New Contracting Parties to the HCCH Service and HCCH Evidence Conventions and a signatory State to the HCCH Judgments Convention

Yesterday (4 March 2020) Viet Nam acceded to the HCCH Evidence Convention and the Philippines acceded to the HCCH Service Convention.  Ukraine signed the HCCH Judgments Convention.

The HCCH Evidence Convention will enter into force for Viet Nam on 3 May 2020. Pursuant to article 39 of the Evidence Convention, the accession will have effect only as regards the relations between Viet Nam and such Contracting States as will have declared their acceptance of the accession. Accordingly, this is a semi-open Convention similar to the HCCH Child Abduction Convention.

In the absence of any objection pursuant to its article 28, the HCCH Service Convention will enter into force for the Philippines on 1 October 2020. No objection has ever been made under the Service Convention (so far).

Ukraine has signed the HCCH Judgments Convention in accordance with its article 24. In order to consent to be bound by the treaty, Ukraine needs to deposit an instrument of ratification. In the meantime, a signatory State has the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force (article 18 of the UN Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

The HCCH Judgments Convention is not yet in force. In accordance with article 28: “This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which a notification may be made in accordance with Article 29(2) with respect to the second State that has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession referred to in Article 24.”

There are currently two signatory States: Uruguay and Ukraine. The act of signing a treaty does not count towards the timeline specified in article 28 of the HCCH Judgments Convention as it is not an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

The HCCH news item is available here.

Australia’s first contested ICSID enforcement

In February, the Federal Court of Australia delivered its judgment on the first contested enforcement of International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) awards in Australia. In Eiser Infrastructure Ltd v Kingdom of Spain [2020] FCA 157, the Court enforced two ICSID awards—award of 4 May 2017 in Case No. ARB/13/36, and award of 15 June 2018 as rectified by the award dated 29 January 2019 in Case No. ARB/13/31—against the Kingdom of Spain. The two cases were brought by different applicants but were heard and decided together.

The judgment concerns the interaction of two instruments at the intersection of public and private international law. Firstly, it concerns the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth), which gives effect to a restrictive theory of state immunity. Secondly, the judgment concerns the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) (Investment Convention), which is given the force of law in Australia by s 32 of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth).

Stewart J framed the issue for consideration as follows (at [2]):

[I]s a foreign state immune from the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award made under the Investment Convention notwithstanding that the Investment Convention inherently envisages arbitration awards being made against foreign states and it provides that such awards “shall” be recognised and enforced by Australian courts?

The judgment also contains useful consideration of the distinctions between recognition, enforcement and execution in the context of a common law system.

Background

The underlying dispute was triggered by a change in Spain’s position on subsidies and regulation concerning renewable energy, and the applicant companies’ investments in renewable energy projects in Spain before that change. The changes caused substantial harm to the value of the investments of the applicants, which are incorporated in England & Wales, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

Before ICSID tribunals the applicants argued that Spain failed to accord fair and equitable treatment to their investments in breach of Art 10(1) of The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), opened for signature 17 December 1994, 2080 UNTS 95 (entered into force 16 April 1998). They were successful. Spain was ordered to pay hundreds of millions of Euros across two awards.

Spain then made applications for the annulment of the awards, which included stays of enforcement. For a time, each award was stayed. (In Australia, this resulted in a temporary stay of enforcement proceedings: see Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.A.R.L v Kingdom of Spain [2019] FCA 1220). The stays were then discontinued, allowing enforcement action to proceed in Australia. At the time of writing, Spain had not complied with the awards in whole or in part.

Enforcement of the ICSID awards in Australia

The Commonwealth of Australia is a generally arbitration-friendly jurisdiction. Part IV of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) deals with the Investment Convention. Section 33(1) provides the basic proposition ‘that [a]n award is binding on a party to the investment dispute to which the award relates’, while s 35 provides that awards may be enforced through the Federal Court of Australia.

How, then, could Spain challenge enforcement of the ICSID awards? It asserted immunity under s 9 of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth), which provides foreign States with general immunity from the jurisdiction of Australian courts. An exception to the general position is provided in s 10(1) for proceedings in respect of which a foreign State has submitted.

