Brexit: No need to stop all the clocks.

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Written by Jonathan Fitchen.

‘The time has come’; a common enough phrase which may, depending on the reader’s mood and temperament, be attributed variously to Lewis Carroll’s discursive Walrus, to Richard Wagner’s villainous Klingsor, or to the conclusion of Victor Hugo’s epigrammatic comment      to the effect that nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time has come. In the present context however ‘the time has come’ refers more prosaically to another step in the process described as ‘Brexit’ by which the UK continues to disentangle itself from the EU.

On the 31st of January 2020 at 24.00 CET (23.00 UK time) the UK ceases to be an EU Member State. This event is one that some plan to celebrate and other to mourn. For those interested in private international law and the conflict of laws in the EU or in the legal systems of the UK, celebration is unlikely to seem apt. Whether for the mundane reason that the transition period of the Withdrawal Agreement preserves the practical application and operation of most EU law concerning our subject in the UK and within the EU27 until the projected end point of 31st December 2020, or for deeper reasons connected with the losses to the subject that the EU and the UK must each experience due to the departure of the UK from the EU. If celebration is not appropriate must we therefore opt to mourn? This post suggests that mourning is not the only option (nor if overindulged is it a useful option) and sets out some thoughts on the wider implications for the private international laws of the UK’s legal systems and the legal systems that will comprise the EU27 consequent on the UK’s departure.

This exercise is necessarily speculative and very much a matter of what one wishes to include in or omit from the equation under construction. If too little is included, the result may be of only abstract relevance; if too much is included, the equation may be incapable of solution and hence useless for the intended purpose of calculation. Such difficulties, albeit expressed in a non-mathematical form, are familiar to private international lawyers who while engaging with their subject routinely consider the macroscopic, the microscopic and many points in between. In what remains of this post I will offer some thoughts that hopefully will provoke further thoughts while avoiding useless abstraction and (at least for present purposes) ‘useless’ incalculability.

The loudest calls for the UK to leave the EU did not arise from UK private international law, nor from its practitioners; few UK private international lawyers appear to have wished for Brexit as a means of reforming private international law. Whatever appeals to nostalgia may have swayed opinions in other sectors of the UK and may have induced those within them to vote to leave, they were not expressed with reference to matters of private international law. Few who remember or know the law as it stood in any of the UK’s legal systems prior to the implementation of the UK’s accession to the Brussels Convention of 1968 would willingly journey back to the law as it then stood and regard it as an upgrade. Mercifully, aspects of this view are, at present, apparently shared by the UK Government and account for its wish, after ‘copying and pasting’ most EU law and private international law into the novel domestic category of ‘retained EU Law’, to then amend and allow that which does not depend on reciprocity to be re-presented as a domestic private international law to be applied within and by the UK’s legal systems: thus the Rome I and Rome II Regulations will be eventually so ‘imitated’ within the legal systems of the UK. Unfortunately, many other EU provisions do require reciprocity, and thus cannot be ‘saved’ in this manner; for these provisions the news in the UK is less good.  

There are however other available means of salvage. Because the UK will no longer be an EU Member State at 24.00 Brussels Time it may, but for the Withdrawal Agreement, thereafter participate more fully in proceedings and projects at the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The UK plans to domestically clarify the domestic understanding of certain existing Hague conventions, e.g. 1996 Parental Responsibility Convention, via the recently announced Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill 2019. Earlier in 2018 the UK deposited instruments of accession concerning conventions it plans to ratify at the end of the Withdrawal Agreement’s transition period to attempt to retain prospectively the salvageable aspects of certain reciprocity requiring EU private international law Regulations lost via Brexit: thus, the UK plans to ratify the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the 2007 Maintenance Convention. After these ratifications it may be that the UK will also consider the ratification of the 2019 judgment enforcement convention, particularly it the EU takes this option too. In the medium and long term however, the UK, assuming it wishes to participate in an active sense, will have to accept the practical limitations of the HCCH as it (the UK) becomes accustomed to the differences, difficulties and frustrations of private international law reform via optional instruments that all the intended parties are entitled to refuse to opt-in to or ratify.

