Save the date: IC2BE final Conference 21 and 22 November 2019, Antwerp

The final conference for the EU-funded IC2BE project will take place in Antwerp on 21 and 22 November 2019.

This project is the follow-up of the EUPILLAR project, which was concluded in 2016.

IC2BE investigates in eight Member States the application of the European Private International Law Instruments of the second generation, i.e. the unified procedures for cross-border enforcement. The discussed regulations include the European Enforcement Order (805/2004), European Payment Order (1896/2006), the European Small Claims Procedure (861/2007) and Account Preservation Order (655/2014).

The research is coordinated by the University of Freiburg and carried out by a consortium consisting of the Max-Planck-Institute Luxembourg and the Universities of Antwerp, Madrid (Complutense), Milan, Rotterdam and Wroclaw. The investigated Member States are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. The case law of the Court of Justice of the EU is also analysed.

The research method combined setting up a database of case law and interviews with lawyers, judges, businesses and consumer organisations. The case law database  (not yet complete) is available here.

The conference will discuss the specific problems that these procedures raise and look into the perspectives for a more coherent European system of cross-border enforcement. Speakers will include the project researchers, distinguished academics, policy makers and stakeholders such as judges, lawyers, businesses and consumer organisations. Confirmed speakers include Paul Beaumont, Gilles Cuniberti, Burkhard Hess, Xandra Kramer and Jan von Hein.

More information, including the draft programme is available here. Registration will be possible on this page soon, but please save the date in the mean time!

UK Supreme Court decision in Vedanta: Finding a proper balance between Brussels I and the English common law rules of jurisdiction

Written by Ekaterina Aristova, PhD in Law Candidate at the University of Cambridge. She is currently working towards preparing for submission her thesis on the tort litigation against English-domiciled parent companies and their foreign subsidiaries for the human rights violations arising in the subsidiaries’ operations.

On 10 April 2019, the UK Supreme Court passed its long awaited decision in Vedanta v Lungowe confirming that Zambian citizens, who have suffered from the environmental pollution caused by mining operations in Zambia, can pursue in England claims against Vedanta Resources Plc, an English-domiciled parent company, and Konokola Copper Mines plc, its foreign subsidiary and the owner of the mine (“Vedanta” and “KCM”). The decision, which has been an object of intense interest in the last weeks, sets important guidelines on the appropriate jurisdictional limits of pursuing claims against English-based transnational corporations (“TNCs”) in the English courts and the substantive standards of parent company liability. In 2015, Zambian villagers commenced proceedings in the English courts against Vedantaand KCM alleging personal injury, damage to property, loss of income, and loss of amenity and enjoyment of landcaused by the toxic emissions from a mine operated by KCM in Zambia. The jurisdiction of the English courts was obtained by virtue of Article 4 of the Brussels I Regulation recast (“Brussels I”). KCM – the owner and operator of the mine – was brought in the English courts under the ‘necessary or proper’ party gateway. In 2016, the High Court allowed claims against both companies to be heard in England (see author’s previous blog for further details). The Court of Appeal later has entirely upheld a High Court ruling (also analysed by the author). The Supreme Court has also confirmed jurisdiction of the English courts to try the case on the merits arguing that claimants will not obtain substantial justice in Zambia. The judgement addressed four principal issues which are summarised below.

Abuse of EU law

Corporate defendants argued that claimants’ attempt to litigate the case in Englandamountsto an abuse of EU law since they have brought ill-founded claims before the English courts against English-domiciled parent company as a local defendant solely for the purposes of joining a foreign-domiciled subsidiary as a co-defendant. So far, an abuse of EU law argument in the context of Brussels I has been only made in relation to Article 8(1) of Brussels I (former Article 6(1)), which permits the joining of connected claims against persons domiciled in different Member States in one jurisdiction to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. Uncertainty remained, however, over whether the exercise of mandatory jurisdiction under Article 4 of Brussels I could ever be challenged on the grounds that it amounts to an abuse of EU law. The Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility of using the abuse of EU law principle in cases, where Article 4 is used as a means of circumventing or misusing another EU principle or (as was the case in Vedanta) the English common law rules of jurisdiction over foreign defendants. The narrow scope of an abuse of EU law test was also confirmed. In particular, the Supreme Court relied on the factual findings made by the lower courts that (i) the claimants established that there was a real issue to be tried against Vedanta; and (ii) the claimants had a genuine desire to obtain a judgment for damages against Vedanta and not merely KCM. Consequently, the abuse of EU law issue was resolved in favour of the claimants.

