Chinese courts made decision taking into account of the Hague Choice of Court Convention

China has signed the Hague Choice of Court Convention on 12 September 2017, but has not yet ratified this Convention. The Hague Choice of Court Convention has not entered into force in China. However, Shanghai High Court has already relied on the Hague Choice of Court Convention to make decision.

In Cathay United Bank v Gao, Shanghai High Court, (2016) Hu Min Xia Zhong No 99, the appellant, a Taiwan commercial bank, and the respondent, a Chinese citizen resident in Shanghai, entered into a Guarantee contract. It included a clause choosing Taiwan court as the competent court to hear disputes arising out of the contract. This clause did not specify whether it was exclusive or not. Chinese law does not provide how to decide exclusivity of a choice of court agreement. Facing the legal gap, Shanghai High Court took into account Article 3 of the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005 and decided that choice of court agreements should be exclusive unless the parties stated otherwise. The Shanghai High Court thus declined jurisdiction in favour of Taiwan Court.

This decision was made on 20 April 2017, even before China signed the Hague Choice of Court Convention. Since the Hague Choice of Court Convention has not entered into force in China, it should not be directly applied by Chinese courts in judicial practice. The question is whether Chinese courts could ‘take into account’ of international conventions not being effective in China to make decision. Although Article 9 of the Chinese Supreme Court’s Judicial Interpretation of Chinese Conflict of Laws Act allows the Chinese courts to apply international conventions, which have not entered into effect in China, to decide the parties’ rights and obligations, such an application is subject to party autonomy. In other words, parties should have chosen the international convention to govern their rights and obligations. Article 9 does not apply to international judicial cooperation conventions that do not deal with individuals’ substantive rights and are not subject to party autonomy. Perhaps, a more relevant provision is Article 142(3) of the PRC General Principle of Civil Law, which provides that international customs or practice may be applied to matters for which neither the law of the PRC nor any international treaty concluded or acceded to by China has any provisions. Arguably, the Hague Choice of Court Convention represents common practice adopted internationally and forms a source to fill the gap in the current Chinese law.

 

EU Member State sees opportunities in Brexit: Belgium is establishing a new English-language commercial court

Expecting higher demands for international commercial dispute resolution following Britain’s departure from the EU, Belgium plans to set up a new English-language commercial court, the Brussels International Business Court (BIBC), to take cases away from the courts and tribunals in London. This decision was announced on 27 Oct 2017. This BIBC is designed to address disputes arising out of Brexit and major international commercial disputes. The court will take jurisdiction based on parties’ choice, and will do the hearing and deliver judgments in English. The parties would have no right to appeal. BIBC combines elements of both traditional courts and arbitration. See comments here.

Although Brexit may cause uncertainty to litigants in the UK, a survey suggests that the EU judicial cooperation scheme is not the main reason for international parties choosing London to resolve their disputes. The top two factors that attract international litigants to London are the reputation and experience of English judges and combination of choice of court clauses with choice of law clauses in favor of English law,  followed by efficient remedies, procedural effectiveness, neutrality of the forum, market practice, English language, effective UK-based counsel, speed and enforceability of judgments. Furthermore, Brexit will not affect the New York Convention and would less likely affect London as an arbitration centre. It may be more reasonable to suggest that the main purpose of BIBC is not to compete with London at the international level, but to offer additional judicial tool and become a new commercial dispute resolution centre within the EU to attract companies and businesses to Brussels.

CJEU on the place of the damage under Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia as regards violation of personality rights of a legal person

First personal impressions presented by Edina Márton, LLM, PhD (Saarbruecken)

For jurisdictional purposes, the localisation of cross-border violations of personality rights under European instruments, such as Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (Brussels Ia), has attracted the attention of a considerable number of scholars and often led to different legal solutions in the national judicial practice. At EU level, besides Shevill (C-68/93; ECLI:EU:C:1995:61) as well as eDate and Martinez (C-509/09 and C-161/20; ECLI:EU:C:2011:685), since 17 October 2017, a third judgment in case Bolagsupplysningen (C-194/16; ECLI:EU:C:2017:766) has given further clarification in this area. In the recently delivered judgment, the ECJ specified one of the two limbs of the connecting factor “where the harmful event occurred or may occur” under Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia, namely the place of the alleged damage. Read more

Is “la réserve héréditaire” part of French international public policy ?

Through two decisions (Civ. 1ère, 27 sept. 2017, n° 16-17198 et 16-13151) both issued on September 27th, The French Cour de cassation finally gave an answer to one of the most discussed question of French Succession law: Is la réserve héréditaire part of French international public policy?

The circumstances of both cases are very similar. Two French composers living in California, where they had most of their assets, got married respectively in 1984 and 1990. They put their assets in a trust and designated their wives as beneficiaries. In both cases, the settlers did not designate the children they had from previous relationships as beneficiaries of the trust. After the death of their fathers, the latter turned to French courts in order to obtain part of the inheritance. They argued that the Californian law applicable to the succession should be declared contrary to French international public policy for not including a réserve héréditaire for certain heirs.

According to Article 912 §1 of the French Civil Code, la réserve hérédiataire or the reserved portion « is that part of the assets and rights of the succession whose devolution, free of charge, the law assures to certain heirs, called forced heirs, if they are called to the succession and if they accept it ». In other words, under French succession law, a person cannot freely dispose of all of his or her assets. French law set boundaries by putting aside a reserved portion of the deceased’s property. However, he or she can freely dispose of the disposable portion (quotité disponible) which is defined as « that part of the assets and rights of the succession that is not reserved by law and of which the deceased can freely dispose by liberalities » (Article 912 § 2).