The applicant companies argued that the Investment Convention excludes any claim for foreign state immunity in proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of an award. The Court was thus asked to consider whether, ‘by being a Contracting Party to the ECT and a Contracting State to the Investment Convention, Spain submitted to the arbitrations under the Investment Convention which produced the awards they seek to enforce’: [179]. The Court held that Spain had submitted. There was no inconsistency between the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) and the enforcement of the Investment Convention via the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth).

The Court thus recognised each of the awards. Spain was ordered to pay the applicant companies hundreds of millions of Euros, plus interest, and costs—the scope of which are still to be determined.

Comments on recognition, enforcement and execution

According to Stewart J, ‘[t]he distinction between recognition and enforcement, on the one hand, and execution on the other, is central to [the] reasons’: [6]. The judgment contains dicta that will be useful for teaching private international law in Australia. There is a helpful passage at [89] ff:

Recognition is a distinct and necessarily prior step to enforcement, but recognition and enforcement are closely linked: Briggs A, The Conflict of Laws (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Clarendon Series, 2013) 140-141; Clarke v Fennoscandia Ltd [2007] UKHL 56; 2008 SC (HL) 122 at [18]-[23].  An award may be recognised without being “enforced” by a court: TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia [2013] HCA 5; 251 CLR 533 at [23].  Examples would be where an award is recognised as giving rise to res judicata, issue estoppel, cause of action estoppel or set-off, or as a claim in an insolvent estate.  See Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services Ltd v European Reinsurance Co of Zurich [2003] UKPC 11; [2003] 1 WLR 1041 at [15] as an example of recognition by estoppel.

An arbitral award is enforced through the means of the entering of a judgment on the award, either in the form of a money judgment for the amount of an award or for damages for failing to honour an award.  That form of enforcement by a court is an exercise of judicial power: TCL at [32].  There is some debate in the authorities as to whether an award can be enforced by means of a court making a declaration.  See Tridon Australia Pty Ltd v ACD Tridon Inc [2004] NSWCA 146 and AED Oil Ltd v Puffin FPSO Ltd [2010] VSCA 37; 27 VR 22 at [18]-[20].  It is not necessary to enter upon that debate for present purposes because Art 54(3) of the Investment Convention requires the enforcement of only the pecuniary obligations of an award.  That would seem to exclude declaratory awards, injunctions and orders for specific performance.

An award cannot, however, be executed, in the sense of executed against the property of an award debtor, without first being converted into a judgment of a court: Uganda Telecom Ltd v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 206; 277 ALR 441 at [12]-[13].  Nevertheless, it is not a strain of language to refer to an award being enforced by way of execution.

Thus, depending on the context, reference to the enforcement of an arbitral award can be used to mean the entering of a judgment on the award to the exclusion of execution or it can mean execution, or it can encompass both.

Recognition and enforcement by judgment on the award is equivalent to what is referred to in civilian jurisdictions as exequatur (see Firebird at [47]-[48] and Briggs A, The Conflict of Laws (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Clarendon Series, 2013), 139).

Comment

Eiser Infrastructure Ltd v Kingdom of Spain provides plenty to think about for those interested in private international law, public international law, and international arbitration. It confirms the intuition that ICSID awards should be easily enforced in Australia.

However, it begs the question, why Australia? Stewart J speculated that the CJEU’s decision in Slovak Republic v Achmea BV [2018] 4 WLR 87, [60] may have made Australia a more attractive forum for enforcement proceedings in these cases. However, should Spain have any assets in Australia, it may be difficult for the successful companies to get access to them. The High Court of Australia takes a foreign-State-friendly approach to immunity of execution over foreign States’ property. It will be interesting to see what happens next in this dispute.

CJEU rules on the opposability of a choice-of-court clause contained in a large-risk insurance contract in relation to the insured: Case C-803/18, BALTA

The case concerns the question whether the Lithuanian courts have jurisdiction under the Brussels I bis Regulation to deal with a case involving an insurance payment claimed by a company established in Lithuania and covered by a civil liability insurance contract concluded between the policyholder and the insurer, both of whom are established in Latvia.

