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Krombach: The Final Curtain
Readers of this blog may be interested to learn that the well-known (and, in many ways, quite depressing) Krombach/Bamberski saga appears to have finally found its conclusion with a decision by the European Court of Human Rights (Krombach v France, App no 67521/14) that was given yesterday. Read more
Cross-border Human Rights and Environmental Damages Litigation in Europe: Recent Case Law in the UK
Over the last few years, litigation in European courts against gross human rights violations and widespread environmental disasters has intensified. Recent case law shows that victims domiciled in third States often attempt to sue the local subsidiary and/or its parent company in Europe, which corresponds to the place where the latter is seated. In light of this, national courts of the EU have been asked to determine whether the parent company located in a Member State may serve as an anchor defendant for claims against its subsidiary – sometimes with success, sometimes not:
For example, in Okpabi & Ors v Royal Dutch Shell Plc & Anor, the English High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, by its Technology and Construction Court, decided that it had no international jurisdiction to hear claims in tort against the Nigerian subsidiary (SPDC) of Royal Dutch Shell (RDC) in connection with environmental and health damages due to oil pollution in the context of the group’s oil production in Nigeria. To be more specific, Justice Fraser concluded that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the action, inasmuch as the European parent company did not owe a duty of care towards the claimants following the test established in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman. Under the Caparo-test, a duty of care exists where the damage was foreseeable for the (anchor) defendant; imposing a duty of care on it must be fair, just, and reasonable; and finally, there is a certain proximity between the parent company and its subsidiary, which shows that the first exercises a sufficient control over the latter.
On 14 February 2018, the Court of Appeal validated the first instance Court’s reasoning by rejecting the claimants appeal (the judgment is available here). In a majority opinion (Justice Sales dissenting), the second instance Court confirmed that the victims’ claims had no prospect of success. Nevertheless, Justice Simon provided a different assessment of the proximity requirement: after analysing the corporate documents of the parent company, he observed that RDS had established standardised policies among the Shell group. According to the Court, however, this did not demonstrate that RDS actually exercised control over the subsidiary. At paragraph 89 of the judgment, Justice Simon states that it is “important to distinguish between a parent company which controls, or shares control of, the material operations on the one hand, and a parent company which issues mandatory policies and standards which are intended to apply throughout a group of companies (…). The issuing of mandatory policies plainly cannot mean that a parent has taken control of the operations of a subsidiary (…) such as to give rise to a duty of care”. Therefore, the Court of Appeal set a relatively high jurisdictional threshold that will be difficult for claimants to pass in the future.
Conversely, in Lungowe v Vedanta, a case that involved a claim against a parent company (Vedanta) seated in the UK and its foreign subsidiary for the pollution of the Kafue River in Zambia, as well as the adverse consequences of such an occurrence on the local population, the Court of Appeal concluded that there was a real issue to be tried against the parent company. Moreover, the Court considered that the subsidiary was a necessary and proper party to claim and that England and Wales was the proper place in which to bring the claims. Apparently, this case involved greater proximity between the parent company and its subsidiary compared to Okpabi. In particular, the fact that Vedanta hold 80% of its subsidiary’ shares played an important role. The same can be said as regards the degree of control of Vedanta’s board over the activities of the subsidiary (see the analysis of Sir Geoffrey Vos at paragraph 197 of the Okpabi appeal).
Unsatisfied with the current landscape, some States adopted –or are in the process of adopting– legislations that establish or reinforce the duty of care or vigilance of parent companies directly towards victims. In particular, France adopted the Duty of Vigilance Law in 2017, according to which parent companies of a certain size have a legal obligation to establish a vigilance plan (plan de vigilance) in order to prevent human rights violations. The failure to implement such a plan will incur the liability of parent companies for damages that a well-executed plan could have avoided. In Switzerland, a proposal of amendment of the Constitution was recently launched, the goal of which consists in reinforcing the protection of human rights by imposing a duty of due diligence on companies domiciled in Switzerland. Notably, the text establishes that the obligations designated by the proposed amendment will subsist even where conflict of law rules designate a different law than the Swiss one (overriding mandatory provision). Finally, some other States, such as Germany, propose voluntary measures through the adoption of a National Action Plan, as this was suggested by the EU in its CSR Strategy.
For further thoughts see Matthias Weller / Alexia Pato, “Local Parents as ‘Anchor Defendants’ in European Courts for Claims against Their Foreign Subsidiaries in Human Rights and Environmental Damages Litigation: Recent Case Law and Legislative Trends” forthcoming in Uniform Law Review 2018, Issue 2, preprint available at SSRN.