Over the medium term and longer term, it should additionally be noted that though the UK has left the EU it has not cast-off and sailed away from continental Europe at a speed in excess of normal tectonic progress: there may therefore eventually be further developments between the two. It may be that the UK can be induced at some point in the future, when Brexit has become more mundane and less politically volatile within the UK, to cooperate in relation to private international law in a deeper sense with the EU27; whether by negotiating to join the 2007 Lugano Convention or a new convention pertaining to aspects of private international law. If this last idea seems too controversial then maybe it would be possible for the UK to eventually negotiate with an existing EU Member State as a third country via Regulation 664/2009 or Regulation 662/2009 or perhaps via another yet to be produced Regulation with a somewhat analogous effect? Brexit, considered in terms of private international law, may well re-focus a number of existing questions for the EU27 pertaining to the interaction of its private international law with third States, whether former Member States or not.   

What is however unavoidably lost by Brexit is the UK’s direct influence on the development and particularly the periodic recasting of the EU’s private international law: this loss cuts both ways. For the EU27 the UK will no longer be at the negotiating table to offer suggestions, criticisms and improvements to the texts of new and recast Regulations. For the EU27 this loss is somewhat greater than it might appear from the list of Regulations that the UK did not opt-in to as the terms of the UK’s involvement in these matters permitted it to so participate without having opted-in to the draft Regulation.   

The suggested loss of influence will however probably be felt most acutely by the private international lawyers in the UK. Despite the momentary impetus and excitement of salvaging that which may be salvaged and ratifying that which may be ratified to mitigate the effect of Brexit on private international law, the reality is that we in the UK will have lost two of the motive forces that have seen our subject develop and flourish over decades: viz. the European Commission and the domestic political reaction thereunto. Post-Brexit, once the salvaging (etc.) is done, it seems unlikely that the UK Government will continue to regard a private international law now no longer affected by Commission initiatives or re-casting procedures as retaining its former importance or meriting any greater legislative relevance than other areas of potential law reform. The position may be otherwise in Scotland as private international law is a devolved competence that devolution entrusted to the Scottish Government. It may be that once the dust has settled and the returning UK competence related reforms have been applied that the comparatively EU-friendly Scottish Government may seek to domestically align aspects of Scots private international law with EU law equivalents. For he who would mourn for the effect of Brexit on the subject of private international law, it is the abovementioned loss of influence of the subject at both the EU level and particularly at the domestic level that most merits a brief period of mourning. After this, the natural but presently unanswerable question of, ‘What now?’ occurs. Though speculation is offered above, all in the short term will depend on the progress in negotiations over an unfortunately already shortened but technically still extendable transition period during which the EU and UK are to attempt to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement: thereafter for the medium term and long term all depends on the future political relationship of the EU and the UK.

Gender and Private International Law: Whole Day Workshop May 25 – Call for applications deadline extended to February 15

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The project on Gender and Private International Law (GaP) at the Hamburg Max Planck Institute, jointly organized by Ivana Isailovic and Ralf Michaels, will end the academic year with a bang! After the inaugural workshop (see Asma Alouane’s report here) and three successful reading sessions in the fall, there will be a whole day workshop with three themes and six fabulous conveyors who will enable a truly crossdisciplinary event.
A call for applications to take part is here. The deadline has been extended to February 15. Note that some travel and accommodation money is available for emergent scholars!

RabelsZ, Issue 1/2020

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The first 2020 issue RabelsZ has just been released. It features the following articles:

Magnus, Robert, Unternehmenspersönlichkeitsrechte im digitalen Raum und Internationales Privatrecht (Corporate Personality Rights on the Internet and the Applicable Law), pp. 1 et seq

Companies can defend themselves against defamatory and business-damaging statements made on the internet. German case law in this area is based primarily on the concept of a corporate right relating to personality, which has some similarities but also important differences to the personality rights of natural persons. A corresponding legal right is also recognised in European law. However, determining the applicable law for these claims proves to be difficult. First of all, it is an open though not yet much-discussed question whether the exception in Art. 1(2) lit. g Rome II Regulation for “violation[s] of privacy or personal rights” is limited to the rights of natural persons or whether it applies also to the corresponding claims of legal entities. Moreover, the determination “of the country in which the damage occurs” in accordance with Art. 4(1) Rome II Regulation is hotly debated with respect to violations of rights relating to personality, especially when the violations were committed via the internet. The thus far prevailing mosaic principle produces excessively complex results and therefore makes it unreasonably difficult to enforce the protected legal position. This article discusses alternative concepts for the determination of the applicable law for these actions and analyses the scope and background of the exception in Art. 1(2) lit. g Rome II Regulation.

