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German Judges Travel to Peru in Climate-Change Trial

In a widely reported trip, members of the 5th Civil Chamber of the Higher Regional Court of Hamm, Germany, together with two court-appointed experts, travelled to Peru to collect evidence in one of Germany’s first climate-change lawsuits. The highly symbolic case has been brought by Saúl Luciano Lliuyas, a Peruvian farmer, who claims that man-made climate change and the resulting increased flood risk threatens his house in the Andes, which is located right below a glacial lake. Supported by two German NGOs, he seeks compensation from RWE, Europe’s single biggest emitter of carbon dioxide, for the equivalent of its contribution to worldwide human carbon dioxide emissions, i.e. 0.47 percent, of the additional protective measures he had to take to flood-prove his house.

The trip had already been scheduled in 2019 but was delayed by the Covid-19 pandemic. Its main purpose appears to have been the proper instruction of the two experts, who are charged with assessing the climate-change-related risk for the claimant and the extent of RWE’s potential contribution to it.

In terms of private international law, the case is straightforward. The German courts have international jurisdiction on the basis of Articles 4(1), 63(1) Brussels Ia as RWE has its statutory seat and central administration in Germany. As far as the applicable law is concerned, the claimant can rely on the privilege awarded to the (alleged) victims of environmental torts by Art 7 Rome II, according to which they may opt for the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred (as opposed to the law of the country in which the damage occurred, which generally applies pursuant to Art. 4(1) Rome II), i.e. for German law in the case of pollutions caused by RWE’s power plants in Germany. Thus, the usual PIL problems of climate-change lawsuits (international jurisdiction based on Art. 7(2) or 8(1) Brussels Ia, immunity of state-owned corporations, predictability of the law of the place of the damage, application of Art. 17 Rome II, …) do not arise in this case.

Regarding the application of substantive German law, the case is much more open. In the first instance, the Regional Court of Essen outright rejected the claim for lack of a sufficient causal connection between RWE’s contribution to climate change and the specific risk of the claimant. This is in line with what might still be the majority position in German scholarship, according to which individual contributions to global climate change cannot trigger civil liability in tort or property law. The fact that the second-instance court has now started to collect evidence implies, however, that it considers the claim to succeed on the basis of the claimant’s submissions. Seen together with the German Constitutional Court quashing national legislation for being incompatible with Article 20a of the Constitution and international commitments to limit global warming in 2021, the lawsuit in Hamm may be a sign of German courts slowly adopting a more active position in the global fight against climate change, including with regard to civil liability.

Conflicting Views on the Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws

The American Law Institute is currently drafting the Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws. Lea Brilmayer (an eminent scholar of conflict of laws and a professor at Yale Law School) and Kim Roosevelt (the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) and a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School) recently engaged in a spirited debate about the current state of that project. Brilmayer and Daniel Listwa argued here that the current draft needs less theory and more blackletter rules. Roosevelt argued in response that the critics identify a problem that does not exist and propose a solution that would make things worse.

This exchange — the latest back-and-forth in a conversation between these interlocutors — is likely to prove illuminating to anyone curious about the status of the Restatement (Third) in the United States.

Can Blockchain Arbitration become a proper ‘International Arbitration’? Jurors vs. arbitrators

Written by Pedro Lacasa, Legal Consultant, Universidad Nacional de Asunción

There is no doubt that the use of emerging technologies has impacted the international arbitration arena. This tech revolution was unprecedently accelerated by the 2020 pandemic whilst national States’ borders were closed, and travel activity diminished (if not directly forbidden by some States).

The increase of the application of the Blockchain technology in commercial contracts and the proliferation of smart contracts (even though some think they are in essence merely a piece of software code[1]) have reached the point of being a relevant part of international commerce and suddenly they demand more attention than before (see the overview of these new technologies and its impact in arbitration here http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/27/2018-in-review-blockchain-technology-and-arbitration/).

The omnipresence of technology in arbitration and the application of the blockchain technology to dispute resolution mechanisms in the international arena led to the naissance of the ‘blockchain arbitration’.

But just because a method focuses on dispute resolution, is not ipso facto a proper ‘arbitration’.

While the utilization of a trusted chain of information enhanced by technology is encouraged in arbitration proceedings, particularly in international arbitrations, we must underscore the fact that not any dispute resolution mechanism is a proper ‘arbitration’… not even if based on the blockchain.

