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IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2018] SGHC 123
In IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2018] SGHC 123, the Singapore High Court had the occasion to discuss and resolve various meaty private international law issues. The facts concerned the alleged negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation by the defendants on the fuel consumption of a specific model of engine that was sold and installed into ships owned by the plaintiffs. The issue before the court was whether the Singapore courts had jurisdiction over the misrepresentation claim. The defendants were German and Norwegian incorporated companies so the plaintiffs applied for leave to serve the writ out of Singapore. This entailed fulfilling a 3 stage process, following English common law rules: (1) a good arguable case that the case falls within one of the heads set out in the Rules of Court, Order 11, (2) a serious issue to be tried on the merits, and (3) Singapore is forum conveniens on applying the test set out in The Spiliada [1987] AC 460. Stages (1) and (3) were at issue in the case.
The judgment, by Coomaraswamy J, merits close reading. The main private international law issues can be summarised as follows:
(a) Choice of law is relevant when assessing the heads of Order 11 of the Rules of Court.
The plaintiffs had relied on Order 11 rule 1(f) and rule 1(p). Rule 1(f) deals with tortious claims and the court proceeded by ascertaining where the tort was committed. According to the court, this question was to be answered by the lex fori. If the tort was committed abroad, the court held that choice of law for tort then came into play: the court must then determine if the tort satisfied Singapore’s tort choice of law rule, ie the double actionability rule. It should be noted that the Court of Appeal in Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 had held that the double actionability rule will apply even in relation to local torts (as the flexible exception may displace Singapore law to point to the law of a third jurisdiction). The double actionability rule thus remains relevant when assessing Order rule 1(f) whether the tort is committed abroad or in Singapore.
(b) ‘damage’ for the purposes of Order 11 rule 1(f)(ii) is not limited to direct damage.
Order 11 rule 1(f)(ii) is in these terms: ‘the claim is wholly or partly founded on, or is for the recovery of damages in respect of, damage suffered in Singapore caused by a tortious act or omission wherever occurring.’ The court held that ‘damage’ for the purposes of rule 1(f)(ii) included the increased fuel expenditure and reduction in capital value of the ships due to the fuel inefficient engines suffered not just by the original owners of the ships at the time of the misrepresentation, but also the subsequent purchasers of the ships. On the facts, the court held that the damage suffered by the subsequent purchasers arose directly from the misrepresentation as the misrepresentation was also intended to be relied upon by them. Further, the court held that, even if that had not been the case, direct damage is not required under rule 1(f)(ii). The difference in wording between Order 11 rule 1(f) and the UK CPR equivalent (CPR PD6B para 3.1(9)) makes the decision on this point less controversial than the reasoning in Four Seasons v Brownlie [2017] UKSC 80, [2018] 1 WLR 192.
(c) The test used to ascertain whether ‘the claim is founded on a cause of action arising in Singapore’ for the purposes of Order 11 rule 1(p) differs from the substance test which applies to determine the loci delicti in a multi-jurisdictional tort situation for the purposes of the double actionability rule.
The former test derives from Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Thompson [1971] AC 458. The court observed that the Distiller’s test is more plaintiff-centric compared to the substance test used for the purposes of the double actionability rule because Order 11 rule 1(p) ‘requires the court to view the facts of the case through the cause of action which the plaintiff has sought to invoke.’ Whereas, the latter test is ‘the more general and more factual question “where in substance did the tort take place.”’ (para [166], emphasis in original). This point will likely be revisited by the Court of Appeal, not least because it had, as the court itself acknowledged, cited the Distillers test as authority for the substance test in JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises [2011] 1 SLR 391.
(d) Whether Singapore is forum conveniens for the purposes of a setting aside application and whether Singapore is forum non conveniens for the purposes of a stay application should be assessed with reference to current facts.
Norway and Germany were potential alternative fora for the action. After leave had been given to serve out of jurisdiction in the ex parte hearing, the plaintiffs commenced proceedings in Norway as a protective measure. No proceedings were commenced in Germany. This meant that, under the Lugano Convention, the Norwegian courts had priority over the German courts. The court treated this as indicating that the courts of Germany ceased to be an available forum to the parties. This was significant, given that the court had earlier held that the loci delicti was Germany. The defendants argued that the commencement of Norwegian proceedings was to be ignored and the application to set aside service out of jurisdiction was to be assessed solely with reference to the facts which existed at the time when leave to serve out of jurisdiction was granted. The effect of the defendants’ argument would be that the setting aside application would be determined on the basis that Germany was an available forum, while their alternative prayer for a stay would be determined on the basis that Germany was an unavailable forum. The potential for wastage in time and costs is clear on this argument and the court rightly took a common sense and practical approach on this issue.
(e) The possibility of a transfer of the case from the Singapore High Court (excluding the SICC) to the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) is a relevant factor in the Spiliada analysis.
