On December 2, 2013, the case of BG Group v. Argentina was argued at the Supreme Court. As the argument neared its end, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy quipped to Argentina’s counsel: “Your – your whole argument gives me intellectual whiplash.” Last Wednesday, when the Court released its decisions in BG Group and Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, the same might be said back to the Court. I’m not the first commentator to feel this way. Lozano concerned the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of Child Abduction, which in essence says that if one parent unilaterally takes their child to another country, and the child is found within a year, the child must be automatically returned home. Otherwise, a court must consider the best interests of the child, who may have developed ties in the new country. But what to make of the clandestine parent and a child whose location could not be discovered for 16 months? Is there a principle of “equitable tolling” under the Convention, according to which the one-year period should only begin after the child’s location can be ascertained? This is certainly a familiar doctrine under U.S. law—equity tolls statutory limitations periods all the time. So as not to reward a clandestine parent, the father in the Lozano case wanted the same principle applied to his case. The Supreme Court refused this request. The Convention, they said, was not a federal statute—it was a “contract between . . . nations”—so it would be “particularly inappropriate to deploy this background principle of American law” when interpreting it. Interpreting the Convention to preclude equitable tolling is more consistent with its text; if the drafters of the Convention had wanted the one-year period to start when the left-behind parent actually discovered where the child was, they could have easily said so. Because they didn't, the uniquely common law notion of equitable tolling could not justify the father’s suit for automatic return. The notion of a treaty as a contract pervaded the BG Group decision, too. On their face, the two cases had some similarities. Both involved UK parties with rights under an international treaty. The similarities, however, ended there. Lonzano was a father seeking the return of his foreign-domiciled daughter. BG Group was a British multinational oil and gas company who had invested in an Argentine gas distribution company, and whose investment was harmed by Argentine emergency legislation. BG Group filed a Notice of Arbitration against Argentina under the UK-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”), and sited the arbitration in the United States under the UNCITRAL Rules. But Article 8(2) of the BIT provides that disputes under the Treaty between an investor and Argentina must first be submitted to a competent court in the sovereign state where the investment was made. Subsequently, the dispute can go to international arbitration at one party’s request only if (1) a period of eighteen months has elapsed since the dispute was presented to the court and no decision has been made; or (2) a final decision was made by the court, but the parties still disagree. Argentina opposed jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal because the dispute had not been submitted to Argentine courts at all. BG Group argued that waiting to meet the requirements of Article 8(2) of the BIT would have been futile. The arbitral tribunal determined that they had jurisdiction because Argentina had enacted laws hindering judicial recourse for foreign investors, and ultimately issued an award on the merits in favor of BG Group. Both parties filed petitions for review in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which deferred to the arbitrators and upheld the arbitration award. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, overturned that decision. It found that the arbitral tribunal did not have jurisdiction because BG Group had not complied with the local litigation requirements of Article 8(2) of the BIT. As a result, it set aside the award. The Supreme Court was asked to decide the question that had split the inferior U.S. Courts, namely: “whether a court of the United States, in reviewing an arbitration award made under the Treaty, should interpret and apply the local litigation requirement de novo, or with the deference that courts ordinarily owe arbitration decisions.” Now here comes the “intellectual whiplash.” A majority of the Supreme Court “treat[ed] the [treaty] before us as if it were an ordinary contract between private parties.” In doing so, Justice Breyer—citing the Court’s domestic, commercial arbitration jurisprudence—found that the local litigation requirement was a procedural condition precedent to arbitration, which determined “when the contractual duty to arbitrate arises, not whether there is a contractual duty to arbitration at all.” Thus, as a procedural precondition rather than a substantive bar to arbitrability, Breyer found that, “courts presume that the parties intend arbitrators, not courts, to decide disputes about [the local litigation requirement’s] meaning and application.” The Court found nothing in Article 8 of the BIT to overcome this presumption, and thus saw “no reason to abandon or increase the complexity of [its] ordinary intent-determining framework” for contractual arbitration clauses. (Of course, it remains an open question of what the Court would do if the Treaty were more express on the