Blockchain arbitration models do not share some of the essential features of arbitration. The parties cannot choose the arbitrator in charge freely. They cannot easily choose aspects like the language of the procedure, the nationality of the arbitrators, the qualification of the arbitrators, the applicable law, etc. If the parties choose the arbitrators based on their qualifications or nationality, such choices can directly impact the availability of the existing ‘blockchain arbitrators’. A fortiori, the parties cannot choose the applicable law to the arbitration itself or to the merits of the dispute either.

Nominating the arbitrators

In Kleros, one of the most popular blockchain arbitration applications, the candidates for adjudicators first self-select themselves into specific courts (i.e., specific types of disputes) and then, the final selection of the adjudicators is done randomly (meaning a party cannot directly nominate someone in particular as an arbitrator for the underlying dispute). As it specifies in its whitepaper[2]contracts will specify the options available for jurors to vote”, meaning the contract itself is the first factor that restrain party autonomy. In Kleros anyone can be an adjudicator. The probability of being drawn as an adjudicator for a dispute is proportional to the amount of tokens such user stakes within the platform.

Whilst other platforms such as Aragon[3] use the same drafting (of adjudicators) system, networks such as Jur[4], Mattereum and Sagewise[5] use a system that go a step closer to the International Arbitration legal framework (like the 1958 New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, etc.) in order to make their awards more enforceable worldwide but still lack the flexibility of a wider private autonomy and the role of the conflicts of laws, both present in classical international commercial arbitration processes.

These blockchain-based dispute resolution adjudicators are referred also as ‘jurors’[6]. ‘Jurors’ are Blockchain users elected to vote in favor of one of the parties to the underlying dispute utilizing the Schelling Point method.

But without even analyzing what the Schelling Point methodology has to do with the art of rendering justice in a definitive and final manner, we must ask the question: if the ‘jurors’ have more features of a jury and not of an arbitrator, why do we call a mechanism that solves disputes through decisions made by jurors and not by arbitrators arbitration?

Moreover, these jurors, like users of the Blockchain, have a direct economic interest in serving as jurors in the dispute at hand[7]. However, to think that an arbitrator decided to assume the task of being a part of an arbitral tribunal in an international arbitration constituted to resolve an international dispute, only because that would mean eventually more money to him, is an obscure idea at best. Such arbitrator was elected because of his or her qualities, experience, background, and reputation. This also occurs in domestic arbitrations. Nonetheless, such private autonomy is not possible in some blockchain arbitrations.

It is one thing to refer to such mechanisms as blockchain-based methods. But it is completely different is to maintain that such mechanisms are indeed ‘arbitrations’ stricto sensu[8], just like suggested by many authors[9] and professional associations such as the Blockchain Arbitration Society

Although the global society must embrace all the tech innovations regarding dispute resolution, the clear definition of what is an ‘arbitration’ and what is not should be a healthy practice.

Conclusion

Overall, the technology evolution within the dispute resolution mechanisms is here to stay. This disruption needs a twofold adaptation: on one hand, the parties on an international contractual commercial relationship must adapt themselves to the new ways of solving disputes. The same goes for Sovereign States, that must update their domestic and international legislation to recognize and somehow regulate such new dispute resolution mechanisms.

On the other hand, these platforms for dispute resolution must adapt to the historical surrounding of the conflict solving industry, calling a dispute resolution mechanism for what it is and avoid euphemisms.

Lastly, the misconception on the dispute resolution mechanisms and international arbitration procedures may provoke a confusion to the detriment of the users of such digital networks.

[1] See Charlie Morgan ‘Will the Commercialisation of Blockchain Technologies Change the Face of Arbitration?’ [Kluwer Arbitration Blog, March 5, 2018] available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/03/05/topic-to-be-confirmed/.

[2] Kleros white paper [September 2019] available at https://kleros.io/whitepaper.pdf.

[3] See “Juror staking” and “ Juror drafting” https://github.com/aragon/whitepaper.

[4] See “Open Justice Platform” in Jur’s whitepaper V 3.0.0  [March 2021], available at https://jur.io/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/jur-white-paper-v.3.0.0.pdf.

[5] See Darcy W.E. Allen, Aaron M. Lane & Marta Poblet, ‘The Governance of Blockchain Dispute Resolution’ [Harvard Negotiation Law Review, vol. 25, issue 1, Fall 2019] 75-102.

[6] Maxime Chevalier, ‘From Smart Contract Litigation to Blockchain Arbitration, a New Decentralized Approach Leading Towards the Blockchain Arbitral Order’ [Journal of International Dispute Settlement, vol. 12, issue 4, December 2021] 558 – 584 https://academic.oup.com/jids/article-abstract/12/4/558/6414874?redirectedFrom=PDF.

[7] Kleros white paper [September 2019] available at https://kleros.io/whitepaper.pdf.

