Views
Private international law requirements for the effective enforcement of human rights
Written by Tanja Domej, University of Zurich
Note: This blogpost is part of a series on „Corporate social responsibility and international law“ that presents the main findings of the contributions published in August Reinisch, Stephan Hobe, Eva-Maria Kieninger & Anne Peters (eds), Unternehmensverantwortung und Internationales Recht, C.F. Müller, 2020.
1. It is essential for the effective enforcement of human and workers’ rights to create effective local institutions and procedures. This encompasses functioning, trustworthy and accessible civil courts, but also other public, private and criminal institutions and mechanisms (e.g. permission, licencing or inspection procedures to ensure safety in the workplace; accident insurance; trade unions). Civil litigation cannot be a substitute for such mechanisms – particularly if it takes place far away from the place where the relevant events occurred.
2. This, however, is not a reason against ensuring effective enforcement mechanisms, including judicial mechanisms, for private law claims arising from violations of human rights or claims aiming to prevent or to terminate such violations. Such judicial proceedings can also help to promote the establishment of effective local mechanisms for preventing and remedying violations.
3. The usual difficulties arising in cross-border litigation tend to be aggravated in cases concerning human rights violations in developing countries. In addition to issues of jurisdiction and choice of law, there are often considerable challenges particularly with respect to litigation funding, fact-finding and establishing the content of foreign law, if required.
4. Legal aid alone usually is not a viable financial basis for corporate human rights litigation. The funding of such claims largely depends on market mechanisms, particularly on success-based lawyers’ fees or commercial litigation funding. Because of the moral hazard that may arise in this context, it is desirable to promote the establishment of public-interest litigation funders. Nevertheless, “entrepreneurial litigating” in the field of corporate human rights cases cannot be considered as per se abusive. There seems to be a need, however, to monitor practices in this field closely to assess whether further regulation is required.
5. Where cross-border judicial cooperation is not functioning, taking of evidence located in a foreign state without involving authorities of the state where such evidence is located becomes increasingly important. A generous approach should be adopted in cases where “direct” taking of evidence neither violates legitimate third-party interests nor involves the use or threat of compulsion in the territory of a foreign state.
6. In cases where liability for damage inflicted by the violation of human rights standards depends on a business’s internal operations, it is essential for an effective access to remedy that either the burden of proof with respect to the relevant facts is on the business or that there is a disclosure obligation that ensures access to relevant information. Where such disclosure could endanger legitimate confidentiality interests (particularly with respect to trade secrets), appropriate mechanisms to protect such interests should be put in place.
7. Collective redress mechanisms can improve access to justice with respect to corporate human rights claims. Meanwhile, reducing an excessive burden on the courts that could result from a large number of parallel proceedings currently does not seem to be as important a consideration in practice in the field of corporate human rights litigation as it can be in other fields of mass tort litigation. Appropriate safeguards have to be put in place to protect both the legitimate interests of defendants and those of the members of the claimant group. When designing such safeguards, it is important to ensure that they do not lead to the obstruction of legitimate claims. Particularly in collective redress proceedings, the court should have strong case management and control powers, both during the proceedings and in the case of a settlement.
8. In addition to claims aiming at remedies for victims of violations, private law claims brought by non-government organisations, by public bodies or by individuals can at least indirectly contribute to the enforcement of human rights standards. Possible examples are claims on the basis of unfair competition, and possibly also contractual claims, because of false statements about production standards. Actions by associations or popular actions for injunctive or declaratory relief could also contribute to private enforcement of human rights standards. It remains to be seen whether litigation among businesses concerning contractual obligations to comply with human rights standards will play a meaningful role in this field in the future as well.
9. Soft law mechanisms and alternative dispute resolution can supplement judicial law enforcement mechanisms, but they are not a substitute for judicial mechanisms. In particular, human rights arbitration depends on a voluntary submission. Its practical effectiveness therefore requires the cooperation of the parties to the dispute. It would, however, be possible to create incentives for such cooperation.
Full (German) version: Tanja Domej, Zivilrechtliche Rechtsdurchsetzungsmechanismen, in: August Reinisch, Stephan Hobe, Eva-Maria Kieninger & Anne Peters (eds), Unternehmensverantwortung und Internationales Recht, C.F. Müller, 2020, pp. 229 et seq.
