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The Aftermath of the CJEU’s Kuhn Judgment – Hellas triumphans in Vienna. Really.

Written by Stephan Walter, Research Fellow at the Institute for German and International Civil Procedure Law, University of Bonn, Germany

Claims brought by creditors of Greek state bonds against Greece in connection with the 2012 haircut do not fall under the substantive scope of the Brussels Ibis Regulation because they stem from the exercise of public authority. Hence, they cannot be regarded as civil and commercial matters in the sense of Article 1(1) Brussels Ibis Regulation. This is the essence of the CJEU’s Kuhn judgment (of 15 November 2018, Case C-308/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:911), which was already discussed on this blog.

In said blog post, it was rightly pointed out that the judgment could be nothing but a Pyrrhic victory for Greece. Not least the – now possible – application of national (sometimes exorbitant) jurisdictional rules was considered to have the potential to backfire. This was, however, only the case, if Greece was not granted immunity in the first place. In short: the fallout of the CJEU’s judgment was hardly predictable. (more…)

Is there a need for international conventions on legal parentage (incl. international surrogacy arrangements)?

The Experts’ Group on Parentage / Surrogacy of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) has answered in the affirmative.

At its fifth meeting earlier this year, the Experts’ Group agreed that it would be feasible to develop both:

  • a general private international law instrument on the recognition of foreign judicial decisions on legal parentage; and
  • a separate protocol on the recognition of foreign judicial decisions on legal parentage arising from international surrogacy arrangements (abbreviated as “ISA”).

As announced on the HCCH website, the Experts’ Group will recommend to the governance body of the HCCH (i.e. Council on General Affairs and Policy) during its meeting in March 2019 that “work continue with a view to preparing proposals for inclusion in future instruments relating to the recognition of judicial decisions.” The Council will have the last word.

In my opinion, there are many reasons for drafting two separate instruments, which may range from legal to political as these are very sensitive topics. One that particularly struck me relates to the indirect grounds of jurisdiction when considering the recognition of such decisions:

“Most Experts concluded that the indirect grounds previously identified in the context of general legal parentage would not work in ISA cases, and instead supported the State of birth of the child as the primary connecting factor in an ISA case as this would provide certainty and predictability. A qualifier to that connecting factor (such as the habitual residence of the person giving birth to the child) might be necessary to guarantee sufficient proximity, as well as to prevent and combat trafficking of persons and law evasion.” See also para 25 of the Report.

Please note that these instruments would deal with the recognition and not with the enforcement of foreign judicial decisions given the nature of decisions on legal parentage. See in contrast my previous post on the HCCH draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.

The HCCH news item is available here.

The full report is available here.

Sweden: New rules on non-recognition of underage marriages

Written by Prof. Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg, Uppsala University, Sweden

On 1 January 2019, new restrictions came into force in Sweden’s private international law legislation in respect of marriages validly concluded abroad. The revised rules are found in the Act (1904:26 p. 1) on Certain International Relationships on Marriage and Guardianship, Chapter 1 § 8a, as amended by SFS 2018:1973. The content of the new legislation is, briefly, the following: no marriage shall be recognised in Sweden if the spouses or either one of them was under the age of 18 years at the time of the marriage. By way of exception, this rule may be set aside once both parties are above 18 years of age, if there are exceptional reasons to recognise the marriage.  (more…)

News

Virtual Workshop (in German) on July 5: Brigitta Lurger on International law enforcement in social networks

On Tuesday, July 5, 2022, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its 24th monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00-12:30 (CEST). Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Brigitta Lurger (University of Graz) will speak, in German, about the topic

International law enforcement in social networks

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

Just Launched: RDIPP’s New Website

The new website of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP) has just been launched and is available at rdipp.unimi.it.

Giving access to the complete collection of the journal’s Indexes (available both in Italian and in English), a set of useful databases to browse the journal’s content, and the Table of Content of the volumes published in the Book Series Studi e pubblicazioni della Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, this new online resource is designed to disseminate the wealth of knowledge accrued with more than fifty years of Italian and European scholarship and case-law in the field of private international and procedural law.

