Views
Dutch collective redress dangerous? A call for a more nuanced approach
Prepared by Alexandre Biard, Xandra Kramer and Ilja Tillema, Erasmus University Rotterdam
The Netherlands has become dangerously involved in the treatment of mass claims, Lisa Rickard from the US Chamber of Commerce recently said to the Dutch financial daily (Het Financieele Dagblad, 28 September 2017) and the Dutch BNR newsradio (broadcast of 28 September 2017). This statement follows the conclusions of two reports published in March and September 2017 by the US Institute for Legal Reforms (ILR), an entity affiliated with the US Chamber of Commerce. Within a few hours, the news spread like wildfire in online Dutch newspapers, see for instance here.
Worryingly enough, the March 2017 report, which assessed collective redress mechanisms in ten Member States, predicted that ‘there are a number of very powerful indicators that all of the same incentives and forces that have led to mass abuse in other jurisdictions are also gathering force in the EU’. Among the jurisdictions surveyed, the Netherlands appeared as a place particularly prone to such abuse. The September 2017 report focuses on consumer attitudes towards collective redress safeguards, and ultimately concludes that 85% of respondents tend to support the introduction of safeguards for the resolution of mass claims.
The publication of the aforementioned reports is timely as the European Commission’s evaluation report on the 2013 Recommendation on Collective Redress is expected this autumn, following the recent call for evidence. Some of the statements in these reports call for a more nuanced view. Indeed, the Dutch approach to the resolution of mass claims might have its drawbacks. It is certainly not exempt from criticisms. However, in a matter of such expedient nature, it is of the utmost importance that both sides are thoroughly addressed and assessed.
For the information of readers that are not familiar with the Dutch system: the Netherlands currently has two mechanisms that have been designed for collective redress specifically. The first one is the collective action for injunctive or declaratory relief. A verdict in such action can provide the basis for an amicable settlement or for individual proceedings to seek monetary compensation. The second mechanism is the much-discussed WCAM settlement (based on the Dutch Collective Settlements Act, see also a previous post linking to papers and a report on the WCAM procedure). In addition, there is a proposal to introduce a collective action for damages (see a previous post on this blog).
Bad apples and the bigger picture
In the past years, few incidents have occurred in Dutch collective redress that may indeed come close to ‘American situations’ that are generally feared in Europe. Unfortunately, some commentators have chosen to mainly highlight such incidents. Notably, the ILR report of March 2017 refers to the notorious case of Stichting Loterijverlies, in which a foundation initiated a collective action on behalf of aggrieved lottery ticket holders against the Dutch State Lottery. The report rightfully mentions that the foundation’s director has been accused of funnelling elsewhere, for personal gain, part of the consumers’ financial contribution to the foundation. However, the report neglects to mention that the foundation had also been litigating for quite some years and that, ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled in its favour: the Dutch State Lottery had misled consumers for years. Furthermore, the report fails to mention that some of the foundation’s participants successfully filed a request to replace the foundation’s board. Moreover, despite (or on account of) the complexity of establishing causation and damages, the case has now been amicably settled. As part of the settlement, participants of the foundation have been reimbursed their financial contribution thereto, and all class members were free to participate in the settlement: an extraordinary, one-off lottery draw. Reportedly, 2.5 million individuals have done so.
Obviously, incidents such as the aforementioned case are of no avail to civil justice, and justify concerns about claim vehicles’ activities and motives. However, we should also consider the many positive effects of collective redress mechanisms. Generally, Dutch collective actions and WCAM settlements provide for much-needed effective and efficient dispute resolution in mass harm situations.