Third-party liability of classification and certification societies in the context of conflict of laws and public international law – a comment on the CJEU’s recent ‘Rina judgement’
Written by Yannick Morath
Yannick Morath, doctoral candidate at the University of Freiburg, has kindly provided us with his thoughts on the CJEU’s judgement in the case of LG and Others v Rina SpA, Ente Registro Italiano Navale (C-641/18 – ECLI:EU:C:2020:349)
(See also the earlier post by Matthias Weller concerning the CJEU’s judgement).
- Introduction
Private-law classification and certification societies play a vital role in modern economies. Especially in the maritime sector, external auditors issue certificates dealing with public tasks such as the seaworthiness and safety of vessels. Not only their contractual partners but also third parties rely on the accuracy of such certificates. Due to cross-border mobility of certificates and certified items, issues of Private International Law have to be taken into account when dealing with a certifiers’ liability.
When not applying the appropriate level of care, classification and certification agencies can – according to the CJEU – be sued in the courts of the Member State where the agency is seated. By finding this ruling, the CJEU had to deal with two interesting questions: Firstly, it had to establish whether an action for damages, brought against private certifiers falls within the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’, and therefore, within the scope of the Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels I). Secondly, the CJEU had to examine the legitimacy of the certifier’s plea based on the principle of customary international law concerning immunity from state jurisdiction.
2. Facts of the ‘Rina-case’
In 2006, the Al Salam Boccaccio ’98, a ship sailing under the flag of the Republic of Panama, sunk in the Red Sea, tragically causing the loss of more than 1,000 lives. Relatives of the victims and survivors have brought an action under Italian law before the Tribunale di Genova (District Court, Genoa, Italy) against two private law corporations (the Rina companies), that are seated in Genoa and were responsible for the classification and certification of the ship.
The applicants argue that the defendants’ operations, carried out under a contract concluded with the Republic of Panama, are to blame for the ship’s lack of stability and its lack of safety at sea, which are the causes of its sinking. Therefore, they claim compensation from the Rina companies for the losses they suffered.
The Rina companies counter that the referring court lacks jurisdiction, relying on the international-law principle of immunity from jurisdiction of foreign States. They state that they are being sued in respect of activities, which they carried out as delegates of the Republic of Panama. The activities in question were a manifestation of the sovereign power of a foreign State and the defendants carried them out on behalf of and in the interests of that State.
The applicants, however, argue in favour of the case’s civil law nature, within the meaning of Article 1 (1) of Regulation 44/2001. As the Rina companies are seated in Genoa, the Italian courts should have jurisdiction under Article 2 (1) of that regulation. They submit that the plea of immunity from jurisdiction does not cover activities that are governed by non-discretionary technical rules, which are, in any event, unrelated to the political decisions and prerogatives of a State.
The Tribunale di Genova decided to stay the proceedings and consult the CJEU for further clarification under Article 267 TFEU.
3. Background: The dual role of classification and certification societies
When dealing with the classification and certification of ships it is important to be aware of the dual role private-law societies play in this area. Traditionally they are hired by a shipowner to attest that a ship is built in accordance with the standards of a specific ship class. Those ‘class rules’ are developed by the classification societies themselves. The maritime industry depends on these services, as the classification of a ship is necessary to evaluate its insurability and marketability. Therefore, these voluntary classifications are mainly prompted by private interest. This is referred to as the ‘private function’ of classification.
On the other hand, the same societies fulfil a ‘public function’ as well. Under international maritime law, states have a duty to take appropriate measures for ships flying under their flag to ensure safety at sea (Article 94 (3) of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea). For this purpose ships have to be surveyed by a qualified personnel to make sure it meets all relevant safety and environmental standards. Flag states can perform these tasks themselves; however, most of them delegate executive powers to classification societies. Pursuant to Article 3 (2) of Directive 2009/15 this is also possible under EU law. When executing these powers classification agencies are subject to two contracts: The first one is the agreement on the delegation of powers with the flag state, the second contract is the actual certification agreement with the owner of the ship that is about to be surveyed. Whereas shipowners are free to choose one of the recognized classification societies, the certification itself is compulsory.
It must be noted that the classification according to class rules (private function) is a prerequisite for the statutory inspection and certification (public function). In the case at hand, the Rina companies were responsible for both aspects. They classified the ship in accordance with their class rules and then issued the statutory certificate on behalf of and upon delegation from the Republic of Panama. This public law background caused the need for clarification by the CJEU.
