Views
Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co., Ltd, Hague Service Convention and Judgment Enforcement in China
Jie (Jeanne) Huang, University of Sydney Law School, Australia
Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd. v. Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII is a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of California on April 2, 2020. The certiorari to the Supreme Court of the US was denied on 5 October 2020. It is a controversial case concerning the interpretation of the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters of November 15, 1965 (the “Hague Service Convention”) for service of process in China.
- Facts:
Changzhou SinoType Technology Co. (SinoType) is based in China. Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII (Rockefeller) is an American investment firm. In February 2008, they signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which provided that:
“6. The parties shall provide notice in the English language to each other at the addresses set forth in the Agreement via Federal Express or similar courier, with copies via facsimile or email, and shall be deemed received 3 business days after deposit with the courier.
7. The Parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the Federal and State courts in California and consent to service of process in accord with the notice provisions above.
8. In the event of any disputes arising between the Parties to this Agreement, either Party may submit the dispute to the Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Service in Los Angeles for exclusive and final resolution pursuant to according to [sic] its streamlined procedures before a single arbitrator who shall have ten years judicial service at the appellate level, pursuant to California law, and who shall issue a written, reasoned award. The Parties shall share equally the cost of the arbitration. Disputes shall include failure of the Parties to come to Agreement as required by this Agreement in a timely fashion.”
Due to disputes between the parties, in February 2012, Rockefeller brought an arbitration against SinoType. SinoType was defaulted in the arbitration proceeding. According to the arbitrator, SinoType was served by email and Federal Express to the Chinese address listed for it in the MOU. In November 2013, the arbitrator found favorably for Rockefeller.
Instead of enforcing the award in China according to the New York Convention,[1] Rockefeller petitioned to confirm the award in State courts in California. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1290.4(a) provides that a petition to confirm an arbitral award “shall be served in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement for the service of such petition and notice.” Therefore, Rockefeller transmitted the summons and its petition to SinoType again through FedEx and email according to paragraph 7 of the MOU. SinoType did not appear and the award was confirmed in October 2014. SinoType then appeared specially and applied to set aside the judgment. It argued that the service of the Californian court proceeding did not comply with the Hague Service Convention; therefore, it had not been duly served and the judgment was void.
- Decision
The California Supreme Court rejected SinoType’s argument.
The Court discerned three principles for the application of the Hague Service Convention. First, the Convention applies only to “service of process in the technical sense” involving “a formal delivery of documents”. The Court distinguished “service” and “notice” by referring to the Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention, published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (‘Handbook’). The Court cited that
“the Convention cannot—and does not—determine which documents need to be served. It is a matter for the lex fori to decide if a document needs to be served and which document needs to be served. Thus, if the law of the forum states that a notice is to be somehow directed to one or several addressee(s), without requiring service, the Convention does not have to be applied.”[2]
Second, the law of the sending forum (i.e. the law of California) should be applied to determine whether “there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.”
Third, if formal service of process is required under the law of the sending forum, the Hague Convention must be complied for international transmission of service documents.
The court held that the parties have waived the formal service of process, so the Hague Service Convention was not applicable in this case.[3]
- Comments
The Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd has a number of interesting aspects and has been commented such as here, here and here.
First, the Hague Service Convention is widely considered as ‘non-mandatory’ but ‘exclusive’.[4] Addressing the non-mandatory nature of the Convention, the Handbook states that “the Convention can not—and does not—determine which documents need to be served. It is a matter for the lex fori to decide if a document needs to be served and which document needs to be served.”[5] However, this statement does not necessarily mean, when judicial documents are indeed transmitted from a member state to another to charge a defendant with notice of a pending lawsuit, a member state can opt out of the Convention by unilaterally excluding the transmission from the concept of service. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v Schlunk decided by the Supreme Court of the US and Segers and Rufa BV v. Mabanaft GmbH decided by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) are the two most important cases on the non-mandatory nature of the Convention. Both cases concentrate on which law should be applied to whether a document needed to be transmitted abroad for service.[6] However, Rockefeller is different because it is about which law should be applied to determine the concept of service when the transmission of judicial documents takes place in the soil of another member state. The Handbook provides that the basic criterion for the Convention to apply is “transmission abroad” and “place of service is determining factor”.[7] When judicial documents are physically transmitted in the soil of a member state, allowing another member state to unilaterally determine the concept of service in order to exclude the application of the Convention will inappropriately expand the non-mandatory character of the Convention. This will inevitably narrow the scope of the application of the Convention and damage the principle of reciprocity as the foundation of the Convention. The Hague Convention should be applied to Rockefeller because the summons and petitions were transmitted across border for service in China.
