Rescheduling of the Bonn University / HCCH Conference on the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: Video Pre-Conference Roundtable 29 October 2020; On-Site Conference 13 and 14 September 2021

Dear Friends and Colleagues,

Kindly allow us to inform you about the following decisions we had to take in view of our conference, originally scheduled for 25 and 26 September 2020:

As the University of Bonn does not allow on site events of a larger scale until the end of the Winter Semester 2020/2021 (31 March 2021) in order to avoid any Covid-19 risks and as we are also concerned about the risks you would take while travelling to our place, we decided against an on site event.

Originally, we thought that in this case a video conference would be a good substitute. However, after months of video conferences, classes and meetings, all of us are probably feeling quite exhausted, and another round of two long days looking at the screen did no longer appear appealing to us, all the more since we have gathered such a distinguished group of speakers, with whom the audience would certainly like to interact directly, to say nothing of ourselves. This is why we decided, in close cooperation with the HCCH, to reschedule our Conference at Bonn University on Monday and Tuesday, 13 and 14 September 2021.

Additionally, in order to keep our topic connected with the period of the German Presidency of the EU Council and also in order to react to requests by a number of interested colleagues from far distances who would have difficulties travelling to Bonn, we decided to offer a Pre-Conference Video Roundtable “The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: Prospects for Judicial Cooperation between the EU and Third States” on Thursday evening, 29 October 2020, 6 to 8 p.m. As things are standing at the moment, the Secretary General of the HCCH, Dr Christoph Bernasconi, will give us the honour to join us “live” and open this session, and an edited version of the Explanatory Report might be out at this point of time.

If you are interested in participating in the video conference, please register with sekretariat.weller@jura.uni-bonn.de. You will then receive an email with the access code to the video conference (via zoom) the day before the event.

We will inform you about the precise programme of our video round table in due time.

We do hope that you agree with our decisions. Looking forward to seeing you via video in October 2020 and on site in September 2021.

With best wishes from Bonn,

Moritz Brinkmann, Nina Dethloff, Matthias Lehmann, Philipp Reuß, Matthias Weller

Chinese court refuses enforcement of an IFTA Arbitration award

Shawn He reported recently on a Chinese judgment refusing the declaration of enforceability of an arbitral award issued by the Independent Film & Television Alliance Arbitration Court.

The Tianjin Intermediate People’s Court dismissed the application on two grounds: No standing to be sued of the Chinese company, and notification vices.

One point which should be highlighted is the duration of the proceedings: The application was filed on March 2018, and the judgment (in first instance) was rendered on May 2020…

 

Job Offer at the University of Bayreuth

by Professor Dr Robert Magnus

The chair of civil law III at the Faculty of law and economics of the University of Bayreuth offers a position as a

Doctoral researcher / PhD Student (m/w/d)

which should be filled as soon as possible. The position is limited for a period of two years and is preferably granted for the purpose of preparing a doctoral thesis. The position is part-time (50 % of regular working hours) with the salary and the benefits of a public service position in the state of Bayern, Germany (TV-L E13, 50 %).

The Doctoral researcher will be working in the department of law. His main task will be to assist the research projects of his supervisor in the area of civil law, civil procedural law, arbitration law, conflict-of-laws and comparative law. The position includes the possibility to prepare a doctoral thesis. Applicants should fulfill the requirements to prepare a doctoral thesis under the doctoral degree regulation of the University of Bayreuth. It is expected that the first state examination is accomplished at least with the grade “vollbefriedigend”. The position additionally requires the Applicant to be proficient in German.

Furthermore, the Applicant should be interested in the areas of expertise of the supervisor; preferably there is already knowledge in these fields. Desirable are good skills in English and IT-expertise.

Applicants with a disability as described in SGB IX (§ 2 Abs. 2, 3) will be preferred in case of equal qualifications. The advertising chair of civil law as well as the University of Bayreuth are interested in increasing the quota of women; therefore, we strongly encourage female candidates to apply.