The insurance contract in question contained a clause providing that any dispute relating to this contract should be brought before the Latvian courts. Following the wording of the preliminary question, the claimant is a ‘person insured under that contract who has not expressly subscribed to that clause’.

Similarly to the preliminary question referred in Case C-112/03, Société financière and industrielle du Peloux, the referring court seeks to establish whether the choice-of-court clause contained in the insurance contract may be invoked against the insured who has not expressly subscribed to that clause and who is established in a Member State other than that of the policyholder and the insurer.

The particularity of the present case stems from the fact the insurance contract covered a ‘large risk’ referred to in Articles 15(5) and 16(5) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. Following the wording of these Articles, concerning the large-risk insurances, the rules on jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance may be departed from by an agreement with no further conditions. It was the impact of Articles 15(5) and 16 of the Brussels I bis Regulation on the opposability of the choice-of-court clause against the insured that inspired the referring court to request for a preliminary ruling.

In its Judgment delivered today without Advocate General’s Opinion, the Court ruled that the choice-of-court clause contained in a large-risk insurance cannot be invoked against an insured who has not subscribed to that clause and who is established in a Member State other than that of the policyholder and the insurer.

At the outset the Court observed that when contrasted with Article 15(3) and (4) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, the wording of Article 15(5) of the Regulation may suggest that a choice-of-court clause contained in a large-risk insurance contract could be invoked not only against the parties to the contract but also against an insured. In fact, Article 15(3) and (4) of the Regulation refers to the policyholder and to the insurer as the parties to the choice-of-court clause. No such reference is to be found in Article 15(5) (paragraph 33 of the Judgment).

However, after having presented a series of arguments with respect to the history of this provision, the scheme of the rules on jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance and their objectives (paragraphs 34 to 36 of the Judgment), the Court held, on the one hand, that the prorogation of jurisdiction is strictly circumscribed by the aim of protecting the economically weaker party and it cannot be inferred from the nature of large-risk insurance that an insured (not being a party to this contract) is not a ‘weaker party’ (paragraphs 37 to 41 of the Judgment). On the other hand, the application of the special rules of jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance is not to be extended to persons for whom that protection is not justified. No special protection is justified where the parties concerned are professionals in the insurance sector (paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Judgment).

The Court rejected a case-by-case assessment of the question whether an insured covered by a large-risk insurance may be regarded as a ‘weaker party’/professional in the insurance sector (paragraph 43 of the Judgment). This interpretation is of course in line with the pre-existing case-law, in particular the judgments in Cases C-340/16, MMA IARD, paragraph 34 and C-106/17, Hofsoe, paragraph 45. It seems that a similar approach was also followed in paragraph 109 of the judgment in Case Aspen Underwriting v Credit Europe [2018] EWCA 2590 Civ, where the Court of Appeal held in relation to large-risk insurance that while the case-law of the CJEU excludes an individual factual assessment of the strength of the economic position, it is still possible to decide on the application of the protective rules on jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance by having regard to the class of business conducted by the party in question.

It is, as Court clarifies, common ground that the insured acting as a claimant in the procedure before the national courts is not considered as a professional in the insurance sector (paragraph 45 of the Judgment). It follows that the choice-of-court clause cannot be invoked against the insured who has not subscribed to that clause and who is established in a Member State other than that of the policyholder and the insurer.

The Judgment can be found here (no English version yet). For those wishing to study the case more extensively, the request for a preliminary ruling is available here.