Second, as part of its accession to the Hague Convention, China expressly stated that it does not agree to service by mail. Indeed, the official PRC declarations and reservations to the Hague Convention make it clear that, with the limited exception of voluntary service on a foreign national living in China by his country’s own embassy or consulate, the only acceptable method of service on China is through the Chinese Central Authority. Therefore, although China has recognized monetary judgments issued in the US according to the principle of reciprocity, the judgment of Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd probably cannot be recognized and enforced in China.
The California Supreme Court decision has important implications. For Chinese parties who have assets outside of China, they should be more careful in drafting their contracts because Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd shows that a US court may consider their agreement on service by post is a waiver of China’s reservation under the Hague Service Convention. For US parties, if Chinese defendants only have assets in China for enforcement, Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd is not a good case to follow because the judgment probably cannot be enforced in China.
[1] China is a party to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (“New York Convention”).
[2] Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention (4th ed. 2016) par. 54, p. 23, fn. Omitted.
[3] The Court emphasized that their conclusions should be limited to Section 1290.4, subdivision (a): “Our conclusions as to California law are narrow. When parties agree to California arbitration, they consent to submit to the personal jurisdiction of California courts to enforce the agreement and any judgment under section 1293. When the agreement also specifies the manner in which the parties “shall be served,” consistent with section 1290.4, subdivision (a), that agreement supplants statutory service requirements and constitutes a waiver of formal service in favor of the agreed-upon method of notification. If an arbitration agreement fails to specify a method of service, the statutory service requirements of section 1290.4, subdivisions (b) or (c) would apply, and those statutory requirements would constitute formal service of process. We express no view with respect to service of process in other contexts.”
[4] Martin Davies et al., Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia 36 (10th ed. 2020).
[5] Paragraph 54 of the Handbook.
[6] Ibid., paragraphs 31-45, and 47.
[7] Ibid., paragraph 16.
The Contractual Function of a Choice of Court Agreement in Nigerian Jurisprudence
Many international commercial parties usually provide for a choice of court agreement as a term of their contract. This is done to enhance predictability, certainty and reduction of costs in the event a dispute arises between the parties. Since a choice of court agreement is a term of the contract, does the principle of contract law apply to determine a choice of court agreement? Though this is a matter of controversy in Nigerian law,[1] some recent appellate courts (Court of Appeal and Supreme Court) have given a foreign choice of court agreement a contractual function.[2]
Kashamu v UBN Plc[3] is a most recent Court of Appeal decision that analyses a foreign choice of court agreement exclusively from the principles of contract law. In this case, The Banque International Du Benin (“BIDB”), a limited financial institution in Benin Republic, granted medium term loan facilities, in different sums, to the Societe d’ Egrenage Industrial De Cotonu du Benin (“SEIC-B”), a private limited company registered in Benin Republic, for construction of its Cotton Ginning factory. The facilities were secured by, inter alia, SEIC-B’s goodwill, factory and land. In addition, the defendant/appellant, the alter ego of SEIC-B, personally guaranteed the facilities in a personal guarantee agreement. The loan agreement between BIDB and SEICB provided that the law and courts of Benin Republic should determine their dispute. However, the guarantee agreement between BIDB and the defendant/appellant did not explicitly provide for a choice of court agreement.
SEIC-B defaulted in the repayment of the loans despite repeated demands. As a result, BIDB appointed the plaintiff/respondent, a public limited financial institution in Nigeria, as its attorney to recover the outstanding facility. Further to the donated power of attorney, the plaintiff/respondent claimed recovery of the debt from the defendant/appellant in the Lagos High Court, Nigeria. The defendant/appellant counter-claimed and also challenged the jurisdiction of the Lagos High Court as being the wrong forum to institute the action. The Lagos High Court held that it had jurisdiction.