Parent company’s duty of care

The Supreme Court has also made several important findings on the scope of the duty of care of the English-domiciled parent companies in relation to the operation of its foreign subsidiaries. First, it was unequivocally held that intervention of the English-domiciled parent companies in the management of the subsidiaries’ operations and their human rights and environmental performance may give rise to a duty of care to third parties, such as local communities. Second, tort litigation against legal entities of TNCs does not involve assertion of a new category of common law negligence liability or amount to novel disputes (as was argued by the corporate defendants). Third, the Supreme Court refused to stick all the cases of parent company liability into specific categories based on the fact that organisational and management structures of corporate groups vary significantly. Fourth, issuance by the parent company of the group-wide policies may give rise to a duty of care, if the parent company takes active steps to their implementation in the subsidiaries’ operations by training, supervision and enforcement. Finally, the Supreme Court claimed that omissions to supervise subsidiaries’ operations contrary to the public statements made by the parent company may also lead to the breach of duty of care.

England as a proper forum

The Supreme Court was also faced with the necessity to identify whether England was a proper forum for litigating the case. This question forms part of the forum conveniensinquiry for exercising discretion to permit service on a foreign subsidiary as a necessary or proper party. Both the High Court and the Court of Appealconcluded that the existence of an arguable claim against Vedanta made England the most appropriate place for trying the claims against KCM. The courts’ reasoning was grounded on the desire to avoid parallel proceedings on similar facts in two jurisdictions. The Supreme Court has, however, took a different view and argued that the purpose of avoiding irreconcilable judgements should be balanced against other connecting factors which link the case with the foreign forum. The Supreme Court further held that – in light of Vedanta’s consent to submit to the jurisdiction of the Zambian courts – the claimants have a choice of whether or not to sue Vedanta in England at the risk of irreconcilable judgments. In other words, the risk of irreconcilable judgments ceases to be a “trump card” and decisive factor in determining the appropriateness of the forum. Overall, Zambia was identified as the proper forum for pursuing claims against both co-defendants on the basis of several factors (the alleged acts and omissions primarily occurred in Zambia; the claimants are Zambian citizens; the mine is located and operated in Zambia; the damages were sustained by the claimants in Zambia; the majority of the witnesses and the evidence are likely to be based in Zambia, etc).

Access to justice considerations

Even though the Supreme courtconcludedthat the natural forum for the dispute was not England, that wasnot the end of the matter. Under the second limb of forum conveniens test, the English courts consider if they should nevertheless exercise jurisdiction in cases when the claimants would be denied justice in the foreign forum. There is no exhaustive list of factors that can be taken into account in this analysis. In Vedanta, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there is a real risk that substantial justice will be unobtainable in Zambia based on two principal grounds. First, securing funding for pursuing proceedings in Zambia was a serious problem for the rural villagers. Second, the “unavoidable” complexity of the case means that it would be litigated in Zambia on a simpler and more economical scale than in England. As a result, the Supreme Court allowed claims against both defendants to be tried in England on the substantial justice issue.

Practical implications of the Supreme Court decision

The ruling of the Supreme Court in Vedanta has been already called thethe most important judicial decision in the field of business and human rights since the jurisdictional ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum in 2013”. Indeed, it will undoubtedly have several important implications in litigating cases on the human rights performance of TNCs. First, the Supreme Court’s unequivocal acknowledgement of the existence of duty of care by the parent companies is an important step towards enhancing corporate accountability for human rights violations. Although there are concerns as to whether the ruling will be a disincentive for parent companies to get actively involved in the supervision of the subsidiaries’ operations, the risk of liability for the English-based multinationals is topical more than ever and will (hopefully) result in the concrete steps by businesses and their lawyers in identifying the risks of human rights violations in their foreign operations. Second, allowing claims against Vedanta and KCM to be heard in England is a promising move towards increasing access to justice for the underprivileged claimants coming from the jurisdictions with weak governance. In light of the most recent study on access to legal remedies for victims of business-related human rights abuses conducted for the European Parliament, it is pivotal to ensure that home state courts continue to remain an available forum for commencing proceedings in relation to the worldwide operations of the TNCs.