On a side note…

It might be interesting to note a few points that may be inspirational for the discussion on EU private international law in contexts other than those of the present request for a preliminary ruling and in relation to the issues not covered by this request:

  • Article 15(5) of the Brussels I bis Regulation allows to deviate from the protective rules on jurisdiction by a choice-of-court clause in relation to insurance contracts covering one or more of the risks set out in Article 16 of this Regulation, including those referred to in Article 16(5) as ‘large risks’. As the Court observes in its Judgment, even the large-risk insurances alone encompass the contracts covering risks of varied nature. Some risks are deemed large due to the subject of insurance cover (i.e. marine and aviation risks), while other have to meet the specific criteria that relate to the policyholder in order to be considered as large. It may be interesting to see in the future developments whether, in different contexts relating to the contracts that are considered as large-risk insurances solely due to the subject of insurance cover (the reference to various conditions in paragraph 43 of the Judgment seems to hint the fact that this was not the case here), the nature of risk is equally irrelevant and, if so, whether the nature of risk may be for instance used by national courts as an indication that the insured parties are professionals in the insurance sector.
  • The insured acting as the claimant in the proceedings before the Lithuanian courts is a company which shares are held exclusively by the policyholder (paragraph 15 of the Judgment). In the national proceedings that led to the request for a preliminary ruling, the first instance court considered that, due to the fact that the insured is a company owned by the policyholder, this insured must have consented, even if only indirectly, to the choice-of-court clause (paragraph 18 of the Judgment). In its Judgment, the Court held in particular that the choice-of-court clause cannot be invoked against an insured who has not subscribed to that clause, without further distinction between express and implicit consent (‘la personne assurée par ce contrat […] qui n’a pas consenti à cette clause’). It is to be noted that the wording of the preliminary question refers solely to an insured who has not expressly subscribed to that clause. The referring court seemingly did not consider it necessary to inquire the Court on this particular aspect of the case. If anything, it is yet to be seen whether any definitive conclusion in relation to the aforementioned aspect (that the Court was not directly asked to address) may be inferred from the Judgment.
  • The large-risk insurance contract in question did not only contain a clause conferring jurisdiction to the Latvian courts but apparently also a choice-of-law clause in favour of the laws in force in this Member State (paragraph 16 of the Judgment). It can be argued that in the context of choice-of-law clauses made in relation to insurance contracts in general (and not solely large-risk insurances), the Rome I Regulation approaches the protection of the ‘weaker parties’ in a different manner than the Brussels I bis Regulation. Having in mind the concept of consistency between these Regulations, it is likewise yet to be seen whether the solution adopted in relation to the Brussels I bis Regulation may be transposed to the realm of conflict of laws.

Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in the case C-41/19, FX: Jurisdiction to rule on an application opposing enforcement of a maintenance decision

In today’s Opinion, Advocate General Bobek analyses whether the courts of a Member State in which a maintenance decision delivered by the courts of another Member State is enforced have jurisdiction to rule on an application opposing the enforcement.

More specifically, the reference for a preliminary ruling originates in a dispute between a maintenance debtor residing in Germany and a maintenance creditor residing in Poland. The latter lodged with the referring court an application requesting the recognition of a Polish maintenance decision and a declaration of its enforceability in Germany in accordance with Maintenance Regulation. The referring court delivered an order for enforcement in respect of the Polish maintenance decision. On the basis of that order, the defendant sought the enforcement of this decision against the debtor in Germany. The maintenance debtor opposed the enforcement based on Paragraph 767 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (the ZPO) and argued that the claim underlying the maintenance decision has been settled by payment.

Before deciding on the merits, it was for the referring court to decide whether it has jurisdiction to rule on the application opposing the enforcement. As the Opinion explains, at point 29:

In a nutshell, it seems that the referring court understands that there are two mutually exclusive possibilities. If [the Maintenance Regulation] were applicable, that would mean that the referring court lacks jurisdiction under Article 3 of that regulation. It is only if [the Maintenance Regulation] cannot be applied that it would be possible to base jurisdiction on Article 24(5) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation], according to which the courts of the Member State of enforcement have jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with such enforcement.

Against this background, the Opinion confirms, at points 32 et 33, that while the Brussels I bis Regulation contains, in Article 24(5), an explicit rule granting exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments to the courts of the Member State in which the judgment has been or is to be enforced, the Maintenance Regulation does not contain any explicit rule on jurisdiction regarding the enforcement of decisions in matters relating to maintenance.

Disagreeing with the referring court’s understanding of the issue of jurisdiction, at point 42, the Opinion states, however, that the rules on jurisdiction provided for in the Chapter II of the Maintenance Regulation establish jurisdiction with regard to the main procedure on the merits, but not with regard to the enforcement of such decisions.