Thon, Marian, Transnationaler Datenschutz: Das Internationale Datenprivatrecht der DS-GVO (Transnational Data Protection: The GDPR and Conflict of Laws), pp. 24 et seq

This article analyses the territorial scope of the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and addresses the question whether Article 3 GDPR can be considered as a conflict-of-law rule. It analyses the possibility of agreements on the applicable law and argues that Article 3 GDPR qualifies as an overriding mandatory provision. It finds that the issue of the applicable national law is no longer addressed by the GDPR and that a crucial distinction should therefore be made between internal and external conflicts of law. It argues that the country-of-origin principle is the key to determining which national data protection law applies. Furthermore, the article analyses Article 3 GDPR in more detail from the perspective of private international law. It finds that the targeting criterion is helpful in mitigating the problem of information asymmetries in view of the applicable data protection law. However, it criticizes the establishment criterion because it puts European companies at a competitive disadvantage. Finally, the article proposes to incorporate a “universal” conflict-of-law rule into the Rome II Regulation which should be accompanied by a general conflict-of-law rule specifically addressing violations of privacy and rights relating to personality.

Voß, Wiebke, Gerichtsverbundene Online-Streitbeilegung: ein Zukunftsmodell? Die online multi-door courthouses des englischen und kanadischen Rechts (Court-connected ODR: A Model for the Future? – Online Multi-door Courthouses Under English and Canadian Law), pp. 62 et seq

Will conflict management systems based on the model of companies such as eBay and PayPal soon become a part of civil proceedings before German state courts? Recently, some thought has been given to the development of a new “expedited online procedure” designed to provide an affordable and fast alternative to traditional civil litigation for small consumer claims, thus broadening access to justice. After a brief outline of the current barriers to the justice system and the shortcomings of the private ODR platforms consumers often turn to instead, this article explores the concept of online procedures which other legal systems have developed in response to similar challenges. The analysis of typical, trendsetting examples of e-courts – the Civil Resolution Tribunal under Canadian Law as well as the Online Court that is currently being established in England – reveals a new model of court-connected ODR that is based on the integration of private ODR structures into the justice system. By harnessing digital technologies and integrating methods of dispute prevention and consensual dispute resolution into the state-based proceedings, such online courts offer enormous potential for lay-friendly, accessible civil justice while at the same time using scarce judicial resources sparingly. On the other hand, online technology alone is not a panacea. Establishing online procedures in Germany poses challenges which go beyond the technical dimension. These procedures may conflict with constitutional requirements and procedural maxims such as the principle of open justice, the right to be heard before the legally designated court and the principle of immediacy. However, a well thought-out design and minor modifications of the English and Canadian models would avoid these conflicts without losing the benefits of the innovative procedure.

Monsenepwo, Justin, Vereinheitlichung des Wirtschaftsrechts in Afrika durch die OHADA (The Unification of Business Law in Africa Through OHADA), pp. 97 et seq

In the 1980s, legal and judicial uncertainty prevailed in most western and central African countries, thereby impeding local and foreign investments. To improve the investment climate and further legal and economic integration in Africa, fourteen western and central African States created the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, OHADA) on 17 October 1993. As per the preamble of the Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, OHADA aims to harmonize business laws in Africa through the elaboration and the adoption of simple, modern, and common business law regulations adapted to the economies of its Member States. Nearly two decades after its creation, OHADA has developed ten Uniform Acts and three main Regulations, which cover several legal areas, such as company law, commercial law, security interests, mediation, arbitration, enforcement procedures, bankruptcy, transportation law, and accounting. This article analyses the historical background, the institutions, and the main provisions of some of these Uniform Acts and Regulations. It also recommends a few legal areas which OHADA should make uniform to increase legal certainty and predictability in civil and commercial transactions in Africa.