Safeguards work: learning from experience
The March report by the ILR warns against the gradual decline of safeguards in the Netherlands, and in the EU more generally. Yet, various safeguards already exist, continue to do so, and generally function well in practice. For instance, the admissibility rules regarding representative organizations (that bring collective actions or are involved in a WCAM settlement) have become more stringent and are applied increasingly strict by courts. As to the current Dutch collective actions, there is proof that its numbers have slowly risen since 1994, but no proof exists that this is necessarily attributable to entrepreneurial parties, let alone that they have increased the number of frivolous claims (Tillema 2017). The proposed collective action for damages further raises the current threshold for representative organizations to obtain standing. The requirements concern the organizations’ governance, financial means, representativeness, experience and expertise, and individuals’ participation in the decision-making process. Indeed, a judgment will have binding effect upon all aggrieved parties who have not opted out, but all actions will be publicly registered, there is a strict scope rule, and individuals can raise objections.
So far, eight WCAM settlement have been declared binding. Undeniably, various parties have entered this market, including US counsels and their sizeable fees. However, in spite of its difficult task, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal seems growingly comfortable in assessing the reasonableness of a collective settlement, including the representative organizations’ remuneration. In Converium, the reasonableness of (contingency) fees was assessed for the first time. In the currently pending eighth WCAM case, the Fortis-settlement, the court has demonstrated its awareness of the risks and of its task to also scrutinize the motives of representative organizations. In its interlocutory judgment, it has ruled that the settlement, in its current state, cannot be declared binding. It is deemed not reasonable due to, inter alia, the sizeable remuneration of the representative organizations and their lack of transparency thereon.
A Dutch ‘manoeuvre’ to become a ‘go-to-point’ for mass claim or an attempt to enhance access to justice for all?
‘The Netherlands and the UK seem to be manoeuvring themselves to become the go-to jurisdictions for collective claims outside the EU’, the March report highlighted. Obviously, this not the first time that other countries express their concerns against the extra-territorial effects of the Dutch legislation, an issue that has been discussed for several years in the context of the WCAM (Van Lith, 2011). The ILR report indeed highlighted that in the Converium case, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal declared the settlement binding where a majority of shareholders were domiciled outside the Netherlands. Yet, the key question here is whether, for reasons linked to equality and efficiency, individuals who have suffered from losses resulting from a same misbehaviour should not be treated in a same manner and in the same proceeding, regardless of their actual location. By asserting global jurisdiction, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ultimately ensured access to justice and equal treatment for all parties placed in similar situations, and ultimately avoided costly fragmentation of the case for parties and courts. In this regard, it should also be highlighted that the WCAM is a settlement-only mechanism, and – to the benefit of victims of wrongdoings – it is the wrongdoing party and the representatives of the aggrieved parties that jointly choose to address the Amsterdam Court of Appeal considering that the Netherlands has a suitable procedure to declare such settlement binding.
It is evident that collective redress mechanisms have both benefits and drawbacks. More than ever, the challenging, yet indispensable key word here is balance. As Commissioner Jourova recently observed at the release of the ILR September report, ‘the discussion in EU countries is in full swing on how to strike the right balance between access to justice and prevention of abuse’. We hope this short post can contribute to the discussion.
I thought we were exclusive? Some issues with the Hague Convention on Choice of Court, Brussels Ia and Brexit
This blog post is by Dr Mukarrum Ahmed (Lancaster University) and Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Aberdeen). It presents a condensed version of their article in the August 2017 issue of the Journal of Private International Law. The blog post includes specific references to the actual journal article to enable the reader to branch off into the detailed discussion where relevant. It also takes account of recent developments in the Brexit negotiation that took place after the journal article was completed.