obligatory nature of the local litigation provision). Under a deferential review of the arbitrators’ decision, the award was allowed to stand. The dissent, authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justice Kennedy, harkened back to Lozano and took issue with the majority’s decision to consider the BIT as an ordinary contract between private parties. In their view, when looking at the BIT as an act of state between co-equal sovereigns, with all deference that comes with that conclusion, the local litigation requirement can only be viewed as a textual precondition to the formation of an agreement to arbitrate against the state. “By focusing first on private contracts, the majority “start[s] down the wrong road” and “ends up at the wrong place,” the dissent noted. “It is no trifling matter for a sovereign nation to subject itself to suit by private parties,” the Chief Justice said; “we do not presume that any country-including our own-takes that step lightly.” Thus, without having submitted to the local courts before it initiated arbitration, the dissent would have held that BG Group had no agreement to arbitrate against Argentina. In some contexts, sovereign consent to convene an arbitration deserves a special place in the law. At least one federal judge has said that the federal policy in favor of arbitration carries special force when the agreement to arbitrate is contained in a treaty as opposed to a private contract. And take, for example, the recurring situation where parties use the U.S. courts to seek evidence by way of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for use in international arbitration proceedings. Where that arbitration is convened by treaty and not by contract, U.S. courts will more readily lend their assistance. On its face, the BG Group decision runs counter to the idea that U.S. courts will treat investment treaty arbitration with greater deference than commercial arbitration. On the other hand, however, upholding the award furthers the above jurisprudence, the Supreme Court’s recent string of pro-arbitration rulings, as well as the “basic objective of . . . investment treat[ies].” But “intellectual whiplash” still occurs when we consider that, in Lonzano, the Court was unwilling to “rewrite the treaty” in order to “advance its objectives.”
The University of Missouri is issuing a call for proposals for an upcoming works-in-progress conference as well as a call for papers for a student writing competition. Both of these calls are affiliated with a symposium that is being convened at the University of Missouri's Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution on Friday, October 10, 2014. The symposium is entitled "Judicial Education and the Art of Judging: From Myth to Methodology" and addresses a number of issues relating to the role of judges and the goals and methods of judicial education. The symposium features the Honorable Duane Benton of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit as keynote speaker as well as an accomplished group of judges, academics, and judicial education experts from the United States and Canada as panelists. The day before the symposium (Thursday, October 9, 2014), the University of Missouri will be hosting an international works-in-progress conference relating to the subject matter of the symposium, broadly interpreted. Presentation proposals should be no more than one page in length and can include analyses that are practical, theoretical or interdisciplinary in nature. Participants can discuss judges at the state, federal or international level, and applications from outside the United States are particularly welcomed. Proposals for the works-in-progress conference should be directed to Professor S.I. Strong (email@example.com) and will be accepted until May 26, 2014. Decisions regarding accepted papers will be made in June 2014. Prospective attendees should note that there is no funding available to assist participants with their travel expenses. The University of Missouri is also organizing an international student writing competition in association with the symposium. Papers will likely be due in August 2014, although precise details (such as the due date and the amount of any prize money associated with the competition) are still being finalized. More information about the symposium, works-in-progress conference and student writing competition is available at the symposium website, located here. People may also contact Professor S.I. Strong (firstname.lastname@example.org) with any questions. Please feel free to distribute this information to anyone you believe might be interested in the symposium, works-in-progress conference or writing competition. You are also welcome to cross-post this information on any blogs.
Edited by Jean E. Kalicki and Anna Joubin-Bret, this TDM special issue has close to 70 papers making it the largest TDM Special Issue to date. The interest in this topic, and the breadth of proposals offered by our contributors, demonstrates both the importance of holding this dialogue and the creativity of astute users and observers of the present system. It should be of interest to all international disputes lawyers. This Special Issue is particularly timely in light of the European Union public consultation on investor-state dispute settlement and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership just begun by EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht. The Table of Contents is available here.