Call for applications: Postdoctoral positions at the Faculty of Law at Hebrew University, Jerusalem

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A postdoctoral fellowship at the Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University is available for the academic year of 2020-2021. The position is part of the “Old Identities, New Times: Does the Common Legal Identity Withstand Modernity?”, a research project headed by Dr Sharon Shakargy and funded by the Israeli Science Foundation (grant 835/18).

The research project deals with items of personal status, such as age, sex, religion, marital status, parenthood, legal capacity, and the changes in the regulation and perception thereof. The project investigates these items of personal status comparatively, focusing on Western legal systems but not limited to them. More details on the project are available here.

Scholars interested in perusing independent work related to the questions mentioned above are invited to apply. 

Qualifications: 

  • Candidates’ doctoral dissertation has focused on, or closely connected to, family law, comparative private law, private international law (conflict of laws).
  • Candidates will have submitted their doctoral dissertation by the starting date of the postdoctoral position. 
  • Good knowledge of German, French or English private law/ family law is an advantage.
  • Candidates must have an excellent command of the English language. Other relevant languages are an advantage. No Hebrew proficiency is required. 

Position Details: 

  • The position is available starting from October 18, 2020, for a minimum of 3 months and a maximum of 12 months.
  • Regular participation in workshops and other academic activities is expected throughout the academic terms.
  • The compensation is a stipend of 10,000 ILS/ Month (~$US 2890; €2620). Health insurance, travel, accommodation and any other expenses are not covered.

Interested applicants should submit a 2-page long research proposal, their CV and publication list, and 1-2 letter(s) of recommendation to Sharon.Shakargy@mail.huji.ac.il by March 15, 2020. Please indicate “postdoc position” in the subject line. 

Master Programme on International Trade Law (InTradeC) at University of Milan

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The University of Milan announces the first edition of the Master Programme on International Trade Compliance Control (IntTradec) to be held in Milan at the Department of International, Legal and Historical-Political Studies,

The Programme aims to train professional figures called to work within the Export Control Program, with a specific focus on International Trade Law, Private International Law, Customs Law and Tax Law.  It includes teaching activities and workshops for a total of 500 hours, and a training period of 300 hours.

More information is available here (in Italian).

Director: Prof. Angela Lupone, University of Milan

Scientific Committee:  Prof. Giovanna Adinolfi (UNIMI), dr. Cristian Battistello (consulente aziendale), prof. Andrea Carati (UNIMI), dr. Maurizio Castello, dr. Antonio Ciavatta (Baker Hughes), dr. Simone Dossi (UNIMI), prof. Manlio Frigo (UNIMI), prof. Alessandra Lang (UNIMI), prof. Laurent Manderieux (Università Bocconi), dr. Luca Moriconi (adjunct prof.), avv. Marco Padovan (Padovan Law Firm), dr. Marco Piredda (ENI S.p.a.), prof. Marco Pedrazzi (UNIMI), prof. Francesca Villata (UNIMI).

Stages and internships: Baker Hughes, Nuovo Pignone International S.r.l., Banca Popolare di Sondrio, Caleffi Hydronic Solutions, Comecer S.p.a., Elantas Europe S.r.l; Fratelli Cosulich S.p.a.; Modo Customs Services S.r.l.; Omal S.p.a., Sabaf S.p.a., StMicroelectronics S.r.l, Studio Legale Padovan (Milano). 

Contacts: direzione.intgiurpol@unimi.it

Deadline: 3 February 2020 (2 p.m.) with possibility of extention. 

‘Reasonableness’ Limits in Extraterritorial Regulation: A Public Lecture by Hannah Buxbaum at LSE, 30 January 2020

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The Law Department at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) is pleased to host a Public Lecture by Visiting Professor Hannah Buxbaum, on ”Reasonableness’ Limits in Extraterritorial Regulation’.


About the topic:
Extraterritorial regulation has become commonplace. States frequently apply their laws to foreign conduct in order to protect local economic interests—and sometimes to advance shared interests, such as the protection of human rights. Are there limits to these exercises of state authority? If so, what is the source and content of those limits? This lecture will investigate the role of “reasonableness” as a limitation on extraterritorial regulation. It will focus in particular on developments in the United States, where the recently adopted Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law has reframed the role of international law in limiting the reach of national legislation.