On 1 October 2015, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (‘Hague Convention’) entered into force in 28 Contracting States, including Mexico and all the Member States of the European Union, except Denmark. The Convention has applied between Singapore and the other Contracting States since 1 October 2016. China, Ukraine and the USA have signed the Convention indicating that they hope to ratify it in the future (see the official status table for the Convention on the Hague Conference on Private International Law’s website). The Brussels Ia Regulation, which is the European Union’s device for jurisdictional and enforcement matters, applies as of 10 January 2015 to legal proceedings instituted and to judgments rendered on or after that date. In addition to legal issues that may arise independently under the Hague Convention, some issues may manifest themselves at the interface between the Hague Convention and the Brussels Ia Regulation. Both sets of issues are likely to garner the attention of cross-border commercial litigators, transactional lawyers and private international law academics. The article examines anti-suit injunctions, concurrent proceedings and the implications of Brexit in the context of the Hague Convention and its relationship with the Brussels Ia Regulation. (See pages 387-389 of the article)
It is argued that the Hague Convention’s system of ‘qualified’ or ‘partial’ mutual trust may permit anti-suit injunctions, actions for damages for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements and anti-enforcement injunctions where such remedies further the objective of the Convention. (See pages 394-402 of the article) The text of the Hague Convention and the Explanatory Report by Professors Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi are not explicit on this issue. However, the procès-verbal of the Diplomatic Session of the Hague Convention reveal widespread support for the proposition that the formal ‘process’ should be differentiated from the desired ‘outcome’ when considering whether anti-suit injunctions are permitted under the Convention. Where anti-suit injunctions uphold choice of court agreements and thus help achieve the intended ‘outcome’ of the Convention, there was a consensus among the official delegates at the Diplomatic Session that the Convention did not limit or constrain national courts of Contracting States from granting the remedy. (See Minutes No 9 of the Second Commission Meeting of Monday 20 June 2005 (morning) in Proceedings of the Twentieth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau of the Conference, Intersentia 2010) 622, 623–24) Conversely, where the remedy impedes the sound operation of the Convention by effectively derailing proceedings in the chosen court, there was also a consensus of the official delegates at the meeting that the Convention will not permit national courts of the Contracting States to grant anti-suit injunctions.
However, intra-EU Hague Convention cases may arguably not permit remedies for breach of exclusive choice of court agreements as they may be deemed to be an infringement of the principle of mutual trust and the principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) which animate the multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order of the Brussels Ia Regulation (see pages 403-405 of the article; C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565). If an aggrieved party does not commence proceedings in the chosen forum or commences such proceedings after the non-chosen court has rendered a decision on the validity of the choice of court agreement, the recognition and enforcement of that ruling highlights an interesting contrast between the Brussels Ia Regulation and the Hague Convention. It appears that the non-chosen court’s decision on the validity of the choice of court agreement is entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Brussels Ia Regulation. (See C-456/11 Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG v Samskip GmbH EU:C:2012:719, [2013] QB 548) The Hague Convention does not similarly protect the ruling of a non-chosen court. In fact, only a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States. (See Article 8(1) of the Hague Convention) Therefore, the ruling of a non-chosen court is not entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Hague Convention’s system of ‘qualified’ or ‘partial’ mutual trust. This provides a ready explanation for the compatibility of anti-suit injunctions with the Hague Convention but does not proceed any further to transpose the same conclusion into the very different context of the Brussels Ia Regulation which prioritizes the principle of mutual trust.
The dynamics of the relationship between Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation and Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention is mapped in the article (at pages 405-408). In a case where the Hague Convention should apply rather than the Brussels Ia Regulation because one of the parties is resident in a non-EU Contracting State to the Convention even though the chosen court is in a Member State of the EU (See Article 26(6)(a) of the Hague Convention) one would expect Article 6 of the Convention to be applied by any non-chosen court in the EU. However, the fundamental nature of the Article 31(2) lis pendens mechanism under the Brussels Ia Regulation may warrant the pursuance of a different line of analysis. (See Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Interzuid Transport BV EU:C:2013:858, [2014] I.L.Pr. 10, [36]; See also to similar effect, Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG EU:C:2010:243, [2010] I.L.Pr. 35, [49]) It is argued that the Hartley–Dogauchi Report’s interpretative approach has much to commend it as it follows the path of least resistance by narrowly construing the right to sue in a non-chosen forum as an exception rather than the norm. The exceptional nature of the right to sue in the non-chosen forum under the Hague Convention can be effectively reconciled with Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. This will usually result in the stay of the proceedings in the non-chosen court as soon as the chosen court is seised. As a consequence, the incidence of parallel proceedings and irreconcilable judgments are curbed, which are significant objectives in their own right under the Brussels Ia Regulation. It is hoped that the yet to develop jurisprudence of the CJEU on the emergent Hague Convention and the Brussels Ia Regulation will offer definitive and authoritative answers to the issues discussed in the article.