We’ve discussed on this site in the past the various nuances and pervasive disagreements among the U.S. federal courts regarding the scope of discovery in aid of foreign tribunals under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. The longest-running dispute is whether that statute can be used in aid of arbitral tribunals, and the scholarship on this question is rich. (See here, and here.). Another disagreement, however, just won’t go away, but hasn't garnered nearly as much public attention: that is, whether the statute can reach documents held outside the United States. Before the holidays, the Southern District of New York decided In re Application of Kreke Immobilien KG (S.D.N.Y. 2013), a case brought in U.S. court under § 1782 to obtain documents from Deutsche Bank for use in a German litigation. Deutsche Bank argued that the court had to deny the application because the documents in question were not kept in the United States. To be sure, the statute does not impose such a limitation, but citing Judge Rakoff’s decision in In re Godfrey, 526 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), Judge Buchwald held that the statute does indeed bar extraterritorial discovery. She therefore denied the application. Judge Rakoff decided five years ago that the Supreme Court in Intel “implicitly assumed that evidence discoverable under § 1782(a) would be located in the United States.” But the evidence of that implicit assumption is merely dictum: “nonparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the foreign tribunal’s jurisdictional reach; hence, their evidence, available in the United States, may be unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid.” (emphasis added). “Available in the United States,” however, could mean simply that the evidence is obtainable via legal process in the United States; it need not mean that the evidence is physically located in the United States. And this seems the better reading given the metaphysical problem of determining exactly where a document is “located.” I’m not the only one to espouse that view; Ted Folkman’s recent post on the Kreke Immobilien decision seems to agree. As Judge Buchwald noted, the federal courts are deeply split on this issue. Some courts have followed Judge Rakoff’s decision in Godfrey and read § 1782 narrowly. See, e.g., In re Sarrio S.A., No. 9-372, 1995 WL 598988 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1995); In re Microsoft Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194, fn. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Chubb Ins. Co. of Can., 384 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2005). Other courts, however, read the statute more naturally, and hold that a court’s power under § 1782 is coextensive with the Federal Rules. Indeed, this is what the penultimate sentence of § 1782(a) says (stating that discovery should generally proceed “in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). Under those Rules, a person under subpoena in the United States can be compelled to produce all documents within his “possession, custody or control,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii), “even if the documents are located abroad,” Tequila Centinela, S.A. de C.V. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 242 F.R.D. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2007) (emphasis added); see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). On this basis, a number of federal courts in recent years have ordered Section 1782 discovery of documents located outside the United States when the person is found there. See, e.g, In re Eli Lilly & Co., No. 3:09MC296 (AWT), 2010 WL 2509133, at *4 (D. Conn. June 15, 2010); In re Gemeinshcaftspraxis Dr. Med. Schottdorf, No. Civ. M19-88 (BSJ), 2006 WL 3844464, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2006); In re Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 n.3 (D. Minn. 2007); In re Minatec Fin. S.À.R.L., No. 1:08-CV-269 (LEK/RFT), 2008 WL 3884374, at *4 n.8 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2008). Even courts who have come down between this split of authority have still applied Section 1782 and Rule 45 to reach electronically stored information accessible from within this District. In In re Veiga II, 746 F. Supp. 2d 8, 25 (D.D.C. 2010), Judge Kollar-Kotelly (who also decided Norex five years earlier) outlined the “split of authority” on the geographic scope of Section 1782; “assum[ed] there is no absolute bar to the discovery of documents located outside the United States”; but nevertheless “exercise[d] [her] discretion to decline to order the production of [physical] documents abroad.” When she did so, however, she still required the Respondent to produce all materials “located within the United States, a category that includes electronically stored information accessible from within this District.” Id. at 26 (emphasis added). Decisions like this prudently avoid the metaphysical question of where electronic materials are “located,” and still give effect to the complementary reach of Rule 45 and Section 1782. Ultimately, this may be a question for the Supreme Court; but until then, it illustrates the sometimes-difficult intersection of judicial restraint and liberal statutory intent when it comes to extraterritorial issues.