Please send your application with the usual documents (especially CV, Abitur certificate, transcript of records, State Examination certificate(s) via email (preferably in a pdf file) to Ms. Birgit Müller, chair of civil law III at the Faculty of Law and economics, University of Bayreuth, 95440 Bayreuth, Tel.: +49 (0)921 – 55-6071, E-Mail: ze3.sekretariat@uni-bayreuth.de.

Marshall Islands: A Pacific island-country joins the HCCH Service Convention (updated)

On 31 July 2020, the Depositary (i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) notified that the Marshall Islands acceded to the HCCH Service Convention. A six-month period for filing objections has been set to run from the date of the Depositary’s notification until 31 January 2021. In the absence of any objection from an already ratifying State, the Convention will enter into force for the Marshall Islands on 1 February 2021.

So far the Marshall Islands has made no declarations under the treaty (think for example of Articles 8, 10, 15 and 16). Nor has it designated Central Authority. While this can be done at a later date, it is undoubtedly of great importance that the designation of Central Authority be made as soon as possible for the treaty to operate smoothly and avoid potential objections, even if this is only a theoretical possibility as the objection-mechanism has never been used in practice.*

In the Pacific region, there are a few other States already a party to the Service Convention, such as the Philippines (date of entry into force: 1 October 2020!), Japan and Australia.

The HCCH news item is available here.

* On 4 August 2020, the Marshall Islands diligently informed the Depositary of its declarations under Articles 8, 10(a), 15 and 16 of the Service Convention. It also made a declaration concerning the language of the documents to be served under Article 5 of the Service Convention, and although this declaration is not contemplated explicitly in this treaty, it is a very common declaration to file. Importantly, it also designated the Republic of the Marshall Islands Attorney-General as the Central Authority. See here (notification of 7 August 2020).

Nagy on collective actions in EU

Recently published paper The Reception of Collective Actions in Europe: Reconstructing the Mental Process of a Legal Transplantation, authored by Csongor István Nagy, Professor at the University of Szeged, is a must read for those studying collective actions in EU. It is intended to identify the differentia specifica of the European collective actions as opposed to those in US, which in itself is not an easy task as there are various models in different Member States. However, the paper elegantly navigates these waters and offers a firm grasp of the history and present state on this increasingly important topic on this side of the Atlantic (you may track the EU developments at the legislative train site). For the rest, you need to read the paper…

It is published in Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2020, No. 2, pp. 413-443 (2020), and also available at SSRN.

New text: The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand

Readers of this blog may be interested to hear of a new textbook on private international law, recently published by LexisNexis. The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand is the first comprehensive treatment of the subject from a New Zealand perspective. Drawing on principles developed in common law countries while adopting a comparative perspective, it explains how New Zealand law has developed into an indigenous body of rules to deal with problems of jurisdiction, choice of law, recognition of judgments and international civil procedure. The textbook may be of interest to scholars and academics outside New Zealand who are looking for a comparative treatment of problems in modern private international law, as well as any lawyers who find themselves interacting with New Zealand law in practice.

The first part of the book covers the four distinct functions of the conflict of laws: adjudicatory jurisdiction (including personal and subject-matter jurisdiction), choice of law, recognition and enforcement of judgments, and international civil procedure. The second part of the book addresses the conflict of laws rules as they relate to the main subject areas of private law, including obligations, property and trusts, succession, family law and corporations and insolvency

Political Agreement on the Reform of the Evidence and the Service Regulation

After years of discussion the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament have finally reached agreement on the reform of the Evidence and the Service Regulation. The new rules aim to improve the cross-border taking of evidence as well as the cross-border service of documents in particular through an enhanced use of information technology (notably electronic communication and videoconferencing).

The European Parliament’s official press release is available here. For a more detailed coverage see the contributions on the International Litigation Blog and the EAPIL Blog. 

CJEU on the deceased’s habitual residence

Written by Vito Bumbaca, University of Geneva

On 16 July the CJEU issued its preliminary ruling in case E.E. & K.-D. E. (CJEU, C-80/19, ECLI:EU:C:2020:569, not yet available in English). The case concerned, inter alia, the assessment of the deceased’s habitual residence under the EU Succession Regulation No. 650/2012. Given the novelty of the ruling, which represents the very first CJEU assessment of the deceased’s habitual residence under the EU Succession Regulation, we will focus on this particular aspect only.