About the speaker:
Professor Hannah Buxbaum is Vice President for International Affairs, the John E. Schiller Chair in Legal Ethics and a Professor of Law at Indiana University. Professor Buxbaum is an expert on cross-border regulatory litigation and extraterritoriality, U.S. securities and competition law, and foreign relations law. 

Thursday 30 January 2020 6:30pm to 8:00pm
Hosted by the LSE Department of Law
Chair: Dr. Jan Kleinheisterkamp (LSE)SUMEET VALRANI LECTURE THEATRE LSE Centre Buildings (CBG.1.01)

The Lecture is open to all; there is no need to register. For more information, please contact Jan Kleinheisterkamp (LSE) or Jacco Bomhoff (LSE).

The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention – A Game Changer?

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UPDATE: The conference has been cancelled.

The Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters will form the object of a conference (in English) scheduled to take place on 23 April 2020 at the Catholic University of Milan.

Speakers include Gilles Cuniberti (University of Luxembourg), Elena D’Alessandro (University of Turin), Francisco Garcimartín Alférez (Autonomous University of Madrid), Marko Jovanovic (University of Belgrade), Antonio Leandro (University of Bari) and Matthias Weller (University of Bonn). Fausto Pocar (University of Milan) will chair the conference while Luca Radicati di Brozolo (Catholic University of Milan) will offer some concluding remarks.

The event benefits from the support of EAPIL, the European Association of Private International Law, and of the Interest Group on Private International Law of SIDI, the Italian Society of International and EU Law.

Attendance is free, but those wishing to attend are required to register by 10 April 2020 through the conference website. In view of the limited seating capacity of the room where the conference will take place, early registration is recommended.

For more information: pietro.franzina@unicatt.it.

Inaugural Lecture by Alex Mills (UCL): The Privatisation of Private (and) International Law

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Speaker: Professor Alex Mills (Faculty of Laws, UCL)

Chair: Professor Campbell McLachlan QC (Victoria University Wellington)

Date and time: 06 February 2020, 6:00 pm to 7:00 pm

Location: Bentham House, UCL Laws, London, WC1H 0EG, United Kingdom

Abstract

The boundary between public and private legal relations at the international level has become increasingly fluid. State actors engage internationally in private commercial activity, while the privatisation of traditional governmental functions has led to private actors exercising ostensibly public authority, and accelerated the development of a hybridised public-private international investment law. Privatisation as a general phenomenon is much debated, although there has been relatively little focus on the governmental functions which are perhaps of most interest to lawyers – law making, law enforcement, and dispute resolution. This lecture will argue that modern legal developments in the context of private law and cross-border private legal relations can be usefully analysed as two distinct forms of privatisation. First, privatisation of the allocative functions of public and private international law, in respect of both institutional and substantive aspects of regulation. Second, privatisation of the institutional and substantive regulation of private legal relationships themselves, through arbitration and the recognition of non-state law. Analysing these developments through the lens of privatisation highlights a number of important critical questions which deserve greater consideration.

About the Speaker

Alex Mills is Professor of Public and Private International Law in the Faculty of Laws, University College London. His research encompasses a range of foundational issues across public and private international law, as well as international investment law and commercial arbitration. He has degrees in Philosophy and Law from the University of Sydney, and an LLM and PhD (awarded the Yorke Prize) from the University of Cambridge, where he also taught before joining UCL. His publications include ‘Party Autonomy in Private International Law’ (CUP, 2018), ‘The Confluence of Public and Private International Law’ (CUP, 2009), and (co-authored) ‘Cheshire North and Fawcett’s Private International Law’ (OUP, 2017). He was awarded the American Society of International Law’s Private International Law Prize in 2010, has Directed Studies in Private International Law at the Hague Academy of International Law, and is a member of Blackstone Chambers Academic Advisory Panel and the Editorial Board of the International and Comparative Law Quarterly.

The organisors request you to consult for more information and to register for the event here.

Development of Private International Law in the UK post Brexit.

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The event is free to attend. The following URL provides full information and registration details: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-development-of-private-international-law-in-the-uk-post-brexit-tickets-89779245139

Date: Friday 28th February 2020, 9am-5pm.

