A recently published and very interesting case note by Jens Adolphsen (Gießen) deals critically with the two recent and much discussed ECJ decisions on patent litigation – "GAT" and "Roche" – by arguing both decisions illustrated that effective infringement proceedings in intellectual property matters are not possible on the basis of the Brussels I Regulation.
Adolphsen starts his annotation by an analysis of the ECJ's reasoning in "GAT". Here the ECJ has held that,
[a]rticle 16 (4) of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters […] is to be interpreted as meaning that the rule of exclusive jurisdiction laid down therein concerns all proceedings relating to the registration or validity of a patent, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection.
This leads to the result that the continuation of infringement actions with an indirect examination of the validity of the patent is inadmissible since this "would undermine the binding nature of the rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 16 (4) of the Convention". (ECJ, para. 26).
This approach is criticised by Adolphsen – who favours a restrictive interpretation of Art. 16 (4) Brussels Convention – for obstructing an effective protection by patent.
Secondly, Adolphsen attends to the "Roche" decision where the ECJ has held that,
[a]rticle 6 (1) of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [..] must be interpreted as meaning that it does not apply in European patent infringement proceedings involving a number of companies established in various Contracting States in respect of acts committed in one or more of those States even where those companies, which belong to the same group, may have acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with a common policy elaborated by one of them.
Adolphsen agrees with the ECJ regarding the first question referred for a preliminary ruling. Here, the ECJ has held that,
[…] in the case of European patent infringement proceedings involving a number of companies established in various Contracting States in respect of acts committed in one or more of those States, the existence of the same situation of fact cannot be inferred, since the defendants are different and the infringements they are accused of, committed in different Contracting States, are not the same.
Adolphsen points out that the negation of a connection in this context makes allowance for the fact that national patents of a European patent are subject only to the national law of the State they have been granted for.
However, Adophsen criticises the point of view adopted by the ECJ with regard to the second question. Here the ECJ declined a connection even if companies are involved which belong to the same group and have acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with a common policy elaborated by one of them.
The ECJ laid – according to the author – too much weight on the existence of the same situation of fact and law and adopted therefore an approach far too formalistic.
This criticism leads Adolphsen to questioning fundamentally whether it was appropriate to transfer the meaning of "closely connected" – which has now been incorporated into Art. 6 (1) and Art. 28 (3) Brussels I Regulation – from Art. 22 (3) to Art. 6 (1) Brussels Convention since both provisions are based on different considerations and goals.
The full annotation can be found in IPRax 2006, 15 et seq.