Draft Withdrawal Agreement, Continued
It is not quite orthodox to follow on oneself’s post, but I decided to make it as a short answer to some emails I got since yesterday. I do not know why Article 63 has not been agreed upon, although if I had to bet I would say: too complicated a provision. There is much too much in there, in a much too synthetic form; per se this does not necessarily lead to a bad outcome , but here… it looks like, rather. Just an example: Article 63 refers sometimes to provisions, some other to Chapters, and some to complete Regulations. Does it mean that “provisions regarding jurisdiction” are just the grounds for jurisdiction, without the lis pendens rules (for instance), although they are in the same Chapter of Brussels I bis?
One may also wonder why a separate rule on the assessment of the legal force of agreements of jurisdiction or choice of court agreements concluded before the end of the transition period in civil and commercial matters (Regulation 1215/2912) and maintenance (Regulation 4/2009): does the reference to “provisions regarding jurisdiction” not cover them already? Indeed, it may just be a reminder for the sake of clarity; but taken literally it could lead to some weird conclusions, such as the Brussels I Regulation taken preference over the 2005 Hague Convention “in the United Kingdom, as well as in the Member States in situations involving the United Kingdom”, whatever these may be. Of course I do not believe this is correct.
At any rate, for me the most complicated issue lies with the Draft Withdrawal Agreement provisions regarding time. As I already explained yesterday, according to Article 168 “Parts Two and Three, with the exception of Articles 17a, 30(1), 40, and 92(1), as well as Title I of Part Six and Articles 162, 163 and 164, shall apply as from the end of the transition period”, fixed for December 31st, 2020 (Article 121). In the meantime, ex Article 122, Union Law applies, in its entirety (for no exception is made affecting Title VI of Part Three). What are the consequences? Following an email exchange with Prof. Heredia, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, let’s imagine the case of independent territorial insolvency proceedings – Article 3.2 Regulation 2015/848: if opened before December 31st, 2020, they shall be subject to the Insolvency Regulation. If main proceedings are opened before that date as well, the territorial independent proceedings shall become secondary insolvency proceedings – Article 3.4 Insolvency Regulation. If the main proceedings happen to be opened on January 2nd, 2021, they shall not – Article 63.4 c) combined with Article 168 Draft Withdrawal Agreement (I am still discussing Articles 122 and 168 with Prof. Heredia).
Another not so easy task is to explain Article 63.1 in the light of Articles 122 and 168. The assessment of jurisdiction for a contractual claim filed before the end of the transition period will be made according to Union Law, if jurisdiction is contested or examined ex officio before December 31st, 2020; and according to the provisions regarding jurisdiction of Regulation 1215/2012 (or the applicable one, depending on the subject matter, see Article 63.1 b, c, d) Draft Withdrawal Agreement, if it -the assessment- happens later. Here my question would be, what situations does the author of the Draft have in mind? Does Article 63.1 set up a kind of perpetuatio iurisdictionis rule, so as to ensure that the same rules will apply when jurisdiction is contested at the first instance before the end of the transition period, and on appeal afterwards (or even only afterwards, where it is possible)? Or is it a rule to be applied at the stage of recognition and enforcement where the application therefor is presented after the end of the transition period (but wouldn’t this fall under the scope of Article 63.3)?
That is all for now – was not a short answer, after all, and certainly not the end of it.
(Addenda: as for the UK, on 13 July 2017, the Government introduced the Withdrawal Bill to the House of Commons. On 17 January 2018, the Bill was given a Third Reading and passed through the House of Commons. Full text of the Bill as introduced and further versions of the Bill as it is reprinted to incorporate amendments (proposals for change) made during its passage through Parliament are available here. The Bill aims at converting existing direct EU law, including EU regulations and directly effective decisions, as it applies in the UK at the date of exit, into domestic law.)
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Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP) No 4/2022: Abstracts
The fourth issue of 2022 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:
Christian Kohler, Honorary Professor at the University of Saarland, Private International Law Aspects of the European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on SLAPPs (‘Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation’)
The Commission’s proposal for a Directive on SLAPPs (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) aims at protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public debates from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings with cross-border implications. Inter alia, it protects SLAPP defendants against judgments from third countries that would have been considered manifestly unfounded or abusive if they had been brought before the courts or tribunals of the Member State where recognition or enforcement is sought, and allows SLAPP defendants to seek compensation of the damages and the costs of the third country-proceedings before the courts of the Member State of his or her domicile. This article examines the conflicts rules in question and discusses the broader private international law context of the proposed Directive, in particular the rules of jurisdiction and the mosaic approach of the CJEU for the interpretation of Article 7(2) of Regulation Brussels Ia. In order to limit the forum shopping potential of the present rules on jurisdiction and applicable law in defamation cases, an intervention by the EU legislature should be envisaged.