This had previously been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Rappo, Tania v Accent Delight International Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 265. The SICC is a division of the Singapore High Court which specialises in international commercial litigation. Its rules allow for a question of foreign law to be determined on the basis of submissions instead of proof. Further, the bench includes International Judges from not only common law but also civil law jurisdictions. The court held that the specific features of the SICC and the possibility of the transfer of the case to the SICC weighed in favour of Singapore being forum conveniens compared to Norway and Germany.
(f) In a setting-aside application, where the plaintiffs have succeeded in showing that Singapore is the prima facie natural forum in the first stage of the Spiliada test, the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to show why they would suffer substantial injustice if the action were to proceed in Singapore.
In an Order 11 case, the second stage of the Spiliada test usually operates to give the plaintiffs a second bite of the cherry should they fail to establish Singapore is the natural forum under the first stage of the test. The plaintiffs are allowed to put forward reasons why they would suffer substantial injustice if trial takes place in the natural forum abroad. Very interestingly, the court held that where, as on the facts of the case, the plaintiff had already satisfied the burden of showing that Singapore is the natural forum under the first stage of the Spiliada test, the burden then shifts to the defendants to show why they would suffer substantial injustice if trial took place in Singapore.
The case is on appeal to the Court of Appeal. Its judgment is eagerly anticipated.
The Russian Supreme Court’s guidelines on private international law
The Russian Supreme Court has published the English translation of the guidelines on Russian private international law, issued in Russian on 27 June 2017 (ruling No 23 ‘On Consideration by Commercial Courts of Economic Disputes Involving Cross-Border Relations’).
The ruling is binding on all the lower courts in Russia: from time to time the Russian Supreme Court gathers in a plenary session to discuss the case law approaches to controversial matters in a particular field of law. It then adopts binding guidelines to ensure a uniform application of law in the future (this role of the Supreme Court is based on art. 126 of the Constitution and arts. 2 and 5 of the law on the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 2 February 2014). Read more
Towards a European Commercial Court?
The prospect of Brexit has led a number of countries on the European continent to take measures designed to make their civil justice systems more attractive for international litigants: In Germany, the so-called “Justice Initiative Frankfurt”, consisting of lawyers, judges, politicians and academics, has resulted in the creation of a special chamber for commercial matters at the District Court in Frankfurt which will, if both parties agree, conduct the proceedings largely in English (see here). In France, an English-language chamber for international commercial matters was established at the Cour d’appel in Paris, adding a second instance to the English-speaking chamber of commerce at the Tribunal de commerce in Paris (see here). In the Netherlands, the Netherlands Commercial Court and the Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal will soon begin their work as special chambers of the Rechtbank and the Gerechtshof Amsterdam (see here). And in Belgium, the government plans to establish a Brussels International Business Court (see here). Clearly: the prospect of Brexit has stirred up the European market for international litigation.
News
Conference: The Law of Treaties as Applied to Private International Law, Milan, 5-6 May 2023
A conference on “The Law of Treaties as Applied to Private International Law” will take place at the Catholic University of Milan on 5 and 6 May 2023, under the auspices of the Italian Society of International Law and EU Law (SIDI) and the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL).
The event aims to discuss the impact of the rules of treaty law on the formation, interpretation and implementation of international conventions laying down rules of private international law, and to assess whether, and in which way, the specific object and features of private international law have a bearing on the operation of the law of treaties in this area.
Speakers and chairs include Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling), Catherine Brölmann (University of Amsterdam), Sergio Carbone (University of Genova, Emeritus), Luigi Crema (University of Milan), Zeno Crespi Reghizzi (University of Milan), Pedro De Miguel Asensio (Complutense University of Madrid), Malgosia Fitzmaurice (Queen Mary University of London), Burkhard Hess (Director of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law), Patrick Kinsch (University of Luxembourg), Catherine Kessedjian (University Paris II Panthéon-Assas, Emerita), Jan Klabbers (University of Helsinki, TBC), Antonio Leandro (University of Bari), Alex Mills (University College London), Etienne Pataut (University Paris I – Panthéon-Sorbonne), Andrea Schulz (German Federal Ministry of Justice), Jean-Marc Thouvenin (University of Paris Nanterre; Secretary-General of The Hague Academy of International Law), Chiara Tuo (University of Genova), Hans van Loon (former Secretary-General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law), and Jan Wouters (KU Leuven).
A roundtable on “The role of IGOs in the elaboration, implementation and coordination of private international law treaties”, chaired by Fausto Pocar (University of Milan, Emeritus), will feature interventions by Luca Castellani (Secretary of Working Group IV (Electronic Commerce) – Uncitral), Nicolas Nord (Secretary-General of the International Commission on Civil Status), Andreas Stein (Head of Unit (Civil Justice) at the European Commission Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers – Civil and commercial justice) and Ignacio Tirado (Secretary-General of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (Unidroit), among others.
