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Polish Constitutional Court about to review the constitutionality of the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign State?

Written by Zuzanna Nowicka, lawyer at the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and lecturer at Department of Logic and Legal Argumentation at University of Warsaw

In the aftermath of the judgment of the ICJ of 2012 in the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) that needs no presentation here (for details see, in particular, the post by Burkhard Hess), by its judgment of 2014, the Italian Constitutional Court recognized the duty of Italy to comply with the ICJ judgment of 2012 but subjected that duty to the “fundamental principle of judicial protection of fundamental rights” under Italian constitutional law (for a more detailed account of those developments see this post on EAPIL by Pietro Franzina and further references detailed there). In a nutshell, according to the Italian Constitutional Court, the fundamental human rights cannot be automatically and unconditionally sacrificed in each and every case in order to uphold the jurisdiction immunity of a foreign State allegedly responsible for serious international crimes.

Since then, the Italian courts have reasserted their jurisdiction in such cases, in some even going so far as to decide on the substance and award compensation from Germany. The saga continues, as Germany took Italy to the ICJ again in 2022 (for the status of the case pending before the ICJ see here). It even seems not to end there as it can be provocatively argued that this saga has its spin-off currently taking place before the Polish courts.

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The Greek Supreme Court has decided: Relatives of persons killed in accidents are immediate victims

A groundbreaking judgment was rendered last October by the Greek Supreme Court. Relatives of two Greek crew members killed in Los Llanos Air Base, Spain, initiated proceedings before Athens courts for pain and suffering damages (solatium). Although the action was dismissed by the Athens court of first instance, and the latter decision was confirmed by the Athens court of appeal, the cassation was successful: The Supreme Court held that both the Brussels I bis Regulation and the Lugano Convention are establishing international jurisdiction in the country where the relatives of persons killed are domiciled, because they must be considered as direct victims.

THE FACTS

On 26 January 2015, an F-16D Fighting Falcon jet fighter of the Hellenic Air Force crashed into the flight line at Los Llanos Air Base in Albacete, Spain, killing 11 people: the two crew members and nine on the ground.

The relatives of the Greek crew members filed actions for pain and suffering damages before the Athens court of first instance against a US (manufacturer of the aircraft) and a Swiss (subsidiary of the manufacturer) company. The action was dismissed in 2019 for lack of international jurisdiction. The appeals lodged by the relatives before had the same luck: the Athens court of appeal confirmed in 2020 the first instance ruling. The relatives filed a cassation, which led to the judgment nr. 1658/5.10.2022 of the Supreme Court.

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Standard (and burden) of proof for jurisdiction agreements

Courts are often required to determine the existence or validity of jurisdiction agreements. This can raise the question of the applicable standard of proof. In common law jurisdictions, the question is not free from controversy.  In particular, Stephen Pitel has argued on this very blog that jurisdiction clauses should be assessed on the balance of probabilities, as opposed to the “good arguable case” standard that is commonly applied (see, in more detail, Stephen Pitel and Jonathan de Vries “The Standard of Proof for Jurisdiction Clauses” (2008) 46 Canadian Business Law Journal 66). That is because the court’s determination on this question will ordinarily be final – it will not be revisited at trial.

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News

AMEDIP: Annual seminar to take place from 22 to 24 October 2025 (in Spanish)

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) will be holding its XLVIII Seminar entitled “Reflections regarding the Inter-American system in the 50th Anniversary of the CIDIP-I and the latest developments of Private International Law in Mexico” (Reflexiones en torno al sistema interamericano en el 50 Aniversario de la CIDIP-I y la actualidad del Derecho Internacional Privado en México) from 22 to 24 October 2025. The venue of the seminar will be the Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro (Querétaro, Mexico). Read more

University of East Anglia Law Podcast Series on (Private and Public) International Law: Series 3 out now

All episodes of Series 3 of the University of East Anglia Law School Podcast are now out. Hosted by Rishi Gulati, they cover the following topics:

  • The Future of International Investment Law (Muthucumarasamy Sornarajah)
  • Double Standards in International Law (Patryk Labuda)
  • The launch of the Elgar Companion to UNIDROIT (Edward Elgar, 2024)
  • The Rise of International Commercial Courts (Giesela Rühl)
  • The exercise of self-defence in outer space (Chris O’Meara)
  • Greenland, Self-Determination, and the Geopolitical Contest (Maria Ackrén).

All  episodes are available at SoundCloud, Apple Podcasts, and Spotify

Where do Children Reside? Where they are “at Home”

The Supreme Court of Canada has released its reasons for dismissing the appeal (which it did orally on December 9, 2024) in Dunmore v Mehralian, 2025 SCC 20.  The narrow issue was the meaning of “habitual residence” for a child in the statutory context of the Children’s Law Reform Act (Ontario).  The SCC had earlier explained that a hybrid approach to the meaning of habitual residence is to be used under the Hague Convention: Office of the Children’s Lawyer v Balev, 2018 SCC 16.  In the convention, there is no definition of habitual residence.  In contrast, the CLRA does provide elements of a definition of habitual residence (in s 22) though it leaves “resides” undefined.  This generated the issue: under the statute, does the same hybrid approach apply or is the definition different because of the statute?

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