Whereas the Court of Cassation ruled that the reserved portion is mandatory in internal matters, the question of its imperative nature in international cases was yet unclear. Authors disagree. While some consider that the réserve héréditaire cannot be considered as such as part of French ordre public international, others consider that due to the fact that it is an expression of solidarity among family members as well as a guarantee of equality between heirs, it has to be part of French international public policy.

The controversy was aggravated in 2011 when the Conseil Constitutionnel condemned le droit de prélèvement for amounting to a discrimination based on nationality. The droit de prélèvement is another specific French mechanism. It allows French heirs that have been deprived of the reserved portion from the assets located abroad to deduct the equivalent of such reserved portion from the part of the deceased’s assets that are located in France. As a consequence of this decision, the reserved portion remained the only protection for heirs from the risk of disinheritance.

However, in both decisions, the Court found that the mere fact that the foreign law does not provide for a mechanism such as the reserved portion does not amount to a violation of French international public policy. The foreign law could nevertheless be disregarded, but only if its concrete application in a specific case leads to a situation that would be incompatible with French essential principles.

Giving the particulars circumstances of the cases, the Court found that in both cases the application of Californian law was not contrary to French public policy. First, the Court outlined that the deceased had lived in California for over thirty years and that most of their assets were located there. As a consequence, both situations were not strongly connected to the French forum. Then, the Court pointed out that the children living in France were adults and that their economic situation will not suffer from their being deprived of the succession.

These observations lead the Court to consider that, in these situations, the Californian law is not contrary to French international public policy even though it does not provide for a reserved portion. The Court emphasis on the particular circumstances of the case, namely that the situation was mainly located in California and that none of the claimants was in need or economically instable, indicates that these circumstances weighed strongly on the outcome. It does not exclude that, in different circumstances, a foreign law that would not provide for a reserved portion could be dismissed as contrary to public policy.

Prior to the coming into force of the Succession Regulation, the solution appears in accordance with its public policy provision. Stating that courts could only refuse to apply provisions that are manifestly incompatible with the forum’s international public policy, Article 35 allows that foreign laws be disregarded when their application could lead to serious consequences. It does not appear to be the case in the present situations.

The new discussed question is now: In which case the application of a foreign law not including a reserved portion could lead to a situation incompatible with French essential principles ?

Freedom of establishment after Polbud: Free transfer of the registered office

Bastian Brunk, research assistant and doctoral student at the Institute for Comparative and Private International Law at the University of Freiburg (Germany), has provided us with the following first thoughts on the CJEU’s groundbreaking Polbud judgment.

The Judgment

In its judgment in Polbud (C-106/16), the CJEU again took the work out of the EU legislature’s hands while further developing the freedom of establishment provided for in Articles 49 and 54 TFEU. The case was heard following a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU by the Sad Najwyzszy (Supreme Court of Poland). In short, the CJEU had to decide on the following questions:

(1) Are Articles 49 and 54 TFEU applicable to a transfer of the registered office of a company incorporated under the law of one Member State to the territory of another Member State with the purpose of converting its legal form, when the company has no intention to change the location of its real head office or to conduct real economic activity in the latter Member State?

(2) Is a national legislation that makes the removal of a company from the commercial register and, accordingly, the out-migration of that company conditional upon its liquidation compatible with the freedom of establishment?

Answering these questions, the CJEU made Polbud, the company at stake, a liberal gift and strengthened the mobility of companies within the European Single Market. First, the CJEU stated that the freedom of establishment applies to the transfer of the registered office of a company from one Member State to another even if no real business is intended to be conducted in the latter Member State. Secondly, the CJEU ruled out national legislation providing for the mandatory liquidation of a company if the company requests the removal from the initial commercial register in cases of outward migration.

The facts

In September 2011, the shareholders of Polbud, a limited liablity company established under Polish law, decided to transfer the company’s registered office from Poland to Luxembourg. The resolution made no reference to a simultaneous transfer of either the real head office or the place of real economic activity. Based on that resolution, the registry court in Poland recorded the opening of the liquidation procedure. In May 2013, following a resolution adopted by a shareholder meeting in Luxembourg, the registered office of Polbud was transferred to Luxembourg. Polbud was renamed to Consoil Geotechnik and its legal form was changed to the Société à responsabilité limitée (S. à r. l.), the Luxembourgish private limited liability company. Subsequently, Polbud lodged an application with the Polish registry court for its removal from the commercial register. This application was refused to be registered because, as the registry court stated, Polbud failed to provide evidence of the successful execution of a liquidation procedure. Polbud appealed against this decision, arguing that no liquidation was needed because the company continued to exist as a legal person incorporated under Luxembourgish law.

The precedents

Articles 49 and 54 TFEU provide for the freedom of establishment. According to the CJEU case-law, the concept of “establishment” within the meaning of these Articles is a very broad one, allowing a Union national to participate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic life of another Member State and to profit therefrom (CJEU in Gebhard, C-55/94, para. 25 and Almelo, C-470/04, para. 26). It involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period (CJEU in Factortame and Others, C-221/89, para. 20 and Commission v. United Kingdom, C-246/89, para. 21). In order to claim freedom of establishment, it is generally necessary to have secured a permanent presence in the host Member State (CJEU in Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer, C-386/04, para. 19 and Schmelz, C-97/09, para. 38). This case law can, generally speaking, be translated as “no freedom of establishment without establishment”.