4. The CJEU on the interpretation of ‘civil and commercial matters’
Under Article 1(1) of Regulation 44/2001, the scope of that regulation is limited to ‘civil and commercial matters’. It does not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters. In order to ascertain whether Italian courts have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 2 (1) of that regulation it is necessary to interpret the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’. This concept is subject to an autonomous European interpretation. By determining whether a matter falls within the scope of the Regulation, the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the dispute is crucial. It must be noted that the mere fact that one of the parties might be a public authority does not exclude the case from the scope of the Regulation. It is, however, essential whether the party exercises public powers (acta iure imperii). These powers are ‘falling outside the scope of the ordinary legal rules applicable to relationships between private individuals’ (para. 34).
Following the Advocate General’s opinion and the CJEU’s judgement in Pula Parking (C-551/15 – ECLI:EU:C:2017:193), the Court notes that ‘it is irrelevant that certain activities were carried out upon delegation from a State’ (para. 39). The fact that the operations were carried out on behalf of and in the interest of the Republic of Panama and that they fulfil a public purpose, do not, in themselves, ‘constitute sufficient evidence to classify them as being carried out iure imperii’ (para. 41.).
In fact it must be taken into account that ‘the classification and certification operations were carried out for remuneration under a commercial contract governed by private law concluded directly with the shipowner of the Al Salam Boccaccio ’98’ (para. 45). Moreover, it is the responsibility of the flag state to interpret and choose the applicable technical requirements for the certification necessary to fly their flag.
The CJEU continues to examine the agency’s decision-making power. If the agency decides to withdraw a certificate, the respective ship is no longer able to sail. It argues, however, that this effect does not originate from the decision of the agency but rather from the sanction which is imposed by law (para. 47). The role of the certifier simply ‘consists in conducting checks of the ship in accordance with the requirements laid down by the applicable legislative provisions.’ As it is for the States to fix those provisions, it is ultimately their power to decide on a ship’s permission to sail.
Whereas the general remarks on the interpretation of ‘civil and commercial matters’ are convincing and based on settled case law, the findings about the ‘decision making power’ of recognised organisations give rise to further questions. If a ship does not comply with the relevant requirements, the statutory certificate must not be issued and the shipowner is not allowed to sail under the flag of the respective state. Even though this legal consequence is finally imposed by law, it is the certifier’s application of that law that leads to this effect. Whenever a certification agency refuses to issue a certificate, the ship is initially not able to sail. The CJEU’s technical perspective in paragraph 47 does not sufficiently appreciate the factual decision making of the certifier. The judgement does unfortunately not explicitly address the issue of legal discretion and its consequences on the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’.
However, there are other grounds to qualify the case a ‘civil matter’. As the CJEU pointed out as well, it follows from Regulation 6 (c) and (d) of Chapter I of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, that the final responsibility is allocated to the flag state (para. 48). Therefore, the state is subject to far-reaching supervisory duties. Even though this is not expressively regulated by international or EU law, it appears like the flag state can at any time overrule an agency’s decision to issue or withdraw the certificate. This would result in a limitation to the finality of the agency’s powers and prepare the ground for a civil law qualification. Some further remarks by the CJEU about this aspect would have been interesting.
5. The CJEU on state immunity from jurisdiction
Doubts regarding the jurisdiction of the Italian courts arose from the Rina companies’ plea based on the principle of customary international law concerning immunity from jurisdiction. Pursuant to the principle par in parem non habet imperium, a State cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of another State. ‘However, in the present state of international law, that immunity is not absolute, but is generally recognised where the dispute concerns sovereign acts performed iure imperii. By contrast, it may be excluded if the legal proceedings relate to acts which do not fall within the exercise of public powers’ (para. 56).
The CJEU held that this principle does not preclude the application of the Regulation in this case, although it is the referring court that has to examine whether the Rina companies had recourse to public powers within in the meaning of international law. It must be noted that a rule of customary international law will only exist where a given practice actually exists that is supported by a firm legal view (opinio iuris). Following the Advocate General, the CJEU finds that the case-law cited by the defendants ‘does not support the unequivocal conclusion that a body carrying out classification and certification operations may rely on immunity from jurisdiction in circumstances such as those of the present case` (c.f. para. 109 of his opinion).