The defendant/appellant was dissatisfied with this decision and appealed to the Court of Appeal. The defendant/appellant argued that the proper forum for the action was the Courts in Benin Republic, given that the loan agreement between BIDB and SEICB provided that the law and courts of Benin Republic should determine their dispute. He argued that the choice of court agreement in the loan contract should also be incorporated into the guarantee agreement, so that it was the intention of the parties that the courts of Benin Republic should determine their dispute. He also argued that the execution and performance of the contract were to be in Benin Republic hence the agreement was in French Language.
The plaintiff/respondent argued that the loan agreement and guarantee agreement were distinct. It observed that the parties were bound by the terms in the guarantee agreement. It added that the parties in the guarantee agreement did not agree that the court in Benin Republic would have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from it. It asserted that the guarantee agreement was not expressly incorporated in the loan agreement. It opined that the defendant/appellant was not privy to the loan agreement and would not take a benefit from or enforce it for want of privity of contract. It claimed that the content of the guarantee agreement was clear and must be given its literal meaning.
The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal. In construing the loan and guarantee agreement to determine if the parties chose the courts of Benin Republic, it applied the principles of Nigerian contract law to the effect that courts are allowed to read a document holistically so as to reach and garner harmonious results of its content. In construing a document, the court is enjoined or mandated by law to apply the literal rule as a canon of interpretation, that is, to accord the words employed there in their ordinary grammatical meaning without any embellishment.[4] It then held that for the document of parties to a private contract to confer jurisdiction on a court, the words used must be clear and explicit and devoid of woolliness and ambiguity. In the instant case, the guarantee contract did not precisely confer jurisdiction on the Benin Republic court.[5] It further held that loan contract did not in any way allude to the guarantee to benefit from the doctrine of incorporation by reference. The doctrine of incorporation could not be invoked because of the want of connection between the two documents.[6]
Kashamu’s case demonstrates the recent attitude of some Nigerian appellate courts to treat choice of court agreements as a term of the contract which should be construed strictly according to the literal and ordinary words used in the contract. In effect in the absence of vitiating circumstances, the parties are bound by the terms of a choice of court agreement, and a Nigerian court will not add or subtract from the way the parties drafted the contract. The Court of Appeal’s approach in Kashamu reflected Nigeria’s law that interprets contractual documents strictly. Kashamu is a modern approach that applies the principles of contract law to choice of court agreements.
[1]For an extended analysis see generally CSA Okoli and RF Oppong, Private International Law in Nigeria (Hart, 2020) 107 – 125.
[2]Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008 ) 16 NWLR 509, 542 (Tobi JSC); Conoil Plc
v Vitol SA ( 2018 ) 9 NWLR 489 – 490 (Nweze JSC); 497 (Kekere-Ekun JSC); 500 (Okoro JSC); 501 – 2
(Eko JSC); Captain Tony Nso v Seacor Marine ( Bahamas) Inc ( 2008 ) LPELR-8320 (CA); Megatech Engineering Limited v Sky Vision Global Networks Llc (2014) LPELR-22539 (CA); Beaumont Resources Ltd v DWC Drilling Ltd ( 2017 ) LPELR-42814 (CA); Kashamu v UBN Plc (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1746) 90. See also Felshade International (Nig.) Ltd v Trafugura Beheer BV Amsterdam (2020) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1743) 107, 144.
[3]Kashamu (Ibid)
[4] Kashamu (Ibid) 114-5 (Ogbuinya JCA).
[5] Kashamu (Ibid) 115 (Ogbuinya JCA).
[6] Kashamu (Ibid) 116 (Ogbuinya JCA).
Chris Thomale on the EP Draft Report on Corporate Due Diligence
Professor Chris Thomale, University of Vienna and Roma Tre University, has kindly provided us with his thoughts on the recent EP Draft Report on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability.
