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Common law recognition of foreign declarations of parentage

This note addresses the question whether there is a common law basis for the recognition of foreign declarations of parentage. It appears that this issue has not received much attention in common law jurisdictions, but it was the subject of a relatively recent Privy Council decision (C v C [2019] UKPC 40).

The issue arises where a foreign court or judicial authority has previously determined that a person is, or is not, a child’s parent, and the question of parentage then resurfaces in the forum (for example, in the context of parentage proceedings or maintenance proceedings). If there is no basis for recognition of the foreign declaration, the forum court will have to consider the issue de novo (usually by applying the law of the forum: see, eg, Status of Children Act 1969 (NZ)). This would increase the risk of “limping” parent-child relationships (that is, relationships that are recognised in some countries but not in others) – a risk that is especially problematic in the context of children born by way of surrogacy or assisted human reproduction technology.

The following example illustrates the problem. A baby is born in a surrogacy-friendly country to a surrogate mother domiciled and resident in that country, as the result of a surrogacy arrangement entered into with intending parents who are habitually resident in New Zealand. The courts of the foreign country declare that the intending parents are the legal parents of the child. Under New Zealand law, however, the surrogacy arrangement would have no legal effect, and the surrogate mother and her partner would be treated as the child’s legal parents upon the child’s birth. Unless the foreign judgment is capable of recognition in New Zealand, the only way for the intending parents to become the child’s legal parents in New Zealand is to apply for adoption (see, eg, Re Cobain [2015] NZFC 4072, Re Clifford [2016] NZFC 1666, Re Henwood [2015] NZFC 1541, Re Reynard [2014] NZFC 7652, Re Kennedy [2014] NZFLR 367, Re W [2019] NZFC 2482, Re C [2019] NZFC 1629).

So what is the relevance of a foreign declaration on parentage in common law courts? In C v C [2019] UKPC 40, [2019] WLR(D) 622, the Privy Council decided that there was a basis in the common law for recognising such declarations, pursuant to the so-called Travers v Holley principle. This principle, which has traditionally been applied in the context of divorce and adoption, calls for recognition of foreign judgments on the basis of “jurisdictional reciprocity” (at [44]). The Privy Council applied the principle to recognise a declaration of parentage made in Latvia, in relation to a child domiciled and habitually resident in Latvia, for the purposes of maintenance proceedings in the forum court of Jersey. Lord Wilson emphasised that, although foreign judgments may, in some cases, be refused on grounds of public policy, recognition will not be refused lightly: “a court’s recognition of a foreign order under private international law does not depend on any arrogant attempt on that court’s part to mark the foreign court’s homework” (at [58]).

As a matter of policy, my first impression is that the Privy Council’s decision is to be welcomed. Common law jurisdictions have traditionally taken a conservative, relatively “closed” approach to the recognition of foreign laws and judgments on parentage (see Hague Conference on Private International Law A Study of Legal Parentage and the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements (Prelim Doc No 3C, 2014)). Such an approach has become increasingly indefensible in a world that is witnessing unprecedented levels of cross-border mobility and migration. The conflict of laws should, as a matter of priority, avoid limping parent-child relationships: for example, a child who was declared by the courts of their place of birth to be the child of the intending parents, but who is nevertheless treated as the surrogate mother’s child under New Zealand law. The ability to recognise foreign judgments on parentage may not amount to much progress, given that it can apply only where the foreign court has, in fact, made a declaration of parentage: it would have no application where the relevant parent-child relationship simply arises by operation of law or through an administrative act (such as entry of the intending parents in the birth register). There is no doubt that an international solution must be found to the problem as a whole. But it is surely better than nothing.

Another question is what to make of the Privy Council’s reliance on the Travers v Holley principle. Based on the decision in Travers v Holley [1953] P 246 (CA), the principle enables recognition of foreign judgments by virtue of reciprocity: the forum court will recognise a foreign judgment if the forum court itself would have had jurisdiction to grant the judgment had the facts been reversed (ie had the forum court been faced with the equivalent situation as the foreign court). In the context of divorce, the principle has since been subsumed within a wider principle of “real and substantial connection” (Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 AC 33 (HL)). In the context of adoption, the principle has been applied to recognise “the status of adoption duly constituted … in another country in similar circumstances as we claim for ourselves” (Re Valentine’s Settlement [1965] Ch 831 (CA) at 842).