In regard of state immunity, the CJEU changes its perspective on the case. Whereas the interpretation of ‘civil and commercial matters’ was driven by EU law, the doctrine of state immunity requires a different methodological approach, as it originates from international law. Nevertheless, the CJEU’s overall convincing remarks are in line with its earlier findings, setting a high bar for statutory certification societies to plead for state immunity.
6. Final remarks
The CJEU established legal security for the victims of maritime disasters such as the sinking of the Al Salam Boccaccio ’98. The judgement indirectly clarified the applicability of the Brussels I Regulation in cases where maritime certifiers operate only in their private function. When statutory certifications are a civil matter, this must a fortiori be the case for voluntary classifications. Having consistent results when establishing jurisdiction in such cases, also meets with the principle of foreseeability. The remarks on the applicability of the Brussels I regulation are also of significant relevance when dealing with the Brussels Ibis and the Rome I and II Regulations, as all of them apply the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’.
Moreover, the judgement underlines the responsibility of private-law certifiers and recognises their vital role as regulators that operate in the public interest. Even though the CJEU’ findings on the interpretation of ‘civil matters’ are consistent with its earlier developed broad understanding of the concept, further clarification regarding privatised decision making powers would have been desirable.
Corporate responsibility in (public) international law
Written by Oliver Dörr, University of Osnabrück
Note: This blogpost is part of a series on „Corporate social responsibility and international law“ that presents the main findings of the contributions published in August Reinisch, Stephan Hobe, Eva-Maria Kieninger & Anne Peters (eds), Unternehmensverantwortung und Internationales Recht, C.F. Müller, 2020.
I. Companies – responsibility
1. As for commercial entities, international law is concerned, above all, with transnational or multinational companies. The term basically describes the conglomerate of commercial entities that are acting separately in at least two different countries and which are tied together by a regime of hierarchical coordination.
2. In times of „global governance“ the international legal concept of responsibility is undergoing a process of de-formalization and, thus, encompasses the violation of social behavioural expectations, which for companies may result from international standards that are not legally binding. The resulting responsibility is a legal one insofar as the law adopts those standards and attaches negative consequences to their violation.
II. Private persons and the law of international responsibility
3. Private companies may be held responsible under international law to the extent that they are either themselves bound by primary legal obligations (direct responsibility), or their business activities are regulated by States which, in doing so, are fulfilling their own international legal obligations (indirect responsibility). A State may just as well impose such regulation without actually being under an obligation to do so (e.g. the US Alien Tort Statute).
Private persons as subjects of international legal obligations
4. Private persons being themselves bound by international legal obligations pertain to the process of de-medatization, which established the legal personality of the individual under international law.
5. Sovereign States can, by concluding international treaties, create legal obligations for private persons, including private companies, directly under international law. The personal scope of this comprehensive law-creating power of States is delimitated by their personal jurisdiction under international law. Whether an individual treaty itself gives rise to legal obligations for private persons, is, just as the creation of individual rights, a matter of treaty interpretation.
6. Genuine legal obligations have evolved for private persons under international criminal law: Here, detailed primary obligations of private persons have developed that are linked to a specific regime of individual responsibility, in particular under the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
7. In contrast, the extension of international human rights obligations to apply directly between private persons is not yet part of the international lex lata. Individual texts pointing in that direction (such as art. 29 para. 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) are merely of a programmatic nature.
8. Genuine international legal obligations of companies can today be found in the rules regulating deep sea-bed activities (arts. 137, 153 para. 2 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) and in various treaties establishing regimes of civil liability.
9. Obligations of private persons under international law, including those having direct effect within UN Member States, may also be created by the UN Security Council through resolutions under arts. 39, 41 of the UN Charter.
10. It is fairly uncertain whether the initiative, currently being undertaken within the UN Human Rights Council, to adopt a „legally binding instrument“ encompassing direct human rights liability of private companies, will ever have a chance of becoming binding law.
11. To the extent that there actually are primary obligations of private persons under international law, a general principle of law requires their violation to result in a duty to make reparation. Only in exceptional circumstances could the rules of State responsibility be transferred to private persons.
Obligations to establish the responsibility of private persons
12. An indirect responsibility under international law applies to undertakings via the international legal obligation of States to criminalize certain activities, e.g. in respect of waste disposal, bribery in foreign countries, organized crime and corruption.
Responsibility of private persons under autonomous national law
13. Provisions in national law that autonomously sanction private acts for international law violations bridge with their own binding effect the fact that the private person is not itself bound by the international legal norm.