Facts:

A Lithuanian mother and her son moved to Germany to live with the mother’s husband. Prior to her death in Germany, she drew up a testament in Lithuania, naming her son as her sole heir. The mother owned an apartment in Lithuania and when she died (in Germany), her son approached a notary in Lithuania concerning the apartment and in order to obtain a Certificate of Succession. This notary refused both requests based on their interpretation of the EU Succession Regulation according to which the deceased’s last habitual residence was in Germany at the time of death. The deceased’s son appealed against such a decision; subsequently the proceedings reached the Lithuanian Supreme Court (Lietuvos Aukš?iausiasis Teismas), which decided to stay proceedings and ask the preliminary ruling of the CJEU. The CJEU found that a person can have only one habitual residence.

Relevance:

This is the first CJEU ruling on the determination of the deceased’s habitual residence under the EU Succession Regulation.

It is  welcomed to the extent that it provides a guiding assessment of the hierarchical order and practical implementation of recitals 23, 24 and 25. These are considered as explanatory rules for the determination of international competence and applicable law in matters of EU 25 cross-border succession based on habitual residence as a primary connecting factor.

Specifically, the Court clarifies which key factors should be assessed in the determination of the deceased’s habitual residence by virtue of the above-mentioned recitals and in line with the objectives followed by the EU Succession Regulation. Furthermore, it confirms that, when assessing the deceased’s habitual residence at the time of death, a lengthy determination of the deceased’s life circumstances preceding his/her death should be made. Lastly, it leaves unresolved the factual assessment of the manifestly closest connection criterion applicable on an exceptional basis.

Brief analysis:

According to the Court, the deceased cannot simultaneously have more than one habitual residence at the time of death (§ 41). This however does not exclude the possibility of acquiring an alternative and consecutive habitual residence at different points in time during the deceased’s life. The Court indicated that by virtue of recital 23 the main element in determining the deceased’s habitual residence is the stability of his/ her stay, and therefore of his/ her physical presence, at the time of death (§ 38). In the absence of stability, therefore on a subsidiary basis (§ 39), recital 24 advises national authorities, in some circumstances including notaries (§ 46), to refer to the deceased’s nationality (personal factor) and/ or assets (economic factor). Finally, the criterion relating to the “manifestly closest connection” in relation to the determination of applicable law will have to be applied in a strict manner and not subsidiary to the complex determination of habitual residence, in accordance with the principles of predictability and legal certainty as provided for by the EU Regulation (§ 37). The exceptional use of the “manifestly closest connection” criterion, however, is left to the judicial discretion of the first seised national courts (§ 45).

Ultimately, according to the Court’s reasoning, which follows the Advocate General’s Opinion of 26 March 2020 (§ 52), the element of stability relating to the deceased’s physical presence at the time of death must be sought in the reasons (subjective element) and the conditions (objective element) of his/ her stay showing a close and stable link between the succession and the given State, in line with the objectives of the EU Succession Regulation (§ 37). The assessment of both objective and subjective elements, and generally of habitual residence, should consider the deceased’s life circumstances at the time of death and the years preceding his/ her death (§ 23). Such a “lengthy” determination of the deceased’s life assessment leaves the debate open as to its pertinence in an increasingly globalised society within which cross-border settlements regularly occur, in particular when involving expats holding multiple nationalities and various assets in different countries.

Lastly, the Court has made clear that the habitual residence assessment must be twofold in matters of competence and threefold in relation to applicable law. With regard to competence, according to the Advocate General, the Court first seised will have to look primarily at the duration and regularity of the deceased’s settlement and subsidiarily at his/ her nationality and/ or assets. In relation to the deceased’s settlement, the Advocate General clarified that duration (time factor) cannot be considered, in itself, a decisive element and that it should be accompanied by other relevant factors such as the deceased’s family and social integration, or his/ her proximity to the State in question (Advocate General’s Opinion, § 54). Furthermore, the Advocate General confirmed that, in line with recital 24, the contexts typically falling under the subsidiary assessment of the deceased’s nationality and/ or assets are: (i) the scenario involving expats; and (ii) that involving a “peripatetic” cross-border movement and life not allowing the establishing of stable connection (Advocate General’s Opinion, § 55-57).

