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Enforcing Foreign Judgments in Egypt: A Critical Examination of Two Recent Egyptian Supreme Court Cases
I. Introduction
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the MENA region can sometimes be challenging, as it often involves navigating complex legal frameworks (domestic law v. conventions). In addition, case law in this field has encountered difficulties in articulating the applicable guiding principles and is sometimes ambiguous, inconsistent, or even contradictory. Two recent decisions rendered by the Egyptian Supreme Court highlight this issue, alhoutgh – it must be admitted – the Court did provide some welcome clarifications. In any event, the cases reported here highlight some key issues in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment and offer valuable insights into the evolving landscape of this area of law in Egypt.
Toothless vs. Shark-Teeth: How Anti-Suit Injunctions and Anti-Anti-Suit Orders Collide in the UniCredit Saga
by Faidon Varesis, University of Cambridge
Background
The dispute in the UniCredit v. RusChem saga arose from bonds issued by UniCredit to guarantee performance under contracts for Russian construction projects, where RusChem, after terminating the contracts due to EU sanctions, initiated Russian proceedings for payment in breach of an English-law governed arbitration agreement that mandates resolution in Paris under ICC rules.
UniCredit sought an anti-suit injunction in the UK to stop these Russian proceedings, arguing that the arbitration clause must be enforced under English law. Teare J at first instance held that the English court lacked jurisdiction—finding that the arbitration agreements were governed by French substantive rules and that England was not the appropriate forum—whereas the Court of Appeal reversed this decision by granting a final anti-suit injunction requiring RCA to terminate its Russian proceedings.
CJEU in Albausy on (in)admissibility of questions for a preliminary ruling under Succession Regulation
In a recent ruling, the CJEU adds another layer to the ongoing discussion on which national authorities can submit questions for preliminary rulings under the Succession Regulation, and its nuanced interpretation of what constitutes a ‘court.’
Albausy (Case C-187/23, ECLI:EU:C:2025:34, January 25, 2025) evolves around the question of competence to submit a request for preliminary ruling under the Succession Regulation (Regulation 650/2012 on matters of succession and the creation of a European Certificate of Succession).
Although the CJEU finds that the request in that case is inadmissible, the decision is noteworthy because it confirms the system of the Succession Regulation. Within the regulation, the competence to submit questions for preliminary ruling is reserved for national courts that act as judicial bodies and are seized with a claim over which they have jurisdiction based on Succession Regulation’s rules on jurisdiction.
The opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona is available here.
News
New Canadian Conflicts Text
The Irwin Law “Essentials Series” is a collection of texts about Canadian law aimed at a broad audience: it includes law students and also lawyers, judges and academics. It has been quite successful over the past twenty years. In 2024 Irwin Law was acquired by University of Toronto Press. It has continued the Essentials Series and the use of the Irwin Law imprint.
It has now published the third edition of Conflict of Laws written by Professor Stephen G.A. Pitel of Western University, Canada. The second edition was published in 2016 and so this edition updates almost a decade of activity, mainly from courts across Canada. The major change is that the chapter on declining jurisdiction has been reorganized and updated in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Douez v Facebook, Inc (2017) and Haaretz.com v Goldhar (2018). All chapters have been updated to reflect new decisions, legislative changes and recent scholarship.
More information is available here. For those outside Canada, the book is a clear and accessible source of comparative conflict of laws analysis.
English and EU Perspectives on Hague 2019: Hybrid Seminar at UCL Laws
Ugljesa Grusic (UCL) has kindly shared the following invitation with us.
On 24 March 2025, at 6pm UK time, Marta Pertegás (Maastricht University; University of Antwerp; a fulltime member of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law between 2008 and 2017) and Alex Mills (UCL; a Specialist Editor of Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, with particular responsibility for, inter alia, the rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments) will give a seminar on The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention – English and EU Perspectives at the Faculty of Laws, University College London. The event will be delivered in a hybrid format and the readers of the blog are welcome to join either in person or on line.
The seminar is part of the International Law Association (British Branch) Lecture Series and will be chaired by Ugljesa Grusic.
On 1 July 2025, the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters will enter into force in England and Wales. This historic regime establishes a general treaty basis for the recognition and enforcement of civil judgments between Convention States, supplementing the existing national rules and the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005. Perhaps most significantly, it will provide common rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments from England and Wales in EU Member States, and conversely, for EU Member State judgments to be recognised and enforced in England and Wales, to some extent filling a ‘gap’ created by Brexit.
This seminar will address the significance of this development from both an English and EU perspective, examining the main features of the 2019 Convention and considering the opportunities and challenges it presents.
To register, please follow this link.
U.S. District Court’s Order in the Venezuelan Deportees Case Was Not Extraterritorial
The following post was kindly provided by Hannah Buxbaum, Vice President for International Affairs, Professor of Law and John E. Schiller Chair, Indiana University, and is cross-posted on tlblog.org
As was widely reported yesterday, the Trump administration permitted two planes carrying Venezuelan deportees to continue on their way to El Salvador after receiving a judicial order to turn the flights back to the United States. A story in Axios quotes an administration official who explains that they were not in fact “actively defying” the judge—the order just came too late, since the planes were already out of U.S. airspace. This seems to be an extraterritoriality argument, suggesting that the judge lacks authority to order an action to take place outside U.S. borders.
The administration has this completely wrong. The judge is ordering the administration to take action inside the United States—that is, to instruct the planes to turn around. That instruction will in turn cause something to happen elsewhere (the pilots will change course), but that doesn’t make the order impermissibly extraterritorial. This is exactly the same the basis on which courts in garden-variety civil disputes order parties subject to their jurisdiction to procure evidence or turn over assets that are located abroad. Moreover, since the planes were reportedly over international waters at the time the order was entered, compliance would not have required any actions by a foreign actor or within the territory of another state—in other words, it wouldn’t have created a conflict of laws.
Now that the deportees are already in El Salvador, that picture is more complicated, since local authorities there might refuse to take action. Even the existence of such a conflict, though, doesn’t mean that Judge Boasberg’s order exceeds his authority. It remains to be seen whether any of the other justifications the White House offered up for ignoring that order are any more compelling, but the argument that it didn’t apply once the planes had left the United States is certainly not.
For further leading expert input on extraterritoriality see one of our previous posts here.