Moreover, at points 43 et seq., the Opinion explains that a rule according to which enforcement belongs to the courts of the Member State where enforcement is sought is inherent in the system of the Maintenance Regulation and is an expression of what could be considered a general principle of international law:

43. […] even though Chapter IV of [the Maintenance Regulation] does not contain any explicit jurisdictional rule with regard to enforcement, that rule can be considered inherent in the system of that regulation.

44. In general terms, international jurisdiction for enforcement belongs to the courts of the Member State where enforcement is sought. As the Polish Government points out, that rule is an expression of what could be considered a general principle of international law connected with State sovereignty: it is only the authorities of the State of enforcement that are empowered to rule on the execution of decisions, as enforcement measures can only be carried out by the authorities of the Member State(s) where the assets or persons against which enforcement is sought are situated. That rule is valid, a fortiori, where a decision has already been recognised as enforceable in the Member State where enforcement is sought.

45. Therefore, it is not necessary to have recourse to Article 24(5) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation] as a supplementary provision in order to be able to establish that the courts of the Member State of enforcement also have jurisdiction with regard to the enforcement of maintenance decisions within the scope of [the Maintenance Regulation]. Indeed, that article can be considered as an expression of the general principle just mentioned. 

Next, at points 50 et seq., the Opinion addresses the question whether an application seeking to oppose enforcement based on the discharge of the debt is to be considered as appertaining, for the purposes of jurisdiction, to enforcement proceedings. The extensive analysis is followed by a summary, at point 85:

85. For those reasons, it is my view that jurisdiction to adjudicate on an action opposing enforcement based on the discharge of debt falls to the courts of the Member State where the enforcement is sought. For the sake of completeness, I wish to stress two points in lieu of a conclusion. First, the discussion in the present Opinion and the conclusion reached concerned only the ground of opposition based on the discharge of the debt. Second, beyond that specific ground, no position is taken on the overall compatibility of Paragraph 767 of the ZPO with EU law.

The Advocate General concluded, at point 86:

86. [The Maintenance Regulation] and, in particular, Article 41(1) thereof, should be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the Member State where the enforcement of a maintenance decision given in another Member State is sought have jurisdiction to adjudicate on an application opposing enforcement, in so far as it is intrinsically connected with enforcement proceedings, it does not seek the modification or review of the maintenance decision, and it is based on grounds that could not have been raised before the court that issued the maintenance decision. Those conditions appear to be fulfilled by the application of opposition to enforcement based on the discharge of the debt at issue in the present case, which is nonetheless ultimately for the referring court to verify.

The Opinion can be found here.

Monasky v. Taglieri, a Guest Post by Melissa Kucinski

On February 25, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which concluded that Italy was the habitual residence of an infant that was brought from Italy to Ohio by her mother in 2015, shortly after the child was born. This opinion resolved a circuit split over the definition of habitual residence. The 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention is the private international law instrument that seeks to secure the prompt return of a child removed from or retained out of its habitual residence. It is not a child custody or jurisdictional determination, and not a means of enforcing existing custody orders. Instead it is designed to restore some type of status quo so that the child’s parents can pursue a custody order from the court in the appropriate jurisdiction. It discourages forum shopping and gives the child some consistency during the parents’ custody litigation. The threshold question that a court must resolve in determining whether to return a child is that child’s habitual residence, with the treaty being premised on the fact that a child cannot be returned to a location that is not her habitual residence. The U.S. circuits have had a long-standing split on the definition of this undefined treaty term, used in numerous Hague family law conventions.