In relation to applicable law, the Court first seised should consider, as a last resort when none of the above elements can be traced, specific factors indicating a situation falling under “manifestly closest connection”. According to the EU Succession Regulation, and confirmed by the Advocate General (§ 25 of the Opinion), a typical situation falling under “manifestly closest connection” is when the deceased moved to his/ her new habitual residence fairly recently before his/ her death. Nonetheless, the Court has not yet identified any specific elements for the determination of the exceptional “manifestly closest connection” criterion (§ 59).

 

Soft launch of the Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

In January 2018, we reported on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Asia, a publication by the Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI).

The sequel to this publication, the Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, will shortly be released by ABLI. This is a more ambitious piece of work which seeks to set out the principles which are common to the countries within the scope of the ABLI Foreign Judgments Project (namely the 10 ASEAN Member States and Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea). There are 13 principles in total and each principle is accompanied by a commentary which fleshes out how the various countries apply each principle.  Among other things, the principles cover the rules on international (or ‘indirect’) jurisdiction, reciprocity, the enforcement of non-money judgments, public policy, due process and inconsistent judgments. A detailed write-up on the project and principles can be found at Adeline Chong, ‘Moving towards harmonisation in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment rules in Asia’ (2020) 16 Journal of Private International Law 31-68 (https://doi.org/10.1080/17441048.2020.1744256).

ABLI has kindly offered to ‘soft-release’ the 13 principles which form the subject-matter of the 13 chapters of the Asian Principles to readers of conflictsoflaws.net. The 13 principles are set out below.

The Asian Principles will be released in eBook and hardcopy formats. Further details are available here.

Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

Principle 1

As a general proposition and subject to these Principles, a foreign judgment in a commercial matter is entitled to recognition and enforcement.

Principle 2

A foreign judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if the court of origin has international jurisdiction to render that judgment.

The typical grounds on which a court is considered to have international jurisdiction include:

(a) where the judgment debtor was present, resident or domiciled in the country of the court of origin;

(b) where the judgment debtor, being a corporation, had its principal place of business in the country of the court of origin;

(c) where the judgment debtor submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of origin by invoking its jurisdiction or by arguing the merits of the case against it; and

(d) where the judgment debtor submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of origin by way of a choice of court agreement for the court of origin.

Principle 3

A foreign judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if it is final.

Principle 4

The court addressed must not review the merits of a foreign judgment, except to the extent necessary for the application of these Principles.

A foreign judgment may not normally be challenged on the ground that it contains an error of fact or law, or both.

Principle 5

A foreign judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if there is reciprocity between the country of the court addressed and the country of the court of origin.

Principle 6

Monetary judgments that are not for a sum payable in respect of a foreign penal, revenue or other public law are enforceable.

Principle 7

Non-monetary judgments that are not preliminary or provisional in nature may be enforced.

Principle 8

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if the judgment was obtained by fraud.

Principle 9

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if to do so would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the country of the court addressed.

Principle 10

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if there was a lack of due process in the proceedings before the court of origin.

Principle 11

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if it is inconsistent with a judgment in a dispute between the same parties that is given by the court addressed.

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if it is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given by a court of another country between the same parties and on the same subject matter, provided the earlier judgment fulfils the requirements for recognition.

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused on the ground that proceedings between the same parties and on the same subject matter are pending before the court addressed if the court addressed was seized of the matter before the court of origin.

Principle 12

A foreign judgment that has as its object a right in rem in immovable or movable property is eligible for recognition and enforcement.

Principle 13

A foreign judgment that is objectionable in part may be severed and the unobjectionable part recognised and enforced.

postdoc position at the Max Planck Institute

under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Ralf Michaels in a full-time or part-time capacity.

More info here