German Judgment on Rome II
Even though the decision is not really new anymore and the case has been discussed already – at least with regard to certain aspects concerning the temporal scope of Rome II – it might still be worth mentioning since it is the first judgment of the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) applying the Rome II Regulation.
The case concerns an action brought by a registered association in terms of § 4 Unterlassungsklagengesetz, UKlaG (Injunctive Relief Act) seeking an injunction to prevent an airline established in Latvia from using a particular clause in its general terms and conditions towards consumers.
With regard to the question of international jurisdiction, the BGH held that German courts were competent to hear the case on the basis of Art. 5 No. 3 Brussels I Regulation since the use of unfair general terms of conditions constituted a “harmful event” in terms of Art. 5 No. 3 Brussels I Regulation. In this respect, the BGH referred to the ECJ’s judgment in Henkel (C-167/00) where the ECJ had held that “[t]he concept of ‘harmful event’ within the meaning of Article 5 (3) of the Brussels Convention is broad in scope […] so that, with regard to consumer protection, it covers not only situations where an individual has personally sustained damage but also, in particular, the undermining of legal stability by the use of unfair terms which is the task of associations such as […] to prevent.” (ECJ, C-167/00, para. 42).
With regard to the applicable law concerning the claim for injunctive relief against the use of unfair terms, the BGH referred to Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 (Rome II) and held that German law – and therefore §§ 1, 2, 4a UKlaG – was applicable in this case: According to Art. 4 (1) Rome II the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country in which the indirect consequences of that event occur. In the present context, the country in which the damage occurs or is likely to occur (Art. 2 (3) b) Rome II) is, according to the court, the country where the unfair general terms were used or are likely to be used and therefore the country in which the consumers’ protected collective interests were affected or are likely to be affected. In support of this interpretation, the BGH referred to Art.6 (1) Rome II according to which the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of an act of unfair competition shall be the law of the country where the collective interests of consumers are, or are likely to be, affected. In this respect, the BGH left the question open whether Art. 6 Rome II is directly applicable in the present context, since, according to the court, the underlying rationale – namely that consumers should be protected by the law of that country where their collective interests are affected – applied in the present context as well.
With regard to the temporal scope of application of Rome II – which is contentious in view of the not unambiguous provisions of Art. 31 and Art. 32 of the Regulation (see in this respect the abstracts of the articles by Glöckner and Bücken which can be found here) – the BGH seems to adopt, as it has been pointed out already by Professor von Hein in his recent comment, the point of view according to which the Regulation entered into force on 11 January 2009. The BGH, however, did not discuss the problems surrounding Artt. 31 und 32 Rome II.