On the other hand, the CJEU generously extended the application of Articles 49 and 54 TFEU to letterbox companies without “fixed establishment” and/or “permanent presence” in their home Member State. In Centros (C-212/97) the Court ruled that EU law is applied to the set-up of subsidiaries, branches and agencies in other Member States and, in that regard, it is immaterial that the company was formed in one Member State only for the purpose of establishing itself in another Member State, where its main, or indeed entire, business is to be conducted (Centros, para 17).

The CJEU then used its 2009 Cartesio judgment (C-210/06) as an opportunity to, obiter dictu, set guidelines for cross-border transfers of seat. It stated that, on the one hand, a Member state has the power to define both the connecting factor required of a company if it is to be regarded as incorporated under the law of that Member State and, as such, capable of enjoying the right of establishment, and that required if the company is to be able subsequently to maintain that status (thus treating companies as legal creatures of their country of origin). On the other hand, freedom of establishment comprises the right of a company to move from one Member State to another. If domestic legislation of the Member State of origin requires the liquidation of the company, thereby preventing it from converting itself into a legal person governed by the law of the target Member State, such a measure cannot be justified under the rules on freedom of establishment (Cartesio, paras. 110 ff.).

This jurisdiction was complemented by the CJEU in Vale (C-378/10) where the Court clarified the legal position of the Member State of destination. If a Member State allows for the conversion of companies governed by national law, it must also grant the same possibility to foreign EU companies (Vale, para. 46). In the absence of relevant EU-law, the target Member State may set up procedural rules to cover the cross-border conversion but must ensure that they are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the European Union legal order (principle of effectiveness) (Vale, para. 48).

The Opinion of AG Kokott

In her Opinion of 4 May 2017 (see here), AG Kokott took up a distinct position emphasizing the need for actual establishment for the application of Articles 49 and 54. This criterion is sufficiently met, as AG Kokott states, if, at least, the company intends to set up an actual establishment in the sense of conducting at least a nominal economic activity in the target Member State (Opinion, para 36). The AG underlines her position citing the above mentioned CJEU case-law in Factortame and Others (C-221/89), Commission v. United Kingdom (C-246/89), Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer (C-386/04) and Schmelz (C-97/09). She concludes that the freedom of establishment “gives economic operators in the European Union the right to choose the location of their economic activity, it does not give them the right to choose the law applicable to them” (Opinion, para. 38).

Implications of the Polbud judgment for the internal market

The CJEU now takes a different point of view: Once formed in accordance with the legislation of a Member State, companies enjoy the full range of that freedom. Nothing new, so far, as Geert van Calster suggests in his comment (see here). But what makes Polbud (r)evolutionary?

First, the CJEU creates legal certainty in an area that is particularly important for the functioning of the European Single Market. In its Cartesio judgment, the Court allowed for the cross-border conversion of EU companies in general but did little to shape the relationship between the involved Member States. Therefore, it was widely thought, that, just like AG Kokott propounds, the conversion of a company from one Member State to another required a genuine economic link with the State of destination. In Polbud, the CJEU clarifies that the regulatory power of a Member State ends when a company converts itself into a company governed by the law of another Member state. It is for the latter State to determine the legal and/or economic conditions that have to be satisfied by the company in order to bring the conversion into effect (paras 33 ff.). Under Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, the State of origin is only allowed to provide legislation for the protection of public interests (such as the protection of creditors, minority shareholders and employees) but cannot impose mandatory liquidation.

Secondly, the CJEU obliges the State of origin to observe the principle of equivalence. This principle, already known from the Vale decision (see above), was generally considered as obliging only the target Member State in cross-border conversion cases to legally treat domestic and foreign companies equally. By contrast, the State of origin was only thought to be bound by the general prohibition of restrictions (i.e. the prohibition of rules hampering or rendering less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms, see CJEU in Kraus, C-19/92, para. 32). In Polbud, the CJEU, without being explicit on this point, extends the scope of application of the principle of equivalence to the Member State of origin by stating that “the imposition, with respect to such a cross-border conversion, of conditions that are more restrictive than those that apply to the conversion of a company within that Member State itself” is not acceptable (para. 43).

Finally, recapitulating its jurisdiction in Daily Mail and National Grid Indus (C-371/10), the CJEU points out that exercising the freedom of establishment for the purpose of enjoying the benefit of the most favourable legislation, does not, in itself, amount to an abuse of rights (para. 62). The Court further explains its position saying that “the mere fact that a company transfers its registered office from one Member State to another cannot be the basis for a general presumption of fraud and cannot justify a measure that adversely affects the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty” (para. 63).

Assessment

As already observed, Polbud encouragingly facilitates the cross-border mobility of companies but, on the other hand, leaves the reader with open questions.

It was high time to free cross-border conversions from the requirement of a genuine economic link with the Member State of destination. The legal situation before Polbud, that allowed letterbox companies to conduct their business in other Member States (which can be compared to initial choice of law) but prevented the formation of letterbox companies through the transfer of an existing company’s registered office to another Member State (which can be compared to subsequent choice of law), was somewhat arbitrary from a legal and economic point of view.