The Supreme Court’s approach to the identification of the proper forum, however, raises reasonable concerns about the future of litigating negligence claims against English-domiciled parent companies in the English courts. Until recently,claimants from the host states have relied heavily on the mandatory nature of Article 4 of Brussels I to bring claims against English-based parent companies as anchor defendants so as to allow the joinder of a foreign subsidiary under common law. The policy of avoiding parallel proceedings in both states resulting in duplication of cost and the risk of inconsistent judgments hadmore force in the jurisdictional analysis than the existence of any territorial connections between England and claims against the foreign subsidiary. It washighly unlikely that a claim against the foreign subsidiary will be stayed on forum conveniensgrounds if the courts have already decided that there is an arguable claim against an English-domiciled parent company and the foreign subsidiary is a necessary or proper party to the English proceedings. In effect, thejurisdiction over an arguable claim against the parent company also resolved the issue of jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiary. Following, the Supreme Court decision this practice will change and the English courts will look at the balance of connecting factors to decide where the proper forum for litigating claims against the foreign subsidiary is. Overall, the rules of jurisdictional will remain a hurdle for the claimants seeking recourse in the English courts and the outcome of the jurisdictional inquiry will now depend on whether or not the access to justice is available in the host states.

 

Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 3/2019: Abstracts

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:

R. Wagner: Twenty Years of Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters

With the Treaty of Amsterdam entering into force on 1 May 1999 the European Union has obtained the legislative competence concerning the judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters. This event’s 20th anniversary gives ample reason to pause for a moment to briefly appreciate the achievements and to look ahead. This article follows the contribution of the author in this journal in regard to the 15th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (IPRax 2014, 217).

E. Jayme/C.F. Nordmeier: The Freedom to Make a Will as a European Human Right? – Critical Considerations on the West Thrace Decision of the European Court of Human Rights

The article critically examines the decision of the ECHR of 19 December 2018, Molla Sali v. Greece, which deals with the special legal regime applicable to Muslims in West Thrace, a region in northern Greek. The Court considers Art. 14 ECHR in conjunction with Art. 1 of the Additional Protocol No. 1 to be violated if the will of a Muslim testator of this region, drawn up according to Greek state law, is measured against religious law. The authors are of the opinion that a human rights-protected election to state law is not permissible for individual areas of law or single legal questions. It opens up an arbitrary mixture of state and religious law, which can lead to inconsistent overall results. This is particularly the case when legal positions of third parties are affected. In addition, overarching political aspects of the protection of minorities, especially in Western Thrace, are not sufficiently taken into account in the decision.

J. Schulte: A Wii bit illegal? International jurisdiction and applicable law for the infringement of a Community Design by several tortfeasors (ECJ C-24, 25/16 – Nintendo)

On 27 September 2017 the European Court of Justice decided on the international jurisdiction and applicable law with regards to the infringement of a unitary Community intellectual property right, when Nintendo Inc. sued a mother and a daughter company for replicating, advertising and selling Wii console accessories. The Court’s judgement clarifies many important issues ranging from the member state courts’ scope of competence in case of several defendants, to the difficult relationship between Rome II’s conflict of law rules and the ones in the regulations on Community intellectual property rights as well as to the applicable law for infringing acts via the internet. Most notably, the ruling establishes a central act theory in case of multiple places of acts of infringements in the sense of Art. 8(2) Rome II.

P. Mankowski: Choice of law clauses in the Standard Terms and Conditions of airlines

Choice of law clauses in the Standard Terms and Conditions of airlines are commonplace in international air travel. Art. 5 (2) subpara. 2 Rome I Regulation “limits” freedom of choice in passenger contracts. Yet the CJEU’s Amazon judgment has raised questions whether choice of law clause in Standard Terms and Conditions might also be challenged under the aegis of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.

B. Heiderhoff: Jurisdiction based on Art. 12 (3) Brussels IIbis and its consequences

The Saponaro judgment concerns the judicial authorisation for a renouncement of succession by the parents of a minor heir whose habitual residence is not within the state of the succession proceedings. The Court confirmed that this issue falls within the scope of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and gave details on the prerequisites of jurisdiction under Art. 12 (3) Brussels IIbis Regulation. In particular, the ECJ needed to clarify the meaning of the requirement of having been “accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal manner by all the parties”. As Greek law, in order to secure the rights of the child, provides that a prosecutor is a party to the proceedings, the ECJ held that the acceptance of the prosecutor is necessary. The Court does not, however, even mention the necessity of the agreement of the child, an omission which must be criticised. This contribution additionally raises the question of the applicable law. Here, we see a number of difficulties. Firstly, the prorogated jurisdiction under Art. 12 (3) Brussels IIbis Regulation poses problems for the synchronous operation of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and the 1996 Hague Convention. Secondly, the approval procedure is a constellation where the distinction between protective measures (under Article 15 of the 1996 Convention) and the exercise of parental responsibility (under Article 17 of the 1996 Convention) becomes necessary. Thirdly, the strong interlinkage between the substantive law of parental responsibility and the procedural measures to protect the child make it very complicated to combine the approaches that the different legal systems take. All in all, it generally seems easier to institute the judicial authorisation in the state of the child’s habitual residence.