A weekly newsletter is expected to be launched in the upcoming months to keep our community updated on the latest developments in this area of the law. You can already subscribe to it in the RDIPP network section of the website.

From the Directors and the Editorial Board of RDIPP, a very warm welcome to our pages!

The RDIPP team

With thanks to Professor Francesca C. Villata for the tip-off.

Matters Relating to a Contract – The Saga Continues (with AG Szpunar’s Opinion on Case C-265/21, AB et al v Z EF)

With Case C?265/21, the CJEU is bound to add another chapter to the never-ending story of accurately describing the scope of the head of special jurisdiction for contracts in what is today Art. 7(1) Brussels Ia. The Opinion by AG Szpunar, which was published last week, might give readers an indication of what to expect.

The case arises out of an action for a declaration that the claimants are the owners of 20 works of art, which are currently in their possession. While the claimants argue that they have bought the pieces from their (step)mother, who had bought them from their two creators (the parents of the defendant), the defendant, a German domiciliary, claims that her parents had only temporarily stored the works in the gallery of the claimants’ (step)mother in Liège, Belgium. The case was dismissed in the first instance for lack of international jurisdiction as the Belgian court found itself unable to establish a contractual connection linking the claimants to the defendant.

On the claimants’ appeal, who argue that the claim should nonetheless be qualified as contractual in light of the two sales contracts (between the defendant’s parents and the claimants’ (step)mother and between their (step)mother and themselves), with both relevant places of performance being located in Belgium, the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles referred the following questions to the CJEU:

1. Must the concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’, within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘the Brussels I Regulation’):

a. be interpreted as requiring the establishment of a legal obligation freely assumed by one person towards another, which forms the basis of the applicant’s action, and is that the position even if the obligation was not freely assumed by the defendant and/or towards the applicant?

b. If the answer is in the affirmative, what must the degree of connection between the legal obligation freely assumed and the applicant and/or the defendant be?

2. Does the concept of ‘action’ on which the applicant ‘relies’, like the criterion used to distinguish whether an action comes under the concept of matters relating to a contract, within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, or under ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’, within the meaning of Article 5(3) of that regulation (C-59/19, paragraph 32), entail verification of whether the interpretation of the legal obligation freely assumed seems to be indispensable for the purpose of assessing the basis of the action?

3. Does the legal action whereby an applicant seeks a declaration that he or she is the owner of an asset in his or her possession in reliance on a double contract of sale, the first entered into by the original joint owner of that asset (the spouse of the defendant, who is also an original joint owner) with the person who sold the asset to the applicant, and the second between the latter two parties, come within the concept of matters relating to a contract within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation?

a. Is the answer different if the defendant relies on the fact that the first contract was not a contract of sale but a contract of deposit?

b. If one of those situations comes within the concept of matters relating to a contract, which contract must be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the place of the obligation which serves as the basis of the claim?

4. Must Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) be interpreted as applying to the situation referred to by the third question referred for a preliminary ruling and, if so, which contract must be taken into consideration?

After quickly dismissing the fourth question (which the Cour d’appel might indeed have referred somewhat prematurely at this stage), the Opinion (which is not available in English), starts with a comprehensive review of the Court’s case law on the interpretation of what is now Art. 7(1) Brussels Ia. It culminates in the following summary (references ommitted; own emphasis):

65. Eu égard aux considérations qui précédent, il y a lieu de constater, en premier lieu, que la jurisprudence de la Cour relative à l’interprétation de la notion de « matière contractuelle », au sens de l’article 5, point 1, du règlement nº 44/2001, ne saurait être considérée comme uniforme, ce qui
explique les difficultés rencontrées par les juridictions nationales pour déterminer, encore aujourd’hui, si les litiges relèvent ou non de cette matière.