Location: Queen Mary University of London, 67-69 Lincoln’s Inn Fields, Room 3.1, London, WC2A 3JB

This is the first of four public AHRC workshops on Private International Law after Brexit from global, European, Commonwealth and intra-UK perspectives.

About the event

With Brexit having taken place on 31 January 2020 this workshop comes at an ideal time to focus on how private international law in the UK should develop once the implementation period for the UK leaving the EU has finished (which under UK law should be on 31 December 2020). Several eminent speakers will address the issue from four key perspectives:

  • Global – Professor Trevor Hartley LSE
  • Commonwealth – Professor David McClean, University of Sheffield
  • EU/EEA – Michael Wilderspin – Commission Legal Service
  • Intra-UK – Dr Kirsty Hood QC, Faculty of Advocates, Scotland

There will be a discussant for each perspective and then plenty of time for questions and comments after each main speaker.

The workshop will also hear from the organisers of this AHRC Research Network:

  • Professor Paul Beaumont, University of Stirling
  • Dr Mihail Danov, University of Exeter (who will report on his English pilot study)

Furthermore some empirical research findings will be shared by:

  • Professor Sophia Tang, University of Newcastle
  • Dr Jayne Holliday, University of Stirling

Those interested in advising on the development of this Research Network are welcome to stay for an informal meeting to be held at the end of the workshop between 5.10 and 6pm.

This event is free and open to all but registration is required because spaces are limited.

Professor Paul Beaumont and Dr Mihail Danov would like to thank Queen Mary University of London for their wonderful support by hosting the first three workshops and also AHRC for funding the Research Network.

Future Events

The second and third workshop of this series will be held on Wednesday 1st and Thursday 2nd April 2020 in the same location, Queen Mary University of London, Room 3.1, 67-69 Lincoln’s Inn Field, London and will focus on the future development of private international law in the UK in relation to commercial law (April 1) and family law (April 2).

The final workshop will be held on Thursday 2nd July 2020. This will be held as a joint venture with the Journal of Private International Law and will be held at Reed Smith, Broadgate Tower, 20 Primrose Street, EC2A 2RS

Tickets for these events will be available shortly.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CLEARS THE MURKINESS SURROUNDING THE TERMS ‘VENUE’, ‘SEAT’ AND ‘PLACE’

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By Tasha Joseph

The confusion between ‘place’, ‘seat’ and ‘venue’ in International Commercial Arbitration cases was put to rest in the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Hardy Explorations And Production(India) Inc.1. The decision was given by a three-judge bench which unanimously passed the decision that ‘seat’, ‘venue’ and ‘place’ did not signify the same meaning and could not be used interchangeably. Instead, the three terms denote different meanings and in the absence of express provision for any of the same, there were tests to be met in order to determine the actual ‘place’, ‘venue’ and ‘seat’.

In this case, Kuala Lumpur was selected as the ‘venue’ for the arbitration proceedings in the agreement, with the application of the UNCITRAL model for the same. Upon the Union of India challenging the award under section 342 in the Delhi High Court, the Court had to determine whether Kuala Lumpur was the ‘seat’ and hence if the action in the Indian court was unmaintainable. The Delhi High Court held that the courts did not have jurisdiction and thus refrained from looking into the merits of the case. The matter then went to a division bench and finally a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court.

The court went into the previous decisions such as Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC & Ors. 3, Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. 4and BALCO case5 to understand the principles that need to be applied for deciding the seat of arbitral proceedings.

The Court observed that the determination of the seat has to be contextually done. Only when the ‘place’ was agreed upon, in the agreement, between the parties, ‘place’ would be equivalent to the seat. Positive action is needed and for ‘place’ to be treated as ‘seat’, a condition precedent (if any) must be met as well. For instance, a ‘place’ can become a ‘seat’ if a condition precedent present (if any) is met. For the ‘venue’ to become ‘seat’ something else was needed as a concomitant to the provision of ‘venue’ in the agreement. ‘Venue’ and ‘place’ do not ipso facto assume the status of a ‘seat’.

There were no conditions precedent or any positive act mentioned to determine Kuala Lumpur as the ‘seat’ in the concerned matter and hence Kuala Lumpur could not be treated as the juridical seat. Thus, the matter was maintainable as the courts in India have jurisdiction and the order passed by the Delhi High Court had been set aside.