Pietro Franzina, Professor at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Il contenzioso civile transnazionale sulla corporate accountability (Cross-Border Civil Litigation on Corporate Accountability) [in Italian]
Civil proceedings are brought with increasing frequency against corporations for allegedly failing to prevent or mitigate the adverse impact of their activity on the protection of human rights and the environment. Most of these proceedings are initiated by non-governmental organisations whose activity consists in safeguarding or promoting the collective interests at issue, or otherwise benefit from support provided by such organisations. A cross-border element is almost invariably present in these proceedings, as they often involve persons from different countries and/or relate to facts which occurred in different States. Litigation in matters of corporate accountability is, distinctively, strategic in nature. The aim pursued by those bringing the claim does not consist, or at least does not only or primarily consist, in achieving the practical result that the proceedings in question are meant, as such, to provide, such as compensation for the prejudice suffered. Rather, the goal is to induce a change in the business model or industrial approach of the defendant (and, possibly, of other corporations in the same field or with similar characteristics) and increase the sustainability of their corporate activity at large. The paper gives an account of the factors that determine the impact of the described proceedings, that is, the ability of those proceedings to effectively prompt the pursued change. The analysis focuses, specifically, on the factors associated with the rules of private international law, chiefly the rules that enable the claimant to sue the defendant before the courts of one State instead of another. The purpose of the article is not to examine the latter rules in detail (actually, they vary to a large extent from one State to another), but to assess the strategic opportunities, in the sense explained above, that the rules in question may offer to the claimant, depending on their structure and mode of operation.
The following review and comments are also featured:
Lenka Válková, Researcher at the University of Milan, The Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the Recognition of Parenthood and Other Legislative Trends Affecting Legal Parenthood
The developments in science and changing family patterns have given rise to many problems, including those of non-recognition of parenthood, which affects mostly children of same-gender parents and children in cases of surrogacy. The basic drivers of the current difficulties in recognising parenthood lie in the differences of the national rules on the establishment and recognition of parenthood and the lack of the uniform conflict rules and rules on recognition of judgments in the area of parenthood. Despite the copious case law of CJEU and ECtHR, which plays a crucial role in allowing flexibility in law with regard to parenthood, there is still no legal instrument which provides for a clear framework seeking to outline a consistent and systematic approach in this area. In 2021 and 2022, three important legislative actions have been taken. The Parenthood Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions has been published on 7 December 2022. At the same time, the Final Report of the Experts Group on the Parentage/Surrogacy Project of the HCCH has been issued on 30 November 2022. Moreover, the Report on Review of the Implementation of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock has been prepared in November 2021 as a preliminary step to a possible future update of the substantive law provisions of the Convention. All regulatory initiatives are addressed in this article, with a special focus on the Parenthood Proposal. In particular, this article offers a first appraisal of the Parenthood Proposal in light of other two legislative efforts and examines whether the works on international level may eliminate the need for an action concerning recognition of parenthood at EU level.
Stefano Dominelli, Researcher at the University of Genoa, Emoji and Choice of Court Agreements: A Legal Appraisal of Evolutions in Language Methods through the Prism of Article 25 Brussels Ia Regulation
Starting from the consideration that emoji and the alike are becoming increasingly common in computer-based communication, this article transposes current debates in material law surrounding emoji and their aptitude to express intent into the field of choice of court agreement through the prism of Art 25 Brussels Ia Regulation. The aim of this article is to develop some hypotheses and methods for the assessment of emoji in the conclusion of choice of court agreements.
Michele Grassi, Research fellow at the University of Milan, Revocazione della sentenza civile per contrasto con la Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali (Revocation of a Civil Judgment for Conflict with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) [in Italian]
This article comments on the recent reform of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, with a specific focus on the introduction of the possibility to seek revocation of a civil judgment conflicting with a decision of the ECtHR. The possibility to re-open proceedings in breach of the ECHR was not contemplated by the previous rules applicable to the matter, and the Italian Constitutional Court had excluded that the obligation of Contracting States to conform to the judgments of the ECtHR could imply the need to review national res judicata in civil or administrative law matters. Against this background, this article examines the new mechanism of review of national decisions introduced by the recent reform, pointing out that such mechanism has been designed to apply in limited circumstances and that, consistently with the reparatory perspective adopted by the Italian Constitutional Court, it gives little to no consideration to the obligation of cessation of international wrongful acts consisting in violations of human rights protected by ECHR.