U.P. Gruber: The habitual residence of infants and small children

The ECJ has stressed in several decisions that for the purpose of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003, a child’s place of “habitual residence” has to be established by considering all the circumstances specific to each individual case. However, in a new case, the ECJ has opted for a more conclusive weighing of selected criteria. The ECJ based its assessment on the fact that the child was permanently resident in Belgium. Furthermore, the ECJ pointed to the fact that the mother, who – in practice – had custody of the child, and also the father, with whom the child also had regular contract, both lived in Belgium. Other circumstances were expressly deemed to be “not decisive”, especially the stays of mother and child in Poland in the context of leave periods or holidays, the mother’s cultural ties to Poland and her intention of settling in Poland in the future. In summary, it can be said that for a rather typical fact pattern, the ECJ has given valuable guidance as to where the habitual residence of children is located.

U.P. Gruber/L. Möller: The admissibility of a custody order after the return of the child under the Hague Abduction Convention

The Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction seeks to provide a rapid procedure for the return of the child to the country of the child’s former residence. Pursuant to Art. 16 of the Convention, a court in the state of refuge is not permitted to decide on the merits of any custody issue until it has been decided that there exists a reason for not ordering the return of the child, or the application for the return of the child is not lodged within a reasonable time. This provision is based on the assumption that a procedure dealing with custody issues in the state of refuge might delay or otherwise impair the procedure on the return of the child in that state. The OLG Bremen had to decide whether Art. 16 of the Convention was still applicable when the conclusive order to return the child had already been carried out, i.e. the child had been given back to the holder of the right of custody and had returned to its state of residence prior to its removal. The court concluded that in this situation the prohibition in Art. 16 of the Convention had ceased and that therefore German courts could decide on the rights of custody. The decision is correct: When the status quo ante has been fully restored, the objectives of the Convention have been reached; therefore, there is no more need to protect the procedure on the return of the child against influences of parallel proceedings on custody issues. Subsequently, the court also assumed jurisdiction as, under German law, jurisdiction can be based solely on the German nationality of the child. At closer look, the case illustrates that German jurisdictional rules are not well-suited for child abduction cases and there is need for reform.

K. Siehr: International jurisdiction of German courts to take measures in order to enforce the right of access of the mother to meet her children living abroad

A German couple had two sons. The couple divorced and the father got custody for the two children and moved with them to Beijing/China. The Magistrate Court of Bremen (Amtsgericht Bremen) awarded to the mother, still living in Germany, rights of access to the children and obliged the father to cooperate and send the children from Beijing to Germany in order to visit their mother. The father did not cooperate and did not send the children to Germany. The Magistrate Court of Bremen fixed a monetary penalty (Ordnungsgeld) of e 1000,00 in order to sanction the father’s misbehavior. The father lodged an appeal against this decision and the Court of Appeal of Bremen (Oberlandesgericht Bremen) vacated the decision of the Magistrate Court because of lack of international jurisdiction. The Federal Court for Civil and Criminal Matters (Bundesgerichtshof) corrected the Court of Appeal of Bremen and upheld the order for monetary penalty awarded by the Magistrate Court of Bremen. German courts are allowed to sanction their decision by awarding monetary penalties against a party living abroad.