The implications of Brexit on this topic are not yet fully clear. (See pages 409-410 of the article) The UK is a party to the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention as a Member State of the EU, the latter having approved the Convention for all its Member States apart from Denmark. The UK will do what is necessary to remain a party to the Convention after Brexit. In its recently published negotiating paper – only available after the article in the Journal of Private International Law was completed – the UK Government has explicitly stated that:
“It is our intention to continue to be a leading member in the Hague Conference and to participate in those Hague Conventions to which we are already a party and those which we currently participate in by virtue of our membership of the EU.” (see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework (PDF) at para 22).
The UK will no doubt avoid any break in the Convention’s application. Brexit will almost certainly see the end of the application of the Brussels Ia Regulation in the UK. The reason being that its uniform interpretation is secured by the CJEU through the preliminary ruling system under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The UK is not willing to accept that jurisdiction post-Brexit (“Leaving the EU will therefore bring an end to the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK, because the CJEU derives its jurisdiction and authority from the EU Treaties.” see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 20). So although the UK negotiators are asking for a bespoke deal with the EU to continue something like Brussels Ia (“The UK will therefore seek an agreement with the EU that allows for close and comprehensive cross-border civil judicial cooperation on a reciprocal basis, which reflects closely the substantive principles of cooperation under the current EU framework” see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 19) it seems improbable that the EU will agree to such a bespoke deal just with the UK when the UK does not accept the CJEU preliminary ruling system. The EU may well say that the option for close partners of the EU in this field is the Lugano Convention. The UK Government has indicated that it would like to remain part of the Lugano Convention (see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 22). In doing so it would continue to mandate the UK courts to take account of the jurisprudence of the CJEU -when that court is interpreting Brussels Ia or the Lugano Convention – when UK courts are interpreting the Lugano Convention (see the opaque statement by the UK Government that “the UK and the EU will need to ensure future civil judicial cooperation takes into account regional legal arrangements, including the fact that the CJEU will remain the ultimate arbiter of EU law within the EU.” see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 20). However, unless the Lugano Convention is renegotiated it does not contain a good solution in relation to conflicts of jurisdiction for exclusive choice of court agreements because it has not been amended to reflect Article 31(2) of Brussels Ia and therefore still gives priority to the non-chosen court when it is seised first and the exclusively chosen court is seised second in accordance with the Gasser decision of the CJEU (see Case C-116/02 [2003] ECR I-14693). Renegotiation of the Lugano Convention is not even on the agenda at the moment although the Gasser problem may be discussed at the Experts’ Meeting pursuant to Article 5 Protocol 2 of the Lugano Convention on 16 and 17 October 2017 in Basel, Switzerland (Professor Beaumont is attending that meeting as an invited expert). Revision of the Lugano Convention would be a good thing, as would Norway and Switzerland becoming parties to the Hague Convention. It seems that at least until the Lugano Convention is revised and a means is found for the UK to be a party to it (difficult if the UK does not stay in EFTA), the likely outcome post-Brexit is that the regime applicable between the UK and the EU (apart from Denmark) in relation to exclusive choice of court agreements within the scope of the Hague Convention will be the Hague Convention. The UK will be able to grant anti-suit injunctions to uphold exclusive choice of court agreements in favour of the courts in the UK even when one of the parties has brought an action contrary to that agreement in an EU Member State. The EU Member States will apply Article 6 of the Hague Convention rather than Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation when deciding whether to decline jurisdiction in favour of the chosen court(s) in the UK.