This issue also features an account by Silvia Favalli, Researcher at the University of Milan, Bellini c. Italia: Il Comitato ONU sui diritti delle persone con disabilità si pronuncia sulla situazione dei caregiver familiari in Italia (Bellini v. Italy: The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on the Situation of Family Caregivers in Italy) [in Italian].
Finally, this issue features the following book review by Francesca C. Villata, Professor at the University of Milan: Louise MERRETT, Employment Contracts in Private International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2nd ed., 2022) pp. XXXII-329.
Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2/2023: Abstracts
The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:
(These abstracts can also be found at the IPRax-website under the following link: https://www.iprax.de/en/contents/)
H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner: Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2022: Bewegung im internationalen Familienrecht
This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from January 2022 until December 2022. It presents newly adopted legal instruments and summarizes current projects that are making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. Furthermore, the authors look at areas of law where the EU has made use of its external competence. They discuss important decisions and pending cases before the CJEU pertaining to the subject matter of the article. In addition, the article also looks at current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.
N. Elsner/H. Deters: Of party requested service by post and courts as transmitting agencies under the EU Service Regulation
On 1 July 2022, the EU Regulation on the Service of Documents No. 1784/20 (Recast) (EU Service Regulation) took effect and changed the law on service by postal services in cross-border proceedings. This calls for a revisiting of the divergent opinions and ways of interpretation of service by postal services according to Art. 14 EU Service Regulation 2007 and its relation to Art. 15 EU Service Regulation 2007. Against this background, this article discusses a decision of the Higher Regional Court Frankfurt (OLG Frankfurt) holding that service by postal services pursuant to Art. 14 EU Service Regulation 2007 is in principle only open to a court when effecting service in cross-border proceedings. A party shall effect service according to Art. 15 EU Service Regulation 2007 by contacting directly the foreign authorities designated to effect service in the other member state.
Firstly, the reasoning of the court and the opinions in legal scholarship on the admissibility of service by postal services effected by parties are assessed critically. Subsequently, the authors propose a different application of Art. 14 and 15 EU Service Regulation 2007 in Germany. It will be argued that the OLG Frankfurt was indeed correct in stating that service by postal services must be effected through a transmitting agency according to Art. 2 EU Service Regulation 2007. Under German law, only courts are considered transmitting agencies. However, this does not preclude parties from effecting this type of service. When parties are required to effect service themselves under German law, they may send the documents to the court, inform the court of the address of the other party and apply for service in accordance with Art. 14 EU Service Regulation 2007. The court then acts as a mere transmitting agency on behalf of the party, and thus, in its administrative capacity.
S. Schwemmer: Direct tort claims of the creditors of an insolvent company against the foreign grandparent company
In its ruling of 10 March 2022 (Case C-498/20 – ZK ./. BMA Nederland), the ECJ had to deal with a so-called Peeters/Gatzen-claim under Dutch law brought by the insolvency administrator. The court had already ruled in an earlier judgement that these claims fall under the Brussels I Regulation (recast). So the main question was now where the harmful event occurred within the meaning of Art. 7 para. 2 of the Regulation. The ECJ opts for the seat of the insolvent company, basing its analysis on the differentiation between primary damage and consequential damage. The same analysis is also used to determine the applicable law under the Rome II Regulation. In this context, however, the ECJ examines more closely the specific breach of duty of care to determine whether the claim falls under the scope of the Rome II Regulation or under the rules of international company law.
A. Kronenberg: Disapproved overriding mandatory provisions and factual impossibility
Two years after the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht, OLG) of Frankfurt am Main, the OLG Munich also had to rule on a lawsuit filed by an Israeli against Kuwait Airways. The plaintiff had demanded to be flown from Munich to Sri Lanka with a stopover in Kuwait City in accordance with the contract the parties had concluded. The OLG Munich dismissed the claim with regard to a Kuwaiti Israel boycott law, which, although inapplicable, according to the court had the effect that it was factually impossible for the defendant airline to transport Israeli nationals with a stopover in Kuwait. The ruling shows that in cases of substantive law level consideration of disapproved foreign overriding mandatory provisions the legally required result can be undesirable. However, this result depends on the circumstances of the individual case as well as on certain prerequisites that must be observed when taking into consideration overriding mandatory provisions. The article sets out these prerequisites and shows why the OLG Munich probably should have ordered the defendant to perform its obligation. It also explains why, in cases in which factual impossibility indeed exists, the result of the dismissal of the action most likely cannot be changed even by enacting a blocking statute.