Perhaps it is not a big step from adoption to parentage more generally. The Privy Council recognised that the latter primarily represents “a conclusion of biological fact”, while adoption “stamps a person with a changed legal effect” (at [39]). But the Privy Council did not seem to consider that this distinction should warrant a different approach in principle. In C v C, the issue of parentage involved a relatively straightforward question of paternity. Had the case involved a question of surrogacy or human assisted reproduction, the answer might well have been different. There is an argument that a parent-child relationship created under foreign law can only be recognised in the forum if the foreign law is substantially similar to forum law. Thus, in the context of adoption, it has been asked whether the concept of adoption in the foreign country “substantially conform[s] to the English concept” (Re T & M (Adoption) [2010] EWHC 964, [2011] 1 FLR 1487 at [13]). This requirement might not be made out where, for example, the law of the forum does not recognise parentage by way of surrogacy (as is the case in New Zealand).

The Privy Council cautioned that the Board did not receive full argument on the issue and that the reader “must bear the lack of it in mind” (at [34]). It seems especially important, then, for conflict of laws scholars to give the issue further consideration. This note may serve as a careful first step – I would be interested to hear other views. Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the Board’s reasoning, in my mind, is its openness to recognition. The Board’s starting point was that the declaration could be recognised. Arguably, this was because counsel seemed to have largely conceded the point. But to the extent that it cuts through an assumption that questions of parentage are generally left to the law of the forum, it nevertheless strikes me as significant – even more so since the UK Supreme Court’s previous refusal to extend the Travers v Holley principle beyond the sphere of family law (Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2012] 3 WLR 1019 at [110], [127]).

Recognition in the UK of a marriage celebrated in Somaliland

Can a foreign marriage be recognised in the UK if the State where it was celebrated is not recognised as a State? This was the question which the High Court of Justice (Family Division) had to answer in MM v NA: [2020] EWHC 93 (Fam).

The Court distilled two questions: was the marriage validly celebrated and if so, can it be recognised in the UK? If the answers to both questions were affirmative, the court could give a declaratory order; if one of them were negative, the parties could celebrate a new marriage in the UK.

In assessing the first question, the court considered issues of formal and essential validity. It took account of the various systems of law in Somaliland: formal law (including the Somali civil code, which is still in force in Somaliland on the basis of its continuation under the Somaliland constitution), customary law and Islamic law. In matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance, the latter applies. On the basis of the facts, the Court came to the conclusion that the parties were validly married according to the law of Somaliland.

Although this would normaly be the end of the matter, the Court had to consider what to do with a valid marriage emanating from a State not recognised by the UK (the second question). The Court referred to the one-voice principle, implying that the judiciary cannot recognise acts by a State while the executive branch of the UK refuses to recognise the State. It then considered exceptions and referred to cases concerning the post-civil war US, post-World War II Eastern Germany, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Ciskei (one of the ‘States’ created by Apartheid-era South Africa), and Southern Rhodesia.

It also referred to the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 on the continued presence of South Africa in Namiba, particularly its §125, which states:

“while official acts performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory.”

The Court found that an exception to the one-voice doctrine is acceptable in matters of private rights. The Court also explained that it had conferred with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK Government, who would not object to the recognition of a Somaliland marriage even though that State is not recognised.

It thus gave the declaration of recognition of the marriage.

(Thanks to Prakash Shah for the tip.)

Brexit & Lugano

Written by Jonathan Fitchen

The UK’s intention to attempt to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention is apparently proceeding apace. Though the events leading up to Friday 31st January, when the UK left the EU,  rather overshadowed this fact, the UK Government had already announced that its intention to accede by a posting on 28th January 2020 that may be found here https://www.gov.uk/government/news/support-for-the-uks-intent-to-accede-to-the-lugano-convention-2007   As will be remembered, the 2007 Lugano Convention is open to non-EU third States if the consent of all the existing Convention parties can be first secured. The UK Gov posting records that the UK has secured statements in support of it joining the 2007 Convention from the Swiss, the Norwegians and Iceland. So now all that is required is to secure the consent of the EU to this course of action. Assuming that such consent can be secured, the UK Gov posting records that it is the intention of the UK Government to accede to the 2007 Convention at the end of the transition period (currently scheduled / assumed for 23.00 GMT on 31st December 2020).

News

ARBITRATION: International Commercial – Domestic – Investment

The author is Dr. Faidon Varesis, Attorney at Law

Teaching Fellow, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

PhD (University of Cambridge); MJur (University of Oxford); LLM, LLB (University of Athens).

In an era where the resolution of disputes is increasingly moving away from traditional court systems towards alternative methods, the comprehensive collective work in Greek with Professor Charalampos (Haris) P. Pamboukis as editor emerges as both a timely and seminal contribution to the field of arbitration, both nationally within Greece and on an international scale. This book review seeks to delve into the multifaceted contributions of the book, examining its scope, its pioneering contributors, its evolution within Greek law, and its broader implications for dispute resolution globally.