Whilst the Hague Convention only offers a comprehensive jurisdictional regime for cases involving exclusive choice of court agreements, it does give substantial protection to the jurisdiction of UK courts designated in such an agreement which will be respected in the rest of the EU regardless of the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. Post-Brexit the recognition and enforcement regime for judgments not falling within the scope of the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention could be the new Hague Judgments Convention currently being negotiated in The Hague (see Working Paper No. 2016/3- Respecting Reverse Subsidiarity as an excellent strategy for the European Union at The Hague Conference on Private International Law – reflections in the context of the Judgments Project? by Paul Beaumont). Professor Beaumont will continue to be a part of the EU Negotiating team for that Convention at the Special Commission in the Hague from 13-17 November 2017. It is greatly to be welcomed that the UK Government has affirmed its commitment to an internationalist and not just a regional approach to civil judicial co-operation:
“The UK is committed to increasing international civil judicial cooperation with third parties through our active participation in the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law… We will continue to be an active and supportive member of these bodies, as we are clear on the value of international and intergovernmental cooperation in this area.” See Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 21.
One good thing that could come from Brexit is the powerful combination of the EU and the UK both adopting a truly internationalist perspective in the Hague Conference on Private International Law in order to genuinely enhance civil judicial co-operation throughout the world. The UK can be one of the leaders of the common law world while using its decades of experience of European co-operation to help build bridges to the civil law countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America.
On the Global Community of Private International Law – Impressions from Brazil
From August 3-5 this year, the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro hosted the 7th biennial conference of the Journal of Private International Law. Ably organized by Nadia de Araujo and Daniela Vargas from the host institution, together with Paul Beaumont from Aberdeen, the conference was a great success, as concerns both the quality and quantity of the presentations. Instead of a conference report, I want to provide some, undoubtedly subjective, impressions as concerns the emerging global community of private international law.
First, no less than 168 participants attended, from all over the world. The Journal conference has, by now, become something like a World Congress of Private International Law. This is no small achievement. The Journal of Private International Law started out in 2005 as a very doctrinal publication focusing primarily on common law systems and European private international law. Fittingly, the first two conferences took place in the UK. It was a very wise decision to move, after that, to cities in other countries—New York (2009), Milan (2011), Madrid (2013) and now, after a return to the UK (Cambridge) for the ten-year anniversary in 2015, Rio de Janeiro (2017). By now, it can be said that Journal and conference both really represent the world. And what is emerging is a global community that comes together at these and other events.
Second, this first Journal conference in Latin America was an excellent opportunity to showcase the tremendous developments of the discipline on this Continent. Latin America, the region that created the Código Bustamante, has long produced excellent scholars in private international law. However, for some time the discipline appeared, at least to the outside observer, marginalized, caught between a very doctrinal approach on the one side and a very philosophical one on the other, both often without connection to actual practice. In recent years, this has changed, for a number of reasons: the Hague Conference established a bureau, led by Ignacio Goicoechea; a young generation of scholars connects theory and practice, doctrine and interdisciplinarity; legislators are, at long last, replacing antiquated legislation. Many Latin American scholars and practitioners at the conference proved that interest and quality. But the best sign for the vitality of the field were the many excellent Brazilian students who followed the conference with enthusiasm and expertise.
Third, and finally, this emerging globalization captures all regions, but not to the same degree. The great importance of Latin America in Rio was no surprise. Nor was the great role that European private international law, a testament not only both to the European background of the journal and the more generous travel budgets in European universities, but also to the legislative and scholarly developments in Europe. Asia was somewhat less well represented, as far as I could see, despite exciting developments there (including current work on Asian Principles of Private International Law), but several presentations dealt with Asian development. The most palpable absence concerned the United States. There were only two participants from the US, fewer than there were Nigerians. In a not so distant past, US private international law was the avant-garde of the discipline worldwide. When the Second Restatement was being discussed, the whole world was watching what the conflicts revolution would yield. Now, a third Restatement is underway. But I heard no word about that from participants in Rio, and the Restatement’s reporters did not use the occasion to advertise their project. The United States is no longer leading the globalization of the field. Will it at least follow?