On the other hand, the extension of the scope of application of the principle of equivalence to the Member State of origin can only be seen as inconsistent with the legal doctrine of the freedom of establishment provided for in Articles 49 and 54 TFEU. Heretofore, only EU-foreigners could enjoy the right to non-discrimination, whereas, in regard to EU law, Member States were free to impose (relatively) stricter rules to its own citizens. This principle finds its expression, for example, in the above-mentioned treatment of companies as creatures of their state of origin that the CJEU established in its Cartesio judgment. As the principle of equivalence corresponds to the prohibition of discrimination, it is even more astonishing that the CJEU permits exemptions for overriding reasons in the public interest. These unwritten exemptions generally apply only in cases of restrictions of the freedom of movement (see Kraus, para. 32 and Gebhard, para. 37). On the contrary, discriminations require the strict observance of the catalogue of justifications set out in Article 52 TFEU. In future decisions, the CJEU should recall this clear distinction and cease to further the linguistic ambiguity.

Court of Appeal allows in England claims against English-based multinational for overseas human rights violations

Written by Ekaterina AristovaPhD in Law Candidate, University of Cambridge

On 14 October 2017, the London’s Court of Appeal passed its long awaited decision in Lungowe v Vedanta confirming that foreign citizens can pursue in England legal claims against English-based multinationals for their overseas activities.

In 2015, Zambian villagers commenced proceedings against Vedanta, an English-based mining corporation, and its indirect Zambian subsidiary, KCM, alleging responsibility of both companies for the environmental pollution arising out of the operation in Zambia of the Nchanga Copper Mine by KCM. In 2016, the High Court allowed claims against both companies to be heard in England. The overall analysis of the judgement (see the author’s earlier post on this blog) suggested that (1) claims against the parent company on the breach of duty of care in relation to the overseas operations of the foreign subsidiary can be heard in the English courts and (2) the existence of an arguable claim against the English-domiciled parent company also establishes jurisdiction of the English courts over the subsidiary even if the factual basis of the case occurs almost exclusively in the foreign state. The Court of Appeal has entirely upheld a High Court ruling.

Vedanta has focused their argument on the fact that Article 4 of the Brussels I Regulation Recast does not automatically allow an English-domiciled parent company to be sued in England and, despite the CJEU’s ruling in Owusu v Jackson, there is always discretion as to whether the English court should allow the claims to be tried in England. In response, the three appeal judges were very clear in confirming the univocal effect of Owusu decision which precludes English courts from declining a mandatory jurisdiction to try claims against the English-domiciled defendant. Logically, analysis further moved to KCM’s applications. KCM as a foreign defendant was brought into proceedings on the basis of a ‘necessary or proper party’ gateway under the English traditional rules of jurisdictions. It allows service out of the jurisdiction subject to two additional conditions: (1) there is between the claimant and English-domiciled defendant a real issue which it is reasonable for the court to try; and (2) England is the proper forum for trying the claims. Unsurprisingly, an initial question of whether uncustomary claims alleging liability of the local parent company for overseas damages are viable in England was a major stumbling block for the corporate defendants.

First of all, Lord Justice Simon, who delivered a leading judgement, confirmed that absence of the reported cases on the breach of duty of care by the parent company owed to the persons affected by its subsidiary’s operations does not automatically render such a claim unarguable. He then relied on several well-known English cases to derive basic principles for the imposition of such duty of care on the parent company: (1) The three-part test of foreseeability, proximity and reasonableness set out in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman constitutes a starting point of the analysis; 2) A duty of care may be owed, in appropriate circumstances, to the employees of the parent company and those directly affected by the subsidiary’s operations; 3) Such a duty of care arises when the parent company has taken direct responsibility for devising a material health and safety policy the adequacy of which is the subject of the claim, or controls the operations which give rise to the claim; 4) Some of the circumstances in which the existence of the duty of care may, or may not, be established can be traced in Chandler v Cape and Thompson v The Renwick Group; 5) It is necessary to determine whether the parent company was well placed, because of its knowledge and expertise to protect the claimants; proving that parent company and the subsidiary run the same business is not sufficient; (6) The evidence sufficient to establish the duty may not be available at the early stages of the case. Following these principles, it was concluded that, irrespective of the strength or the weakness of the claim against the parent company (as opposed to the claim against the subsidiary as an operator of the mine) and in light of the supporting evidence already presented by the claimants, the claim against Vedanta cannot be dismissed as not properly arguable.

The Court of Appeal’s decision is particularly interesting for two reasons. The first issue relates to how its conclusions should be approached in the context of similar environmental litigation against English-based multinational in Okpabi v Shell. Earlier this year, Fraser J, sitting as a judge in the Technology and Construction Court, ruled that a claim against English-based parent company and the Nigerian subsidiary of the Shell group for oil pollution in Nigeria will not proceed in the English courts. The judge himself did not make any conclusions which would question the ultimate decision reached by the two instances in Lungowe v Vedanta. More importantly, his analysis fairly suggests that determination of the parent company liability should be approached on a case-by-case basis weighing the particular characteristics of the corporate organisation of the group and the nexus between the parent company and its subsidiaries (see the author’s earlier post on this blog). Nevertheless, the reasoning of Fraser J could be criticised for the scrupulousness of identifying whether sufficient evidence on each factor of the duty of care test was presented by the claimants at such an early stage of the proceedings. The jurisdictional inquiry into existence of an arguable claim against the parent company should not substitute the determination of the substantive argument and the trial itself. This approach was rightly emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Vedanta. By contrast, thorough analysis of the liability argument carried by Fraser J in Okpabi v Shell is arguably very close to the resolution of the case on the merits. The decision was appealed by the claimants, the Nigerian citizens, on these very grounds.