P. Kindler/D. Paulus: Entry of Italian partnerships into the German land register

Under German law, following a judgment of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) of 29 January 2001, even non-commercial partnerships (the „Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts“, GbR) under certain circumstances – and without being regarded a legal entity – have an extensive legal capacity. On 4 December 2008, in a second step, the Federal Court of Justice held that a GbR can not only acquire ownership of land or other immovable property or rights but may also be entered in the German land register (Grundbuch – „formelle Grundbuchfähigkeit“). Subsequently, as of 18 August 2009, the German legislator implemented a new § 899a to the German Civil Code (BGB) as well as a new section 2 to § 47 of the German Land Register Code (GBO), stating that if a GbR is to be registered, its partners must also be entered into the land register. In its judgment of 9 February 2017 concerning an Italian società semplice, the

German Federal Court of Justice held that also foreign non-commercial partnerships can be entered into the German land register. Prerequisite for this is not a full legal capacity but only that the respective partnership, according to its company statute, at least has a partial legal capacity with regard to the acquisition of real estate („materielle Grundbuchfähigkeit“). In order to determine this, a judge has to investigate foreign law ex officio. This includes not only the determination of the law itself but also of its concrete application in the respective foreign legal practice. To this end, the judge must make full use of the legal sources available to him. The authors share the position of the German Federal Court of Justice but point out that the applicable Italian law of business associations even provides for a full legal capacity of non-commercial partnerships.

K. Duden: Jurisdiction in case of multiple places of performance: preparatory work vs. its implementation on site

In the case of a contract for the provision of services, Art. 7 (1) (b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation establishes jurisdiction at the place where the service is provided. In light of a decision of the Austrian Supreme Court on an architect’s contract this paper analyses how jurisdiction at a single place of performance can be identified if the performance actually is provided in several places. In doing so, it is argued that a distinction should be drawn between services that have an internal as opposed to an external variety of places of performance. Regarding architects’ contracts the author agrees with the Austrian Supreme Court that the courts at the building site have jurisdiction as the courts at the place of the main performance. Furthermore, the paper discusses where jurisdiction generally should be located for services that consist of extended preparatory work at one place that culminates in its implementation at another place, but where those services do not necessarily have a comparatively strong link with the place of implementation. Finally, cases will be considered in which the place where the service is mainly provided cannot be determined. It is argued that amongst the approaches taken in such cases by the ECJ it is more convincing to grant the claimant a choice amongst the places which could be considered as the place of main performance, rather than give preference – amongst various potential places of main performance – to the jurisdiction at the seat of the characteristic performer.

L. Hübner: Existential disputes as a case for Art. 24 no. 2 Brussels 1a Regulation – the doctrine of fictivité in the European law of jurisdiction

The decision of the Cour de cassation deals with the exclusive jurisdiction for company-related disputes in Art. 24 No. 2 Brussels 1a Regulation. The Cour de cassation confirms the strict interpretation in accordance with the parameters of the ECJ. The subject-matter of the action is not a dispute regarding deficiencies in resolutions, which frequently is the subject-matter of action in connection with Art. 24 (2) Brussels 1a Regulation, but a so-called existential dispute arising from the French doctrine of fictivité.

P. Schlosser: Prescription as Lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal

In view of the expropriation of gold mines the claimant instituted arbitral proceedings on the basis of the Bilateral Agreement between Canada and Venezuela according to the Additional Facility Rules of the Word Bank Centre. The Canadians were successful. The Cour d’Appel de Paris, however, invalidated the calculation of the award, but not the further elements of the ruling. The reason therefor was a term in the Bilateral Investment Treaty, that the tribunal had only competence to consider events no more than three years prior to the institution of arbitral proceedings. In validating the damage of the Canadians, however, the tribunal had taken into consideration events of a prior occurrence. Normally the claimant had to institute new proceedings because in France the case cannot be referred back to the arbitrators. But since the parties had found a settlement agreement no further proceedings were necessary.

Belgian Court of Cassation and Ryanair’s forum clauses

On 8 February 2019 the Belgain Court of Cassation decided the case Happy Flights v Ryanair. The Dutch version of the decision is available here.

At issue was the validity of the clause in Ryanair’s general terms and conditions that the Irish courts have jurisdiction over disputes. The Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the Commercial Court of Brussels, which had considered only the formal validity of the choice-of-court clause.

The Court of Cassation confirmed that the consumer protection provisions of Brussels Ia do not apply (the contracts concern transport). It further found that according to Art. 25(1) of Brussels Ia the substantive validity of the clause (in a non-negotiated contract) was subject to Irish law (specifically the Irish implementation in Act 27/1995 of Directive 93/13/EEG on unfair terms in consumer contracts). The Court did not explicitly refer to Irish private international law (according to Consideration 20 of Brussels Ia), but directly to Act 27/1995.

It sent the case back to the Commercial Court of Leuven for a new assessment.

UK Supreme Court Judgment in Vedanta

Thank you to Veerle Van den Eeckhout for the tip-off.