[8] See for example Sharath Mulia & Romi Kumari, ‘Blockchain Arbitration: The Future of Dispute Resolution’ [Fox Mandal, November 2021] available at https://www.foxmandal.in/blockchain-arbitration-the-future-of-dispute-resolution/.

[9] For example, see Ritika Bansal, ‘Enforceability of Awards from Blockchain Arbitrations in India [August 2019] available at: http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/08/21/enforceability-of-awards-from-blockchain-arbitrations-in-india/.

News

Yong Pung How Professorship Lecture 2024

The Yong Pung How Professorship Lecture 2024 will be held on Thursday 23 May 2024 5:00 to 6:30pm Singapore time. Professor Yeo Tiong Min, SC (Hon), who holds the Yong Pung How Chair Professor of Law at Singapore Management University, will be speaking on ‘Past, Present, and Future Tensions: Jurisdiction over Absent Defendants’.

The synopsis is as follows: ‘This lecture considers the historical backdrop to the current law in Singapore on when overseas defendants may be subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the court, with a view to understanding the old and new issues arising from the overhaul of the rules for service out of jurisdiction in 2021 and the amendments in 2023 to accommodate the Hague Service Convention. The future-readiness of these rules will also be considered.’

The event will be in hybrid format. Further details may be found here.

The DRIG Prize for Best Article in International Dispute Resolution

The Dispute Resolution Interest Group of the American Society of International Law (ASIL) is pleased to announce the third edition of the DRIG Prize for Best Article in International Dispute Resolution. The Prize will be awarded to the author(s) of the article published in 2023 that the Selection Committee considers to be outstanding in the field of international dispute resolution. DRIG is currently accepting submissions for the Prize.

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Out Now: Aristova, Tort Litigation against Transnational Corporations. The Challenge of Jurisdiction in English Courts

Ekaterina Aristova (Bonavero Institute of Human Rights, University of Oxford) is the author of the ‘Tort Litigation against Transnational Corporations: The Challenge of Jurisdiction in English Courts’ (OUP 2024), which has just been published in the Oxford Private International Law series. She has kindly shared the following summary with us:

The book examines the approach of the English courts to the question of jurisdiction in civil liability claims brought against English-based parent companies and their foreign subsidiaries as co-defendants (e.g., Lubbe v Cape, Lungowe v Vedanta, Okpabi v Shell, etc.). While the book is written from the perspective of English law, the book also draws on examples of similar cases in Australia, Canada, EU Member States, and the US to broaden the discussion.

The assertion of jurisdiction in parent company liability claims based on a nexus with the forum state presents a challenge to the courts. The territorial focus of the adjudicative jurisdiction is often contrary to the transnational nature of cross-border business activities. Transnational corporations (TNCs) have the flexibility to spread operations over multiple jurisdictions and create a legal separation between the subsidiary’s activities and the home state of the parent company. Courts rely on various private international law rules and doctrines to resolve the question of jurisdiction in parent company liability claims, including forum non conveniens doctrine in common law legal systems, the mandatory rule of domicile under EU law, and the presumption against extraterritoriality in US jurisprudence. The broad disparities in the issues of civil jurisdiction among domestic legal regimes and the considerable controversy surrounding the exercise of extraterritorial regulation over corporate operations often lead to the creation of a ‘jurisdictional veil’ for the parent company and a significant degree of autonomy, largely free from the control of any national jurisdiction.

To address this puzzle, this book seeks to answer three questions: 1) To what extent can English courts, under existing rules, exercise jurisdiction over English parent companies and their foreign subsidiaries as co-defendants? 2) Is England a suitable forum for deciding parent company liability claims? 3) Should the jurisdictional competence of the English courts be broadened through a new connecting factor derived from the ‘economic enterprise’ theory?

The book aims to offer a new angle to the discourse by placing the discussion of parent company liability claims in the context of the topical debate about the changing role of private international law in a globalised world. The transnational adjudication of disputes, cross-border activities of non-state actors and expansion of private law-making challenge several conventional assumptions of the discipline of private international law, including its focus on territoriality and geographical connecting factors and its capacity to interact with public mechanisms. Home state courts have become the fora for struggles between TNCs and vulnerable communities from the host states, raising complex questions about (il)legitimate forum shopping, the appropriate forum, and the limits of judicial discretion. Parent company liability claims impact how we think about private international law and its function, and the reader is invited to explore these challenging dynamics.

The Bonavero Institute of Human Rights in Oxford will celebrate the publication of the book by hosting a (hybrid) book launch and wine reception on 5 June 2024.