In the Monasky v. Taglieri case, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously concluded that a child’s habitual residence is a flexible fact-based determination that should focus on “[t]he place where a child is at home, at the time of removal or retention…”. This standard gives a trial judge significant deference, with a caution to be informed by “common sense” in reviewing the unique circumstances of the case in front of her. The Supreme Court gave little guidance on how best to weigh the different facts that will be presented to the trial judge but left that to the discretion of the judge, with the view that “[n]o single fact … is dispositive across all cases.” The Court further rejected Ms. Monasky’s argument that habitual residence requires the parents to have an actual agreement, which she, and amici curiae argued is necessary for any child born into a situation of domestic violence. In rejecting that argument, Justice Ginsburg wrote both that the 1980 Convention has mechanisms to help children who would be subjected to a grave risk of harm if returned to situations where domestic violence is an issue, and that the domestic violence itself should be more fully examined in the custody case after the child is returned. She further expressed concern that this argument would leave children, many who are vulnerable, without the ability to use the 1980 Convention because a parent could easily manipulate the facts to argue that the parents lacked an agreement.

The Court also held that the question of a child’s habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact, but only “barely so,” and with the legal standard now clear, with the trial judge reviewing a totality of the circumstances when determining a child’s habitual residence, the court is left with a completely factual analysis in determining “[w]as the child at home in a particular country at issue?” Therefore, on appeal, the appropriate standard of review is clear-error.

Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP) No 4/2019: Abstracts


The fourth issue of 2019 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:

Costanza Honorati, Professor at the University Milan-Bicocca, La tutela dei minori migranti e il diritto internazionale privato: quali rapporti tra Dublino III e Bruxelles II-bis? (The Protection of Migrant Minors and Private International Law: Which Relationship between the Dublin III and Brussels IIa Regulations?; in Italian)

  • Few studies have investigated the relation between Migration Law and PIL. Even less have focused on the interaction between Brussels IIa and Dublin III Regulations. The present study, moving from the often declared assumption that ‘a migrant minor is first of all a minor’ focuses on the coordination between the two Regulations and the possible application of Brussels IIa to migrant minors in order to adopt protection measures to be eventually recognized in all EU Member States or to possibly place a minor in another EU Member State.

Francesca C. Villata, Professor at the University of Milan, Predictability First! Fraus Legis, Overriding Mandatory Rules and Ordre Public under EU Regulation 650/2012 on Succession Matters (in English)

  • This paper aims at investigating: (i) how fraus legis, overriding mandatory rules and ordre public exceptions position themselves within the system of the Succession Regulation; (ii) whether they are meant to perform their traditional function or to pursue any alternative or additional objective; and (iii) which limits are imposed on Member States in the application of said exceptions and to what extent Member States can avail themselves of the same to preserve, if not to enforce, their respective legal traditions in this area, as acknowledged in Recital 6 of Regulation No 650/2012. The assumption here submitted is that the traditional notions to which those exceptions refer have been reshaped or, rather, adjusted to the specific needs of Regulation No 650/2012 and of the entire EU private international law system, which increasingly identifies in predictability the ultimate policy goal to pursue.

In addition to the foregoing, the following comments are featured:

Michele Grassi, Research Fellow at the University of Milan, Sul riconoscimento dei matrimoni contratti all’estero tra persone dello stesso sesso: il caso Coman (On the Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages Entered into Abroad: The Coman Case; in Italian)

  • With its judgment in the Coman case, the Court of Justice of the European Union has extended the scope of application of the principle of mutual recognition to the field of family law and, in particular, to same-sex marriages. In that decision the Court has ruled that the refusal by the authorities of a Member State to recognise (for the sole purpose of granting a derived right of residence) the marriage of a third-country national to a Union citizen of the same sex, concluded in accordance with the law of another Member State, during the period of their residence in that State, is incompatible with the EU freedom of movement of persons. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the private-international-law implications of the Coman decision and, more specifically, to assess the possible impact of the duty to recognise same-sex marriages on the European and Italian systems.

Francesco Pesce, Associate Professor at the University of Genoa, La nozione di «matrimonio»: diritto internazionale privato e diritto materiale a confronto (The Notion of ‘Marriage’: Private International Law and Substantive Law in Comparison; in Italian)

  • This paper tackles the topical and much debated issue of the notions of ‘marriage’ and ‘spouse’ under EU substantive and private international law. Taking the stand from the different coexisting models of family relationships and from the fragmented normative approaches developed at the domestic level, this paper (while aware of the ongoing evolutionary trends in this field) focuses on whether it is possible, at present, to infer an autonomous notion of ‘marriage’ from EU law, either in general or from some specific areas thereof. The response to this question bears significant consequences in terms of defining the scope of application of the uniform rules on the free movement of persons, on the cross-border recognition of family statuses and on the ensuing patrimonial regimes. With specific regard to the current Italian legal framework, this paper examines to which extent characterization issues are still relevant.

