What Will Happen to the Alien Tort Statute?

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As many of our readers know, we are anxiously awaiting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.  Although the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari in Kiobel to decide the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the ATS, it subsequently orderd reargument on the broader question of “[w]hether and under what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”  Comments by the justices in the Kiobel oral arguments raise the possibility that the Court may require exhaustion of local remedies in ATS litigation.  Some believe it is likely that the Court will limit ATS litigation—perhaps substantially.  All of this raises an important question:  What will human rights litigation look like after KiobelThe Kiobel decision is unlikely to end ATS litigation in the federal courts, but it is likely that many post- Kiobel human rights claimants will consider alternative strategies.

A year ago, right after the first oral argument and before the reargument was ordered, Chris Whytock, Mike Ramsey, and I convened a group of private international law and public international law scholars and practitioners to examine the question of what might happen after Kiobel.  In particular, we were curious to see whether pleading ATS-like claims in state courts under state law was viable.  See here for one view.  The UC Irvine Law Review is about to go to press with the papers from that conference.  For those interested, here is a link to the issue’s introduction where we provide an overview of the papers.

Here is the abstract:

Litigation in domestic courts is only one of many ways to promote and protect international human rights, but it has received much attention from lawyers and scholars.  Attention has focused above all on litigation in the U.S. federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute (the “ATS”). However, plaintiffs are facing growing barriers to ATS human rights litigation in the U.S. federal courts, and it is likely that the Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. will further restrict this type of litigation — perhaps substantially.

This Essay provides an overview of the legal issues surrounding one possible alternative human rights litigation strategy: human rights litigation in U.S. state courts or under U.S. state law. It highlights both the attractions and the limits of this strategy, and it identifies the challenging legal issues that this strategy will raise for judges, lawyers and scholars, ranging from choice of law and extraterritoriality, to jurisdiction and federal preemption. This Essay also serves as the foreword to a symposium issue of the UC Irvine Law Review that contains articles by leading practitioners and scholars of human rights, international law, and conflict of laws providing in-depth analysis of these and other aspects of human rights litigation in state courts and under state law.

 

 

Owusu and National Lis Pendens Doctrines

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In Owusu, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that English courts may not decline jurisdiction on the ground  that a third state court is Forum Conveniens when the Brussels Convention applies. English courts have no discretion when Article 2 of the Convention grants them jurisdiction.

What is the impact of this decision in continental Europe? Civil law jurisdictions do not have forum non conveniens doctrines, but they apply instead national doctrines of lis pendens and related actions. Are these doctrines impacted at all by Owusu?

Let’s take an example. Here is a contractual dispute between a Gabonese company and a French company. The French company initiates proceedings in Gabon. Shortly after, the Gabonese company initiates proceedings in France. The French company is domiciled in France, so the jurisdiction of the French court is governed by Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation. May the French court apply its national doctrine to decline jurisdiction?

The relevant doctrine is not FNC, but it has interesting features. It is a special form of lis pendens. On the one hand, a number of conditions must be met: proceedings must have been initiated first before the foreign court, the dispute must be the same (triple identity), the foreign jugdment would be recognised in the forum. On the other hand, the French court only has discretion to decline jurisdiction.

In a judgment of February 19th, 2013, the French supreme court for private and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) affirmed a decision whereby the Paris court had declined jurisdiction in that very same circumstances. It seems that the Owusu decision was neither mentioned nor discussed before the Cour de cassation.

H/T: Severine Menetrey