In recent years, debate on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has picked up speed, finally reaching the EU. The Draft Report first and foremost contains a draft Directive on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability, which seems a logical step ahead from the status quo developed since 2014, which so far only consists of reporting obligations (see the Non-Financial Reporting Directive) and sector specific due diligence (see the Regulations on Timber and Conflict Minerals). The date itself speaks volumes: Precisely, to the very day (!), 8 years after the devastating fire in the factory of Ali Enterprises in Pakistan, which attracted much international attention through its follow-up litigation against the KiK company in Germany, the EU is taking the initiative to coordinate Member State national action plans as required under the Ruggie Principles. Much could be said about this new Directive in terms of company law and business law: The balancing exercise of on the one hand, assuring effective transparency of due diligence strategies and, on the other hand, avoiding overregulation in particular with regard to SMEs still appears somewhat rough and ready and hence should see some refinement in due course. The same applies to the private enforcement of those due diligence duties: By leaving the availability and degree of private enforcement entirely to the Member States (Art. 20), the Directive seems to gloss over one of the most pressing topics of comparative legal debate. The question of availability, conditions and extent of private liability imposed on parent companies for human rights violations committed in their value chains abroad, must be addressed by the EU eventually.
To this forum, however, the private international implications of the Draft Report would appear even more important:
As regards the conflicts of laws solution, the proposed Art. 6a Rome II Regulation seeks to make available, at the claimant’s choice, several substantive laws as conveniently summarized by Geert van Calster in the terms of lex loci damni, lex loci delicti commissi, lex loci incorporationis and lex loci activitatis. Despite my continuous call for a choice between the first two de regulatione lata, to be reached by applying a purposive reading of Art. 4 para 1 and 3 Rome II (see JZ 2017 and ZGR 2017), the latter two, lex loci incorporationis and lex loci activitatis, seem very odd to me. First, they are supported, to my humble knowledge, by no existing Private International Law Code or judicial practice. Second, the lex loci incorporationis has no convincing rationale, why it should in any way be connected with the legal relationship as created by the corporate perpetrator’s tort. Lex loci activitatis is excessively vague and will create threshold questions as well as legal uncertainty. Third, I would most emphatically concur with Jan von Hein’s opinion of a quadrupled choice being excessive and impractical in and of itself.
The solution proposed in terms of international jurisdiction, I will readily admit, looks puzzling to me. I fail to see, which cases the proposed Art. 8 para 5 Brussels Ibis Regulation is supposed to cover: As far as international jurisdiction is awarded to the courts of the “Member State where it has its domicile”, this adds nothing to Art. 4, 63 Brussels Ibis Regulation. In fact, it will create unnecessary confusion as to whether this venue of general jurisdiction is good even when there is no “damage caused in a third country [which] can be imputed to a subsidiary or another undertaking with which the parent company has a business relationship.” Thus, we are left with the courts of “a Member State […] in which [the undertaking] operates.” As already pointed out, this term itself will trigger a lot of controversy regarding certain threshold issues. But there is more: Oftentimes this locus activitatis will coincide with the locus delicti commissi, e.g., when claimants want to rely on an omission of oversight by the European parent company. In that case, Art. 7 No. 2 Brussels Ibis Regulation offers a venue at the very place, i.e. both in terms of international and local jurisdiction, where that omission was committed. How does the new rule relate to the old one? And, again, which cases exactly are supposed to be captured by this provision? In my view, this is a phantom paragraph that, if anything, can only do harm to the fragile semantic and systematic architecture built up by the Brussels Ibis Regulation and CJEU case law.
The same seems true of the proposed Art. 26a Brussels Ibis: First, there is no evident need for such a forum necessitatis, rendering Member State courts competent to hear foreign-cubed cases with no connection to the EU whatsoever. To the contrary, recent development of the US Alien Torts Statute point in the opposite direction. Second, the EU might be overreaching its legislative jurisdiction: Brussels Ibis Regulation is based on the EU’s competence to legislate on judicial cooperation in civil matters (Art. 81 para 2 TFEU). Such a global long-arm statute may not be covered by that competence, if it is legal at all under the public international confines incumbent upon civil jurisdiction (for details, see here). Third, it will be virtually anybody’s guess what a court seized with a politicised and likely emotional case like the ones we are talking about will deem a “reasonable” Third State venue. In fact, this would be a forum non conveniens test with inverted colours, i.e. the very test the CJEU, in 2005, deemed irreconcilable with the exigencies of foreseeability and legal certainty within the Brussels Ibis Regulation.