Carlo De Stefano, PhD, Corporate Nationality in International Investment Law: Substance over Formality (in English)

  • Since incorporation is usually codified in IIAs as sole criteria for the definition of protected corporate ‘investors’, arbitral tribunals have traditionally interpreted and applied such provisions without requiring any thresholds of substantive bond between putatively covered investors and their alleged home State. By taking issue with the current status of international investment law and arbitration, the Author’s main proposition is that States revise treaty provisions dealing with the determination of corporate nationality so as to insert real seat and (ultimate) control prongs in coexistence with the conventional test of incorporation. This proposal, which seems to be fostered in the recent state practice, is advocated on the grounds of legal and policy arguments with the aim to combat questionable phenomena of investors’ ‘treaty shopping’, including ‘round tripping’, and, consequently, to strengthen the legitimacy of investor-State dispute settlement.

Ferdinando Emanuele, Lawyer in Rome, Milo Molfa, Lawyer in London, and Rebekka Monico, LL.M. Candidate, The Impact of Brexit on International Arbitration (in English)

  • This article considers the effects of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on international arbitration. In principle, Brexit will not have a significant impact on commercial arbitration, with the exception of the re-expansion of anti-suit injunctions, given that the West Tankers judgment will no longer be binding. With respect to investment arbitration, because the BITs between the United Kingdom and EU Member States will become extra-EU BITs, the Achmea judgment will no longer be applicable following Brexit. Furthermore, English courts will enforce intra-EU BIT arbitration awards pursuant to the 1958 New York Convention. Investment treaties between the EU and third countries will not be applicable to the United Kingdom.

Finally, the issue features the following case notes:

Cinzia Peraro, Research Fellow at the University of Verona, Legittimazione ad agire di un’associazione a tutela dei consumatori e diritto alla protezione dei dati personali a margine della sentenza Fashion ID (A Consumer-Protection Association’s Legal Standing to Bring Proceedings and Protection of Personal Data in the Aftermath of the Fashion ID Judgment; in Italian)

Gaetano Vitellino, Research Fellow at Università Cattaneo LIUC of Castellanza, Litispendenza e accordi confliggenti di scelta del foro nel caso BNP Paribas c. Trattamento Rifiuti Metropolitani (Lis Pendens and Conflicting Choice of Court Agreements in BNP Paribas v. Trattamento Rifiuti Metropolitani; in Italian)

Gaetano Vitellino, Research Fellow at Università Cattaneo LIUC of Castellanza, Note a margine di una pronuncia del Tribunale di Torino in materia societaria (Remarks on a Decision of the Turin Tribunal on Corporate Matters; in Italian)



Change in German International Adoption Law

Last week the German parliament approved a reform of the German adoption law. The reform was triggered by a decision of the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfG) declaring provisions unconstitutional that did not allow a stepchild adoption for non-marital couples (English translation of the decision here).

The legislator took the opportunity to adapt the conflict of law provisions. The relevant rule, article 22 Introductory Act to the Civil Code (EGBGB) only applies to adoptions in Germany and those abroad that were not established by a foreign court or authority. In the latter case the rules on recognition of court decisions apply. Furthermore, the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption prevails. The new rule, thus, mainly determines the law applicable on the acceptance of an adoption by private agreement that occurred abroad.

The former relevant provision, Article 22 para 1 EGBGB stated, cited after the translation made by Juliana Mörsdorf for the Federal Office of Justice:

Article 22 Adoption

(1) The adoption of a child is governed by the law of the country of which the adopter is a national at the time of the adoption. The adoption by one or both spouses is governed by the law which applies to the general effects of the marriage under article 14 subarticle 1. The adoption by a life partner is governed by the law which applies to the general effects of the life partnership under article 17b subarticle 1 sentence 1.