The second set of issues arises from the Court of Appeal’s reluctance to engage in the discussion of the regulatory significance of the litigation against major transnational corporations for their overseas operations in the English courts. In the course of appeal’s hearing Vedanta argued that allowing cases against English multinationals in their home state was not in the public interest. The judgement itself refrained to consider whether public interest factors have any impact on the jurisdictional inquiry in the disputes concerned with the private interests of the litigants. Therefore, foreign direct liability claims against powerful corporate groups were placed in the context of conventional theoretical public/private divide of the rules of private international law. The Parliament and the Government have at least twice engaged into discussion of the UK role in promoting responsibility and ensuring accountability of its companies in the course of 2009 and 2017 human rights and business inquiries. Further increase in the number of legal claims against English-based transnational corporations brought by the foreign citizens in the English courts may revive interest in the role of the discipline of private international law to take part in the global governance debate.

 

 

Dutch collective redress dangerous? A call for a more nuanced approach

Prepared by Alexandre Biard, Xandra Kramer and Ilja Tillema, Erasmus University Rotterdam

The Netherlands has become dangerously involved in the treatment of mass claims, Lisa Rickard from the US Chamber of Commerce recently said to the Dutch financial daily (Het Financieele Dagblad, 28 September 2017) and the Dutch BNR newsradio (broadcast of 28 September 2017). This statement follows the conclusions of two reports published in March and September 2017 by the US Institute for Legal Reforms (ILR), an entity affiliated with the US Chamber of Commerce. Within a few hours, the news spread like wildfire in online Dutch newspapers, see for instance here.

Worryingly enough, the March 2017 report, which assessed collective redress mechanisms in ten Member States, predicted that ‘there are a number of very powerful indicators that all of the same incentives and forces that have led to mass abuse in other jurisdictions are also gathering force in the EU’. Among the jurisdictions surveyed, the Netherlands appeared as a place particularly prone to such abuse. The September 2017 report focuses on consumer attitudes towards collective redress safeguards, and ultimately concludes that 85% of respondents tend to support the introduction of safeguards for the resolution of mass claims.

The publication of the aforementioned reports is timely as the European Commission’s evaluation report on the 2013 Recommendation on Collective Redress is expected this autumn, following the recent call for evidence.  Some of the statements in these reports call for a more nuanced view. Indeed, the Dutch approach to the resolution of mass claims might have its drawbacks. It is certainly not exempt from criticisms. However, in a matter of such expedient nature, it is of the utmost importance that both sides are thoroughly addressed and assessed.

For the information of readers that are not familiar with the Dutch system: the Netherlands currently has two mechanisms that have been designed for collective redress specifically. The first one is the collective action for injunctive or declaratory relief. A verdict in such action can provide the basis for an amicable settlement or for individual proceedings to seek monetary compensation. The second mechanism is the much-discussed WCAM settlement (based on the Dutch Collective Settlements Act, see also a previous post linking to papers and a report on the WCAM procedure). In addition, there is a proposal to introduce a collective action for damages (see a previous post on this blog).

Bad apples and the bigger picture

In the past years, few incidents have occurred in Dutch collective redress that may indeed come close to ‘American situations’ that are generally feared in Europe. Unfortunately, some commentators have chosen to mainly highlight such incidents. Notably, the ILR report of March 2017 refers to the notorious case of Stichting Loterijverlies, in which a foundation initiated a collective action on behalf of aggrieved lottery ticket holders against the Dutch State Lottery. The report rightfully mentions that the foundation’s director has been accused of funnelling elsewhere, for personal gain, part of the consumers’ financial contribution to the foundation. However, the report neglects to mention that the foundation had also been litigating for quite some years and that, ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled in its favour: the Dutch State Lottery had misled consumers for years. Furthermore, the report fails to mention that some of the foundation’s participants successfully filed a request to replace the foundation’s board. Moreover, despite (or on account of) the complexity of establishing causation and damages, the case has now been amicably settled. As part of the settlement, participants of the foundation have been reimbursed their financial contribution thereto, and all class members were free to participate in the settlement: an extraordinary, one-off lottery draw. Reportedly, 2.5 million individuals have done so.

Obviously, incidents such as the aforementioned case are of no avail to civil justice, and justify concerns about claim vehicles’ activities and motives. However, we should also consider the many positive effects of collective redress mechanisms. Generally, Dutch collective actions and WCAM settlements provide for much-needed effective and efficient dispute resolution in mass harm situations.

Safeguards work: learning from experience

The March report by the ILR warns against the gradual decline of safeguards in the Netherlands, and in the EU more generally. Yet, various safeguards already exist, continue to do so, and generally function well in practice. For instance, the admissibility rules regarding representative organizations (that bring collective actions or are involved in a WCAM settlement) have become more stringent and are applied increasingly strict by courts. As to the current Dutch collective actions, there is proof that its numbers have slowly risen since 1994, but no proof exists that this is necessarily attributable to entrepreneurial parties, let alone that they have increased the number of frivolous claims (Tillema 2017). The proposed collective action for damages further raises the current threshold for representative organizations to obtain standing. The requirements concern the organizations’ governance, financial means, representativeness, experience and expertise, and individuals’ participation in the decision-making process. Indeed, a judgment will have binding effect upon all aggrieved parties who have not opted out, but all actions will be publicly registered, there is a strict scope rule, and individuals can raise objections.

So far, eight WCAM settlement have been declared binding. Undeniably, various parties have entered this market, including US counsels and their sizeable fees. However, in spite of its difficult task, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal seems growingly comfortable in assessing the reasonableness of a collective settlement, including the representative organizations’ remuneration. In Converium, the reasonableness of (contingency) fees was assessed for the first time. In the currently pending eighth WCAM case, the Fortis-settlement, the court has demonstrated its awareness of the risks and of its task to also scrutinize the motives of representative organizations. In its interlocutory judgment, it has ruled that the settlement, in its current state, cannot be declared binding. It is deemed not reasonable due to, inter alia, the sizeable remuneration of the representative organizations and their lack of transparency thereon.