A key-note speech will be delivered by Maciej Szpunar (Judge at the Court of Justice of the European Union, TBC). Closing remarks will be provided by Stefania Bariatti (University of Milan).
The conference, in English, will be on-site only.
See the full programme and the registration form. Early bird rates are offered to those registering before 6 March 2023.
For further information: pietro.franzina@unicatt.it.
New law on International Commercial Arbitration in Greece
A new law on international commercial arbitration was published on the 4th of February in Greece. It is the fruit of the efforts by a committee established by the Ministry of Justice. The previous law nr. 2735/1999 is abolished.
The new law nr. 5016/2023 consists of 59 articles, whereas the predecessor had only 37 articles. Both laws are based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The main novelties of the recent law are the following:
- Article 11 covers the issue of the validity of the arbitration agreement.
- Article 16 introduces a provision for multiparty arbitration.
- Article 22 regulates the issue of the arbitrator’s liability.
- Article 24 introduces a provision for the unification of multiple arbitrations.
- Article 35 contains a special rule for the production of documents and the submission of evidence.
- Last but not least, Article 46 sets the stage for the foundation of Arbitration Centers by private companies or public law corporations, such as Bar Associations. Some of them have already established Arbitration Centers (mostly if not exclusively for purely domestic disputes) in the major cities of the country, such as Athens and Thessaloniki. The new law grants them access to international commercial disputes.
Chinese judgment on the third-party funding in arbitration
Wang Jingru, Wuhan University Institute of International Law
Background
In November 2022, Beijing Fourth Intermediate People’s Court delivered the landmark decision in Ruili Airlines Co. Ltd. and Others v. CLC Aircraft Leasing (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. For the first instance, the Chinese court confirmed the legitimacy of third-party funding in arbitration and clarified the standard of review regarding the challenge towards it.
In 2021, the CIETAC rendered an arbitral award addressing the dispute arising from an aircraft leasing agreement. In this case, the claimant, CLC Aircraft Leasing (Tianjin) Co., Ltd., was funded by a third-party funder, IMF Bentham Limited. The respondents, Ruili Airlines Co. Ltd. (Ruili Airlines), Yunnan Jingcheng Group Co., Ltd. and Dong Lecheng, opposed enforcement of the award before Wuxi Intermediate People’s Court .[i] After being dismissed by the Wuxi Court, the respondents challenged the arbitral award before Beijing Fourth Intermediate People’s Court and were again dismissed.[ii]
Legal Issues
The respondents challenged the arbitral awards based on four grounds: first, the composition of the tribunal was not in accordance with the arbitration rules; second, the claimant and the tribunal breached the principle of confidentiality for disclosing information to the third-party funder; third, the tribunal failed to bear the parties fair opportunity to present the case; fourth, the arbitral award infringed the social public interest.[iii] The court reviewed the challenge under Article 281 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law, which dealt with the challenge to foreign-related arbitral awards. Given our focus on third-party funding, this note only discussed the first two grounds.
Composition of the Tribunal
The respondents submitted that Rollin Chan, the arbitrator appointed by the claimant, was affiliated with the Nixon Peabody CWL, a Hong Kong law firm which had a significant relationship with the funder, IMF Bentham Limited. The Nixon Peabody CWL Law Firm had provided legal services to HSBC Group and JP Morgan Group, which were actual controllers of IMF Bentham Limited’s two main shareholders, HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited and JP Morgan Nominees Australia Limited. The respondents argued that this relationship fell within the arbitrator’s obligation to disclose. However, neither did Rollin Chan disclose the relationship nor did he resign, which raised justifiable doubts about his independence and impartiality.
The court first pointed out that the current law did not prohibit third-party funding arbitration. The third-party funding and the funder’s relationship with the arbitrator are related to the credibility of arbitration and the integrity of the award. Therefore, the court’s analysis focused on the challenge to the arbitrator and the disclosure of the third-party funder.
As explained by the court, the mechanism of challenge to arbitrators intended to eliminate the arbitrators with conflicts of interest which might undermine the fair trial and decision. The disclosure obligation requires the arbitrators to disclose any fact within their knowledge regarding their relationship with the case, the parties, members of the tribunal or other situations which may raise justifiable doubts about their independence and impartiality to the parties and the arbitration institution. Meanwhile, the court stressed that the arbitrators’ obligation to disclose should be based on their knowledge of potential conflicts of interest which may give rise to justifiable doubts about their independence and impartiality. Arbitrators could be challenged based on grounds specified by law or arbitration rules. If the relations were not known to the arbitrators and were insufficient to undermine the independence and impartiality of the arbitration, the arbitrator would not breach the duty for not disclosing the relationship. Likewise, there would be no violation against the provision of challenge to arbitrators.