Dean Symeon C. Symeonides (Willamette University – College of Law) has posted Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2013: Twenty-Seventh Annual Survey on SSRN. It is, as usual, to be published in the American Journal of Comparative Law. Here is the abstract:
This is the Twenty-Seventh Annual Survey of American choice-of-law cases. It is written at the request of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws and is intended as a service to fellow teachers of conflicts law, both in and outside the United States. Its purpose remains the same as it has been from the beginning: to inform, rather than to advocate. This Survey covers cases decided by American state and federal appellate courts from January 1 to December 31, 2013, and posted on Westlaw by midnight, December 31, 2013. Of the 1,354 cases that meet these parameters, the Survey focuses on those cases that may contribute something new to the development or understanding of conflicts law—and, particularly, choice of law. This Survey is longer than the Surveys of any of the previous 26 years because 2013 produced more, and more noteworthy, cases than any of the previous years. The following are some of the highlights: * Five decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court holding, respectively, that: (1) The Alien Tort Statute does not apply to conduct and injury occurring entirely in another country; (2) Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines “marriage” for federal law purposes so as to exclude same-sex relationships, is unconstitutional; (3) The Federal Arbitration Act trumps the provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act; (4) The “first sale” doctrine as codified in the Copyright Act applies to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made abroad and first sold abroad; and (5) The National Voter Registration Act preempts an Arizona law that sets more stringent standard for proof of citizenship when registering to vote. * A sixth Supreme Court decision explaining the methodology that federal courts should use when evaluating venue challenges in cases involving choice-of-forum clauses. * Two federal appellate decisions involving piracy off the Somali coast, and several decisions involving the extraterritorial reach of federal statutes in civil and criminal cases. * Several state court decisions striving to protect consumers, employees, and other weak parties through the few cracks left by the Supreme Court’s decisions on arbitration and choice-of-forum clauses. * An assortment of interesting cases involving products liability, other cross-border torts, economic torts, and other tort conflicts. * A case holding that enforcement of a Japanese tort judgment against a California Church is not “state action” triggering constitutional scrutiny under the Constitution’s Free Exercise clause, and is not repugnant to the public policy. * A case holding that one state’s dismissal of an action on statute of limitation grounds is a dismissal “on the merits,” barring a second action on the same claim in another state. * A case defining “habitual residence” and “wrongful” removal or retention of a child under the Hague Convention on Child Abduction.
The American Society of International Law is currently accepting submissions for this year’s Private International Law prize. The prize is given annually for the best text on private international law written by a young scholar. Essays, articles, and books are welcome, and can address any topic of private international law, can be of any length, and may be published or unpublished, but not published prior to 2013. Submitted essays should be in the English language. Competitors may be citizens of any nation but must be 35 years old or younger on December 31, 2013. They need not be members of ASIL. This year, the prize will consist of a $500 stipend to participate in the 2014 or 2015 ASIL Annual Conference, and one year’s membership to ASIL. The prize will be awarded by the Private International Law Interest Group based upon the recommendation of a Prize Committee. Decisions of the Prize Committee on the winning essay and on any conditions relating to this prize are final. Submissions to the Prize Committee must be received by March 15, 2014. Entries should be submitted by email in Word or pdf format. They should contain two different documents: a) the essay itself, without any identifying information other than the title; and b) a second document containing the title of the entry and the author’s name, affiliation, and contact details. Submissions and any queries should be addressed by email to Private International Law Interest Group Co-Chairs Rahim Moloo (email@example.com) and Ralf Michaels (firstname.lastname@example.org). All submissions will be acknowledged by e-mail.