The book begins by exploring the flourishing landscape of arbitration across various domains such as commercial, investment, construction, maritime, and energy disputes, alongside other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods. The interest in these mechanisms reflects a societal shift towards less adversarial, more cosmopolitan forms of dispute resolution, aimed at alleviating the burdens on state judiciary systems characterized by procedural rigidity and often excessive delays. The prologue set the stage by discussing the significant legislative and jurisprudential developments in domestic and international arbitration within Greece, highlighting the transformative impact of laws passed from 1999 through to the latest reforms in 2023. Such legislative milestones not only signify Greece’s evolving arbitration framework but also illustrate the dynamic interplay between law, scholarly research, and practical application in shaping effective dispute resolution practices. Furthermore, the book weaves through the theoretical underpinnings and the practical aspects of arbitration agreements, the composition of arbitral tribunals, and the procedural norms governing arbitration proceedings, offering a holistic view of the arbitration landscape.

Central to the book’s discourse is the collaborative effort of esteemed scholars, academics, and practitioners who contribute their insights across various themes. This collective approach not only enriches the book’s content with a diversity of perspectives but also underscores the collaborative spirit within the arbitration community. The inclusion of introductory developments on increasingly significant areas such as investment arbitration and mediation, alongside a critical overview of international arbitration consent and the arbitral process, reflects a comprehensive and forward-looking examination of the field.

The book does not shy away from discussing the inherent challenges within arbitration and the diverse methodological approaches adopted by different contributors. However, these aspects are presented as enriching the scientific pluralism and intellectual rigor of the work rather than detracting from its cohesion.

In addition to its substantive chapters, the book is augmented with appendices that include key legislative and regulatory texts relevant to arbitration and mediation. This practical inclusion underlines the book’s aim to serve as a useful tool for both practitioners and scholars.

In conclusion, this collective work stands as a testament to the evolving and vibrant field of arbitration within Greece and its broader implications on the international stage. It encapsulates the intellectual legacy, the legislative advancements, and the practical insights of a diverse group of contributors, offering a comprehensive resource for understanding and navigating the complexities of arbitration. As such, it represents an invaluable contribution to the legal scholarship and practice of arbitration, both within Greece and beyond, fostering a deeper appreciation for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the pursuit of justice and societal harmony.

CCTL Cross-Border Legal Issues Dialogue Seminar Series – ‘Parallel Proceedings between International Commercial Litigation and Arbitration’ by Dr. Guangjian Tu (Recording Released)

Parallel proceedings in international commercial litigation between the courts of different countries have long been discussed and explored, for which the Brussels I Regulation in the EU provides a good model for solution although it is still a problem at the global level and an obstacle for the Hague Jurisdiction Project.

However, it seems that so far no enough attention has been paid to the problem of parallel proceedings between international commercial litigation and arbitration. Theoretically, parties’ consent to arbitration will exclude the jurisdiction of states’ courts by virtue of the rules set out in Article 2 of the New York Convention altogether. But the Convention fails to successfully eradicate parallel proceedings between arbitral tribunals and state courts, owing to its inherent defects. When a conflict arises between international commercial arbitration and litigation proceedings, a rational balance must be struck between the judiciary and the arbitral tribunal with a reasonable division of competence between the two bodies. Different from parallel proceedings between two courts of different countries where usually both have jurisdiction and the question is only who should decide first, the jurisdiction of a national court and that of an arbitral tribunal excludes each other; similar to them, the problems with the former will also happen to the latter. Shall one always give “priority” to the arbitral tribunal to decide i.e. the issue of validity of the arbitration agreement for the purpose of respecting the doctrine of competence/competence? Can a simple lis pendens rule like that under the Brussels I Regulation work i.e. a national court or arbitral tribunal whoever is seized earlier shall decide when the issue of the validity of arbitration agreement is raised as a preliminary question in the national court? This presentation will try to explore an ideal model for the solution to this problem.

The recording can be found here. Read more

Hague Conventions on International Civil Procedure – a Pathway to Adoption in New Zealand (Seminar)

This Friday (12 April) at 3 pm (NZST), Jack Wass and Maria Hook will be giving a seminar at the University of Otago (New Zealand) on their project “Hague Conventions on International Civil Procedure – Pathway to Adoption”. This project, which is funded by the Borrin Foundation, explores a pathway for New Zealand to adopt four key treaties on international civil procedure developed by the Hague Conference on Private International Law – the Service Convention 1965, the Evidence Convention 1970, the Choice of Court Convention 2005, and the Judgments Convention 2019. The purpose of the project is to try and dislodge the inertia within the executive that has resulted in consideration of these Conventions stalling, by producing a briefing paper and draft legislation for the implementation of the treaties. The seminar will focus on the proposed pathway for adoption of the Conventions and discuss its potential effectiveness in encouraging New Zealand’s participation in international treaties.

There is a Zoom link available for anyone who would like to attend the seminar but is unable to do so in person. Please contact me if you would like to attend.

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