[…]

The new Article 22 para. 1 states that

“the adoption of a child in Germany is governed by German law. In all other cases the adoption is governed by the law of the country in which the adoptee has his habitual residence at the time of the adoption.“ [my translation – German federal law in general is not very aware of the use of a gender neutral wording. Of course, also female and non-binary adoptees and their habitual residences are included.]

Due to the Constitutional Court’s ruling, all references to an adoption by somebody living in a marriage or registered civil partnership were eliminated. Furthermore, the rule is a good example for some general general shifts in the German International Family law system regarding connecting factors:

  • First, in the name of procedural efficiency (according to the travaux préparatoires, BT-Drs. 19/15618, p. 8, 16), there is the tendency to distinguish between legal situations occurring in Germany or abroad and use conflict of laws more often to accept legal situations established abroad. Adoptions in Germany are always governed by German law and always require a court proceeding (sec 1752 German Civil Code for minors and sec 1767 para. 2 for adults). With the new provision, the legislative confirmed that an adoption that occurred abroad will be accepted in German according to the so-called method of “recognition by conflict of laws”, as article 22 para 1 phrase 2 exclusively provides a rule for adoptions that took place outside of Germany.
  • Second, by determining the law applicable, the German rule no longer focuses on the adopter(s) but the adoptee. This change is in accordance with the general awareness to put the child’s best interest in the centre of attention in cases involving fundamental changes to a child. While, of course, there can be adoptions of adults, the adoption of a minor is the most common (see also the travaux préparatoires, BT-Drs. 19/15618, p. 16).
  • Third, the rule also includes a temporal connecting factor. Traditionally, German conflict of laws rules do not state the temporal connection factor, thus, the rules always refer to the moment of the closure of the court hearing. This can create uncertainty as it allows a change of connecting factors over time and even in the course of a proceeding.
  • Last but not least, and maybe even more interesting, the main connecting factor changed from nationality to habitual residence. Traditionally in German International Family Law, nationality was the central connecting factor, as it is still in article 13 (law governing the conclusion of a marriage). In article 22, instead, connecting factor is the habitual residence (of the adoptee). This shows a general tendency in German conflict of laws which was mainly triggered by the harmonization of conflict of laws in the EU. Last year the central rule regarding international marriage law (article 14, losing the importance to the latest EU regulations, though) changed the “rungs” of its famous “Kegel’s ladder”: Traditionally, the first “rung” of said ladder was the spouses shared nationality or last shared nationality during marriage. Only in case there was neither, applicable was the law of the spouses’ habitual residence. Since January 2019, main connecting factor (“first rung”) is the spouses’ habitual residence, the second the spouses’ habitual residence during the marriage if one spouse has maintained that habitual residence. Only the third step refers to the shared nationality.

The new law will come into force 31 March 2020. The new provisions apply to international adoptions that were not completed before that date (article 229 § 51 EGBGB).

The US Supreme Court case on the determination of habitual residence under the Child Abduction Convention has been decided – the judgment of Monasky v. Taglieri is now available!

Today (25 February 2020), the US Supreme Court delivered its Opinion in the case Monasky v. Taglieri. This decision is available here.

Two of the main takeaways are:

  • A child’s habitual residence depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an actual agreement between the parents.
  • A first-instance habitual-residence determination is subject to deferential appellate review for clear error.

This would appear to be in line with the case law of other Contracting Parties. We expect to post a more detailed comment shortly. In the meantime, see our previous posts here –  #1, #2 and #3.

Two Legal Officer positions are open at HCCH

This week the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) announced that there are two Legal Officer vacancies and noted that their “duties will include general assistance in various areas of the work programme of the HCCH as determined by the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP). Areas of priority include international commercial litigation / civil procedure and child support (maintenance) matters.”

The deadline for applications is Wednesday 25 March 2020 (12.00 a.m. CET).

More information is available here.

Internship applications are now open at HCCH

The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH, head office in The Hague, the Netherlands) is seeking legal interns for the period July to December 2020. Applications are now open!

The deadline for applications is Friday 27 March 2020 (18:00 CET).

More information is available here.