News
Call for papers: 2023 NGPIL Conflict of Laws’ Essay Prize
The Nigeria Group on Private International Law “(NGPIL”) invites submissions for the annual NGPIL Conflict of Laws’ Competition. The winner will be awarded for the best essay on any aspect of Nigerian conflict of laws. Entries will be accepted from the following: an undergraduate and/or postgraduate scholar studying in Nigeria, or any Nigerian lawyer five years call or below practising and residing in Nigeria. The essay should be unpublished at the time of submission. Submitted essays should be in the English language. Submitted essays should also be within five to eight thousand words. Competitors may be citizens of any nation, age or gender but must be an undergraduate and/or postgraduate scholar studying in Nigeria, or any lawyer below five years post-call experience practising and residing in Nigeria.
The first prize is ?120,000 Naira (NGN), and the winner of the competition will be encouraged to publish the paper in any high-quality peer reviewed journal on private international law (conflict of laws). The second prize is ?80,000 Naira (NGN), and third prize is ?50,000 Naira (NGN). The prize is sponsored by and will be awarded by NGPIL.
Submissions to the Prize Committee must be received no later than January 9, 2023. Entries should be submitted by email in Word or pdf format. The winner will be announced no later than 2 months after the deadline. Decisions of the NGPIL on the winning essay and on any conditions relating to this prize are final. Submissions and any queries should be addressed by email to ngpilaw@gmail.com. All submissions will be acknowledged by e-mail.
Second Issue of Journal of Private International Law for 2022
The second issue of Journal of Private International Law for 2022 was released today. It features the following interesting articles:
T Kruger et. al., Current-day international child abduction: does Brussels IIb live up to the challenges?
Regulation 2019/1111 tries to tackle the new challenges arising from societal changes and legal developments in international child abduction. The result is a sophisticated set of rules centred on the child and aimed at enhancing their protection. The Regulation provides for the hearing of the child and for speedy and efficient proceedings. In it the EU acknowledges its role in the protection of human and children’s rights and sets goals towards de-escalating family conflicts. The new EU child abduction regime is at the same time more flexible than its predecessor allowing consideration of the circumstances characterising each single case in the different stages of the child abduction procedure
O Vanin, Assisted suicide from the standpoint of EU private international law
The article discusses the conflict-of-laws issues raised by such compensatory claims as may be brought against health professionals and medical facilities involved in end-of-life procedures. The issues are addressed from the standpoint of EU private international law. The paper highlights the lack of international legal instruments on assisted-suicide procedures. It is argued that the European Convention on Human Rights requires that States provide a clear legal framework concerning those procedures. The author contends that the said obligation has an impact on the interpretation of the relevant conflict-of-laws provisions of the EU.
S Avraham-Giller, The court’s discretionary power to enforce valid jurisdiction clauses: time for a change?
The paper challenges the well-rooted principle in the Anglo-American legal tradition that courts have discretion whether they should enforce a valid jurisdiction clause. The paper highlights the ambiguity and uncertainty that accompany this discretionary power, which raises a serious analytical problem. The paper then analyses two factors that shaped this discretionary power – jurisdictional theories and the general principle of party autonomy in contracts. Based on the analysis, the paper argues that the time has come to end the courts’ discretionary power with respect to the limited context of the enforcement of valid jurisdiction clauses. The proposal relies on a number of foundations: contractual considerations that relate to autonomy and efficiency; jurisdictional and procedural considerations, including the consent of a party to the jurisdiction of the court by general appearance; the increasing power of parties to re-order procedure; the more appropriate expression of the forum’s public interests and institutional considerations through overriding mandatory provisions; and finally the legal position regarding arbitration agreements and the willingness of a common law legal system such as the United Kingdom to accede to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.
Many transnational corporations have been operating in Vietnam, contributing to economic and social development in this country. However, these actors have caused a number of high-profile environmental incidents in Vietnam through the activities of their local subsidiaries, injuring the local community and destroying the natural ecosystem. This paper discloses the causes of corporate environmental irresponsibility in Vietnam. Additionally, this paper argues that Vietnam’s private international law fails to combat pollution in this country. To promote environmental sustainability, Vietnam should improve ex-ante regulations to prevent and tackle ecological degradation effectively. Additionally, this paper suggests that Vietnam should remedy its national private international law rules to facilitate transnational liability litigation as an ex-post measure to address the harmful conducts against the natural ecosystem of international business.