66. En effet, initialement, la Cour s’est orientée vers une interprétation restrictive de la notion de « matière contractuelle », en considérant que seuls les litiges trouvant leur origine dans un contrat entre les parties au litige relevaient de cette matière. Dans le cadre de cette interprétation, la Cour s’est référée, essentiellement, à l’objectif de prévisibilité et de sécurité juridique de la convention de Bruxelles ou du règlement nº 44/2001.

67. La Cour s’est ensuite orientée vers une interprétation plus large de la notion de « matière contractuelle », en considérant qu’un litige relève de cette notion lorsque le demandeur fonde l’action qu’il dirige contre le défendeur sur une obligation juridique librement consentie par une personne envers une autre. C’est dans l’arrêt Engler que la Cour a, pour la première fois, indiqué clairement qu’elle n’interprète « pas [l’article 5, point 1, du règlement nº 44/2001] de manière étroite ». C’est ensuite dans les arrêts Kareda et flightright, confirmés dans la jurisprudence ultérieure, qu’elle a abandonné définitivement l’interprétation restrictive de cette disposition fondée sur l’approche « personnaliste » de la matière contractuelle, issue de l’arrêt Handte, pour adopter une interprétation plus large.

68. En second lieu, il ressort de cette interprétation plus large que l’action d’un demandeur, même introduite contre un tiers, doit être qualifiée de « contractuelle », au sens de l’article 5, point 1, du règlement no 44/2001, dès lors qu’elle se fonde sur une obligation juridique consentie par une personne à l’égard d’une autre. Par conséquent, la circonstance que, en l’espèce, les deux parties au litige ne sont pas directement liées par un contrat ne saurait remettre en cause la qualification de cette action comme relevant de la « matière contractuelle ». En effet, seul importe le fait que l’obligation juridique dont se prévalent les requérants au principal soit née d’un contrat, entendu comme un accord entre deux personnes, ou d’une relation juridique qui peut être assimilée à un contrat dans la mesure où elle crée des « liens étroits de même type que ceux qui s’établissent entre les parties à un contrat ».

69. Dans le cadre de cette interprétation plus large, il ressort des arrêts Kareda et flightright que la Cour s’est référée non seulement à l’objectif de prévisibilité et de sécurité juridique mais également à celui de proximité et de bonne administration de la justice.

70. Ainsi, lorsque l’obligation contractuelle sur laquelle est fondée l’action du demandeur a été identifiée, il y a lieu de déterminer s’il existe un lien de rattachement particulièrement étroit entre la demande et la juridiction qui peut être appelée à en connaître, ou si l’application de l’article 5, point 1, du règlement nº 44/2001 permet de faciliter la bonne administration de la justice. À mon sens, il y a donc lieu de veiller au respect de l’équilibre entre l’objectif de prévisibilité et de sécurité juridique et celui de proximité et de bonne administration de la justice de ce règlement.

75. Eu égard aux considérations qui précèdent, je propose de répondre à la première question préjudicielle que l’article 5, point 1, du règlement nº 44/2001 doit être interprété en ce sens que son application présuppose la détermination d’une obligation juridique librement consentie par une personne à l’égard d’une autre et sur laquelle se fonde l’action du demandeur, même lorsque cette obligation ne lie pas directement les parties au litige. Dans l’interprétation de cette disposition, la juridiction nationale doit veiller au respect de l’équilibre entre l’objectif de prévisibilité et de sécurité juridique et celui de proximité et de bonne administration de la justice.

On this basis, AG Szpunar proceeds to point out, in response to the second question (which he reformulates for that purpose), that nothing in the Court’s decision in Wikingerhof requires the national court to examine the contractual obligation in question or the content of the contract (paras. 76–80).

As to the third question, AG Szpunar reiterates that he understands the claim to be contractual in nature as it is ultimately based on an obligation freely entered into, even though the particular contract does not bind the two parties to the dispute (para. 83). Out of the two contracts, the AG deems the first one (the contract between the defendant’s parents and the claimants’ (step)mother) to be decisive for jurisdictional purposes “la source originale des droits et obligations litigieux.” (para. 84).