A Dutch ‘manoeuvre’ to become a ‘go-to-point’ for mass claim or an attempt to enhance access to justice for all?

‘The Netherlands and the UK seem to be manoeuvring themselves to become the go-to jurisdictions for collective claims outside the EU’, the March report highlighted. Obviously, this not the first time that other countries express their concerns against the extra-territorial effects of the Dutch legislation, an issue that has been discussed for several years in the context of the WCAM (Van Lith, 2011). The ILR report indeed highlighted that in the Converium case, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal declared the settlement binding where a majority of shareholders were domiciled outside the Netherlands. Yet, the key question here is whether, for reasons linked to equality and efficiency, individuals who have suffered from losses resulting from a same misbehaviour should not be treated in a same manner and in the same proceeding, regardless of their actual location. By asserting global jurisdiction, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ultimately ensured access to justice and equal treatment for all parties placed in similar situations, and ultimately avoided costly fragmentation of the case for parties and courts. In this regard, it should also be highlighted that the WCAM is a settlement-only mechanism, and – to the benefit of victims of wrongdoings – it is the wrongdoing party and the representatives of the aggrieved parties that jointly choose to address the Amsterdam Court of Appeal considering that the Netherlands has a suitable procedure to declare such settlement binding.

It is evident that collective redress mechanisms have both benefits and drawbacks. More than ever, the challenging, yet indispensable key word here is balance. As Commissioner Jourova recently observed at the release of the ILR September report, ‘the discussion in EU countries is in full swing on how to strike the right balance between access to justice and prevention of abuse’. We hope this short post can contribute to the discussion.

I thought we were exclusive? Some issues with the Hague Convention on Choice of Court, Brussels Ia and Brexit

This blog post is by Dr Mukarrum Ahmed (Lancaster University) and Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Aberdeen). It presents a condensed version of their article in the August 2017 issue of the Journal of Private International Law. The blog post includes specific references to the actual journal article to enable the reader to branch off into the detailed discussion where relevant. It also takes account of recent developments in the Brexit negotiation that took place after the journal article was completed.    

On 1 October 2015, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (‘Hague Convention’) entered into force in 28 Contracting States, including Mexico and all the Member States of the European Union, except Denmark. The Convention has applied between Singapore and the other Contracting States since 1 October 2016. China, Ukraine and the USA have signed the Convention indicating that they hope to ratify it in the future (see the official status table for the Convention on the Hague Conference on Private International Law’s website). The Brussels Ia Regulation, which is the European Union’s device for jurisdictional and enforcement matters, applies as of 10 January 2015 to legal proceedings instituted and to judgments rendered on or after that date. In addition to legal issues that may arise independently under the Hague Convention, some issues may manifest themselves at the interface between the Hague Convention and the Brussels Ia Regulation. Both sets of issues are likely to garner the attention of cross-border commercial litigators, transactional lawyers and private international law academics. The article examines anti-suit injunctions, concurrent proceedings and the implications of Brexit in the context of the Hague Convention and its relationship with the Brussels Ia Regulation. (See pages 387-389 of the article)

It is argued that the Hague Convention’s system of ‘qualified’ or ‘partial’ mutual trust may permit anti-suit injunctions, actions for damages for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements and anti-enforcement injunctions where such remedies further the objective of the Convention. (See pages 394-402 of the article) The text of the Hague Convention and the Explanatory Report by Professors Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi are not explicit on this issue. However, the procès-verbal of the Diplomatic Session of the Hague Convention reveal widespread support for the proposition that the formal ‘process’ should be differentiated from the desired ‘outcome’ when considering whether anti-suit injunctions are permitted under the Convention. Where anti-suit injunctions uphold choice of court agreements and thus help achieve the intended ‘outcome’ of the Convention, there was a consensus among the official delegates at the Diplomatic Session that the Convention did not limit or constrain national courts of Contracting States from granting the remedy. (See Minutes No 9 of the Second Commission Meeting of Monday 20 June 2005 (morning) in Proceedings of the Twentieth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau of the Conference, Intersentia 2010) 622, 623–24) Conversely, where the remedy impedes the sound operation of the Convention by effectively derailing proceedings in the chosen court, there was also a consensus of the official delegates at the meeting that the Convention will not permit national courts of the Contracting States to grant anti-suit injunctions.

However, intra-EU Hague Convention cases may arguably not permit remedies for breach of exclusive choice of court agreements as they may be deemed to be an infringement of the principle of mutual trust and the principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) which animate the multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order of the Brussels Ia Regulation (see pages 403-405 of the article; C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565). If an aggrieved party does not commence proceedings in the chosen forum or commences such proceedings after the non-chosen court has rendered a decision on the validity of the choice of court agreement, the recognition and enforcement of that ruling highlights an interesting contrast between the Brussels Ia Regulation and the Hague Convention. It appears that the non-chosen court’s decision on the validity of the choice of court agreement is entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Brussels Ia Regulation. (See C-456/11 Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG v Samskip GmbH EU:C:2012:719, [2013] QB 548) The Hague Convention does not similarly protect the ruling of a non-chosen court. In fact, only a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States. (See Article 8(1) of the Hague Convention) Therefore, the ruling of a non-chosen court is not entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Hague Convention’s system of ‘qualified’ or ‘partial’ mutual trust. This provides a ready explanation for the compatibility of anti-suit injunctions with the Hague Convention but does not proceed any further to transpose the same conclusion into the very different context of the Brussels Ia Regulation which prioritizes the principle of mutual trust.