TDM has published its special anniversary issue. According to the Editorial by Mark Kantor, and especially relevant to readers of this site, "the TDM community has not limited itself to investment treaty disputes. Instead, we have promoted discussion of international commercial arbitration, litigation over international issues in national courts, mediation of cross-border disputes, administrative law in national and international tribunals, labor and environmental disputes, the overlap between human rights law and tribunals and investments, the overlap between WTO dispute resolution and investments, administrative law and international matters, treaty making and treaty unmaking, and so many other methods for transnational dispute management." With articles from leading authorities on timely topics of regional and substantive interest, the anniversary issue is no different.
In the United States at least, judicial decisions deferring competence to arbitrators seem to be on the rise—if not in number, at least in profile. International Arbitration is no exception. Last week, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that both the 1976 and 2010 versions of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules authorize the arbitral panel to determine its own jurisdiction and arbitrability. In Oracle America, Inc. v. Myriad Group, A.G. (9th Circ. Docket No. 11-17186, July 26, 2013), the Court of Appeals concluded that “incorporation of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules into an arbitration provision in a commercial contract constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties to the contract intended to delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.” The complete facts of the case including the parties’ arbitration clause is set out in the text of the judicial decision. In brief, Oracle and Myriad signed a Source License agreement which provided that “[a]ny dispute arising out of or relating to this License shall be finally settled by arbitration [before the AAA and under the UNCITRAL rules],” with certain specified exclusions. When a dispute developed between the parties, Oracle filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and sought an injunction preventing Myriad, a Swiss company, from proceeding with arbitration. Myriad responded with a motion to compel arbitration. The District Court granted the injunction and denied the motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the incorporation of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules did not constitute clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The district court reasoned that the relevant provision of the 2010 UNCITRAL rules states only that the arbitrator has authority, but not exclusive authority, to decide its own jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit rejected that holding. First, the appellate panel resolved a threshold dispute as to whether the 1976 or 2010 versions of the UNCITRAL Rules applied, and ultimately held that there was no substantive difference between the two versions in this regard. With this said, the real issue was whether the incorporation of the UNCITRAL Rules “constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to arbitrate arbitrability.” The Ninth Circuit followed the DC Circuit and the Second Circuit and answered in the affirmative. Indeed, “[v]rtually every circuit to have considered the issue has determined that incorporation of the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. *** The AAA rules contain a jurisdictional provision similar to Article 21(1) of the 1976 UNCITRAL rules and almost identical to Article 23(1) of the 2010 UNCITRAL rules.” This decision (and those it relies on) may form the international component of a nationwide trend for federal courts to fall in line with the U.S. Supreme Court’s “pro-arbitration campaign.” Naturally, though, we must juxtapose this decision with BG Group v. Republic of Argentina, which the Supreme Court will hear and decide in its upcoming term (indeed, the D.C. Circuit case favorably cited by the Ninth Circuit in Oracle was the decision under review in BG Group!). BG Group involves an investment treaty arbitration conducted in the UNCITRAL rules between a British company and Argentina. The tribunal had held that it had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, notwithstanding BG Group’s failure to proceed first in Argentina’s own courts which the treaty required as a prerequisite to arbitration. While the tribunal would surely have power to decide on arbitrability challenges after the agreement to arbitrate became effective (at least in the Ninth, Second and D.C. Circuits), what about decisions on threshold contract defenses before the agreement to arbitrate is even triggered? The district court confirmed the award, holding that the arbitrators had power to decide such questions, but the DC Circuit reversed. As the parties and amici begin to file their briefs before the Court, the how far the “pro-arbitration” policies of the FAA and the New York Convention extend is very much in play.