News
Revue Critique de droit international privé – issue 2024/1
Written by Hadrien Pauchard (assistant researcher at Sciences Po Law School)
The first issue of the Revue Critique de droit international privé of 2024 was released a few months ago. It contains 2 articles and several case notes. Once again, the doctrinal part has been made available in English on the editor’s website (for registered users and institutions).
The opening article is authored by Dr. Nicolas Nord (Université de Strasbourg) and tackles the crucial yet often overlooked issue of L’officier d’état civil et le droit étranger. Analyse critique et prospective d’une défaillance française (Civil registrars and foreign law. A critical and prospective analysis of a French failure). Its abstract reads as follows:
In international situations, French civil registrars may frequently be confronted with the application of foreign law. However, by virtue of the General Instruction on Civil Status and other administrative texts, they are under no obligation to establish the content of foreign law and can be satisfied with the sole elements reported by requesting private individuals. This solution certainly has the advantage of simplifying the task of civil registrars, who are not legal professionals. However, it leads to inconsistencies within the French legal system. The article therefore recommends reversing the principle and creating a duty for the French authority in this area. However, the burden should be lightened by facilitating access to the content of foreign law. Concrete proposals are put forward to this end, both internally and through international cooperation.
In the second article, Prof. David Sindres (Université d’Angers) addresses the complex question of the scope of jurisdiction clauses, through the critical discussion of recent case law on whether Le « destinataire réel » des marchandises peut-il se voir opposer la clause attributive de compétence convenue entre le chargeur et le transporteur maritime ? (Can the “actual addressee” of the goods be submitted to the jurisdiction clause agreed between the shipper and the maritime carrier?). The abstract reads as follows:
In two notable decisions, the French Cour de cassation has ruled that the case law of the Court of Justice Tilly Russ/Coreck Maritime is strictly confined to the third-party bearer of a bill of lading or sea waybill, and cannot be applied to the “actual addressee” of the goods. Thus, unlike the third party bearer, the “actual addressee” cannot be submitted to the clause agreed between the shipper and the maritime carrier and inserted in a bill of lading or a sea waybill, even if he has succeeded to the rights and obligations of the shipper under the applicable national law, or has given his consent to the clause under the conditions laid down in article 25 of the Brussels I bis regulation. The distinction thus made by the Cour de cassation with regard to the enforceability against third parties of jurisdiction clauses agreed between shippers and carriers cannot be easily justified. Indeed, it is in no way required by the Tilly Russ and Coreck Maritime rulings and is even difficult to reconcile with them. Furthermore, insofar as it may lead to the non-application of a jurisdiction clause to an actual addressee who has nevertheless consented to it under the conditions of article 25 of the Brussels I bis regulation, it fails to meet the requirements of this text.
The full table of contents is available here.
The second issue of 2024 has been released and will be presented shortly on this blog.
Previous issues of the Revue Critique (from 2010 to 2022) are available on Cairn.
Call for abstracts: TEGL Conference Re-imagining Law for Sustainable Globalization: Navigating Uncertainty in a Globalized Era – 16-17 December 2024
A call for abstracts has been launched for the TEGL (Transformative Effects of Globalisation in Law) Conference entitled “Re-imagining Law for Sustainable Globalization: Navigating Uncertainty in a Globalized Era”, which will take place on 16-17 December 2024. For more information, click here.
Interested persons may submit a paper proposal abstract, a panel proposal abstract or an abstract to participate in the PhD session. Abstracts should be no more than 500 words. A short bio (of max. 200 words) should also be included. Both documents should be submitted by 15 September 2024 by using the following link.
As stated on its website, the topics are the following:
The conference focuses on the four TEGL research streams: 1) Constitutionalism and Subjects of Globalization; 2) Economic Law and Globalization’s Infrastructures; 3) Courts, Science and Legitimacy; 4) National and Regional Institutions as Global Actors. It, therefore, welcomes submissions on a wide variety of topics. For reference, specific questions include but are not limited to:
- How does law produce socio-economic inequalities in the context of uncertainty and across various areas?
- How can existing categories of law be rethought in different areas to reduce these inequalities and the resulting sense of uncertainty?
- How does law constrain or regulate uncertainties within global value chains, exploring its role in shaping and responding to crises in this interconnected world?