The dynamics of the relationship between Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation and Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention is mapped in the article (at pages 405-408). In a case where the Hague Convention should apply rather than the Brussels Ia Regulation because one of the parties is resident in a non-EU Contracting State to the Convention even though the chosen court is in a Member State of the EU (See Article 26(6)(a) of the Hague Convention) one would expect Article 6 of the Convention to be applied by any non-chosen court in the EU. However, the fundamental nature of the Article 31(2) lis pendens mechanism under the Brussels Ia Regulation may warrant the pursuance of a different line of analysis. (See Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Interzuid Transport BV EU:C:2013:858, [2014] I.L.Pr. 10, [36]; See also to similar effect, Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG EU:C:2010:243, [2010] I.L.Pr. 35, [49]) It is argued that the Hartley–Dogauchi Report’s interpretative approach has much to commend it as it follows the path of least resistance by narrowly construing the right to sue in a non-chosen forum as an exception rather than the norm. The exceptional nature of the right to sue in the non-chosen forum under the Hague Convention can be effectively reconciled with Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. This will usually result in the stay of the proceedings in the non-chosen court as soon as the chosen court is seised. As a consequence, the incidence of parallel proceedings and irreconcilable judgments are curbed, which are significant objectives in their own right under the Brussels Ia Regulation. It is hoped that the yet to develop jurisprudence of the CJEU on the emergent Hague Convention and the Brussels Ia Regulation will offer definitive and authoritative answers to the issues discussed in the article.

The implications of Brexit on this topic are not yet fully clear. (See pages 409-410 of the article) The UK is a party to the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention as a Member State of the EU, the latter having approved the Convention for all its Member States apart from Denmark. The UK will do what is necessary to remain a party to the Convention after Brexit.  In its recently published negotiating paper – only available after the article in the Journal of Private International Law was completed – the UK Government has explicitly stated that:

“It is our intention to continue to be a leading member in the Hague Conference and to participate in those Hague Conventions to which we are already a party and those which we currently participate in by virtue of our membership of the EU.”  (see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework (PDF) at para 22).

The UK will no doubt avoid any break in the Convention’s application. Brexit will almost certainly see the end of the application of the Brussels Ia Regulation in the UK. The reason being that its uniform interpretation is secured by the CJEU through the preliminary ruling system under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  The UK is not willing to accept that jurisdiction post-Brexit (“Leaving the EU will therefore bring an end to the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK, because the CJEU derives its jurisdiction and authority from the EU Treaties.” see  Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 20). So although the UK negotiators are asking for a bespoke deal with the EU to continue something like Brussels Ia (“The UK will therefore seek an agreement with the EU that allows for close and comprehensive cross-border civil judicial cooperation on a reciprocal basis, which reflects closely the substantive principles of cooperation under the current EU framework” see  Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 19) it seems improbable that the EU will agree to such a bespoke deal just with the UK when the UK does not accept the CJEU preliminary ruling system.  The EU may well say that the option for close partners of the EU in this field is the Lugano Convention. The UK Government has indicated that it would like to remain part of the Lugano Convention (see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 22). In doing so it would continue to mandate the UK courts to take account of the jurisprudence of the CJEU -when that court is interpreting Brussels Ia or the Lugano Convention – when UK courts are interpreting the Lugano Convention (see the opaque statement by the UK Government that “the UK and the EU will need to ensure future civil judicial cooperation takes into account regional legal arrangements, including the fact that the CJEU will remain the ultimate arbiter of EU law within the EU.” see  Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 20). However, unless the Lugano Convention is renegotiated it does not contain a good solution in relation to conflicts of jurisdiction for exclusive choice of court agreements because it has not been amended to reflect Article 31(2) of Brussels Ia and therefore still gives priority to the non-chosen court when it is seised first and the exclusively chosen court is seised second in accordance with the Gasser decision of the CJEU (see Case C-116/02 [2003] ECR I-14693).  Renegotiation of the Lugano Convention is not even on the agenda at the moment although the Gasser problem may be discussed at the Experts’ Meeting pursuant to Article 5 Protocol 2 of the Lugano Convention on 16 and 17 October 2017 in Basel, Switzerland (Professor Beaumont is attending that meeting as an invited expert).  Revision of the Lugano Convention would be a good thing, as would Norway and Switzerland becoming parties to the Hague Convention.  It seems that at least until the Lugano Convention is revised and a means is found for the UK to be a party to it (difficult if the UK does not stay in EFTA), the likely outcome post-Brexit is that the regime applicable between the UK and the EU (apart from Denmark) in relation to exclusive choice of court agreements within the scope of the Hague Convention will be the Hague Convention. The UK will be able to grant anti-suit injunctions to uphold exclusive choice of court agreements in favour of the courts in the UK even when one of the parties has brought an action contrary to that agreement in an EU Member State. The EU Member States will apply Article 6 of the Hague Convention rather than Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation when deciding whether to decline jurisdiction in favour of the chosen court(s) in the UK.