On 10 April 10 2019, the UK Supreme Court handed down its much anticipated judgment in the “Vedanta” case (see here). The judgment is currently raising many comments and discussions on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), including from the perspective of Private International Law.

The PowerPoint (in French) of a presentation by Veerle Van den Eeckhout in March 2017 explains some Private International Law aspects of CSR, including the state of the Vedanta proceedings at that time and its context.

 

Expedited settlement of commercial disputes : The Commission’s Response

A Legislative initiative procedure which started nearly a year ago, is coming now to the next level: The European Commission has recently stated its position on the European Parliament non-legislative resolution with recommendations to the Commission on expedited settlement of commercial disputes. The response is featured in a document titled ‘Follow-up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution with recommendations to the Commission on expedited settlement of commercial disputes’. The main issues addressed may be summarized as follows:

Creation of a European Expedited Civil Procedure (EECP)

The Commission will take the resolution as further inspiration to analyse simplifications to cross-border litigation, but not necessarily by a specific European Expedited Civil Procedure.

Possible changes to the Rome I, the Rome II and the Brussels Ia Regulations

The Commission will, as appropriate, consider issues concerning choice of law agreements and choice of court agreements within the framework of the review of the relevant instruments (the Rome I and the Brussels Ia Regulations).

Other measures – building competence in commercial law in Member States

The Commission will continue to support training and research in commercial law and to facilitate access to information on foreign law in the framework of non-legislative actions, including financial programmes.

Other measures – analysing establishment of the European Commercial Court

At this stage, it does not seem appropriate to engage in preparatory action concerning the establishment of a European Commercial Court. However, the Commission will consider the question of the desirability of further studies in this field.

The full text of the doc. document is available here.

Once there, scroll down to Documentation gateway, and open the European Commission box.

Luxembourg Reports on European Procedural Law published

The two volumes of the Luxembourg Reports on European Procedural Law were published early this month. They are the fruits of an evaluation study of national procedural laws and practices in terms of their impact on the free circulation of judgments and on the equivalence and effectiveness of the procedural protection of consumers under EU consumer law.

The volumes present a comparative examination and empirical evaluation of national procedural rules and practices as regards mutual trust and the free circulation of judgments on the one hand, and consumer protection on the other, in light of relevant EU and national legislation and European Court of Justice and domestic case law.

The publication was edited by Burkhard Hess, Stephanie Law & Pietro Ortolani. The Report was prepared by a Consortium of European universities led by the MPI Luxembourg for Procedural Law as commissioned by the European Commission [JUST/2014/RCON/PR/CIVI/0082].

For more information, check here.

Closing soon: ELI Young Lawyers Award

The European Law Institute is calling for submissions for its 2019 ELI Young Lawyers Award. Candidates must be law students (undergraduate or postgraduate) at a European university. The call is for a unique and original paper which has not previ­ously been published and which deals with a European legal issue that is ripe for reform. Papers must be submitted by April 30, 2019, 20:00 CET in any of the EU official languages along with an English translation. Further details can be found here.

Société de législation comparée – comparative law essay prize competition

To celebrate its 150th birthday, the Société de législation comparée is organizing a comparative law essay competition. It is open to all lawyers, of all nationalities, regardless of their speciality. Membership of the Society is not required to participate.

Entrants will compose, on a subject of their choice, an essay which is supported by comparative legal reasoning.

The submitted text must be unpublished, never formally examined and contain at least 100,000 characters. It can be written in French or English. Entrants must send a print and an electronic version of the text to the Société de législation comparée, 28 rue Saint-Guillaume, 75007 Paris, France and emmanuelle.bouvier@legiscompare.com no later than October 15, 2019. The application form must be attached to the text.

The selection committee will present the results of its deliberations at the Society’s birthday colloquium in December 2019. First prize will be the publication of the text by the Society in the form of a book. Other awards may be given to distinguished candidates by the committee. Other forms of publications may also be proposed.

To download the application form, please click here.

Call for submissions – Melbourne Journal of International Law

The Editors of the Melbourne Journal of International Law (‘MJIL’), Australia’s premier generalist international law journal, are now inviting submissions for volume 20(2). MJIL is a peer-reviewed academic journal, based at the University of Melbourne.

The deadline for submissions is July 1, 2019. Submissions and inquiries should be directed to law-mjil@unimelb.edu.au. For more information, please visit https://law.unimelb.edu.au/mjil#submissions.