Investor-State Arbitration has become a salient feature of international dispute settlement, but its continued vitality is not beyond reproach. I myself have waded into the debate with an article published this month in the ICSID Review. Furthering this dialogue, TDM is pleased to announce a forthcoming TDM special issue: "Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of A Roadmap." Co-edited by Jean E. Kalicki (Arnold & Porter LLP and Georgetown University Law Center) and Anna Joubin-Bret (Cabinet Joubin-Bret and World Trade Institute), this special issue will explore recent calls for reform of the investor-State dispute settlement system, along with the viability of five "reform paths" recently proposed for discussion by UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (see UNCTAD IIA Issues Note, "Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap," 29-30 May 2013). You can find an extensive call for papers on the TDM website. Publication is expected in October or November 2013. Proposals for papers (e.g., abstracts) should be submitted to the editors by 15 September 2013. Contact info is available on the TDM website.
The latest issue of TDM is now available. This special issue on Corruption and Arbitration analyzes new trends and challenges regarding the intersection between allegations of corruption and decisions by arbitral tribunals regarding jurisdiction, admissibility and the merits of commercial and investment disputes. As any transnational practitioners will know, allegations of corruption abroad pervade both arbitral and litigation practices--whether its affirmative claims of corruption before investor-state tribunals, or the enforcement of foreign judgments before national courts. This issue is an important contribution to the field. The articles included in this issue are: * Nailing Corruption: Thoughts for a Gardener - A Comment on World Duty Free Company Ltd v The Republic of Kenya by S. Nappert, 3 Verulam Buildings * Proving Corruption in International Arbitration: A Balanced Standard for the Real World by C. Partasides, Freshfields * Corruption in International Arbitration and Problems with Standard of Proof: Baseless Allegations or Prima Facie Evidence? by S. Wilske, Gleiss Lutz Rechtsanw?lte T.J. Fox, Gleiss Lutz Rechtsanw?lte * Random Reflections on the Bar, Corruption and the Practice of Law by F.P. Feliciano, SyCip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan (SyCipLaw) * Fraud and Corruption in International Arbitration by C.B. Lamm, White & Case LLP H.T. Pham, White & Case LLP R. Moloo, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP * Unlawful or Bad Faith Conduct as a Bar to Claims in Investment Arbitration by A. Cohen Smutny, White & Case LLP P. Polášek, White & Case LLP * Suspicion of Corruption in Arbitration: A German Perspective by M.S. Rieder, Shearman & Sterling A. Schoenemann, Shearman & Sterling * The Potential for Arbitrators to Refer Suspicions of Corruption to Domestic Authorities by K.S. Gans, DLA Piper LLP D.M. Bigge, US Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor * The Courses of Action Available to International Arbitrators to Address Issues of Bribery and Corruption by A. Crivellaro, Bonelli Erede Pappalardo * Enforcing Anti-Corruption Measures Through International Investment Arbitration by S. Kulkarni * State Responsibility for Corruption: The Attribution Asymmetry in International Investment Arbitration by A.P. Llamzon, Permanent Court of Arbitration * The Legal Consequences of Investor Corruption in Investor-State Disputes: How Should the System Proceed? by T. Sinlapapiromsuk, Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University * The Judicial Scrutiny of Arbitral Awards in Setting Aside and Enforcement Proceedings Involving Issues of Corruption by M. Hwang, Michael Hwang S.C. K. Lim, Michael Hwang Chambers * West Africa: The Actions of the OHADA Arbitral Tribunal in the Face of Corruption by C.N. Nana, London Metropolitan University * Host-State Counterclaims: A Remedy for Fraud or Corruption in Investment-Treaty Arbitration? by S. Dudas, Leaua & Asociatii N. Tsolakidis, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University * Commercial Arbitration and Corrupt Practices: Should Arbitrators Be Bound By A Duty to Report Corrupt Practices? by S. Nadeau-Séguin, Baker Botts LLP * On the Divide Between Investor-State Arbitration and the Global Fight Against Corruption by D. Litwin, McGill University, Faculty of Law * International Commercial Arbitration and Corruption: The Role and Duties of the Arbitrator by C.A.S. Nasarre, McGill University, Faculty of Law * Legal Consequences of Corruption in International Investment Arbitration: An Old Challenge With New Answers by R.H. Kreindler, Shearman & Sterling LLP