Whilst the Hague Convention only offers a comprehensive jurisdictional regime for cases involving exclusive choice of court agreements, it does give substantial protection to the jurisdiction of UK courts designated in such an agreement which will be respected in the rest of the EU regardless of the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. Post-Brexit the recognition and enforcement regime for judgments not falling within the scope of the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention could be the new Hague Judgments Convention currently being negotiated in The Hague (see Working Paper No. 2016/3- Respecting Reverse Subsidiarity as an excellent strategy for the European Union at The Hague Conference on Private International Law – reflections in the context of the Judgments Project? by Paul Beaumont). Professor Beaumont will continue to be a part of the EU Negotiating team for that Convention at the Special Commission in the Hague from 13-17 November 2017. It is greatly to be welcomed that the UK Government has affirmed its commitment to an internationalist and not just a regional approach to civil judicial co-operation:

“The UK is committed to increasing international civil judicial cooperation with third parties through our active participation in the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law… We will continue to be an active and supportive member of these bodies, as we are clear on the value of international and intergovernmental cooperation in this area.” See Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 21.

One good thing that could come from Brexit is the powerful combination of the EU and the UK both adopting a truly internationalist perspective in the Hague Conference on Private International Law in order to genuinely enhance civil judicial co-operation throughout the world.  The UK can be one of the leaders of the common law world while using its decades of experience of European co-operation to help build bridges to the civil law countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America.

On the Global Community of Private International Law – Impressions from Brazil

From August 3-5 this year, the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro hosted the 7th biennial conference of the Journal of Private International Law. Ably organized by Nadia de Araujo and Daniela Vargas from the host institution, together with Paul Beaumont from Aberdeen, the conference was a great success, as concerns both the quality and quantity of the presentations. Instead of a conference report, I want to provide some, undoubtedly subjective, impressions as concerns the emerging global community of private international law.

First, no less than 168 participants attended, from all over the world. The Journal conference has, by now, become something like a World Congress of Private International Law. This is no small achievement. The Journal of Private International Law started out in 2005 as a very doctrinal publication focusing primarily on common law systems and European private international law. Fittingly, the first two conferences took place in the UK. It was a very wise decision to move, after that, to cities in other countries—New York (2009), Milan (2011), Madrid (2013) and now, after a return to the UK (Cambridge) for the ten-year anniversary in 2015, Rio de Janeiro (2017). By now, it can be said that Journal and conference both really represent the world. And what is emerging is a global community that comes together at these and other events.

Second, this first Journal conference in Latin America was an excellent opportunity to showcase the tremendous developments of the discipline on this Continent. Latin America, the region that created the Código Bustamante, has long produced excellent scholars in private international law. However, for some time the discipline appeared, at least to the outside observer, marginalized, caught between a very doctrinal approach on the one side and a very philosophical one on the other, both often without connection to actual practice. In recent years, this has changed, for a number of reasons: the Hague Conference established a bureau, led by Ignacio Goicoechea; a young generation of scholars connects theory and practice, doctrine and interdisciplinarity; legislators are, at long last, replacing antiquated legislation. Many Latin American scholars and practitioners at the conference proved that interest and quality. But the best sign for the vitality of the field were the many excellent Brazilian students who followed the conference with enthusiasm and expertise.

Third, and finally, this emerging globalization captures all regions, but not to the same degree. The great importance of Latin America in Rio was no surprise. Nor was the great role that European private international law, a testament not only both to the European background of the journal and the more generous travel budgets in European universities, but also to the legislative and scholarly developments in Europe. Asia was somewhat less well represented, as far as I could see, despite exciting developments there (including current work on Asian Principles of Private International Law), but several presentations dealt with Asian development. The most palpable absence concerned the United States. There were only two participants from the US, fewer than there were Nigerians. In a not so distant past, US private international law was the avant-garde of the discipline worldwide. When the Second Restatement was being discussed, the whole world was watching what the conflicts revolution would yield. Now, a third Restatement is underway. But I heard no word about that from participants in Rio, and the Restatement’s reporters did not use the occasion to advertise their project. The United States is no longer leading the globalization of the field. Will it at least follow?

Grounds for Refusal of Recognition of (Quasi-) Annex Judgements in the Recast European Insolvency Regulation

Written by Zoltán Fabók, Fellow of INSOL International, Counsel at DLA Piper (Hungary) and PhD Candidate at Nottingham Trent University

Insolvency-related (annex) actions and judgements fall within the scope of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation (‘Recast EIR’). That instrument both determines international jurisdiction regarding annex actions and sets up a simplified recognition system for annex judgements. However, tension between the Recast EIR’s provisions on jurisdiction and recognition arises when a court of a state different from the state of insolvency erroneously assumes jurisdiction for annex actions. Such ‘quasi-annex’ judgements rendered by foreign courts erroneously assuming jurisdiction threaten the integrity of the insolvency proceedings. Besides, the quasi-annex judgements may violate the effectiveness and efficiency of the insolvency proceedings as well as the principle of legal certainty.

In my paper, it is argued that even the current legal framework may offer some ways to avoid the recognition of such quasi-annex judgements. First, the scope of the public policy exception may be extended in order to protect the integrity of the insolvency proceedings from the quasi-annex judgements rendered by foreign courts erroneously assuming jurisdiction. Second, it may be argued that quasi-annex judgements do not equal real annex judgements and therefore do not enjoy the automatic recognition system provided by the Recast EIR. At the same time, their close connection to the insolvency proceedings – disregarded by the forum erroneously assuming jurisdiction – may exclude quasi-annex judgements from the scope of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, as well. As a consequence, those quasi-annex judgements may fall within the gap between the two regulations, meaning that no European instrument instructs the courts of the member state addressed to recognise quasi-annex judgements.

My research article has been accepted for publication by International Insolvency Review. The paper can be accessed in the Early View section at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/iir.1284/full.