The article revisits jurisdiction in the courts for the place of performance of a contract under Article 7(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. It proposes a new framework for understanding jurisdiction in contractual matters by offering a comparative and historical analysis of both the place of performance as a ground for jurisdiction and its conceptual counterpart, the place of performance as a connecting factor in conflict of laws. The analysis reveals that jurisdiction in the courts for the place of performance is largely a repetition of the same problematic patterns previously associated with the place of performance as a connecting factor. The article asserts that the persisting problems with Article 7(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation are due to the inadequacy of the place of performance as a ground for jurisdiction and advocates for the transition to the theory of characteristic performance in EU civil procedure.
The article discusses the enforcement of foreign judgments within the European Union and the public policy (ordre public) exception. It is mainly focused on some recent judgments of Polish and German courts. On 22nd December 2016 and 23rd of March 2021 rulings in cases of infringement of personality rights were issued by the Court of Appeal in Cracow (ordering an apology and correction). The enforcement of the former ruling was dismissed by the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) (IX ZB 10/18) on 19th July 2018. The non-enforcement was justified by invoking German ordre public and “freedom of opinion” as a constitutional right stipulated in Article 5 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). A reference to the CJEU ruling of 17 June 2021 is also presented.
After presenting the issue of ordre public in the context of enforcement of foreign judgments within the EU, the authors evaluate as questionable the argumentation of the BGH in its 2018 judgment. The Polish ruling ordering the defendant to correct and apologise for the false statement was included by the BGH in the category of “opinion” (Meinung) protected by the German Constitution. Enforcement of the judgment of the Polish court in Germany was held to be contrary to this German constitutional right and the enforceability of the Polish judgment was denied as being manifestly contrary to German public policy.
The authors support the functioning of the ordre public clause in intra-EU relations. It is justified inter alia by the large differences in EU legal systems and future possible changes. However, the common standards of the ECHR should be particularly taken into consideration when applying the public policy clause, because they co-shape the EU legal systems.
9th Journal of Private International Law Conference: Call for Papers
Building on the very successful conferences held in Aberdeen (2005), Birmingham (2007), New York (2009), Milan (2011), Madrid (2013), Cambridge (2015), Rio (2017) and Munich (2019), we are pleased to announce that the Journal of Private International Law will be holding its 9th Conference at the Singapore Management University from 3 to 5 August 2023.
We now invite abstracts for the conference. Please submit an abstract if you would like to make a presentation at the conference and you are willing to produce a final paper that you will submit for publication in the Journal. Abstracts should be up to 500 words in length and should clearly state the name(s) and affiliation(s) of the author(s).
They can be on any subject matter that falls within the scope of the Journal and can be offered by people at any stage of their career, including postgraduate students. Presentation at the conference will depend on whether your abstract is selected by the Editors of the Journal (Professor Jonathan Harris KC of King’s College, London and Professor Paul Beaumont FRSE of the University of Stirling) and the conference organiser (Associate Professor Adeline Chong, Singapore Management University). The subsequent article should be submitted to either of the editors of the Journal before the end of 2023. Publication in the Journal will be subject to the usual system of refereeing by two experts in the field.
There will be a mixture of plenary (Friday) and parallel panel sessions (Thursday afternoon and Saturday morning). Please indicate on the abstract whether you are willing to present in either or are only willing to do so in one or the other. A willingness to be flexible maximises our ability to select your paper.
The Conference will be held in the Yong Pung How School of Law, Singapore Management University. Please see here for up-to-date information on travel requirements to enter Singapore.
Speakers will not be expected to pay a conference fee but will be expected to pay their expenses in relation to their attendance at the conference in Singapore. Details about options for accommodation and the conference dinner on the Friday evening will be made available on the conference webpage . Please send your abstract to the following email address by Friday 16 December 2022: jpil2023@smu.edu.sg.