- How does law guarantee or contribute to uncertainty in international economic exchanges, encompassing trade and investment?
- How effective are legal mechanisms in mitigating uncertainties arising from the current climate crisis? Discuss how the law can contribute to sustainable solutions.
- What is the role of law in empowering or disempowering individuals facing socio-economic inequalities and exploring potential legal reforms to address disparities?
- How does the law address humanitarian concerns during the conflict, considering its effectiveness and proposing innovative solutions?
- What role do principles play in risk regulation/environmental/climate change litigation (before international/EU/national courts)?
- What role do experts play in decision-making and courts, and what role do NGOs/public interest litigation play?
- What is the role of science and its legitimacy in courts?
- How does uncertainty affect legal coherence and migration governance, and can uncertainty be considered a ‘governance strategy?’
- How to regulate and control in times of uncertainty.
- Proportionality in times of uncertainty.
- What role should law play in navigating uncertainty in the digital age, including in platform regulation (e.g., the political economy of platforms, AI utilization in content moderation, design of platform interfaces, access to datasets), automated decision-making, digitization of lawmaking and the use of AI in courtrooms (Robot judge, natural language processing and automation in law).
This event is organized within and supported by the Sector Plan TEGL and the Globalization and Law Network of Maastricht University. For inquiries, please contact glawnet-fdr@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
TEGL research project is a collaboration between the law faculties of Maastricht University, Open Universiteit NL, Tilburg University and the University of Amsterdam. More information is available here.
The Hague Academy of International Law Centre for Studies and Research 2025: “Artificial Intelligence and International Law”
As recently highlighted by contributions on this blog, new technologies have a significant impact on the development of the law. Hence, the Curatorium of the Hague Academy of International Law has chosen for the the 2025 edition of the Centre for Studies and Research (18 August – 5 September 2025) to focus on the emerging topic of “Artificial Intelligence and International Law“. This year, the selected researchers will be work under the guidance of the Directors of Research, Marion Ho-Dac (Université d’Artois) for the French-speaking section as well as Marco Roscini (University of Westminster) for the English-speaking section.
Interested candidates must be researchers and preferably hold an advanced degree (PhD or Doctorate degree). Registration for the 2025 Centre is open from 1 July to 15 October 2024 via the institution’s own Online Registration Form.
The Academy describes the scope of its 2025 Programme as follows (emphasis added to highlight passages of specific interest to col.net readers):
The increasing integration of digital technologies based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) into human activities requires a thorough re-examination of most normative frameworks in the international order. Advanced AI systems operate with ever greater autonomy, generating content, recommendations, predictions and decisions for States, organisations and individuals. AI thus offers enormous opportunities for humankind by facilitating (or even making possible) the performance of certain tasks. At the same time, however, it presents significant risks related, for instance, to potential biases and accountability gaps. In this context, is (public and private) international law capable of addressing the profound changes that the contemporary rise of AI is bringing?
The Centre of Studies and Research 2025 of The Hague Academy of International Law aims to analyse these challenges and opportunities through the lenses of international law in a holistic manner by focusing on three different aspects: AI’s impact on the sources and institutions of the international legal order, AI’s impact on special regimes of international law, and AI’s role in addressing specific contemporary problems.
Selected researchers will be called to work on the following topics under the guidance of the Directors of Research:
- AI and International/Regional Organisations
- AI and International/Regional Courts and Tribunals
- AI and the Making of (Public/Private) International Law
- AI and the Practice of (Public/Private) International Law
- International Governance of AI including Technical Standardisation
- AI and the Risk-based Approach
- AI and the International Law of Armed Conflict
- AI and International Environmental Law
- AI and Conflict of Laws
- AI and International Human Rights Law
- AI and the Law of State Responsibility
- AI and International Criminal Law
- AI and International Business Law
- AI and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security
- Lethal Autonomous Weapons and International Law
- AI and the North-South Divide
- AI and Cybersecurity
- AI and Privacy
- AI and Humanitarian Action
- AI and the Cross-border Movement of Persons
- AI and (Mis)Information
For further information on the HAIL 2025 Centre and the Academy in general, please consult the HAIL Homepage or refer to the attached PDF Programme.