C. Thomale/C. Lukas: The pseudo-foreign British one man-LLC
The Higher Regional Court of Munich has decided that a Bristish one man-LLC, which has its real seat in Germany, under German conflict of laws and substantive rules lacks legal personality altogether. This case note analyzes this decision’s implications for the conflict of company laws, notably for the interpretation of the TCA and application of the so-called “modified real seat theory”.
M. Brinkmann: Discharge in England and subsequent declaratory judgement against debtor in Germany – Binding effects of judgement trump recognition of prior bankruptcy proceedings
The Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf (OLG Düsseldorf) had to decide upon an action for the payment of damages based on a declaratory judgement. The declaratory judgement had established the defendant’s liability and was, at the time, not challenged by the defendant. In his defense against the action for payment the defendant now tries to invoke a discharge, which he had already obtained in insolvency proceedings in the UK in March 2012, i.e. prior to the declaratory judgement.
The OLG argued that under the applicable EIR, the English insolvency proceedings were, in principle, subject to automatic recognition. Under Art. 17 EIR 2002, these proceedings produce the same effects in all Member States. The OLG Düsseldorf nevertheless precluded the defendant from invoking the discharge. As the English bankruptcy proceedings were concluded before the action for the declaratory judgement was initiated, the defendant should have invoked the discharge already in the proceedings that led to the declaratory judgement in March 2013.
The OLG correctly found that the declaratory judgement was procedurally binding between the parties and hence barred the defendant from invoking the discharge in subsequent proceedings.
M. Andrae: Modification or suspension of enforcement of a decision under Article 12 of the Hague Child Abduction Convention?
The article discusses which procedural options exist if, after a final decision pursuant to 12 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, circumstances arise which would justify the refusal of an application for the return of the child. A procedure to change the decision is only permissible if the international jurisdiction of the German courts exists. For child abduction from EU Member States, this is determined in principle according to Art. 9 of the Regulation (EU) n 1111/2019 and for child abduction from other Contracting States of The Hague Protection of Children Convention according to Art. 7 of the Convention. As long as jurisdiction thereafter lies with the courts of the state in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention keep, the German courts are limited to ordering the temporary stay of enforcement.
J. Oster: Facebook dislikes: The taming of a data giant through private international data protection law
Just as the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) suffers from a deficit concerning both its public and its private enforcement. Among other things, this deficit is owed to the fact that European data protection law still raises many questions regarding jurisdiction and the applicable law. In its interlocutory judgment that will be discussed in this article, the Rechtbank Amsterdam established its jurisdiction and declared the GDPR as well as Dutch data protection and tort law applicable to a lawsuit by the Dutch Data Protection Foundation for alleged violations of rules of data protection and unfair competition. This article agrees with the Rechtbank’s findings, but it also draws attention to weaknesses in its reasoning and to unresolved questions of European private international data protection law.
Repeal of the RECJA and transfer of countries to the REFJA
Singapore’s Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act 1921 (‘RECJA’) is based on the UK Administration of Justice Act 1920 and its Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 1959 (‘REFJA’) is based on the UK Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. In 2019, the government amended the REFJA in significant ways (previously detailed here), expanding its scope to include the registration of judgments from non-superior courts of gazetted countries, judicial settlements, non-money judgments and interlocutory judgments. At the same time, the RECJA was repealed from a date to be determined by the government.
That date has now (very nearly) arrived. The RECJA will be repealed on 1 March 2023. When the REFJA was amended in 2019, the intention at that time was to transfer over the countries gazetted under the RECJA gradually to the newly amended REFJA, with negotiations conducted on a country-by-country basis to determine what reciprocal arrangements would be suitable in each case. Only HK SAR has ever been gazetted under the REFJA. On 1 March 2023, it will be joined by Brunei Darussalam, Australia, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (see here). These countries were previously gazetted under the RECJA. An omission is the Windward Islands, which does not appear in the new list. The list now also includes all the States of India; previously the State of Jammu and Kashmir was excluded under the RECJA.
Of particular note, however, is that the terms of the reciprocal arrangements generally remain the same as under the RECJA. Only money judgments rendered by the listed courts of the gazetted countries which are final and conclusive between the parties can be registered under the REFJA. Clearly, the full promise of the REFJA – with its potential for a wider range of foreign judgments to be registered under its scope – will have to be realised another day.