14. The French Law No. 399-2017 on the plan de vigilance is far too general and vague to serve as an example for an (indirect) international legal reporting responsibility. The same applies to the CSR directive of the European Union of 2014.
III. Responsibility on the basis of non-binding rules of conduct
Behavioural governance without legally binding effects
15. The values contained in certain international law principles shape some social behavioural expectations that are summarized today in concepts of corporate social responsibility (CSR). As a matter of substance, those expectations relate to human rights, the environment, conditions of labour and fighting corruption.
Processes of rule-making
16. The discussion is mainly focused on certain international, cross-sector corporate codes of conduct, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976), die ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977), the UN Global Compact (2000) and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011).
17. In particular, with regard to human rights and environment, those rules are extremely unspecific, which means that here, law merely serves as a backdrop in order to endow social behavioural expectations with moral authority.
Responsibility by reception
18. In order to adopt and implement those business-related standards, basically all instruments of law-making and application can be used, as long as they impose normative requirements on companies and their activities. Legal certainty standards under the rule of law, as well as the rules of international law on the jurisdiction of States, can limit the reception.
19. Non-binding standards could be implemented, for example, via the legal regimes of State aid (in particular with respect to export finance), public procurement, investment protection and the rules on civil liability. So far, however, the international standards on business conduct are rarely being implemented in a legally binding manner.
IV. Conclusion
20. If the distinction of law and non-law is to be maintained, responsibility of companies in international law is a theoretical possibility, but of little practical relevance: Only in very specific circumstances are private companies themselves subjected to international legal obligations; moreover, it is similarly rare that „soft“ international standards of conduct are being adopted by „hard“ law and thereby made into specific legal duties of companies.
21. Behavioural standards that determine the international debate on CSR assign a mere „backdrop function“ to the law, as they neither identify concretely the international legal norms referred to, nor differentiate them properly. In that context, companies are simply required to publicly declare their commitment to „the good cause“, which results in duties to take precautionary measures, to exercise transparency and to publish reports.
22. That is why environmental protection, human rights etc. in relation to the activities of private companies is still mainly the responsibility of States. Tools that exist in international law in this respect, such as the rules of attribution or protective duties, must be adapted and enhanced, in order to achieve adequate solutions for detrimental business conduct on the basis of State responsibility.
Full (German) version: Oliver Dörr, Unternehmensverantwortlichkeit im Völkerrecht, in: August Reinisch, Stephan Hobe, Eva-Maria Kieninger & Anne Peters (eds), Unternehmensverantwortung und Internationales Recht, C.F. Müller, 2020, pp. 133 et seq.
News
Book launch: Brooke Marshall, ‘Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses’
On behalf of our former editor Brooke Marshall, we are happy to share the invitation to the UNSW Law & Justice Book Forum, which will host the launch of her book on Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses.
The event will feature the following speakers:
- Professor Mary Keyes, Director of the Law Futures Centre; Professor, Griffith Law School, Griffith University
- Professor Caroline Kleiner, Professor, Centre for Business Law and Management (CEDAG), Faculty of Law, Université Paris Cité, Paris, France
- Chaired by Professor Justine Nolan, Director, Australian Human Rights Institute; Professor, UNSW Faculty of Law & Justice
It will take place in a hybrid setting on Wednesday, 5 July, at 4:30pm AEST = 8:30am CEST = 7:30am BST. You may register using this link.
Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 4/2023: Abstracts
The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:
(These abstracts can also be found at the IPRax-website under the following link: https://www.iprax.de/en/contents/)
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP) No 1/2023: Abstracts
The first issue of 2023 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:
Francesco Salerno, (formerly) Professor at the University of Ferrara, L’impatto della procedura di interpretazione pregiudiziale sul diritto internazionale privato nazionale (The Impact of the Preliminary Rulings of the Court of Justice on National Private International Law; in Italian)
The European Court of Justice’s uniform interpretation of private international law concerns mainly – albeit not only – the EU Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 81 TFEU: in the context of this activity, the Court also takes into account the distinctive features of EU Member States. The increasing number of autonomous notions developed by the Court greatly enhanced the consistency and the effectiveness of the European rules. Against this background, the Italian judicial authorities implemented such a case-law even when it ran counter well-established domestic legal principles. Moreover, the European institutions rarely questioned the case-law of the Court of Justice, but when they did so, they adopted new rules of private international law in order to “correct” a well-settled jurisprudential trend of the Court.