In this case, the court found that Rollin Chan was a consultant of Nixon Peabody CWL instead of an associate or a partner who got dividends. He was based in Shanghai instead of Hong Kong. He did not engage in office matters and did not know about the dealings between Nixon Peabody CWL and IMF’s shareholders, as well as their actual controllers. Also, it was confirmed that none of them had been Nixon Peabody CWL’s clients. While they could connect with Nixon Peabody law firms in other regions, those law firms were independent of Nixon Peabody CWL. Nixon Peabody was an international lawyer network. Law firms within the network were separate entities subject to respective supervision of different jurisdictions. These law firms did not share client information or financial income. The respondents presented evidence to expose the business relationship between Nixon Peabody LLP (US) and HSBC (US), JP Morgan (US). However, the evidence mistook Nixon Peabody LLP (US) for Nixon Peabody CWL (HK). Also, HSBC (US) and JP Morgan (US) were different from the funder’s shareholders, HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited and JP Morgan Nominees Australia Limited. Therefore, the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove the conflicts of interest or create a ground for challenge.
The court confirmed that the civil party had the legitimate right to accept third-party funding. Such a choice shall be respected as long as the arrangement does not breach the law or undermine the integrity of the award. In the absence of guidance on the disclosure of third-party funding, it is encourageable for the party to disclose the existence of third-party funding, which assists the parties in exercising their right based on the information.
Confidentiality
The respondents submitted that the third-party funder got information on the procedure and merits of the case. Considering that the funder was a listed company, the outcome of the case could be disclosed to the public. Therefore, the claimant and the tribunal breach the principle of confidentiality.
As acknowledged by the claimant, information including the procedural arrangement and the arbitral award was shared with the funder. For this issue, the court clarified that the key to confidentiality was withholding the information from the public so as to protect the parties’ commercial secrets and social image. While the arbitration rules prohibit disclosure to the “outsider”, information can be shared with the people concerned. In practice, the people concerned, such as the secretary of the tribunal and the parties’ shareholders who had significant interest in the case, could gain information about the arbitration, even though such disclosure was not explicitly allowed by the arbitration rules. Since the current rules did not preclude third-party funders from sponsoring the parties to engage in arbitration, the establishment of a funding relationship did not violate the principle of confidentiality.
Comments
Supporters of third-party funding argue that this mechanism could promote access to justice for impecunious parties and help the parties to overcome liquidity issues,[iv] which makes it an essential complement to the arbitration market. However, despite the fact that the third-party funding in arbitration has somewhat become a common phenomenon, worries about its adverse influence on arbitration are not unfounded. Third-party funders are stimulated by the economic interest directly connected to the outcome of the arbitration. To secure the recovery and maximize the profit, third-party funders may recommend counsel or arbitrators with whom they are familiar to the parties. They may also precipitate the “claim inflation” which exceeds the real loss of the funded party.[v] The third-party funding raises debate on its legitimacy and brings novel questions to be answered.
In this case, the Chinese court directly clarified the legitimacy of third-party funding and the standard of review. With the ambition to build up an attractive arbitral seat, China takes a rather friendly position to embrace this fast-growing mechanism. The court confirmed that third-party funding was not forbidden by the current law. Accordingly, it is natural to disclose relevant information to the third-party funder which is not viewed as a breach of confidentiality. The challenge to third-party funding will be assessed case by case. The arbitral award can only be set aside if third-party funding hinders the arbitration proceedings or undermine the integrity of the arbitral awards. The decision also shed some light on procedural control over third-party funding arbitration. The court held that the relationship between the arbitrator and third-party funder could also give rise to justifiable doubts about the arbitrator’s independence and impartiality. Besides, without explicit guidance of law, the court encouraged the funded party to disclose the existence of third-party funding, which was consistent with the common anticipation of arbitration practitioners.[vi] Whilst a single decision is not required to address everything, the way forward remains to be seen.
[i] See Ruili Airlines Co. Ltd. and Others v. CLC Aircraft Leasing (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. (2022) Su 02 Zhi Yi No. 14.
[ii] See Ruili Airlines Co. Ltd. and Others v. CLC Aircraft Leasing (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. (2022) Jing 04 Min Te No. 368.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] See Marie Stoyanov and Olga Owczarek, ‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: Is it Time for Some Soft Rules?’ (2015) 2(1) BCDR International Arbitration Review 171, 172.
[v] See John Beechey, ‘The Pandora’s Box of Third-Party Funding: Some Practical Suggestions for Arbitrators in Light of Recent Developments’ (2019) 20 ICCA Congress Series 558, 573.
[vi] See School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary University of London, 2015 Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration, available at: https://arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/2015/index.html.