecise, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in the case of Hilton v. Guyot. Courts often draw upon their ideology and values explicitly and implicitly to ascertain comity. Such assessment will inadvertently lead to adjudicators interposing ad hoc political judgments about foreign relations, opening a door for arbitrators to endorse parochial domestic policies to ascertain the legal orders involving international components. This is evident in the French Court’s reasoning, in which the court heldthat “[t]he unilateral sanctions taken by U.S. authorities against Iran cannot be regarded as the expression of an international consensus, since the French authorities dispute the extraterritorial reach of these sanctions”. This assessment was drawn by balancing the interests of French national policies, which denotes that relying on political considerations rather than legitimate international considerations concerning the legality of sanctions will open the door for domestic idiosyncratic views and interpretations, which in turn, will bar this concept to be applied hegemonically across different jurisdictions.
If the governing law of sanctions is determined by private international law, it may pose conceptual difficulties. Sanctions are international instruments hinging on the notion of sovereign equality. The underpinning principle of sovereign equality of states is deeply embedded in one of the main tenants of international law. Any actions impinging on that principle would therefore need to involve considerations of public policy. Public international law must impose limits to the scope and validity of sanctions and to governing law. To this end, using private international law approaches to ascertain the validity of sanctions will negate the character (or nature) of sanctions as a public international law instrument transcending national boundaries
Conclusion
This post has called into question the viability of a private international law analysis in reviewing the scope of the application of sanctions. It has contended that a private international law analysis borrows its genesis from the domestic law of the forum (state). Private international law analysis needs to have sufficient normative weight to scrutinize or inquire into the substance of sanction regimes. Further, invoking private international law principles does not preclude arbitrators from engaging in subjective assessments to examine the applicability of a sanctions regime. By abandoning a private international law analysis, the interpretation and enforceability of sanctions will become more anachronistic and predictable.